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Abstract	
Drawing	 on	 a	 theory	 of	 non-transition	 from	 communist	 rule,	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	 argue	
that	 in	 the	period	2006-2014	Cuba	experienced	a	 change	 from	a	 charismatic	post-
totalitarian	 regime	 to	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	one.	The	basic	argument	behind	
these	 concepts	 is	 that	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 charisma	 of	 Fidel	 Castro	 as	 a	 source	 of	
legitimacy	–	he	stepped	down	in	2006	–	has	pushed	forward	economic	performance	
as	a	compensatory	source,	which	explains	the	market	reforms	of	Raúl	Castro.	
Thus,	 I	 demonstrate	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	 the	Cuban	 regime	during	 the	presidency	of	
Raúl	Castro	has	experienced	a	‘double	political	shift’	at	the	levels	of	 leadership	and	
ideology.	On	the	one	hand,	 I	claim	that	the	charismatic	character	of	the	 leadership	
has	been	replaced	by	a	collegial	arrangement.	On	the	other,	I	hold	that	the	model	of	
centrally	 planned	 economy	 (CPE)	 has	 been	 replaced	 by	 market-socialist	 ideology.	
After	 substantiating	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 leadership’s	 and	 ideological	 change,	 I	
discuss	the	relationship	between	them	as	part	of	a	re-equilibration	of	legitimacy.	
The	 peculiarity	 of	 the	 Cuban	 case	 is	 that	 socialist	 ideology	 is	 still	 central	 to	 Raúl	
Castro’s	 claims	 to	 legitimacy.	 Therefore,	 the	 new	 role	 of	 the	 market	 has	 been	
inscribed	within	 an	non-capitalist	 framework,	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	official	 advocacy	
for	a	“prosperous	and	sustainable	socialism”	–	i.e.	a	form	of	market	socialism	that,	in	
contrast	to	cases	such	as	China	and	Vietnam,	have	not	yet	restored	capitalism.	
Keywords:	Cuba,	regime,	leadership,	ideology,	legitimacy,	post-totalitarianism.	
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1.	Introduction	
This	study	investigates	the	most	salient	changes	in	the	Cuban	political	system	since	
2006,	when	Raúl	Castro	assumed	the	de	facto	presidency	of	the	 island.	Since	then,	
Cuba	has	experienced	sweeping	reforms	depicted	by	Raúl	Castro	as	an	“updating”	of	
the	 socialist	 model.	 Changes	 have	 included	 an	 overhaul	 of	 the	 public	 sector	
employment	 system,	 a	 vast	 increase	 in	 the	 space	 for	 non-state	 actors	
(cuentapropismo	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 co-operatives),	 and	 an	 announced	
expansion	of	the	role	of	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	in	the	Cuban	economy.	
Such	 reforms	have	given	 rise	 to	wide-ranging	 reverberations	 at	 all	 levels	of	Cuban	
society,	accelerating	the	pace	of	change	on	the	island,	with	profound	implications	for	
the	 country's	 ongoing	 economic	 recovery,	 the	wellbeing	 of	 individual	 Cubans,	 the	
Revolutionary	project,	and	for	Cuba's	overall	place	in	the	world.	
Although	there	have	also	been	non-economic	changes,	like	the	introduction	of	term-
limits	 for	high-level	 functionaries	or	 the	 loosening	of	official	 restrictions	on	 foreign	
travel,	academic	debate	on	how	the	reform	process	has	affected	the	political	system	
or	‘regime’	as	a	whole	has	not	yet	fully	emerged.	Thus,	the	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	
to	contribute	to	this	nascent	discussion	by	identifying	the	main	processes	that	have	
re-shaped	 the	 regime	 in	 2006-2014.	 Hopefully,	 my	 research	 helps	 to	 grasp	 Cuba	
today	–	the	immediate	past	of	the	post-Castro	era,	expected	to	start	in	2018.	
The	 explicit	 political	 aim	 of	 this	 study	 is	 to	 challenge	 two	 influential	 ways	 of	
approaching	 contemporary	 Cuban	 politics:	 first,	 the	 view	 that	 the	 reforms	 have	
triggered	a	‘liberalisation’	that	will	(sooner	or	later)	culminate	in	‘democracy’	(López-
Levy	2011,	29-30);	second,	the	view	that	the	reforms	most	probably	lead	“toward	a	
twenty-first-century	 socialism	 consistent	 with	 the	 historical	 roots	 of	 the	 Cuban	
Revolution”	(Segrera	2011).	In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	both	accounts	fail	to	observe	
that	the	current	reform	process	is	neither	in	transit	to	democracy	nor	to	socialism.	
To	 be	 sure,	 Cuba	 today	 is	 not	 the	 tale	 of	 another	 Third	 World	 neoliberal	
transformation,	but	a	rather	peculiar	development	given	that	 this	Caribbean	 Island	
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has	 remained	 the	only	Western	 society	 still	 under	 communist	 rule.	 In	 this	 thesis,	 I	
suggest	that	Cuban	communism,	under	Raúl	Castro,	has	started	to	pursue	a	political	
path	 comparable	 to	 yet	 distinct	 from	 that	 of	 China	 and	 Vietnam.	 In	 these	 Asian	
nations	a	capitalist	economy	and	a	political	system	led	by	a	Communist	Party	have	
co-existed,	 which	 is	 a	 combination	 that	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 a	 maturing	 post-
totalitarian	 regime	 (Saxonberg	 2013).	 The	 Cuban	 case	 has	 also	 undergone	market	
reforms;	 however,	 these	 are	 different	 for	 they	 are	 still	 constrained	 by	 socialist	
parameters	–	i.e.	they	have	not	crossed	the	line	of	capitalist	restoration.	
Thus,	the	main	argument	of	this	thesis	is	that	Cuba	has	experienced	in	2006-2014	a	
transition	towards	a	political	 legitimacy	based	on	economic	performance,	which	(in	
contrast	 to	China	 and	Vietnam)	 is	 still	 hold	 in	 check	by	 socialist	 ideology.	 In	 other	
words,	the	private	property	of	the	fundamental	means	of	production	is	still	off	limits	
–	 in	 this	 sense,	 the	 adjective	 ‘fundamental’	 is	 the	 term	 of	 the	 Cuban	 constitution	
used	 to	 qualify	 the	 means	 of	 production	 under	 ‘socialist	 property’	 (República	 de	
Cuba	1992).	
In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 Introduction	 I	will	 clarify	 four	 key	 features	 of	 this	 thesis:	 1)	 the	
political	 standpoint	 and	 intention;	 2)	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 former	 and	 the	
theoretical	framework;	3)	the	summary	of	the	main	argument;	and,	4)	the	strategy	
followed	to	conduct	the	research.	Together,	these	elements	constitute	the	approach	
that	the	reader	will	find	throughout	the	rest	of	this	academic	work.	
1.1	Political	intentionality	
The	political	standpoint	that	informs	this	study	is	the	Marxist	tradition.	In	relation	to	
the	analysis	of	 Soviet-like	polities,	my	Marxist	 stance	 is	 rooted	 in	a	non-Soviet-like	
tradition.	 Paraphrasing	 an	 existing	 operationalization	 of	 ‘non-Soviet-like’,	 but	
applying	it	to	Cuba,	 I	 identify	this	thesis	with	the	Marxist	tradition	that	a)	does	not	
conform	to	the	official	Cuban	ideology,	and	b)	does	not	regard	the	social	structure	of	
Cuba	either	as	socialist,	or	as	developing	towards	socialism	(Linden	2009,	4).	
Whether	 the	endorsement	of	an	explicit	political	vantage	point	 leads	 to	a	 ‘biased’,	
non-scientific	 study	seems	not	only	a	misleading	but	also	an	outdated	question.	 In	
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this	respect,	Colin	Hay	has	explained	(vs.	positivism)	that	the	ontological	condition	of	
the	 analyst	 of	 political	 processes	 is	 an	 engaged	one.	 In	 particular,	 I	 agree	with	his	
assertion	that	“we	are,	at	best,	partisan	participant	observers;	[…]	there	is	no	neutral	
vantage-point	from	which	the	political	can	be	viewed	objectively”	(Hay	2002,	63).	As	
part	 of	 the	 reality	 we	 analysts	 try	 to	 grasp,	 “the	 ideas	we	 fashion	 of	 the	 political	
context	we	inhabit	influence	our	behaviour”	(Hay	2002,	64).	
However,	if	even	the	political	analyst	is	prey	to	the	ideas	of	the	polity	s/he	is	part	of,	
through	which	 procedure	 can	 a	well	 founded	 analysis	 be	 obtained?	 For	 Žižek,	 the	
answer	to	this	predicament	has	been	the	invocation	of	an	‘empty	space’:	
[I]t	is	possible	to	assume	a	place	that	enables	us	to	maintain	a	distance	from	[ideology],	but	
this	place	from	which	one	can	denounce	ideology	must	remain	empty,	it	cannot	be	occupied	
by	any	positively	determined	reality	–	the	moment	we	yield	to	this	temptation,	we	are	back	
in	ideology.	(Žižek	1994,	17)	
However,	the	‘empty	space’	notion	is	rather	unsatisfactory	for	it	makes	reference	to	
a	somewhat	more	ambiguous	locus	than	the	 ivory	tower:	an	ethereal	place	beyond	
space	and	time…	Žižek	himself	abandoned	this	solution	fifteen	years	later	in	a	book	
written	in	response	to	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	In	that	intervention,	instead	of	
the	‘empty	space’	notion,	he	advanced	a	partaking	stance	–	just	as	if	the	old	‘empty	
space’	had	been	‘filled’	with	political	intentionality	in	the	interim:	
What	the	book	offers	is	not	a	neutral	analysis	but	an	engaged	and	“partial”	one	–	for	truth	is	
partial,	accessible	only	when	one	takes	sides,	and	is	no	less	universal	for	this	reason.	The	side	
taken	here	is,	of	course,	that	of	communism.	(Žižek	2009a,	6)	
A	proposition	thus	arises:	instead	of	trying	to	avoid	or	eliminate	a	‘bias’	we,	analysts	
would	do	better	by	openly	acknowledging	 it.	 Such	an	approach	 is	 the	one	actually	
advocated	by	Colin	Hay	when	I	interviewed	him	about	this	problem:	
I	don’t	 think	 the	bias	can	 really	be	controlled	and	 I	 certainly	don’t	 think	 it	 can	be	avoided.		
Consequently,	rather	than	strive	to	achieve	the	impossible	–	by	devising	spurious	strategies	
or	bias	control	or	elimination	–	we	are,	I	think,	better	simply	to	acknowledge	the	bias	and	to	
write	in	such	a	way	as	to	draw	attention	to	it.		We	can	trust,	if	you	like,	the	reader	to	control	
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for	our	bias	if	we	are	good	and	reflexive	enough	to	acknowledge	it	and	to	share	it	with	them.	
(Hay	and	Centeno	2012)	
This	 said,	 the	 political	 standpoint	 or	 ‘bias’	 that	 informs	 this	 study	 is	 a	 Communist	
one.	Nonetheless,	 just	 as	 Slavoj	 Žižek	 (2011)	 specified	 in	 a	 speech	 to	Occupy	Wall	
Street:	“We	are	not	Communists	if	Communism	means	a	system	which	collapsed	in	
1990.”	 While	 as	 far	 as	 I	 know	 Slavoj	 Žižek	 has	 not	 clarified	 his	 politics	 towards	
contemporary	Cuba,	 it	can	be	argued	that	 the	“system	which	collapsed	 in	1990”	 is	
the	same	that	had	been	replicated	in	the	Caribbean	island,	as	Samuel	Farber	notes:	
Soviet	 Stalinism	 established	 the	 structural	 paradigm	 of	 a	 one-party	 state	 ruling	 over	 the	
whole	 economy,	 polity,	 and	 society,	 a	 paradigm	 that	was	 later	 implemented	 in	 its	 various	
national	variations	by	countries	such	as	China,	Vietnam,	and	Cuba.	(Farber	2011,	4)	
A	 long-time	 analyst	 of	 the	 Cuban	 Revolution,	 Farber’s	 “political	 roots	 are	 in	 the	
classical	Marxist	tradition	that	preceded	Stalinism	in	the	Soviet	Union”	(Farber	2011,	
4).	 Such	 have	 been	 my	 politics	 too,	 which	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 my	 days	 as	 a	
Trotskyite	militant	in	Mexico	–	well	before	my	academic	research	on	Cuba	began.	
To	get	straight	to	the	point,	I	have	taken	a	‘side’	in	actual	debates	in	Cuba	that	has	
made	me	been	 classified	 as	 a	 “self-managementist”	 (Piñeiro	Harnecker	 2013,	 114,	
117,	Mesa	 Lago	 2012,	 292-3).	 Post-Fidel	 Cuba	 has	 witnessed	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	
public	arena	where	socialists	critical	of	 the	political	system	are	one	of	 the	relevant	
contentious	players	(Geoffray	2015),	which	is	nothing	but	a	meaningful	phenomenon	
in	 a	 country	 “where	 all	 possible	 socialisms	 are	 discarded	 by	 the	 only	 socialism	 in	
power”	(Rojas	2010,	63).	An	intellectual	offspring	of	such	a	‘new	left’	–	a	public	face	
of	which	 can	be	monitored	on	 an	 everyday	basis	 in	 the	 alternative	media	Havana	
Times	 –,	 the	 ‘self-managementist’	 vision	 is	 one	 out	 of	 three	 contending	 visions	 in	
Cuba	–	the	others	being	the	‘economicist’	and	the	‘statist’	positions:	
Three	main	 ideological	 positions	 are	behind	 the	debate	over	 current	 changes	 in	Cuba:	 the	
statist	 position,	 which	 seeks	 to	 perfect	 a	 top-down,	 state	 socialism;	 the	 economicist	 [sic]	
position,	 which	 defends	 market	 socialism;	 and	 the	 self-managementist	 position,	 which	
favours	democratic	socialism	and	worker	participation	in	company	decision	making.	(Piñeiro	
Harnecker	2013,	107)	
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Each	 position	 has	 links	 to	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 Cuban	 polity.	 While	 the	 statist	
position	 “is	 well	 represented	 in	 state	 bureaucracies	 among	 those	 who	 fear	 losing	
their	 posts”,	 the	 “most	 fervent	 economicists	 tend	 to	 be	 enterprise	 administrators	
who	hope	that	they	will	be	left	to	manage	a	state	enterprise	as	they	see	fit”	but	also	
new	 state	 technocrats	 (Piñeiro	 Harnecker	 2013,	 113,	 115).	 For	 its	 part,	 the	
“staunchest	 advocates	 of	 the	 self-managementist	 position	 are	 undoubtedly	
intellectuals	and	professionals	who	have	been	exposed	to	alternative,	post-Stalinist	
socialist	ideas”	(Piñeiro	Harnecker	2013,	118).	From	a	general	perspective,	it	can	be	
fairly	 asserted	 that	 the	 ‘statists’	 and	 the	 ‘economicists’	 are	 two	 competing	 visions	
within	 the	 political	 elite	 (the	 old	 and	 the	 new,	 respectively),	 while	 the	 ‘self-
managementist’	view	is	mostly	an	outsider	player	whose	bottom-up	approach	is	an	
actual	reaction	to	the	top-down	policymaking	of	the	other	two.	
The	 antagonism	 between	 ‘economicists’	 and	 ‘statists’	 was	 suggested	 earlier	 in	 an	
article	published	in	Havana,	which	I	co-authored	with	a	Cuban	academic:	
Therefore,	it	is	brought	to	the	fore	the	discussion	on	how	to	promote	the	socialist	democracy	
from	the	workplace,	through	a	plan-market	relation	away	from	the	recalcitrant	statism	and	
the	extreme	deregulation;	based	on	forms	of	property	away	from	the	bureaucratic	monopoly	
and	the	big	private	property.	(Chaguaceda	and	Centeno	2011,	52)	
Making	reference	to	different	interventions	published	in	Cuba,	including	the	above-
mentioned	 one,	 Piñeiro	 Harnecker	 (2013,	 114)	 sums	 up	 that	 proponents	 of	 self-
management	think	that	“genuine	democratic	management	would	lead	to	efficiency,	
productivity,	equality,	and	justice”.	A	Havana-based	academic,	Piñeiro	Harnecker	has	
gone	as	far	as	taking	a	side	in	the	triadic	dispute:	“if	the	goal	is	to	create	the	fairest	
society	 possible,	 more	 space	 needs	 to	 be	 opened	 up	 for	 the	 discussion	 of	 self-
managementist	proposals	in	the	public	media”	(Piñeiro	Harnecker	2013,	120).	
To	be	sure,	 this	way	 to	start	 the	 introduction	of	 this	 thesis	 intends	 to	disclose	any	
potential	“conflict	of	interest”,	as	is	customary	in	academic	journals.	As	such,	I	hope	
that	by	making	explicit	 the	 side	 I	 have	 taken	 in	Cuban	politics	 and	what	does	 side	
mean,	 the	 reader	 is	 better	 able	 to	 situate	 the	 rationale	 of	 subsequent	 decisions	 I	
have	made	(and	justified)	regarding	analytical	choices.	In	this	sense,	while	this	study	
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will	use	concepts	from	the	literature	on	democratisation	for	matters	of	definition,	it	
will	simultaneously	reject	its	built-in	anti-communist	stance.	Therefore,	I	will	refrain	
from	prescribing	any	policy	advice	aimed	at	helping	a	transition	to	liberal	democracy	
for	the	same	reason	mainstream	analysts	have	for	not	offering	socialist	advice.	
The	purpose	of	this	thesis,	however,	is	not	to	justify	or	theorise	‘self-management’,	
but	to	shed	light	on	the	political	context	in	which	the	Cuban	‘new	left’	is	embedded.	
By	the	term	‘political	context’,	this	thesis	refers	to	the	regime	ruling	Cuba.	Deriving	
from	the	Latin	 'regimen'	–	which	 is	cognate	with	the	Sanskrit	 'raj',	meaning	rule	or	
government	 –,	 the	 English	 term	 ‘regime’	 is	 synonym	 of	 ‘polity’,	 which	 in	 turn	
preserves	 the	 meaning	 of	 classic	 Greek	 'politeia'	 –	 i.e.	 system	 of	 government.	
Although	my	aim	is	to	grasp	the	post-Fidel	polity	in	order	to	inform	the	politics	of	a	
specific	Cuban	player,	this	work	is	also	a	contribution	to	the	scholarly	study	of	Cuba.	
As	 this	 thesis	 is	 about	 the	 regime	 rather	 than	 its	 subjects,	 the	 analysis	 of	 other	
political	 aspects	 are	out	 of	 the	 scope	of	 this	work,	 such	 as	 civil	 society,	 gender	 or	
race.	Still,	 I	do	not	claim	that	 the	study	of	 the	 latter	 items	 is	 irrelevant	or	 that	 the	
understanding	of	post-Fidel	Cuba	is	reducible	to	its	regime	development.	All	I	claim	is	
that	 the	 presidency	 of	 Raúl	 Castro	 cannot	 be	 understood	 without	 a	 systematic	
analysis	of	the	challenges	and	choices	faced/made	by	his	leadership	for	the	sake	of	
communist-led	 continuity.	 By	 “reform	 process”	 or	 “transition”,	 this	 thesis	 thereby	
refers	to	the	policy	changes	undertaken	by	the	Cuban	regime.	In	this	sense,	the	main	
reason	not	to	include	civil	society,	gender	and	race	in	this	thesis	 is	that	such	issues	
have	not	been	defining	 features	of	 the	Cuban	 reform	process	 led	by	Raúl.	A	 good	
case	 in	point	 is	 the	41	pages	document	approved	by	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	 (PCC	
2011b),	which	lacks	any	single	mention	of	such	aspects	–	to	be	sure,	such	a	meeting	
was	all	about	the	economy,	whose	‘updating’	has	been	at	the	core	of	Raúl’s	worries.1	
																																																						
1	Although	 civil	 society,	 gender	 and	 race	 have	 not	 been	 central	 concerns	 of	 the	 post-Fidel	 state	
reform,	there	have	been	some	new	developments	in	these	areas.	For	instance,	the	incorporation,	on	
the	 initiative	 of	 Mariela	 Castro	 –	 Raúl	 Castro’s	 daughter	 –	 in	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 of	 sexual	
orientation	into	the	list	of	discrimination	items	in	the	revised	Labour	Code	enacted	in	2014	(AP	2014).	
However,	this	demand	predates	Raul’s	presidency.	Although	Mariela	partially	succeeded	in	injecting	a	
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As	for	the	aforementioned	rise	of	a	public	arena	in	Cuba	–	of	course,	a	relevant	civil	
society	 issue	–,	 it	 is	 a	societal	 conquest	 that	 consolidates	a	process	 that	 started	 in	
the	1990s	 (Bobes	2013)	 rather	 than	a	 “reform	process”	as	defined	 in	 the	previous	
paragraph.	In	other	words,	civil	society	liberalisation	has	not	been	an	item	so	far	in	
Raul’s	 reforms,	 nor	 been	 a	 novel	 phenomenon	during	his	 leadership.	 In	 the	broad	
sense,	social	pluralisation	has	been	limited	to	the	expansion	of	the	private	sector	of	
the	economy	and	–	as	explored	in	section	7.3	–	a	certain	expansion	of	the	individual	
space	 –	 i.e.	more	 flexible	migration	 rules	 and	 religious	 tolerance.	 In	 the	 narrower	
sense	 of	 political	 pluralism,	 the	 continuing	 US	 policy	 of	 funding	 like-minded	
organisations	 inside	 Cuba	 with	 a	 view	 to	 ‘regime	 change’	 (Badella	 2015)	 has	
effectively	fed	the	regime’s	rationale	to	block	liberalisation	in	the	current	period.	
As	 an	 attempt	 at	 political	 reconnaissance,	 this	 thesis	 intends	 to	 characterise	 the	
most	salient	changes	in	Cuba’s	political	system	during	Raúl	Castro’s	presidency.	The	
politics	of	this	dissertation,	I	would	recap,	far	from	embodying	a	weakness,	has	the	
potential	to	fuel	commitment	with	the	search	for	the	truth.	Here	one	is	tempted	to	
repeat	Trotsky’s	words	in	his	preface	to	the	History	of	the	Russian	Revolution:	
The	 reader,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 obliged	 to	 share	 the	 political	 views	 of	 the	 author,	which	 the	
latter	on	his	 side	has	no	 reason	 to	conceal.	But	 the	 reader	does	have	 the	 right	 to	demand	
that	a	historical	work	should	not	be	the	defence	of	a	political	position,	but	an	internally	well-
founded	portrayal	of	the	actual	process	of	the	revolution.	(Trotsky	1934,	preface)	
Similarly,	 I	 hope	 that	 this	 study	 succeeds	 in	 its	 attempt	 to	 present	 a	well-founded	
and	 coherent	 explanation	 of	 Cuba’s	 political	 change.	 And	while	 I	 also	 hope	 that	 a	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 contemporary	 Cuban	 regime	 helps	 to	 enhance	 the	
																																																																																																																																																											
gendered	perspective	on	discrimination	 into	 the	 Labour	Code	 (which	delayed	 its	 introduction	 for	 6	
months)	the	real	novelty	in	the	Code	was	the	inclusion	of	rights	of	private	sector	self-employed	and	
contracted	workers,	including	the	introduction	of	the	legal	categories	of	employer	and	employee,	all	
intended	to	act	upon	the	shift	in	economic	ideology	behind	the	labour	market	diversification.	On	the	
race	 issue,	 despite	 the	 public	 use	 in	 Cuban	 academia	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘objective	 racism’	 to	
distinguish	 inherited	 disadvantage	 from	 ‘subjective’	 discrimination,	 calls	 in	 Cuba	 –	 prominently	 by	
black	 scholar	 Esteban	Morales	 (2013)	 –	 for	 public	 policy	 reform	 to	 address	 this	 and	other	 (notably	
educational)	phenomena	sustaining	racism,	have	so	far	produced	no	policy	initiatives.	
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political	 intervention	 of	 the	 emerging	 ‘new	 left’,	 such	 concerns	 are	 rather	 a	post-
dissertation	 affair.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 reader	 will	 find	 in	 the	 conclusions	 some	
thoughts	 on	 the	 implications	 that	 the	 changes	 analysed	 in	 these	 pages	 have	 for	
radical	political	practice	–	i.e.	the	ideas	embodied	in	the	‘self-managementist’	view.	
1.2	Analytical	approach	
Long	ago,	Trotsky	(1972)	defined	the	Soviet	Union	under	Stalin	as	a	degenerated	or	
totalitarian	workers’	state	–	the	term	‘workers’	state’	capturing	the	prevailing	non-
capitalist	 socioeconomic	 relations	and	 the	 term	 ‘totalitarian’	 specifying	 the	 type	of	
non-democratic	 political	 system.	 After	 World	 War	 2,	 other	 like-minded	 Marxists	
defined	 the	 new	 socialist	 states	 of	 Eastern	 Europe	 in	 the	 same	 manner,	 but	
substituting	 ‘degenerated’	 by	 ‘deformed’	 (in	 Linden	 2009,	 106)	 	 –	 the	 point	 being	
that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 originally	 a	 workers’	 democracy,	 while	 the	 new	 states	
were	deformed	since	the	outset	following	the	Russian	totalitarian	mould.	Later	on,	
Latin	American	Trotskyites	defined	Cuba	as	another	totalitarian	(deformed)	workers’	
state	(e.g.	Moreno	1984).	These	concepts	are	the	starting	point	of	this	thesis,	whose	
relevance	and	adequacy	within	the	Marxist	tradition	is	discussed	in	chapter	2.	
For	Trotsky	(1940b,	np),	totalitarian	rule	implies	total	control	insofar	as	this	type	of	
regime	 “subjugates	 to	 itself	 all	 functions	 of	 the	 country’s	 social,	 political	 and	
ideological	life	and	crushes	the	slightest	manifestations	of	criticism	and	independent	
opinion”.	However,	 if	one	 is	 to	elucidate	political	change	from	this	status	quo,	one	
finds	 a	 gap	 in	 the	 Marxist	 tradition	 for	 it	 has	 no	 further	 concepts	 to	 define	 the	
communist	 regimes	 apart	 from	 ‘totalitarianism’.	 For	 its	 part,	 mainstream	 Political	
Science	 has	 developed	 a	 toolkit	 created	 by	 Linz	 (2000)	 to	 analyse	 the	 retreat	 of	
totalitarianism	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 more	 restrained	 ‘post-totalitarian’	 rule.	 The	 latter	
corresponds	to	an	ideal	regime-type	that	–	despite	still	being	ruled	by	a	single	party	
–	 replaces	 uniformity	 by	 limited	 pluralism,	 utopian	 by	 down-to-earth	 ideology,	
mobilisation	by	institutionalisation,	and	charismatic	by	collective	leadership	(Linz	and	
Stepan	 1996,	 44-45).	 This	 regime-type	 encompasses	 three	 subtypes.	 Still	 close	 to	
totalitarian	rule,	in	early	post-totalitarian	rule	change	has	just	started	in	at	least	one	
of	 the	 above-mentioned	 dimensions.	 From	 this	 two	 paths	 can	 follow:	 either	 the	
	
9	
regime	‘freezes’	(change	is	stalled)	or	‘matures’	(change	continues)	(Linz	and	Stepan	
1996,	42).	Drawing	on	this	literature	–	also	known	as	transitology	–,	this	dissertation	
has	 tried	 to	 understand	 the	 post-totalitarian	 workers’	 state	 that	 has	 emerged	 in	
Cuba	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	In	consequence,	this	work	proposes	the	
integration	of	the	‘post-totalitarian’	regime-type	into	the	Marxist	literature.	
My	 main	 argument	 is	 that	 from	 2006	 to	 2014,	 Cuba	 experienced	 a	 shift	 from	 a	
charismatic	 to	 a	maturing	 post-totalitarian	 regime.	 The	 charismatic	 starting	 point	
has	been	defined	by	Mujal-León	and	Busby	(2001)	as	a	regime	undergoing	an	early	
post-totalitarian	transition	except	for	its	leadership,	which	remains	charismatic		–	i.e.	
Fidel	Castro,	founder	and	long-time	undisputed	leader	of	the	Cuban	state,	was	still	in	
power.	Emerging	from	the	collapse	of	the	USSR,	this	regime	developed	as	follows:	
This	 phase	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 profound	 tension.	 The	 revolutionary	 founder	 still	 has	 the	
capacity	 to	 limit	 change,	mobilise	 the	 population,	 and	 affirm	 the	 validity	 of	 his	 egalitarian	
ideology	 to	 elites	 and	 society	 alike.	 […]	 However,	 there	 is	 growing	 evidence	 that	 regime	
ideology	 has	 become	 hollow,	 and	 there	 are	 signs	 of	 an	 embryonic	 economic	 and	 social	
pluralism	in	an	increasingly	stratified	society.		(Mujal-León	and	Busby	2001,	11)	
As	 for	 the	maturing	 endpoint,	 as	already	 implied,	 it	 refers	 to	one	of	 the	 two	 ideal	
forms	that	can	take	the	late	post-totalitarian	stage,	which	–	in	the	upgraded	terms	of	
Steven	Saxonberg	–	emerges	out	of	the	process	of	ideological	undermining:	
The	 communist	 regimes	 lose	 their	 grand-future	 oriented	 beliefs	 and	 instead	 promise	
improves	 living	standards.	Consequently	they	try	to	reach	some	sort	of	social	contract	with	
the	population	in	order	to	induce	it	to	“pragmatically	accept”	that	given	certain	external	and	
internal	constraints,	the	regime	is	performing	reasonably	well.	[…]	The	more	the	regime	loses	
its	ideological	legitimacy,	the	more	it	must	rely	on	its	pragmatic	acceptance,	and	the	farther	
it	moves	beyond	the	early	post-totalitarian	phase.	(Saxonberg	2013,	18,	68)	
As	 the	 regimes	 “enter	 the	 late	 post-totalitarian	 phase,	 they	 evolve	 either	 in	 a	
maturing	 or	 freezing	 direction,	 depending	 on	 their	 pragmatic	 acceptance”	
(Saxonberg	 2013,	 105),	 which	 will	 be	 reformist	 or	 conservative,	 respectively.	
Although	Saxonberg	does	not	directly	define	the	maturing	post-totalitarian	regime,	
such	a	concept	can	be	fairly	defined	as	a	fully-fledged	post-totalitarian	polity	that	is	
willing	 to	 reform	the	 (Soviet-style)	centrally	planned	economy	 (CPE)	and	may	even	
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liberalise	 the	 political	 sphere,	 except	 for	 the	 one-party	 system	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	
freezing	post-totalitarian	regime,	which	rather	sticks	to	orthodoxy,	namely	it	refuses	
to	 reform	 the	 CPE,	 let	 alone	 liberalise	 the	 political	 system.	 This	 thesis	 argues	 that	
Cuba	 under	 Raúl	 Castro	 has	 become	 a	maturing	 post-totalitarian	 regime.	 A	more	
detailed	treatment	of	the	notion	of	post-totalitarian	rule	is	offered	in	chapter	3.2	
In	 order	 to	make	 the	 analytical	 design	 of	 this	 thesis	 crystal	 clear,	 I	 have	 certainly	
employed	 insights	 from	 transitology	 for	 Marxist	 purposes	 –	 i.e.	 the	 purpose	 of	
upgrading	the	typology	of	Communist	Party-led	regimes	ruling	Soviet-style	political	
economies	 (or	 their	 successors).	 Although	 there	 is	 no	 intrinsic	 contradiction	 in	
articulating	 concepts	 from	 distinct	 traditions	 –in	 this	 case,	 the	 Marxist	 ‘workers’	
state’	and	the	transitology’s	‘post-totalitarian	rule’–,	such	an	approach	is	rarely	used	
–	a	deficit	that	a	Latin	America-based	scholar	has	addressed	in	terms	I	agree	with:	
We	can	group	the	bulk	of	the	recent	literature	on	the	left	according	to	whether	it	focuses	on	
mainstream	or	alternative	politics.	[…]	Mainstream	and	alternatives	themes	rarely	mix	in	the	
literature,	which	is	a	shame	because	there	is	so	much	room	for	hybridity.	(Arditi	2008,	72-3)	
To	be	sure,	 it	must	be	distinguished	the	Marxist	 literature	 this	 thesis	 is	wedded	to	
and	 the	 (partly	 Weberian)	 tools	 used	 for	 the	 specific	 task	 of	 characterising	 the	
contemporary	Cuban	regime.	This	 type	of	 theoretical	articulation	has	been	termed	
“pragmatist	 realism”	 by	 Erik	 Olin	 Wright	 (2009,	 101),	 who	 argues	 that	 “Marxists	
should	combine	the	distinctive	Marxist-identified	mechanisms	with	whatever	other	
causal	processes	seem	pertinent	to	the	explanatory	task	at	hand.”	In	the	case	of	this	
study	 –as	 will	 be	 elaborated	 in	 the	 next	 section	 along	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘post-
totalitarian’	 rule–,	 its	 pages	 will	 discuss	 the	 interplay	 between	 (the	 decline	 of)	
charisma		–	a	classic	concept	of	Max	Weber,	used	to	define	the	 leadership	of	Fidel	
Castro	 –	 and	 (the	 rise	 of)	 market-socialist	 ideology	 –	 related	 to	 the	 characteristic	
Marxist	attention	to	the	political	economy	or,	in	this	case,	the	ideas	shaping	it.	
																																																						
2	To	be	specific,	sections	3.3	and	4.1	detail	from	different	yet	complementary	angles	(see	Table	2,	in	
particular),	 how	 Cuba	 has	 moved	 beyond	 totalitarian	 rule	 –	 i.e.	 towards	 post-totalitarianism.	 As	
already	mentioned,	 the	 adequacy	 of	 the	 term	 “totalitarianism”	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 initial	 years	 of	 the	
Cuban	communist	system	is	discussed	in	chapter	2,	especially	in	section	2.1.2.	
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In	 focusing	 on	 the	 political	 system	 –	 i.e.	 the	 regime	 –	 of	 Cuba,	 rather	 than	 on	 its	
socioeconomic	 relations,	 this	 thesis	 is	 about	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 ‘totalitarian’	 regime,	
rather	 than	 the	 fate	 of	 the	 ‘workers’	 state’.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 this	 focus	 stems	
from	the	following	fact:	although	Raúl	Castro’s	rule	started	in	2006,	his	main	set	of	
economic	 reforms	 was	 not	 launched	 until	 2011,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Sixth	 Party	
Congress.	On	that	account,	in	assessing	the	regime	this	thesis	addresses	the	political	
changes	that	made	possible	–	i.e.	explain	–	such	economic	reforms	in	the	first	place.	
This	 said,	 I	 do	 not	 claim	 that	 state	 transformation	 in	 Cuba	 “can	 be	 understood	 in	
abstraction	 from	 the	 underlying	 historical	 patterns	 of	 development,	 isolated	 from	
the	 political	 economy	 and	 the	 social	 relations”	 constituting	 Cuban	 society	 –	 to	
paraphrase	 Morton’s	 (2012,	 1632)	 challenge	 to	 ‘internalist’	 explanations	 of	 state	
crisis	in	contemporary	Mexico.	Although	this	is	a	sound	Marxist	contention,	I	would	
also	 resist	 the	 temptation	of	explaining	any	 transformation	of	 the	 state	by	making	
reference	to	the	political	economy	and	other	social	relations	usually	tackled	by	the	
Left.	Therefore,	socioeconomic	changes	–	to	exaggerate	my	point	in	dialectical	terms	
–	can	neither	be	understood	isolated	from	the	state’s	internal	vicissitudes.	
In	this	sense,	even	Engels	acknowledged	the	causal	role	of	non-economic	factors:	
According	 to	 the	materialist	 conception	 of	 history,	 the	 ultimately	 determining	 element	 in	
history	 is	 the	 production	 and	 reproduction	 of	 real	 life.	 Other	 than	 this	 neither	Marx	 nor	 I	
have	ever	asserted.	Hence	if	somebody	twists	this	into	saying	that	the	economic	element	is	
the	 only	 determining	 one,	 he	 transforms	 that	 proposition	 into	 a	 meaningless,	 abstract,	
senseless	phrase.		[…]	Marx	and	I	are	ourselves	partly	to	blame	for	the	fact	that	the	younger	
people	 sometimes	 lay	 more	 stress	 on	 the	 economic	 side	 than	 is	 due	 to	 it.	 We	 had	 to	
emphasise	the	main	principle	vis-à-vis	our	adversaries,	who	denied	it	[…].	(Engels	1895,	np)	
Of	course,	for	him	it	was	still	true	that	economic	conditions	“are	ultimately	decisive.	
But	the	political	ones,	etc.,	and	indeed	even	the	traditions	which	haunt	human	minds	
also	play	a	part,	although	not	the	decisive	one”	(Engels	1895,	np).	Not	surprisingly,	
later	Marxists	challenged	this	causal	asymmetry,	thus	granting	analytical	autonomy	
to	concepts	such	as	‘ideology’	(e.g.	Therborn	1984,	Žižek	1994,	Laclau	2006).	
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Failure	to	appreciate	when	economic	transformation	is	not	the	cause	but	the	effect	
of	 political	 change	 invites	 an	 old	 objection	 of	Weber,	 whom	mocked	 the	 type	 of	
Marxist	whose	“need	for	a	casual	explanation	of	an	historical	event	is	never	satisfied	
until	 somewhere	 or	 somehow	 economic	 causes	 are	 shown	 (or	 seem)	 to	 be	
operative”	 (Weber	 1949,	 68).	 Resorting	 to	 this	 quotation,	 in	 turn,	 may	 raise	 the	
suspicion	that	“inside	every	neo-Marxist	there	seems	to	be	a	Weberian	struggling	to	
get	out”	(Parkin	1979,	25)	–	an	accusation	that	well	serves	to	illustrate	why	for	many	
Marxists	 “the	 main	 challenge	 is	 to	 recognize	 that	 what	 is	 most	 powerful	 within	
Marxist	 social	 science	 is	 its	 theory	of	a	 specific	array	of	causal	mechanisms,	 rather	
than	its	aspiration	to	be	a	comprehensive	paradigm”	(Wright	2009,	114-15).	In	other	
words,	 the	 Marxist	 analyst	 shall	 not	 refrain	 from	 borrowing	 conceptual	 tools	
developed	 by	 other	 traditions	 whenever	 needed:	 that	 is	 the	 bottom	 line	 of	 the	
pragmatist	realism	endorsed	and	applied	in	this	thesis.	
1.3	Summary	of	the	argument	
As	has	already	been	advanced,	this	thesis	has	measured	political	change	in	Cuba	in	
relation	to	a	certain	regime-type:	‘post-totalitarianism’.	In	the	ideal	type	of	Linz	and	
Stepan	 (1996,	 44-45),	 this	 regime	 is	 the	 one	 that	 emerges	 from	 the	 relaxation	 of	
totalitarian	 rule	 –	 as	 in	 post-Stalin	 Russia	 or	 in	 post-Mao	 China.	 Based	 on	 this	
conceptual	framework,	Mujal-León	and	Busby	(1997)	argued	that	the	downfall	of	the	
Soviet	 Union	 had	 turned	 Cuba	 into	 a	 hybrid	 regime:	 a	 ‘charismatic	 early	 post-
totalitarian’	one.	With	this	term,	its	proponents	wanted	to	underscore	that	the	only	
element	that	prevented	Cuba	from	turning	into	a	typical	post-totalitarian	regime	was	
its	 (typically	 totalitarian)	 charismatic	 leadership	 embodied	 in	 Fidel	 Castro,	 whose	
relative	importance	had	grown	(compared	to	other	sources	of	legitimacy)	due	to	the	
1990’s	crisis	that	the	Island	was	experiencing	after	the	USSR’s	collapse.	
The	‘charismatic	early	post-totalitarian’	regime	–	starting	point	of	this	thesis’	analysis	
–	 lasted	in	Cuba	from	1990	to	2006,	when	Fidel	Castro	fell	 ill.	After	this	point,	Raúl	
Castro	took	over	and	carried	out	the	political	changes	covered	in	this	work.	
The	research	question	that	guided	this	thesis	is	then:	
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How	and	why	has	the	Cuban	regime	changed	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro?	
In	 order	 to	 answer	 this	 question,	 here	 I	 follow	 Linz	 and	 Stepan	 (1996,	 42)	 in	 their	
disaggregation	of	 any	 regime	 type	 in	 four	 “constituent	 characteristics”:	 leadership,	
ideology,	 pluralism,	 and	 mobilisation.	 In	 terms	 of	 this	 analytical	 scheme,	 the	
argument	 of	 this	 work	 is	 that	 the	 Cuban	 regime,	 during	 Raúl	 Castro’s	 term,	 has	
experienced	a	political	change	at	two	levels:	leadership	and	ideology.	I	have	focused	
this	study	on	these	two	levels	because	there	is	a	causal	link	between	them;	however,	
I	have	dealt	with	pluralism	and	mobilisation	whenever	I	felt	it	necessary.	
The	change	in	the	Cuban	polity,	in	the	period	2006-2014,	can	be	defined	as	follows:	
- from	charismatic	to	collegial	leadership;	and,	
- from	centrally	planned	economy	(CPE)	to	market-socialist	ideology.	
The	 change	 in	 leadership	 analysed	 here	 is	 related	 to	 the	 generational	 succession	
occurring	within	the	Cuban	political	elite.	Epitomised	 in	the	stepping	down	of	Fidel	
Castro,	the	 long-time	Commander	 in	Chief,	due	to	 illness	and	old	age,	the	group	of	
guerrilla	fighters	that	won	the	1959	Revolution	and	since	then	took	over	the	highest	
offices	of	 the	new	Cuban	State	 is	 facing	 the	end	of	 its	 biological	 life.	 In	Cuba,	 this	
group	 is	 called	 the	historical	 generation	 (la	 “generación	 histórica”)	 and	 its	 leading	
figure	at	the	present	time,	Raúl	Castro,	is	the	current	head	of	the	Cuban	state.	
As	will	be	demonstrated,	Raúl	Castro	has	 taken	significant	 steps	 to	 fill	 the	vacuum	
left	by	Fidel	with	a	collegial	type	of	leadership	–	an	arrangement	installed	to	succeed	
the	 “históricos”	 when	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 there.	 By	 doing	 this,	 Raúl	 Castro	 has	
precluded	the	Cuban	leadership	from	adopting	North	Korea’s	path,	where	charisma	
became	an	institution	transmitted	through	the	Kim	family,	from	father	to	son.	
As	for	the	ideological	change,	this	thesis	refers	to	the	new	approach	of	Raúl	Castro	to	
economic	policy,	which	more	clearly	emerged	 in	the	context	of	the	6th	Congress	of	
the	Communist	Party	of	Cuba	(PCC,	by	its	acronym	in	Spanish).	In	this	event,	held	in	
2011,	the	Party	approved	the	Guidelines	of	Social	and	Economic	Policy	(referred	to	in	
Cuba	 with	 the	 Spanish	 word	 for	 “guidelines”:	 Lineamientos),	 which	 contained	
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general	yet	revisionist	ideas	on	how	the	economy	should	be	reformed.	As	this	work	
will	demonstrate,	the	Lineamientos	de-stigmatised	the	role	of	market	mechanisms	in	
the	 Cuban	 economy,	 hence	 paving	 the	way,	 for	 example,	 to	 the	 increase	 of	 small	
private	businesses	and	a	proportional	reduction	of	people	employed	by	the	state.		
Although	this	Raúl-led	ideological	revision	does	not	restore	capitalism,	it	does	break	
with	the	old	CPE	model.	To	cut	a	long	story	short,	this	thesis	argues	that	the	Cuban	
regime	is	now	guided	by	a	market	socialist	ideology,	which	has	been	defined	as	“an	
attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	market	 as	 a	 system	 of	 exchange	with	
social	ownership	of	the	means	of	production”	(in	Calhoun	2002,	294).	
To	tackle	the	causal	 link	between	the	change	 in	the	 leadership	and	 ideology	of	the	
Cuban	polity,	this	thesis	has	relied	on	a	Weberian-identified	mechanism:	legitimacy.	
The	explanatory	power	of	 this	 concept	 lies	 in	 the	political	 effects	 that	a	 change	 in	
how	a	regime	justifies	its	rule	may	have	in	the	regime	itself.	In	Weber’s	words:	
[Every	 system	 of	 domination]	 attempts	 to	 establish	 and	 to	 cultivate	 the	 belief	 in	 its	
legitimacy.	But	according	to	the	kind	of	 legitimacy	which	is	claimed,	the	type	of	obedience,	
the	 kind	 of	 administrative	 staff	 developed	 to	 guarantee	 it,	 and	 the	 mode	 of	 exercising	
authority,	will	all	differ	fundamentally.	(Weber	1978a,	213)	
In	addition	to	this,	Weber	defined	charismatic	legitimacy	as	the	one	“resting	on	the	
devotion	to	the	exceptional	sanctity,	heroism	or	exemplary	character	of	an	individual	
person”	(Weber	1978a,	215).		When	Fidel	Castro	stepped	down	in	July	2006,	the	loss	
of	 his	 charisma	 (an	 old	 source	 of	 legitimacy)	 generated	 a	 need	 of	 restitution.	
Although	the	predicament	faced	by	a	regime	once	its	charismatic	leader	(or	founder)	
is	no	longer	there	(another	Weberian	theme)	will	be	discussed	later,	at	this	point	it	
suffices	 to	say	that	 the	decline	of	charisma	 in	Communist	 rule	has	the	potential	 to	
raise	economic	performance	as	a	superseding	source	of	political	legitimacy.	
It	 is	 important	 to	clarify,	however,	 that	 I	am	not	claiming	 that	all	 the	 legitimacy	of	
the	Cuban	regime	hanged	on	Fidel	Castro.	There	have	been	other	important	sources	
of	legitimacy,	namely	the	role	of	the	‘conquests	of	the	revolution’	(Conquistas	de	la	
Revolución,	 in	Spanish)	and	the	stance	against	US	imperialism.	The	former	refers	to	
the	endurance	of	the	Cuban	welfare	state	–	e.g.	free	education	and	health	–	and	the	
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latter	 to	 the	 nationalism	 embedded	 in	 the	 ruling	 ideology.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	
these	two	aspects	are	highly	valued	by	Cubans.	However,	the	reason	why	I	did	not	
explore	 in	his	 thesis	 the	vicissitudes	of	 the	Conquistas	 and	anti-imperialism	 is	 very	
simple:	 in	 contrast	 to	 Fidel’s	 charismatic	 leadership,	 they	 did	 not	 disappear	 in	 the	
period	under	scrutiny.	Thus,	my	claim	that	the	dissipation	of	charisma	caused	a	crisis	
of	legitimacy	does	not	mean	that	all	legitimacy	had	dissipated.	That	only	means	that	
one	 source	 in	 particular	 was	 no	 longer	 there	 and	 some	 adjustments	 were	 made.	
Which	adjustments?	Ideological	ones,	 in	order	to	revise	the	ruling	economic	model	
in	Cuba	and	make	it	congruent	with	a	shift	to	performance-based	legitimacy.	
The	conceptualisation	of	‘ideology’	in	this	thesis	is	borrowed	from	Slavoj	Žižek:	
[A]	set	of	explicit	and	implicit,	even	unspoken,	ethico-political	and	other	positions,	decisions,	
choices,	etc.,	which	predetermine	our	perception	of	facts,	what	we	tend	to	emphasize	or	to	
ignore,	how	we	organize	facts	into	a	consistent	whole	of	a	narrative	or	a	theory.	(Žižek	2013,	
np)	
Ideology	is	therefore	relevant	as	an	explanatory	variable	because	“changes	in	policy	
are	 often	 preceded	 by	 changes	 in	 ideas”	 (Hay	 2002,	 166).	 In	 consequence,	 the	
framework	proposed	in	this	thesis	may	help	explain	the	changing	political	economy	
landscape	of	the	Cuban	workers’	state,	from	CPE	to	market	socialism.	Sparked	by	a	
generational	 crisis	 in	 the	 leadership,	 the	 regime	 experienced	 a	 change	 from	
charismatic	 to	 performance-based	 legitimacy,	 which	 is	 the	 causal	 process	 behind	
Raúl’s	 reforms	 in	 the	 leadership	 and	 ideology.	 Now	 that	 I	 have	 outlined	 how	 the	
Cuban	 polity	 has	 changed	 –decline	 of	 charisma	 and	 rise	 of	market	 socialism–	 and	
why	 it	 would	 have	 been	 the	 case	 –a	 re-equilibration	 in	 the	 regime’s	 claims	 to	
legitimacy–,	such	a	process	can	be	conceptually	restated	for	the	sake	of	clarity.	
First,	the	steps	of	Raúl	Castro	to	adapt	the	regime	to	the	dissipation	of	charismatic	
authority	may	have	caused	a	transition	from	an	‘early	charismatic	post-totalitarian’	
regime	 to	 a	 proper	 ‘early	 post-totalitarian’	 one.	 As	 the	 leadership	 became	
decreasingly	 charismatic	 (typically	 totalitarian)	 and	 increasingly	 collegial	 (typically	
post-totalitarian),	 this	 regime’s	 defining	 characteristic	 caught	 up	 with	 the	 other	
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three:	pluralism,	 ideology,	and	mobilisation	–	each	of	 the	three	were	already	post-
totalitarian	since	the	1990s,	according	to	Mujal-León	and	Busby	(2001).	
Second,	 the	 decline	 of	 charisma	 as	 a	 source	 of	 legitimacy	would	 have	 pushed	 the	
regime	 to	 seek	 a	 new	 ‘contract’	 with	 its	 subjects	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 (economic)	
performance-based	claims	to	legitimacy.	As	such	new	‘contract’	relies	on	a	reformist	
agenda	 –as	 opposed	 to	 a	 conservative	 one–,	 this	 process	 corresponds	 to	 what	
Saxonberg	(2013,	29-30)	has	defined	as	a	maturing	path	–as	opposed	to	a	 freezing	
one.	 And	 therein	 lies	 the	 rise	 of	 market	 socialism	 in	 Cuba,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
obstinacy	 of	 CPE.	 In	 summary,	 the	 total	 change	 of	 the	 Cuban	 polity	 during	 Raúl	
Castro’s	presidency	(as	modelled	in	this	thesis)	is	thus	a	transition	from	a	charismatic	
early	post-totalitarian	regime	to	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	one.	
In	other	words,	Cuba	may	be	said	to	have	joined	China	and	Vietnam	into	the	club	of	
contemporary	 ‘mature	 post-totalitarian’	 regimes.	 However,	 the	 degree	 of	
‘maturation’	is	different	given	that	Cuba	under	Raúl	is,	in	strict	terms,	closer	to	China	
and	Vietnam…	in	their	early	days	of	(pre-capitalist)	market	reforms	in	the	1980s.		
1.4	Methods	and	data	collection	
The	 body	 of	 data	 collected,	 or	 corpus,	 was	mainly	 formed	 by	 speeches	 and	 state	
documents	published	in	Cuba.	As	both	types	of	data	were	originally	commented	or	
published	 full-text	 in	 the	 official	 Cuban	media,	 they	 can	 be	 fairly	 seen	 as	material	
residues	 of	 a	 human	 (political)	 activity	 –	 i.e.	 as	 ‘texts’	 or	 ‘artefacts’,	 to	 use	 the	
definition	of	Hodder	 (2002,	 265).	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 as	 “texts	 are	 acts”	 (Skinner	 2002,	
120),	 those	 published	 by	 the	 official	 media	 render	 visible	 an	 intentional	 political	
action	by	the	state	apparatus	aimed	at	the	day-to-day	orientation	of	the	public.	
However,	 although	 the	 relevance	 of	 official	 documents	 in	 the	 form	 of	 new	 party	
doctrine	or	new	 laws	may	be	straightforward,	 the	 status	of	 leader’s	 speeches	may	
not.	First	and	foremost,	political	discourse	–	speech	being	one	such	type	–	comprises	
“the	 communicative	 practices	 through	 which	 ideology	 is	 constituted,	 transmitted	
and	made	visible”	(Maynard	2013,	304).	The	analysis	of	ideology	via	speech	can	thus	
shed	 light	 on	 the	 policy-making	 process	 addressed	 by	 speech	 itself.	 This	 approach	
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shall	 not	 be	 confused	with	 discourse	 analysis	 (e.g.	 van	 Dijk	 2006),	 which	 –	 as	 the	
editor	of	the	Journal	of	Political	Ideologies	has	explained	–	“can	encompass	all	kinds	
of	utterances,	including	those	that	have	minimal	or	indirect	impact	on	public	policy-
making,	which	 is	what	 ideologies	engage	 in”	 (Freeden	2016,	4).	Thus,	 I	 focused	on	
those	leader’s	speeches	with	a	direct	policy	impact	–	i.e.	those	whose	purpose	was	
to	help	both	elites	and	lay	public	make	sense	of	the	state	reform	unfolding	in	Cuba.	
In	practice,	I	compiled	all	the	public	speeches	of	Raúl	Castro	in	Cuba	and	abroad,	in	
the	 period	 2006-2014,	 to	 assemble	 a	 database	 of	 texts	 with	 the	 help	 of	 NVivo®	
software	(version	10).	With	this	tool	–	developed	for	the	analysis	of	qualitative	data	
–	 I	was	 able	 to	 code	 the	 texts	 according	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 this	 research,	 namely	
leadership’s	and	ideological	change,	and	grasp	patterns	and	regularities	that	helped	
me	to	build	the	storytelling,	after	adequate	contextualisation,	of	chapters	5	and	6.	
Most	leader’s	speeches	are	easily	accessible	online	in	Cubadebate	and	Portal	Cuba	–	
both	of	 them	official	websites	of	 the	Cuban	 government.	 In	 order	 to	 collect	 other	
speeches	(between	2006	and	2008)	and	other	specific	political	information	–	e.g.	top	
promotions	and	dismissals,	or	reports	of	Party	meetings	–,	the	Cuban	media	I	relied	
the	 most	 were	 the	 daily	 newspapers	 Granma	 and	 Juventud	 Rebelde.	 The	 first	 is	
edited	by	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Party;	the	second,	by	the	Unión	de	Jóvenes	
Comunistas	 (Union	 of	 Cuban	 Youth,	 or	 UJC),	 a	 Party-led	 mass	 organisation.	 To	 a	
lesser	 extent,	 I	 also	 consulted	 Trabajadores,	 a	 weekly	 newspaper	 edited	 by	 the	
Central	de	Trabajadores	de	Cuba	(Central	of	Unions	of	Cuba,	or	CTC).	
The	role	of	the	head	of	state	(and	his	speeches)	in	non-democratic	settings	shall	not	
be	underestimated.	In	the	case	of	Cuba,	the	leader	of	the	regime	is	at	the	same	time	
the	First	Secretary	of	the	Communist	Party	of	Cuba	(PCC,	by	its	acronym	in	Spanish),	
the	President	of	the	Council	of	State	and	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	and	the	main	
chief	of	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	(FAR,	by	its	acronym	in	Spanish).	In	practice,	
the	leader’s	speeches	are	the	principal	statements	of	policy	and	strategy.	To	cite	just	
one	 example,	 discussed	 later	 in	 chapter	 5,	 in	 late	 2007	Raúl	 Castro	 instructed	 the	
PCC	 to	 conduct	 a	 national	 grassroots	 ‘debate’	 (aimed	 at	 both	 party	members	 and	
general	public)	 around	 the	 speech	he	delivered	on	 the	26th	of	 July.	Considered	his	
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first	major	speech	as	acting	President,	on	that	occasion	he	criticised	the	CPE	model	
and	spoke	about	 the	need	of	economic	 reform	 in	Cuba.	Such	national	debate	 thus	
paved	the	way	for	the	reformist	plans	of	Raúl	Castro.	 In	this	sense,	even	if	 leader’s	
speeches	have	to	be	discerned	in	their	political	context,	they	are	an	infallible	source	
of	 authoritative	 position	 statements.	 The	 subsequent	 legislation	 is,	 of	 course,	 the	
other	main	source	of	published	evidence,	and	was	included	in	this	thesis’	corpus.	
The	methodological	importance	of	the	official	media	for	the	analysis	of	state	reform	
has	been	well	explained	by	Hoffmann,	a	leading	scholar	on	contemporary	Cuba:	
In	the	absence	of	pluralist	political	competition	and	its	corollary	institutions,	the	state	media	
are	more	than	just	channels	through	which	the	Cuban	authorities	communicate	their	views	
to	the	population;	rather,	they	constitute	the	principal	way	Cuban	politics	as	such	are	made	
public.	Their	political	bias	and	shortcomings	are	all	 too	obvious.	Yet,	as	 the	politics	behind	
the	 scenes	 are	 kept	 as	 state	 secrets,	 it	 is	 these	 official	manifestations	 in	 the	media	which	
represent	the	visible	face	of	Cuban	politics	and	hence	become	the	key	points	of	reference	for	
political	actors	as	much	as	for	academic	observers.	(Hoffmann	2009,	232)	
The	 ideology	 I	 analysed	 –	 via	 the	 interventions	 in	 the	media	 (as	 texts/acts)	 that	 I	
collected	as	data	for	this	study	–	still	needed	some	form	of	contextualisation,	namely	
I	had	to	reconstruct	“whatever	context	[that]	enables	us	to	appreciate	the	nature	of	
the	intervention”	(Skinner	2002,	116).	In	this	thesis	I	followed	the	classical	approach	
of	Gadamer	(2014,	314),	whom	advised	“to	reconstruct	the	historical	horizon”	of	the	
‘text’	–	i.e.	the	historical	context	in	which	it	appeared	–	in	order	to	make	possible	its	
interpretation.	Thus,	I	carried	out	a	longitudinal	historical	contextualisation	of	state	
discourse	(across	the	period	2006-2014)	whose	subject	matter	was	the	two	areas	of	
political	reform	analysed	in	this	thesis:	1)	leadership	style,	and	2)	economic	strategy.	
As	for	the	contextualisation	I	relied	on	a	variety	of	sources	that	included	journalistic	
coverage,	academic	journal	articles,	and	fieldwork	to	conduct	experts’	interviews.	
The	reader	will	have	noted	that	in	the	previous	section	I	used	the	term	‘ideology’	in	
the	sense	of	economic	 ideology,	whereas	 in	this	section	the	same	term	denotes	an	
all-embracing	entity	that	mediates	the	formation	of	policy	beyond	the	economy.	In	
the	former	meaning,	I	am	simply	sticking	to	the	literature	on	post-totalitarian	rule;	in	
the	latter,	I	am	referring	to	a	methodological	approach.	Thus,	in	this	thesis	it	needs	
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to	 be	 distinguished	 the	 ‘ideology’	 as	 one	 of	 the	 elements	 of	 any	 regime,	 and	
‘ideology’	as	a	source	of	qualitative	data	on	policy	change.	To	avoid	confusion,	in	the	
rest	of	 the	thesis	 I	will	use	the	term	‘ideology’	according	to	the	first	connotation	–	
i.e.	as	a	characteristic	of	a	regime	distinct	from	the	category	of	leadership.	
To	recapitulate,	the	methodology	of	this	thesis	is	based	on	the	analysis	of	ideology.	
In	this	academic	field,	the	agents	of	ideological	change	include	political	organisations	
(as	the	PCC)	and	key	political	actors	(as	Raúl	Castro);	in	consequence,	the	main	data	
for	analysis	involve,	respectively,	‘major	texts’	(as	party	documents)	and	‘discourse’	
(as	 leader’s	 speeches)	 (Maynard	 2013,	 314).	 Thus,	 I	 analysed	 ideology	 –	 through	
speech	and	documents	–	 in	order	to	discern	a	different	policy	approach	within	the	
Cuban	regime	towards	the	type	of	leadership	and	the	type	of	economic	doctrine.	
In	 ideal	 circumstances,	 however,	 it	 would	 have	 been	 great	 conducting	 interviews	
with	Raúl	 Castro	 and	his	 associates	 to	 gain	 a	more	behind-the-scenes	perspective.	
However,	 the	difficulty	 of	 securing	useful	 interview	material	 in	 the	Cuban	political	
system	 is	 widely	 acknowledged.	 The	 absence	 of	 interview	 material	 from	 most	
academic	 published	 work	 on	 Cuban	 politics	 is	 evidence	 of	 the	 severity	 of	 this	
problem.	The	focus	of	this	thesis	on	contested	and	ongoing	reform	makes	this	even	
more	difficult.	Another	approach	could	have	been	conducting	 independent	surveys	
but	these	cannot	be	carried	out	in	Cuba.	The	surveys	conducted	on	the	reforms	are	
either	the	(regular)	confidential	surveys	carried	out	by	the	PCC,	or	surveys	conducted	
clandestinely	by	US-based	organisations	like	Freedom	House,	which	rely	on	personal	
contacts	 and	 contacts	 of	 personal	 contacts	 such	 that	 these	 surveys	 do	 not	 use	
representative	samples	and	thus	have	no	robust	methodological	basis.	
Besides,	granted	the	difficulties	of	reproducing	social	science	methods	in	the	Cuban	
context,	the	issue	of	fieldwork	resources	is	crucial.	The	very	few	academics	that	have	
been	able	to	conduct	such	research	have	done	so	on	the	basis	of	 long-constructed	
relationships	 based	 on	 long	 periods	 of	 residence	 on	 the	 island.	 A	 decision	 was	
therefore	 made	 to	 use	 the	 fieldwork	 time	 available	 to	 collect	 documentary	
materials,	and	to	meet	and	interview,	off	the	record,	academic	political	economists.	
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I	made	two	field	trips	to	Havana	during	my	PhD	studies.	I	spent	one	month	in	Havana	
between	 June	 and	 July	 2013	 and	 another	 two	 weeks	 on	 November	 2014.	 While	
there	 I	 was	 based	 at	 the	 Centro	 de	 Estudios	 de	 la	 Economía	 Cubana	 (Centre	 of	
Studies	of	the	Cuban	Economy,	or	CEEC),	a	research	centre	of	the	Universidad	de	La	
Habana	(University	of	Havana).	In	the	first	trip	I	took	a	‘summer	school’	led	by	CEEC	
staff	entitled	“Cuban	Economy:	the	Updating	of	its	Model”.	As	I	was	the	only	student	
of	that	course,	the	twenty	hours	I	spent	in	the	classroom	were	largely	a	conversation	
with	 four	 Cuban	 economists	 that	 presented	 to	me	 their	 views	 and	 analysis	 of	 the	
reforms	introduced	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	Also	in	that	trip,	I	attended	
a	 bi-annual	 Conference	 held	 in	 Havana	 of	 the	 Cuba	 Research	 Forum,	 a	 network	
headquartered	at	the	University	of	Nottingham,	UK.	There	I	had	the	opportunity	to	
present	my	 research	project	and	also	 listen	 to	 the	analysis	of	 the	other	academics	
that	attended	the	event,	mostly	from	Cuba	but	also	from	other	countries.	
In	 the	 second	 trip,	 I	 attended	 the	 annual	 International	 Havana	 Fair	 (FIHAV	 2014),	
which	is	a	commercial	exhibition	of	foreign	and	Cuban	companies	with	the	purpose	
of	 boosting	 business	 links.	 The	 2014	 edition	 was	 especially	 relevant	 for	 the	 key	
purpose	was	to	attract	 further	foreign	 investment,	 in	the	context	of	the	new	more	
business-friendly	 FDI	 law	 approved	 earlier	 that	 year	 in	 Cuba.	 I	 was	 present	 in	
conferences	 offered	 by	 Cuban	 officials	 to	 foreign	 investors,	 presenting	 them	 the	
“opportunities”	 the	Cuban	economy	offered	 to	 them.	 In	 this	 trip,	 I	 also	 conducted	
three	expert	 interviews	with	scholars	 in	Havana,	based	at	CEEC	and	FLACSO-Cuba.3	
Nevertheless,	 I	 did	 not	 use	 these	 interviews	 as	 evidence	 for	 this	 thesis.	 The	main	
reason	 not	 to	 do	 so	 is	 that	 these	 scholars	 reiterated	 points	 they	 had	 already	
published,	 which	made	 it	 unnecessary	 to	 transcribe	 the	 interviews	 because	 I	 was	
able	to	quote	their	published	work	directly.	This	does	not	mean	that	such	interviews	
were	 pointless.	 Far	 from	 that,	 such	 interviews	 helped	me	 to	 navigate	 through	 the	
academic	 literature	 on	 Cuba	 under	 Raúl	 Castro.	 In	 other	words,	 I	 could	 quote	 the	
																																																						
3	It	could	be	argued	that	I	could	have	conducted	more	interviews	by	phone	or	e-mail.	However,	the	
former	is	very	expensive	and	the	latter,	uncertain.	The	Cubans	I	approached	actually	expected	me	to	
go	to	Havana	and	talk.	According	to	more	seasoned	researchers,	the	Cuban	scholars	fear	intelligence	
officials	may	monitor	their	e-mail	accounts,	which	is	why	they	prefer	to	speak	in	person.	
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published	work	 I	 quoted	 from	 these	 (and	 other)	 academics	 because	 I	 interviewed	
these	 scholars	on	 the	 first	place.	 In	 addition,	Hoffmann	has	provided	a	 compelling	
reason	not	to	use	the	input	of	such	interviews	as	primary	but	as	auxiliary	data.	
As	 the	 [Cuban]	 political	 process	 at	 the	 upper	 echelons	 of	 power	 is	 solidly	 shielded	 from	
public	 view,	 any	 interview	 partner,	 no	matter	 how	 “high	 up”	 he	 or	 she	may	 be,	 can	 only	
present	 more	 or	 less	 plausible	 interpretations	 of	 a	 political	 reality	 played	 out	 behind	 the	
scenes,	with	no	possibility	of	independent	verification	or	falsification.	As	a	result,	speculation	
becomes	inevitable.	(Hoffmann	2009,	231)	
In	Havana	 I	 also	held	 informal	 conversations	with	 ‘ordinary’	Cubans	 from	different	
backgrounds:	workers,	PCC	militants,	self-employed,	employees	in	the	tourist	sector,	
intellectuals,	and	bureaucrats.	These	conversations	gave	me	a	valuable	sense	of	the	
mood	in	the	Cuban	street,	which	helped	me	to	calibrate	my	thoughts	on	the	popular	
response	 to	 Raúl’s	 reforms.	 Again,	 whenever	 these	 conversations	 referred	 to	
information	 that	 could	 be	 independently	 verified,	 I	 included	 it	 in	 the	 data	 of	 this	
study.	However,	when	this	was	the	case	I	was	not	in	the	ethical	position	to	disclose	
the	identity	of	whoever	led	me	to	such	data,	as	I	was	not	granted	explicit	permission	
from	these	individuals	to	use	and/or	quote	our	conversation	in	this	thesis.	
Finally,	 I	 have	 also	 used	 for	 this	 thesis	 data	 I	 collected	 in	 previous	 field	 trips	 to	
Havana	in	2009-2010,	when	I	anonymously	interviewed	two	professionals	working	at	
the	 Cámara	 de	 Comercio	 de	 la	 República	 de	 Cuba	 (Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 of	 the	
Republic	 of	 Cuba,	 or	 Cámara),	 an	 institution	 that	 has	 promoted	 Cuban	 exports	
abroad	 since	 1959	 but	 started	 claiming	 to	 represent	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Cuban	
managers	(“empresarios”)	in	the	2000s.	I	have	also	collected	data	from	its	quarterly	
magazine,	Cuba	Foreign	Trade,	which	I	updated	in	field	trips	in	2013	and	2014.	
Make-up	of	this	thesis	
In	this	Chapter	1,	I	have	already	advanced	the	model	used	in	this	work	to	explain	the	
changes	undergone	during	the	first	Presidential	period	of	Raúl	Castro,	which	ended	
in	2013	and	was	then	renovated	for	a	final	five-year	period.	
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Chapter	 2	 presents	 the	 theoretical	 and	 political	 perspective	 adopted	 in	 this	 study.	
Hence	I	will	discuss	how	the	Marxist	critique	of	Stalinism	can	be	(and	was	actually)	
extended	 to	 the	Cuban	 revolution	because	 the	 two	 cases	produced	a	 ‘totalitarian’	
regime,	which	stands	opposed	to	the	democratic	spirit	of	socialist	politics.	
Chapter	3,	which	covers	the	theoretical	framework	of	this	thesis,	conceptualises	the	
relationship	 between	 charismatic	 leadership	 and	 market	 reform	 in	 a	 Communist	
system.	 I	 discuss	 in	 this	 chapter	why	 the	decline	of	 charismatic	 leadership	has	 the	
potential	to	cause	a	turn	to	performance-based	legitimacy,	hence	to	market	reforms.	
In	Chapter	4,	 I	will	 summarise	 the	relevant	historical	background	that	 I	hope	helps	
make	sense	of	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	Therefore,	I	discuss	some	key	features	
of	Cuban	politics	in	the	almost	fifty	years	of	Fidel	Castro	in	power.	
Chapter	5	 covers	 the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro	before	 the	Sixth	Party	Congress	of	
2011.	 There	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 contours	 of	 leadership	 and	 ideology	 had	 started	 to	
change:	charisma	was	uprooted	and	CPE	orthodoxy	had	been	challenged.	
Chapter	 6	 covers	 the	 Sixth	 Party	 Congress	 and	 its	 aftermath.	 There	 I	 discuss	 the	
emergence	 of	 new	 leadership	 and	 ideological	 contours:	 collegiality	 had	 been	
installed	and	market	socialism	was	in	the	process	of	becoming	hegemonic.	
Chapter	 7	 analyses	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	decline	 of	 charismatic	 leadership	
and	 the	 rise	 of	 cautious	 reform	 in	 Cuba.	 This	 Chapter	 also	 analyses	 how	 each	 of	
these	 changes	 has	 affected	 the	 regime,	 which	 have	morphed	 into	 an	 ‘early	 post-
totalitarianism’	that	has	adopted	an	incipient	maturing	direction.	
Chapter	8	contains	the	Conclusions	of	this	work.	 In	 it	 I	highlight	the	key	findings	of	
this	thesis	and	briefly	discuss	their	implications	for	both	the	literature	on	communist	
survival	and	for	the	analysis	of	Cuban	politics	from	a	socialist	democratic	view.	
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2.	The	Marxist	critique	of	real	socialism	
For	Žižek	(2002,	3),	“the	moment	one	accepts	the	notion	of	‘totalitarianism’,	one	is	
firmly	 located	 within	 the	 liberal-democratic	 horizon”.	 In	 this,	 he	 is	 opposing	 the	
concept	of	‘totalitarianism’	as	developed	by	“liberal	rantings	against	Stalinism	as	the	
direct	and	necessary	outcome	of	Marxism”	(Žižek	2002,	4).	
The	basic	claim	of	Žižek	is	the	following:	
[T]he	notion	of	‘totalitarianism’,	far	from	being	an	effective	theoretical	concept,	is	a	kind	of	
stopgap:	instead	of	enabling	us	to	think,	forcing	us	to	acquire	a	new	insight	into	the	historical	
reality	 it	 describes,	 it	 relieve	 us	 of	 the	 duty	 to	 think,	 or	 even	 actively	 prevents	 us	 from	
thinking.	(Žižek	2002,	3)	
As	“the	key	weapon	of	the	West	in	the	Cold	War	ideological	struggle”,	Žižek	explains	
that	 the	 notion	 of	 totalitarian	 rule	 served	Western	 hegemony	 by	 “dismissing	 the	
Leftist	critique	of	liberal	democracy	as	the	obverse,	the	‘twin’,	of	the	Rightist	Fascist	
dictatorship”	(Žižek	2002,	2-3).	Žižek’s	critique	of	the	liberal-democratic	explanation	
of	totalitarian	rule	is	thus	of	contemporary	relevance	if	one	wants	to	challenge	“the	
neoliberal	claim	that	any	radical	emancipatory	political	project	necessarily	ends	up	in	
some	version	of	totalitarian	domination	and	control”	(Žižek	2002,	5).	
Although	I	do	agree	with	Žižek’s	stance	against	liberal	democracy,	in	general,	and	in	
particular	on	the	topic	of	‘totalitarianism’,	I	disagree	with	his	disqualification	of	that	
concept	 as	 a	 liberal-democratic	 notion.	 My	 contention	 is	 that	 in	 this	 point	 Žižek	
completely	passes	over	an	older,	yet	relevant	radical	elucidation	of	totalitarian	rule	
from	a	Marxist	perspective.	The	distinctiveness	of	my	 theoretical	path	can	 thus	be	
summarised	as	follows:	while	I	do	retain	‘totalitarianism’	as	an	effective	theoretical	
concept,	I	also	endorse	Žižek’s	criticism	of	its	mainstream	appropriation.	
Having	said	this,	the	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	recover	the	Marxist	notion	of	non-
capitalist	totalitarian	regimes,	which	is	an	articulating	concept	of	this	thesis.	Hence	
in	 the	 first	 section	 I	will	 summarise	 this	 approach	 as	 initiated	 by	Victor	 Serge	 and	
Leon	 Trotsky	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 under	 Stalin
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second	 part	 of	 that	 section	 I	will	 introduce	 the	 equivalent	 approach	 in	 regards	 to	
Cuba	after	the	revolution	of	1959.	
In	the	second	section,	I	will	criticise	an	alternative	Marxist	notion,	“state-capitalism”,	
which	 I	 will	 discard	 as	 an	 adequate	 framework	 to	 grasp	 the	 vicissitudes	 of	 really	
existing	socialism.	In	the	second	part	of	this	section	I	will	thus	contend	the	notion	of	
a	‘state	capitalist’	Cuba	–	my	objection	to	it	being	that	it	is	theoretically	flawed	and,	
even	 on	 its	 own	 terms,	 poorly	 applied	 to	 Cuba.	 In	 the	 last	 section,	 I	 discuss	 the	
contemporary	 relevance	 of	 Trotsky’s	 approach,	 which	 I	 will	 also	 update	 with	 the	
inclusion	of	the	scenario	of	totalitarian	rule	turning	into	a	softer	version	of	itself.	
2.1	Totalitarian	rule:	a	communist	concept	
2.1.1	From	the	critique	of	Stalinism…	
According	 to	 the	 Encyclopaedia	 Britannica	 (2013,	 np),	 it	 was	 the	 Italian	 dictator	
Benito	Mussolini	whom	“coined	 the	 term	 totalitario	 in	 the	early	1920s	 to	describe	
the	 new	 fascist	 state	 of	 Italy”.	 In	 an	 essay	 entitled	 The	 Doctrine	 of	 Fascism,	 the	
dictator	summarised	the	aims	of	his	totalitarian	state	in	the	slogan	“everything	in	the	
state,	nothing	against	the	State,	nothing	outside	the	state”	(Mussolini	1932,	np).	
Later	on	 the	 term	was	widely	used	 to	describe	 the	 regimes	of	both	Nazi	Germany	
and	 Stalin’s	 USSR.	 So	 Hannah	 Arendt	 did	 in	 her	 influential	 work	 The	 Origins	 of	
Totalitarianism,	where	she	examined	these	two	cases	as	the	embodiment	of	“total	
domination	as	a	novel	form	of	government”	(Arendt	1962,	xi).	Nonetheless,	the	first	
to	 use	 this	 term	 to	 define	 Stalinism	was	 apparently	 Victor	 Serge	 (Bourrinet	 2001,	
Weissman	 2001),	 who	 later	 claimed	 so	 in	 his	Memoirs	 of	 a	 Revolutionary	 (Serge	
1980).	 In	 a	 letter	 sent	 from	Moscow	 in	 1933	 to	 friends	 in	 Paris	 just	 before	 being	
arrested	 by	 Stalin’s	 secret	 police,	 Serge	 asserted	 that	 the	 Soviet	 State	 was	
“totalitarian,	 caste-ridden,	 absolute,	 power-mad	 State	 that	 does	 not	 care	 about	
human	beings”	(Serge	quoted	by	Bourrinet	2001,	np).	Years	later,	in	his	1940s	exile	
in	Mexico,	he	 further	elaborated	his	 “democratic	and	 libertarian”	 socialist	 view	on	
the	issue,	clearly	drawing	a	parallel	between	Stalin’s	Russia	and	Hitler’s	Germany:	
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If	 socialism	doesn’t	 vigorously	maintain	 its	 democratic	 and	 libertarian	 (in	 the	 etymological	
and	 not	 anarchist	 sense	 of	 the	 word)	 physiognomy	 it	 will	 be	 torn	 apart	 and	 crushed.	 Its	
worst,	 its	 most	 destructive	 enemy	 at	 the	 current	 time	 is	 the	 totalitarianism	 of	 post-
revolutionary	 Russia,	 Bolshevism	 transformed	 into	 an	 absolute	 totalitarianism	 of	 a	 type	
analogous	to	the	reactionary	[fascist]	totalitarianisms.	(Serge	2006,	np)	
As	can	be	seen	in	this	quotation,	Serge	at	the	same	time	separated	“revolutionary”	
from	“reactionary”	 totalitarian	rule,	Stalinism	being	of	 the	 first	 type	and	Nazism	of	
the	 second.	 This	 distinction,	 though,	 did	not	 imply	 a	 partial	 political	 concession	 to	
Stalinism,	whose	“revolutionary”	nature	was	for	Serge	merely	relative	to	the	global	
hegemony	of	monopolist	capital:	
The	 Russian	 totalitarian	 system	 is	 revolutionary	 in	 relation	 to	 traditional	 capitalism,	 and	
reactionary	in	relation	to	liberal	humanism	and	socialist	aspirations.	(Serge	2006,	np)	
In	 regards	 to	Trotsky’s	adoption	of	 the	 term	 totalitarian	 to	 characterise	 the	Soviet	
regime	it	is	unclear	whether	he	“picked	it	up	either	from	the	popular	press	or	from	a	
reconsideration	of	 Serge”	 (Twiss	2014,	416).	 In	any	 case,	when	Trotsky	 introduced	
the	 term	 in	his	work	on	 the	 late	1930s	he	used	 in	 the	same	way	Serge	did.	Hence	
Trotsky	likewise	used	it	opposed	socialist	democracy	to	Stalinism.	
Of	 [Soviet]	party	democracy	 there	 remained	only	 recollections	 in	 the	memory	of	 the	older	
generation.	And	 together	with	 it	 had	disappeared	 the	democracy	of	 the	 soviets,	 the	 trade	
unions,	the	co-operatives,	the	cultural	and	athletic	organizations.	Above	each	and	every	one	
of	them	there	reigns	an	unlimited	hierarchy	of	party	secretaries.	(Trotsky	1972,	chap.	5)	
From	this	Trotsky	derived	the	same	conclusion	reached	by	Serge:	
The	 regime	 had	 become	 “totalitarian”	 in	 character	 several	 years	 before	 this	 word	 arrived	
from	Germany.	(Trotsky	1972,	chap.	5)	
It	 seems	 that	 Trotsky	 adopted	 the	 term	 as	 part	 of	 a	 new	 turn	 in	 his	 theory	 of	
Stalinism	 in	which	he	had	 granted	political	 autonomy	 to	 the	 ruling	bureaucracy	of	
the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Before,	 he	 had	 portrayed	 the	 Stalinist	 bureaucracy	 as	 a	 force	
incapable	of	standing	on	its	own	feet	(Twiss	2010).	However,	more	clearly	since	The	
Revolution	 Betrayed,	 Trotsky	 (1972)	 started	 to	 analytically	 differentiate	 the	 socio-
economic	 order	 and	 the	 political	 system.	 The	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 thus	 a	 ‘workers’	
	
26	
state’	 –	 meaning	 that	 the	 bourgeoisie	 remained	 uprooted	 –	 whose	 political	
degeneration	under	Stalin	had	enthroned	a	‘totalitarian	regime’.	
Although	 Trotsky	 did	 not	 explicitly	 define	 totalitarian	 rule,	 several	 passages	 of	 his	
late	work	“suggest	some	of	the	features	he	had	in	mind,	including	the	concentration	
of	 enormous	 powers	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 a	 single	 individual,	 the	 abolition	 of	 popular	
control	over	 the	 leadership,	 the	use	of	extreme	 repression,	 and	 the	elimination	of	
contending	loci	of	power”	(Twiss	2014,	416)	–	a	status	quo	Trotsky	was	opposed	to.	
Perhaps	 the	 most	 profound	 synthesis	 of	 Trotsky’s	 grasp	 of	 totalitarianism	 is	
contained	 in	 this	 fragment	 from	 his	 unfinished	 biography	 of	 Stalin,	 where	 he	
contrasted	the	Soviet	phenomenon	with	16th-17th	century	French	absolutism:	
‘L'État,	 c'est	moi’	 is	 almost	 a	 liberal	 formula	 by	 comparison	with	 the	 actualities	 of	 Stalin’s	
totalitarian	 regime.	 Louis	 XIV	 identified	 himself	 only	 with	 the	 state.	 The	 Popes	 of	 Rome	
identified	 themselves	 with	 both	 the	 state	 and	 the	 church	 –	 but	 only	 during	 the	 epoch	 of	
temporal	 power.	 The	 totalitarian	 state	 goes	 far	 beyond	 Caesaro-Papism,	 for	 it	 has	
encompassed	the	entire	economy	of	the	country	as	well.	Stalin	can	justly	say,	unlike	the	Roi	
Soleil,	‘La	Société,	c'est	moi’.	(Trotsky	quoted	by	Deutscher	1948,	np)	
In	 this	quote,	 the	regime	 jumps	out	as	a	concept	able	 to	capture	 the	autonomy	of	
the	political	 system,	hence	 the	endurance	of	 the	Stalinised	 Soviet	Union.	Although	
Trotsky	(and	most	critical	Marxists	after	him)	paid	more	theoretical	attention	to	the	
socio-economic	 role	 of	 the	bureaucracy	 (the	 ‘workers’	 state’	 question),	 in	 his	 final	
years	he	was	increasingly	turning	his	attention	to	the	bureaucracy’s	logic	of	political	
domination.	Days	before	been	killed	by	a	Stalinist	agent	 in	1940	 in	Mexico	City,	he	
had	just	finished	an	article	with	one	of	his	few	positive	definitions	of	the	totalitarian	
nature	of	the	Soviet	regime:	
The	Kremlin	oligarchy	is	totalitarian	in	character,	i.e.,	subjugates	to	itself	all	functions	of	the	
country’s	 social,	 political	 and	 ideological	 life	 and	 crushes	 the	 slightest	 manifestations	 of	
criticism	and	independent	opinion.	(Trotsky	1940b,	np)	
Nonetheless,	he	explained	that	that	“the	totalitarian	character	of	the	Kremlin	politics	
does	not	flow	from	Stalin’s	personal	character	but	from	the	position	occupied	by	the	
new	ruling	stratum	before	the	face	of	the	people”	(Trotsky	1940b,	np).	In	the	same	
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article,	 after	 summarising	 once	 again	 his	 explanation	 of	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 privileged	
bureaucracy,	Trotsky	deals	with	the	relation	between	the	totalitarian	regime	and	the	
bureaucratically	planned	economy:	
This	caste	finds	itself	in	a	profoundly	contradictory	position.	In	words	it	comes	forward	in	the	
name	of	 communism;	 in	 deeds	 it	 fights	 for	 its	 own	unlimited	 power	 and	 colossal	material	
privileges.	 Surrounded	 by	 the	 mistrust	 and	 hatred	 of	 the	 deceived	 masses,	 the	 new	
aristocracy	cannot	afford	the	tiniest	breach	in	its	system.	In	the	interests	of	self-preservation	
it	is	compelled	to	strangle	the	least	flicker	of	criticism	and	opposition.	Hence	the	suffocating	
tyranny,	 the	 universal	 grovelling	 before	 the	 “leader”	 and	 the	 not	 less	 universal	 hypocrisy;	
from	 the	 same	 source	 flows	 the	 gigantic	 role	 of	 the	GPU	 as	 the	 instrument	 of	 totalitarian	
rule.	(Trotsky	1940b,	np)	
He	 had	 earlier	 defined	 the	 totalitarian	 regime	 as	 “the	 regime	 of	 bureaucratic	
command	in	all	spheres	of	life”,	to	the	extent	of	falsifying	the	history	of	the	Russian	
revolution	 “in	 the	 interests	 of	 glorifying	 a	 single	 human	 being,	 namely	 Stalin”	
(Trotsky	1940a).	He	had	also	made	a	similar	point	when	he	condemned	how	in	the	
Soviet	Union	“the	struggle	of	tendencies	and	schools	[in	artistic	literature]	has	been	
replaced	by	interpretation	of	the	will	of	the	leaders”	(Trotsky	1972,	chap.	7).	Such	is	
the	essence	of	the	critique	of	Serge	and	Trotsky:	totalitarian	rule	as	total	domination	
–	a	point	later	repeated	by	Arendt	and	today	credited	to	bien-pensant	liberal	minds.	
To	 claim	 that	 ‘totalitarianism’	 is	 a	 communist	 concept,	 however,	 may	 be	 hard	 to	
swallow	 –	 even	 more	 in	 light	 of	 the	 standard	 liberal	 claim	 that	 the	 seeds	 of	
totalitarianism	in	the	Soviet	Union	were	present	from	the	outset	of	the	revolution	in	
the	Bolshevik	Party.	 In	this	account,	Leninism	is	viewed	as	a	force	whose	evolution	
into	Stalinism	was	inevitable	–	a	thesis	Žižek	blatantly	rejects:	
Was	 the	 passage	 from	 Lenin	 to	 Stalin	 necessary?	 The	 Hegelian	 answer	 would	 evoke	
retroactive	 necessity:	 once	 this	 passage	happened,	 once	 Stalin	won,	 it	was	 necessary.	 The	
task	of	a	dialectical	historian	is	to	conceive	it	‘in	becoming’,	bringing	out	all	the	contingency	
of	a	struggle	that	might	have	ended	differently.	(Žižek	2009b,	47)	
Both	Serge	and	Trotsky	were	aware	of	the	historical	interplay	between	necessity	and	
contingency	–	a	hunch	present	in	their	vindication	of	the	emancipatory	potential	of	
the	1917	revolution.	As	for	Serge,	he	“saw	Stalinism	as	the	corruption	of	Bolshevism”	
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(Weissman	2001,	9).	While	he	was	thus	prepared	to	accept	that	the	“authoritarian	
centralization	 of	 the	 Party	 contained	 the	 seeds	 of	 Stalinism	 as	 a	 whole”,	 he	 also	
stressed	 that	 the	 “revolution	 and	 Bolshevism	 also	 contained	 other	 seeds,	 notably	
that	of	a	new	democracy	 that	Lenin	and	 the	others	endeavoured	 to	establish	with	
good	will	and	passion	in	1917-18”	(Serge	quoted	by	Weissman	2001,	9).	
For	his	part,	Trotsky	did	not	deny	the	dictatorial	character	of	the	initial	regime	with	
Lenin.	Moreover,	 looking	 back	 he	 acknowledged	 that	 “it	 is	 absolutely	 indisputable	
that	 the	domination	of	a	 single	party	served	as	 the	 juridical	point	of	departure	 for	
the	 Stalinist	 totalitarian	 regime”	 (Trotsky	 1937,	 np);	 similarly,	 he	 admitted	 that	
“whoever	prohibits	 factions	 thereby	 liquidates	party	democracy	and	 takes	 the	 first	
step	 toward	 a	 totalitarian	 regime”	 (Trotsky	 1939b,	 np).	 However,	 he	 insisted	 that	
from	these	exceptional	measures	taken	in	the	middle	of	a	civil	war	the	subsequent	
totalitarian	degeneration	did	not	follow.	
[O]ne	 cannot	 identify	 the	 laws	 of	 civil	 war	 with	 the	 laws	 of	 peaceful	 periods	 […].	 If	 one	
considered	Abraham	Lincoln’s	policy	exclusively	from	the	point	of	view	of	civil	liberties,	then	
the	great	president	would	not	appear	very	favourably.	In	justification	of	course	he	could	say	
that	 he	 was	 compelled	 to	 apply	 civil	 war	measures	 in	 order	 to	 cleanse	 the	 democracy	 of	
slavery.	 Civil	 war	 is	 a	 state	 of	 tense	 social	 crisis.	 One	 or	 another	 dictatorship,	 inevitably	
growing	out	of	the	conditions	of	civil	war,	appears	fundamentally	as	an	exception	to	the	rule,	
a	temporary	regime.	(Trotsky	1939c,	np)	
Instead,	the	unfortunate	prolongation	of	civil-war	measures	after	the	civil	war	ended	
brought	about	the	totalitarian	regime	–	as	a	permanent	yet	unacknowledged	state	of	
emergency:	
It	is	true	that	the	dictatorship	in	the	Soviet	Union	did	not	die	out,	but	on	the	contrary	took	on	
monstrous	totalitarian	forms.	This	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	out	of	the	revolution	arose	a	
new	privileged	caste	which	 is	 incapable	of	maintaining	 its	regime	except	through	measures	
of	a	hidden	civil	war.	It	was	precisely	over	this	question	that	I	broke	with	the	Kremlin	ruling	
clique.	 I	 was	 defeated	 because	 the	 working	 class,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 internal	 and	 external	
conditions,	 showed	 itself	 to	be	 too	weak	 to	 liquidate	 its	own	bureaucracy.	 (Trotsky	1939c,	
np)	
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Hence	for	Trotsky	the	civil	war	under	Lenin	was	 ‘open’	while	 it	was	 ‘hidden’	under	
Stalin.	 For	 Žižek,	 there	 is	 a	 subtle	 distinction	 –	 but	 one	 of	 the	 highest	 political	
importance	–	between	the	Leninist	‘red	terror’	and	the	Stalinist	‘totalitarianism’:	
[I]n	 the	 early	 ‘Red	 Terror’,	 prohibition	 was	 openly	 admitted	 and	 announced,	 while	 under	
Stalinism,	prohibition	itself	was	prohibited	–	one	had	to	pretend	and	act	as	 if	there	was	no	
terror,	 as	 if	 life	 had	 returned	 to	 normal.	 This	 difference,	 although	 it	 may	 look	 like	 hair-
splitting,	 is	 crucial,	 for	 it	 changes	 everything:	 from	 the	 early	 Bolshevik	 ‘dictatorship’	which	
was	open	and	transparent	in	its	very	exercise	of	violence	(thereby	also	openly	admitting	its	
temporary	character,	its	exceptional	status),	we	pass	to	the	Stalinist	dictatorship	which	relied	
on	its	self-denial	and	thus	on	a	basic	mystification.	(Žižek	2007,	xxv)	
In	other	words,	how	could	Stalin’s	“hidden	civil	war”	have	been	put	to	an	end	if,	 in	
the	 first	 place,	 the	 official	 violence	 did	 not	 officially	 exist?	 This	 basic	 question	
explains	why	the	Soviet	constitutional	termination	of	the	state	of	emergency	in	1936	
meant	in	practice	that	“those	who	still	opposed	(or	were	presumed	to	oppose)	the	
regime	were	[…]	worthless	scum	to	be	excluded	from	humanity	 itself”	 (Žižek	2007,	
xxv).		Having	co-led	the	initial	Lenin’s	terror	during	the	military	defence	of	a	nascent	
regime	under	imperialist	attack,	Trotsky	later	opposed	the	“monstrous”	continuation	
of	 terror	 after	 the	 primary	 goals	 had	 been	 achieved.	 Trotsky’s	 theoretical	 and	
political	relevance	thus	lies	in	his	articulation	of	a	Leninist	critique	of	Stalinism.	
Independently	of	whether	one	agrees	or	not	with	Serge’s	and	Trotsky’s	analysis	and	
militancy	in	the	founding	years	of	the	Soviet	Union,	what	matters	for	the	purposes	of	
this	theoretical	chapter	is	to	highlight	the	examination	of	Stalinism	as	a	‘totalitarian’	
regime	 presence	 within	 the	 Marxist	 tradition.	 Such	 an	 approach	 dates	 back	 well	
before	the	term	was	reinvented	from	an	anti-communist	perspective	after	WW2	in	
mainstream	political	science	(Weissman	2001,	Twiss	2014).	
2.1.2	…To	the	critique	of	Fidelismo	
I	 revisited	 the	 communist	 critique	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union	 under	 Stalin	 to	 recover	 the	
notion	of	totalitarian	non-capitalist	formations,	which	I	apply	in	this	thesis	to	Cuba.	
However,	 this	 is	 nothing	 new.	 To	 be	 sure,	 the	 Marxist	 critique	 of	 really	 existing	
socialism	had	a	Latin	American	reception	used	to	grasp	Cuban	events	after	the	1959	
	
30	
Revolution.	 In	 this	 sense,	 at	 least	 three	 Latin	 American	Marxist	 intellectuals	 have	
defined	 socialist	 Cuba	 as	 a	 totalitarian	 regime:	 Moreno	 (1984),	 Azor	 (1998),	 and	
Farber	(2006,	2011).	They	reached	this	conclusion	independently	from	each	other.	
Totalitarian	Cuba:	
Samuel	 Farber,	 who	 was	 born	 and	 raised	 in	 Havana,	 has	 produced	 the	 most	
extensive	scholarly	literature	on	Cuba	from	a	‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxist	perspective.	I	
will	mostly	make	reference	to	his	last	book	on	the	topic	hereinafter.	
Farber	draws	a	parallel	between	revolutionary	Cuba	and	the	Soviet	Union	based	on	
the	historical	 fact	 that	 the	“eventual	Stalinist	outcome	of	 the	 [Russian]	 revolution”	
had	grown	into	a	hegemonic	model	that	“pre-empted	or	at	least	greatly	diminished	
the	opportunities	for	consideration	of	other	revolutionary	choices	and	possibilities”	
around	the	world	(Farber	1990,	2).	In	other	words,	“the	‘Marxist-Leninist’	one-party	
state	 as	 interpreted	 and	 developed	 in	 Stalinist	 Russia	 was	 the	 common	 model”	
pursued	and	enforced	in	successive	revolutionary	upheavals	claiming	to	be	socialists	
during	the	20th	century,	“e.g.	in	China,	Cuba,	and	Vietnam”	(Farber	1990,	2).	
Although	Farber	notes	that	‘totalitarian’	is	“an	ambiguous	term	that	has	been	often	
used	for	political	purposes	to	discredit	the	opponents	of	the	West	in	the	Cold	War”,	
he	does	not	dismiss	its	utility	for	the	Marxist	tradition	since	such	term	“can	be	useful	
to	 designate	 something	 similar	 to	 what	 the	 Russian	 Communist	 leader	 Nikolai	
Bukharin	called	the	‘imperialist	pirate	state’.”	(Farber	2011,	18)	
This	 [‘pirate	 state’]	 is	 a	 state	whose	 social	 institutions	 “have	 a	 tendency	 to	 fuse	with	 one	
another	 and	 to	 become	 transformed	 into	 one	 organization	 of	 the	 rulers…	 So	 there	 comes	
into	 being	 a	 single,	 all-embracing	 organization…	with	 innumerable	 functions,	with	 gigantic	
powers,	with	spiritual…	as	well	as	material	methods.”	(Bukharin	cited	by	Farber	2011,	18)	
Farber	traces	the	formation	of	this	kind	of	(totalitarian)	regime	in	Cuba	back	to	1961,	
two	years	after	the	US-backed	dictator	Fulgencio	Batista	had	been	toppled:	
By	April	1961,	when	the	Cuban	government	finally	took	the	step	of	officially	declaring	itself	
to	be	“socialist,”	it	had	achieved	an	almost	total	control	of	the	polity,	economy,	and	society.	
Cuba,	along	the	lines	of	the	Soviet	Union,	China,	and	Eastern	Europe,	was	well	on	the	way	to	
	
31	
becoming	a	one-party	state,	increasingly	controlling	all	social,	political,	and	economic	life	on	
the	island.	It	became	a	totalitarian	country.	(Farber	2011,	18)	
Nahuel	 Moreno,	 a	 leading	 figure	 within	 the	 Latin	 American	 Trotskyite	 movement	
during	the	‘Cold	War’	era,	had	a	compatible	view.	Moreno’s	point	of	departure	was	
his	endorsement	of	Trotsky’s	comparison	of	Stalin’s	Russia	with	Hitler’s	Germany:	
Nazi	 Germany	 and	 Stalinist	 USSR	 had	 very	 similar	 political	 regimes:	 single-party	
governments,	without	the	minimal	democratic	liberty	and	with	a	fierce	repression.	(Moreno	
1984,	9)	
Although	in	his	perspective	the	two	aforementioned	cases	shared	the	same	type	of	
regime,	they	were	grounded	on	“diametrically	opposed”	socio-economic	formations:	
[T]he	Nazi’s	 is	 the	 state	of	 the	most	 reactionary	and	war-prone	monopolies;	 the	USSR	 is	 a	
bureaucratised	workers’	state,	non-capitalist.	(Moreno	1984,	9)	
Based	 on	 this	 distinction	 between	 socioeconomic	 structure	 and	 political	 regime	 in	
Trotsky’s	 framework,	 Moreno	 defined	 revolutionary	 Cuba	 in	 a	 way	 analogous	 to	
Stalin’s	 Soviet	Union.	Hence	 for	 him	Castro’s	 revolution	had	produced	 a	new	non-
capitalist	 formation	 with	 a	 totalitarian	 regime,	 the	 difference	 being	 that	 the	
Caribbean	case	had	not	been	the	product	of	degeneration	of	a	workers’	democracy,	
but	a	direct	(though	not	linear)	recreation	of	a	bureaucratic,	Soviet-style	polity.	
In	a	different	yet	noteworthy	case,	Marlene	Azor,	an	academic	from	the	University	of	
Havana,	 defined	 Cuba	 as	 a	 totalitarian	 state	 socialism	 (Azor	 1998).	 Although	 she	
vindicated	Trotsky’s	analysis	of	the	Soviet	Union,	she	did	not	use	the	term	‘workers’	
state’.	 Instead,	 drawing	 from	 literature	 apparently	 common	 to	 the	 socialist	 bloc’s	
academia,	she	referred	to	the	‘state	socialisms’,	which	she	saw	as	a	wide	replication	
of	 the	 ‘Soviet	 Model’,	 Cuba	 being	 no	 exception	 to	 the	 rule.	 Her	 use	 of	 the	 term	
‘totalitarian’,	however,	was	based	on	mainstream	political	science	at	the	time.	
Although	it	is	unclear	whether	she	was	aware	of	the	socialist	discussion	of	the	term,	
she	was	aware	(and	critical)	of	its	mainstream’s	anti-communist	appropriation:	
The	 concept	 originated	 in	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 is,	 in	 the	 ideological	 language,	 an	 image	 that	
deprecates	 any	 system	 that	 does	not	 present	 the	 formal	 features	 of	 liberal	 representative	
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democracy.	However,	 the	term	became	a	concept	 in	political	sciences	to	designate	specific	
political	regimes.	(Azor	1998,	87)	
From	this	quote,	taken	from	a	paper	based	on	her	PhD	thesis,	it	can	be	appreciated	
that	although	Azor	incorrectly	locates	the	origin	of	the	term,	she	demarcates	herself	
from	its	usual	anti-communist	connotation.	In	any	case,	perhaps	not	so	surprisingly	
in	Cuba,	Azor	was	denied	the	doctoral	degree	by	two	different	academic	committees	
in	 1996	 and	 1997	 –	 for	 her	 it	 was	 a	 clear	 case	 of	 political	 censorship.4	With	 no	
academic	opportunities	in	Cuba,	she	later	moved	to	Mexico	City.	
The	work	of	Farber,	Moreno,	and	Azor	overlap	in	two	defining	characteristics	of	the	
Cuban	regime	that	make	it	totalitarian:	1)	single-party	rule,	and	2)	anti-	pluralism.	
1. Single-party	rule	
For	 Farber	 perhaps	 this	 feature	 summarises	 the	 totalitarian	 nature	 of	 the	 Cuban	
regime	–	a	local	adaptation	of	the	Stalinist	institutional	framework:	
In	structural	and	institutional	terms	there	was	nothing	original	about	the	new	Cuban	model.	
Organized	 along	 the	 Soviet	 model	 of	 “democratic	 centralism,”	 it	 was	 a	 single	 party	 that	
allowed	no	internal	currents	or	factions.	A	constitution	that	enshrined	the	political	monopoly	
of	 the	CCP,	 thereby	making	any	other	competing	parties	 illegal,	was	eventually	adopted	 in	
1976.	(Farber	2011,	18)	
As	for	Moreno	and	Azor,	this	was	also	a	salient	element	of	their	critique.	The	former	
rebuffed	 the	 regime	 self-identification	 with	 Marxist	 politics,	 reminding	 that	 “the	
Leninist	 [regime]	was	 party	 pluralist	 before	 the	 civil	war”	 (Moreno	 1984,	 68).	 The	
latter,	 similarly	 situated	 the	monopoly	of	 the	Communist	Party	 as	 the	basis	 for	 an	
anti-pluralist	 regime	 as	 the	 single-party	 system	 “subordinates	 [the	 different	 social	
groups]	to	the	ideological	principles	and	imperatives”	of	the	leadership	(1998,	87).	
But,	how	does	the	single	ruling	party	actually	rule?	For	Farber,	this	leads	to	the	other	
key	aspect	of	totalitarian	Cuban:	its	prohibition	of	independent	social	organisations.	
2. No	social	pluralism	
																																																						
4	Azor	authorised	me	to	confirm	this	in	a	personal	communication	(5-Aug-2015).	
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For	Farber	single-party	rule	means	that	“power	is	monopolized	at	the	top	in	a	system	
that	 does	 not	 allow	 any	 institutional	 constraints	 by	 unions	 or	 any	 other	 popular	
organization	 independent	 of	 the	 one-party	 state”	 (Farber	 2011,	 18).	 Instead,	 a	
totalitarian	 regime	claims	to	represent	all	social	groups,	setting	up	mass	structures	
that	aim	 to	embody	 the	 interests	of	 the	different	parts	of	 society.	 In	practice,	 this	
means	that	the	ruling	party	controls	the	allocation	of	leaders	at	the	different	levels.	
The	 [Cuban]	 constitution	 also	 established	 the	 ruling	 party’s	 monopoly	 over	 Cuba’s	 mass	
organizations,	such	as	the	state’s	trade	unions	and	women’s	organizations,	which	were	to	act	
as	 its	 transmission	 belts	 to	 the	 population	 at	 large.	 All	 organizations	 dedicated	 to	 the	
independent	defense	of	the	interests	of	workers,	women,	blacks,	gays,	and	any	other	groups	
were	left	outside	the	bounds	of	the	constitution	and	the	law.	(Farber	2011,	18)	
Moreno	had	an	almost	identical	appreciation	which,	again,	contrasted	Stalinism	with	
the	early	days	of	the	Russian	revolution:	“Under	Lenin,	the	unions	were	independent	
of	the	state”	(1984,	68).	Taking	this	stance	to	the	Caribbean,	Moreno	stressed	that	
there	were	“no	liberties”	 in	Cuba:	“if	a	worker	 in	any	Cuban	organisation	or	of	any	
other	 [deformed]	workers’	state	said	s/he	 is	Trotskyite	or	 that	s/he	thinks	that	the	
United	 States	 is	 more	 democratic	 than	 Cuba,	 s/he	 would	 be	 immediately	 jailed”	
(Moreno	 1984,	 68).	 He	 observed	 similar	 obstacles	 in	 relation	 to	 creative	 work	 in	
academia,	 arts	 or	 journalism,	where	 professionals	 cannot	 express	 “if	 they	 are	 not	
authorised	by	the	government”	(Moreno	1984,	68).	However,	regarding	these	views,	
it	must	be	said	that	Moreno	does	not	offer	data	that	can	be	independently	verified.	
As	 for	 Azor,	 she	 concluded	 that	 “the	 total	 penetration	 of	 the	 social	 body”	 by	 the	
structures	of	 the	party-state	 in	Cuba	creates	an	“absence	of	 social	autonomy”;	 i.e.	
the	 lack	 of	 “all	 lines	 of	 distinction	 between	 the	 political	 apparatus	 and	 society”	
(1998,	 87).	 In	 her	 view,	 this	 arrangement	 had	 facilitated	 “the	 permanent	 political	
mobilisation”	demanded	by	the	official	“ideology”	(Azor	1998,	87).	
Alternative	approaches:	
Of	 course,	 the	 approach	 outlined	 above	 differs	 from	 the	 one	 advanced	 by	 Antoni	
Kapcia	(2008,	2014),	whose	work	 is	very	 influential	 in	the	British	academia	focused	
on	Cuba.	 For	 him,	 the	 characterisation	of	 the	Cuban	one-party	 system	 is	 “a	 vexed	
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question	 since	 this	 system	 offends	 conventional	 western	 notions	 of	 a	 functioning	
democracy,	defining	Cuba	as	a	dictatorship	in	most	western	countries’	eyes”	(Kapcia	
2008,	141).	In	response,	Farber	has	criticised	this	Kapcia’s	epigram	for	it	“avoid[s]	a	
straightforward	statement	of	whether	he	thinks	the	Cuban	government	is	or	is	not	a	
dictatorship”	–	an	evasion	that,	Farber	continues,	intends	“to	undermine	the	notion	
that	 Cuba	 is	 a	 dictatorship	 by	 relativizing	 that	 judgment	 as	 ‘Western’	 without	
actually	saying	or	arguing	that	Cuba	could	be	considered	non-dictatorial	according	to	
some	‘non-Western’	criterion	that	is	left	unexplained”	(Farber	2011,	35).	
In	a	less	oblique	(and	more	recent)	statement,	Kapcia	(2014,	9)	has	rejected	that	the	
single-party	 rule	 reflects	 a	 totalitarian,	 “monolithic	 Cuban	 state”.	 Conversely,	 he	
argues	that	the	Cuban	state	has	always	been	weak	from	the	beginning	because	of	its	
low	 institutionalisation	 –	which	 he	 attributes	 to	 an	 anti-bureaucratic	 sentiment	 of	
both	 ex-guerrillas	 and	 Fidel’s	 leadership	 alike	 (Kapcia	 2014,	 9-10).	 Thus,	 he	 argues	
that	“the	absence	of	a	state	capable	of	effecting	all	the	desired	reforms	meant	that	
[…]	a	series	of	‘mass	organizations’	(created	in	1960-62)	took	over	the	state’s	tasks”	
(Kapcia	 2014,	 11).	 Kapcia,	 however,	 separates	 here	 two	 notions	 that	 can	 be	
distinguished	(in	theory)	but	not	disconnected	(in	practice).	In	other	words,	in	Cuba	
the	 mass	 organisations	 are	 part	 of	 the	 state.	 And	 this	 is	 precisely	 the	 point	 of	 a	
totalitarian	regime:	to	retain	the	exclusive	leadership	of	participation	structures.	
Instead,	Kapcia	proposes	to	understand	Cuba	as	a	“post-colonial	corporatism”	(2014,	
203).	With	this	term	he	refers	to	a	statecraft	strategy	that	emerged	in	Third	World	
countries	during	the	20th	century	in	opposition	to	foreign	capital	power.	Therefore,	
rather	than	locating	Cuba	as	part	of	the	family	of	“Communist	systems”,	Kapcia	puts	
it	closer	to	the	formation	of	the	Mexican	state	after	the	1910	revolution.	While	I	do	
think	 that	 this	 is	 an	 insightful	 comparison	 that	 is	 worth	 it	 further	 consideration,	 I	
doubt	 that	 post-revolutionary	 Mexico	 was	 a	 case	 of	 “one-party	 democracy”,	 as	
Kapcia	 (2014,	 201)	 asserts.	 The	 purpose	 of	 Kapcia	 is	 politically	 clear,	 though:	 if	
Mexico	was	a	“one-party	democracy”,	then	Cuba	must	be	one	too.	
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However,	 a	 different	 picture	 emerges	 if	 one	 scrutinises	 the	 conceptual	 framework	
informing	Kapcia’s	comparative	perspective	on	Cuba	and	Mexico.	The	 first	 thing	to	
consider	is	Schmitter’s	seminal	definition	of	corporatism:	
[A]	 system	 of	 interest	 representation	 in	 which	 the	 constituent	 units	 are	 organized	 into	 a	
limited	 number	 of	 singular,	 compulsory,	 non-competitive,	 hierarchically	 ordered	 and	
functionally	differentiated	 categories,	 recognized	 or	 licensed	 (if	 not	 created)	 by	 the	 state	
and	granted	a	deliberate	representational	monopoly	within	 their	 respective	categories	 in	
exchange	 for	 observing	 certain	 controls	 on	 their	 selection	 of	 leaders	 and	 articulation	 of	
demands	and	supports.	(Schmitter	1974,	93-94)	[The	highlight	is	mine,	as	noted	below.]	
Schmitter	 indeed	 argued	 that	 Mexico	 fitted	 this	 definition	 (1974,	 104),	 which	 he	
distinguished	 from	 the	 “monist”	 model	 of	 “the	 Soviet	 experience”	 (1974,	 97).	 He	
defined	‘monism’	as	almost	like	‘corporatism’,	exchanging	the	fragment	I	highlighted	
from	the	quotation	above	for	this:	“created,	subsidized	and	licensed	by	a	single	party	
and	 granted	 a	 representational	 role	 within	 that	 party	 and	 vis-a-vis	 the	 state”	
(Schmitter	 1974,	 97).	 However,	 Kapcia	 bypasses	 the	 concept	 of	 “monism”	 by	
pointing	out	that	“crucially,	 these	[Cuban	mass]	organisations	almost	all	pre-dated,	
and	then	ran	alongside,	the	state	that	eventually	emerged”	(2014,	12).	Nonetheless,	
Farber	(2011,	134-40)	has	documented	how	the	CTC,	for	example,	was	turned	into	a	
transmission	belt	of	the	emerging	state	after	a	purging	process	 in	1959-61.	The	re-
conquered	union	democracy	of	the	first	months	of	the	1959	revolution	did	not	last	
long.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 purge,	 “unanimity	 had	 now	 replaced	 controversy”	 (Farber	
2011,	137)	–	the	CTC’s	longer	history	making	no	difference	in	avoiding	a	Soviet-style	
fate.	
However,	 even	 if	 one	 equates	 the	 (old)	 Mexican	 and	 (current)	 Cuban	 systems	 of	
interest	representation,	it	is	doubtful	that	the	conclusion	be	that	we	are	dealing	with	
a	common	case	of	“one-party	democracy”.	That	time	in	Mexico	is	better	defined	as	
an	 “authoritarian	 bonapartism”,	 as	 Rodríguez	 Araujo	 (2010,	 38)	 has	 put	 it	
condensing	most	scholarly	work	on	the	subject.	Incidentally,	this	label	is	reminiscent	
of	Trotsky’s	grasp	of	1930s	Mexico	as	a	 “bonapartism	sui	 generis”,	 in	 reference	 to	
Cárdenas’	 government	 that	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 “the	 possibility	 of	 a	 certain	 freedom	
from	 the	 foreign	 capitalists”	 had	opted	 for	 “manoeuvring	with	 the	 proletariat	 and	
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even	 going	 so	 far	 as	 to	 make	 concessions	 to	 it”	 (Trotsky	 1938a,	 np).	 Such	 a	
manoeuvring	 being	 anyhow	 achieved	 via	 a	 “semi-totalitarian…	 stateization	 of	 the	
trade	unions”	(Trotsky	1940c,	np)	–	a	co-option	strategy	that	evokes	what	Schmitter	
called	“corporatism”.	
To	 be	 sure,	 since	 its	 inception	 “Mexican	 corporatism	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 a	
lack	of	democracy	in	the	trade	unions”,	as	Garza	Toledo	(2004,	106)	has	stressed	in	
order	to	explain	why	the	subsequent	assault	on	welfare	concessions	to	the	working	
class	 met	 no	 meaningful	 resistance	 during	 the	 neoliberal	 metamorphosis	 of	 PRI-
dominated	 Mexico.	 If	 Cuba	 and	 Mexico	 shared	 a	 similar	 system	 of	 interest	
representation,	 it	 could	 hardly	 be	 called	 a	 democratic	 one.	 Yet	 both	 regimes	
emerged	after	a	revolution	they	claimed	to	epitomise	as	a	key	claim	to	legitimacy	–	
the	difference	being	that	Cuba	took	an	anti-capitalist	path.	To	be	sure,	the	Mexican	
revolution	(1910)	occurred	before	the	Bolshevik’s	(1917),	which	helps	to	understand	
the	absence	of	anti-capitalists	pursuing	state	power	in	the	Mexican	insurgent	ranks.	
In	contrast,	when	the	Cuban	revolution	erupted,	communist	forces	were	all	over	the	
world,	Latin	America	of	course	included.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 regimes	 of	 both	 Mexico	 and	 Cuba	 shared	 an	 ideological	
trace:	 a	 bold	 revolutionary	 nationalism	 –	 a	 defensive	 stance	 against	 foreign	
intervention	 in	 internal	 affairs,	 aimed	 at	 the	 United	 States	 in	 particular.	 This	
convergence	 had	 laid	 the	 ground	 for	 a	 decades-long	 Mexico-Cuba	 “convenient	
partnership”,	which	could	only	be	broken	with	the	entrenchment	of	neoliberalism	in	
Mexico	in	the	1990s,	as	Covarrubias	(2011)	has	explained	at	length.	
Thus,	 just	 as	 the	 non-democratic	 nature	 of	 Mexican	 corporatism	 proved	 self-
defeating	on	the	long	term,	arguably	the	same	danger	haunts	the	Cuban	case.	
Therefore,	 for	 Chaguaceda	 and	 Azor	 (2011),	 the	 party-state	 fusion	 in	 Cuba	
intrinsically	 implies	 the	 control	 of	 political	 participation	 of	 any	 social	 group.	 The	
customary	 suspicion	 of	 the	 Cuban	 state	 towards	 independent	 political	 action,	
explains	the	regime’s	usual	obstruction	of	the	autonomous	citizen’s	organisation;	i.e.	
pluralism.	 Hence	 political	 participation	 in	 Cuba	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	
	
37	
individual	 voice.	 Although	 from	 a	 top-down	 perspective	 the	 aggregation	 of	 social	
demands	 is	 feasible,	 the	 bottom-up	 coordination	 to	 shape	 an	 agenda	 let	 alone	
managing	it	is	excluded.	Therefore,	the	political	participation	of	Cubans	is	reduced	to	
the	 discussion	 of	 plans	 already	 outlined	 (or	 decided)	 at	 the	 higher	 levels	 of	 the	
regime,	 such	 as	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 or	 the	 Politburo.	 Ultimately,	 the	 Cuban	
leadership	is	free	to	interpret	and	communicate	the	popular	will	from	above	–	while	
at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 groups	 the	popular	masses	 in	vertical	organisations	 led	by	 the	
regime	itself.	
From	a	different	angle,	Roman	(2003)	has	found	democracy	in	Cuba	not	in	the	mass	
organisations,	but	in	the	electoral	system,	where	the	practice	of	both	representation	
and	participation	at	the	 local	 level	would	prove	his	point.	However,	a	Cuban	expert	
on	the	same	topic	has	criticised	that	this	view	overlooks	the	role	of	central	organs:	
Although	 it	 is	 not	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 [Roman’s]	 book	 to	 analyze	 this	 side	 of	 the	 problem	
[centralization	of	power],	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	understand	 the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	
participation	 or	 representation	 without	 analyzing	 the	 distribution	 of	 real	 power,	 vertical	
(nation,	province,	municipality)	or	horizontal	 (executive	and	 legislative	organs).	We	are	 left	
here	to	accept	that	these	powers	are	concentrated	in	the	national	executive	organs	and	that	
representative	or	local	action	is	simply	an	accessory.	(Dilla	2002,	85)	
Roman	additionally	argues	that	Cuba’s	legislative	body,	the	National	Assembly	of	the	
Popular	 Power	 (ANPP,	 by	 its	 acronym	 in	 Spanish),	 is	 very	much	 independent	 from	
the	Communist	Party,	pointing	 to	 the	process	of	elaboration	and	approval	of	 laws.	
Dilla	equally	challenges	this	insinuation	that	Cuba	is	thus	not	really	a	party-state:	
His	assertion	that	the	legislative	acts	of	the	Cuban	parliament	do	not	involve	prior	approval	
by	the	party	leadership	is	valid	with	regard	to	legislative	details	(as	was	confirmed	for	him	in	
an	 interview	 by	 a	 former	 parliament	 president)	 but	 not	 with	 regard	 to	 their	 substantive	
aspects.	 In	any	case,	we	must	bear	 in	mind	that	the	majority	of	 legislative	actions	take	the	
form	of	decrees	 issued	by	 the	 State	Council,	whose	 leaders	 are	 all	members	of	 the	Cuban	
Communist	 Party	 Political	 Bureau.	 The	 National	 Assembly,	 although	 it	 has	 the	 right	 to	
suspend	or	expel	them,	 in	reality	has	never	done	so	and	has	preferred	to	approve	them	all	
with	 little	 or	 no	 discussion.	 Much	 the	 same	 thing	 occurs	 at	 the	 provincial	 and	 municipal	
levels	[…].	(Dilla	2002,	86)	
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This	 said,	 Dilla	 nonetheless	 highlights	 that	 Roman’s	 work	 represent	 a	 serious	
challenge	 to	 mainstream	 research	 on	 Cuba.	 Not	 least	 because	 it	 shows	 that	
“representative	and	participatory	institutions	can	function	in	a	one-party	system	as	
efficiently	as	in	a	multiparty	one,	and	his	reaffirming	this	in	a	world	context	of	liberal	
dogmatism	 is	 a	 sign	 of	 his	 courage	 and	 intellectual	 honesty”	 (Dilla	 2002,	 85-86).	
Much	 the	 same	 can	be	 said	 of	 Kapcia’s	work,	which	 even	 shows	 that	 Cuban	mass	
organisations	 can	 be	 more	 responsive	 to	 citizen’s	 demands	 than	 the	 liberal	
democratic	 sporadic	 vote.	My	 point,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 institutionalised	 (single-
party)	exclusion	of	coordinated	controversy	is	closer	to	Stalinism	than	to	democracy.	
2.2	A	Marxist	dead-end	path	
Up	 to	 this	 point,	 I	 have	 advanced	 the	 definition	 of	 Cuba	 as	 a	 totalitarian	 non-
capitalist	 formation.	However,	an	alternative	view	also	 inspired	 in	Marxism	defines	
Cuba	as	a	case	of	‘state	capitalism’	–	a	notion	I	reject	in	this	section.	
Firstly,	 I	 will	 question	 the	 theoretical	 consistency	 of	 that	 concept	 –	 as	 developed	
after	WW2	as	a	revision	of	Trotsky’s	analysis	of	the	USSR.	Then,	I	will	argue	against	
the	transposition	of	this	framework	to	the	analysis	of	the	Cuban	case.	
2.2.1	The	invention	of	‘state	capitalism’	
Leon	Trotsky	had	defined	 the	Soviet	Union	under	Stalin	as	a	degenerated	worker’s	
state	 ruled	 by	 a	bureaucracy.	 Trotsky	 developed	 his	 approach	 in	 the	 1930s,	more	
clearly	in	the	book	The	Revolution	Betrayed:	what	is	the	Soviet	Union	and	where	is	it	
going?	However,	 twenty	years	 later	and	with	WW2	already	over,	 the	Soviet	Union	
annexed	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 Eastern	 Europe	 –	 recreating	 there	 both	 the	 Soviet’s	
socioeconomic	structure	and	political	system.	Were	they	new	‘workers’	states’?	
The	debate	over	 this	question	divided	 the	Trotskyite	movement	among	 those	who	
thought	Trotsky’s	analysis	was	still	relevant	and	those	who	concluded	it	was	wrong	
and	a	new	theory	was	needed.	The	revisionists	converged	in	the	view	that	the	Soviet	
Union	was	actually	a	form	of	capitalism,	which	was	ruled	by	a	new	social	class	–	and	
as	such	socialists	must	not	defend	that	system	as	Trotsky	had	argued.	
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For	 example,	 Claude	 Lefort	 and	 Cornelius	 Castoriadis	 in	 France,	 and	 Tony	 Cliff	 in	
Britain,	were	among	several	Trotskyite	figures	in	different	countries	that	attempted	
to	 develop	 an	 alternative	 to	 Trotsky’s	 original	 framework	 (Linden	 2009,	 107).	
However,	they	did	not	share	the	same	political	trajectory.	While	Castoriadis	actually	
departed	from	Trotskyism,	Cliff	set	up	a	distinct	yet	Trotskyite	tradition.	
Regarding	Castoriadis,	he	frankly	explained	that	he	and	his	comrades	had	departed	
from	 Trotskyism	 “on	 the	 most	 crucial	 problem	 of	 all,	 that	 of	 Stalinism”	 –	 in	 his	
account,	“the	history	of	our	times	has	disproved	again	and	again	both	the	Trotskyist	
viewpoint	and	the	forecasts	that	have	been	derived	from	it”	(Castoriadis	1955,	np).	
Specifically,	for	Castoriadis	political	events	after	WW2	had	disproved	the	following:	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 revolution,	 Trotsky	 said,	 the	 Stalinist	 parties	would	 become	more	 and	
more	like	the	reforming	parties	and	more	and	more	attached	to	the	bourgeois	order,	while	
the	Russian	bureaucracy	would	be	overthrown	with	or	without	foreign	intervention	so	as	to	
bring	about	a	restoration	of	capitalism.	(Castoriadis	1955,	np)	
The	conclusion	he	and	his	comrades	drew	from	this	did	not	hide	their	frustration:	
Trotsky	had	 tied	 this	 prognostication	 to	 the	outcome	of	 the	 Second	World	War.	As	 is	well	
known,	this	war	disproved	it	in	the	most	glaring	terms.	The	Trotskyist	leadership	made	itself	
look	ridiculous	by	stating	that	it	was	just	a	matter	of	time.	But	it	had	become	apparent	to	us,	
even	before	the	war	ended,	that	it	was	not	and	could	not	have	been	a	question	of	some	kind	
of	time	lag,	but	rather	of	the	direction	of	history,	and	that	Trotsky's	entire	edifice	was,	down	
to	its	very	foundations,	mythological.	The	Russian	bureaucracy	underwent	the	critical	test	of	
the	war	and	showed	it	had	as	much	cohesiveness	as	any	other	dominant	class.	If	the	Russian	
regime	admitted	of	some	contradictions,	 it	also	exhibited	a	degree	of	stability	no	 less	than	
that	of	the	American	or	German	regime.	The	Stalinist	parties	did	not	go	over	to	the	side	of	
the	bourgeois	order.	(Castoriadis	1955,	np)	
As	the	Soviet	bureaucracy	was	not	an	ephemeral	social	group	–	on	the	contrary,	 it	
was	 a	 stable	 ‘social	 class’	 that	 had	 undergone	 “the	 critical	 test	 of	 the	 war	 and	
showed	 it	 had	 as	much	 cohesiveness	 as	 any	other	 dominant	 class”	 –	 then	 Trotsky	
was	wrong	 and	 a	 new	 understanding	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	was	 needed.	 Hence	 for	
Castoriadis	 the	Stalinist	 system	was	not	a	non-capitalist	 formation	 (a	 ‘degenerated	
worker’s	state’),	but	a	‘bureaucratic	capitalism’	(Linden	2009,	116).	
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Even	more,	the	Soviet	system	was	supposed	to	be	“the	final	stage”	of	capitalism:	
Once	rid	of	the	Trotskyist	outlook,	it	was	easy	to	see	using	the	basic	categories	of	Marxism,	
that	Russian	society	is	divided	into	classes,	among	which	the	two	fundamental	ones	are	the	
bureaucracy	 and	 the	 proletariat.	 The	 bureaucracy	 there	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 the	 dominant,	
exploiting	 class	 in	 the	 full	 sense	 of	 the	 term.	 […]	We	 see,	 therefore,	 that	 […]	 bureaucracy	
personifies	the	final	stage	of	capitalist	development.	(Castoriadis	1955,	np)	
For	 his	 part,	 Tony	 Cliff	 similarly	 theorised	 the	 Soviet	Union	 as	 a	 ‘state	 capitalism’,	
which	 he	 identified	 with	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 state	 had	 “concentrated	 the	 total	
national	capital	in	its	hands	which	competition	on	the	world	market	continued”	(Cliff	
1948,	chap.	5).	In	contrast	to	Castoriadis,	however,	it	was	interaction	with	the	‘world	
market’	what	conferred	its	capitalist	character	to	any	Soviet-like	economy.	
Linden,	who	has	studied	Cliff’s	theory	in	depth,	has	synthesised	it:	
If	 one	 saw	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	 isolation,	 without	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 international	
context,	 then	 it	 would	 strikingly	 resemble	 ‘one	 big	 factory’,	 which	was	 led	 from	 a	 central	
point.	 The	 capitalist	 character	 of	 this	 big	 state	 enterprise	 became	 visible	 if	 one	 included	
world	 relations	 in	 the	 analysis;	 then	 it	 transpired	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 a	 nation	 was	
comparable	to	any	individual	capitalist	enterprise	which	sought	to	survive	within	competitive	
relations.	(Linden	2009,	121)	
Also	 similar	 to	 Castoriadis’	 idea	 that	 the	 ‘bureaucratic	 capitalism’	 was	 the	
consummation	 of	 capitalist	 development,	 Cliff	 saw	 his	 ‘state	 capitalism’	 as	 “the	
extreme	theoretical	limit	which	capitalism	can	reach”	(Cliff	1948,	chap.	5).	Although	
both	 Castoriadis	 and	 Cliff	 converged	 in	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 the	
final/extreme	 stage/limit	 of	 capitalism,	 they	 differed	 on	 where	 exactly	 lay	 its	
capitalist	character.	While	Castoriadis	asserted	that	 the	Soviet	Union	was	capitalist	
due	to	internal	factors	(the	bureaucracy	is	an	‘exploitive	class’),	Cliff	emphasised	the	
external	side	(the	USSR	competes	in	‘the	world	market’).	
In	what	follows	I	will	only	examine	Cliff’s	theory	as	it	has	been	more	influential	than	
Castoriadis’	 (Linden	 2009),	 my	 contention	 being	 that	 state-capitalism	 theory	 is	
inconsistent.	 To	begin	with,	 the	weak	 spot	of	portraying	 the	Soviet	Union	as	 a	big	
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capitalist	 company	 competing	 in	 the	 world	 market	 –	 an	 idea	 central	 to	 Cliff’s	
approach	–	was	actually	anticipated	by	Cliff	himself:	
Russia’s	backwardness	has	ruled	out	any	question	of	 flooding	foreign	markets	with	Russian	
goods.	On	the	other	hand,	Russian	markets	are	kept	from	being	flooded	with	foreign	goods	
by	the	monopoly	of	foreign	trade	which	only	military	might	can	smash.	(Cliff	1948,	chap.	7)	
Cliff’s	solution	to	this	theoretical	tension	(how	can	the	world	market	affect	the	USSR	
if	 there	 is	 no	 foreign	 trade?),	 and	 the	 problems	 derived	 from	 it,	 has	 been	 well	
detected	and	discussed	by	Linden:	
This	 circumstance	 could,	 however,	 be	 taken	 to	 imply	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 a	 national	
capitalist	enterprise	did	not	 compete	with	other	 foreign	capitals.	And	 if	 that	was	 the	case,	
would	it	then	still	make	sense	to	talk	about	‘capital’	at	all?	Cliff	thought	he	could	neutralise	
the	 obvious	 objection	 by	 postulating	 that	 international	 competition	 did	 not	 take	 place	 by	
means	of	commodities,	but	by	means	of	use-values	in	the	form	of	armaments.	[…]	
Cliff’s	approach	forces	him	to	reduce	competition	essentially	to	the	arms	race:	a	competition	
over	military	capacity.	That,	however,	 is	still	 in	conflict	with	[Marxian]	orthodoxy.	The	arms	
race,	 after	 all,	 did	 not	 involve	 mainly	 commodities	 produced	 for	 an	 open	 market,	 and	
therefore	cannot	be	considered	as	trade	based	on	capitalist	competition.	(Linden	2009,	122,	
312-3)	
Thus	 for	Linden,	“we	are	 forced	to	 the	conclusion	that	not	a	single	 theory	of	state	
capitalism	succeeded	in	being	both	orthodox-Marxist	as	well	as	consistent	with	the	
facts”	(Linden	2009,	313).	Although	for	Linden	the	only	inconsistency	of	Cliff’s	theory	
is	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 world	 market,	 another	 problem	 that	 compounds	 the	 overall	
picture	lies	on	the	definition	of	the	bureaucracy	as	a	capitalist	class.	
To	be	sure,	to	talk	about	capitalism	means,	for	Marx,	to	talk	about	capitalists:	
The	 capitalist,	 as	 capitalist,	 is	 simply	 the	 personification	 of	 capital,	 the	 creation	 of	 labour	
endowed	with	its	own	will	and	personality	which	stands	in	opposition	to	labour.	[…]	[I]f	one	
eliminates	the	capitalists,	the	means	of	production	cease	to	be	capital.	(Marx	1972,	296)	
Alternatively,	Marx	 (1973,	512)	underscored	 in	his	Grundrisse	 that	 “the	concept	of	
capital	 contains	 the	 capitalist”.	 If	 such	 is	 the	 case,	 therefore	 the	 concept	 of	 state	
capitalism	must	necessarily	 imply	 the	bourgeoisie.	 The	way	Cliff	 circumvented	 this	
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problem	was	 to	 theorise	 that	 the	 Soviet	 bureaucracy	 was	 indeed	 a	 bourgeoisie	 –	
even	more,	the	“purest	personification”	of	the	capitalist	class:	
We	 can	 therefore	 say	 that	 the	 Russian	 bureaucracy,	 “owning”	 as	 it	 does	 the	 state	 and	
controlling	 the	process	of	accumulation,	 is	 the	personification	of	 capital	 in	 its	purest	 form.	
[…]	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 bureaucracy	 fulfils	 the	 tasks	 of	 the	 capitalist	 class,	 and	 by	 doing	 so	
transforms	 itself	 into	 a	 class,	makes	 it	 the	 purest	 personification	 of	 this	 class.	 (Cliff	 1948,	
chap.	6)	
For	Linden,	the	solution	just	quoted	above	“assumed	the	existence	of	a	bourgeoisie	
in	 the	Soviet	Union”,	 therefore	Cliff’s	 approach	was	 “compatible	with	an	orthodox	
definition	of	capitalism”	(Linden	2009,	312).	However,	Linden’s	assessment	can	only	
stand	on	 its	 feet	 if	 one	 ignores	 another	 core	element	of	Marx’s	 theory;	 i.e.	 that	 a	
capitalist	 class	 is	 such	 because	 its	 individual	 members	 own	means	 of	 production.	
Each	capitalist	has	a	right	on	a	property:	s/he	can	sell	 it,	 let	 it,	 inherit	 it,	etc.	From	
this	perspective,	the	bureaucracy	of	the	old	Soviet	Union	and	that	of	the	countries	
where	its	structure	was	later	replicated	cannot	be	conceived	as	a	capitalist	class.	A	
bureaucrat	 is	 not	 a	 bourgeois:	 s/he	 does	 not	 enjoy	 the	 same	 privilege,	 which	 is	
qualitatively	inferior.	Trotsky	disputed	the	first	version	of	state-capitalism	theory	on	
precisely	this	point.	For	him,	the	issue	of	property	rights	was	“sufficient	to	show	how	
absurd	 are	 the	 attempts	 to	 identify	 capitalist	 stateism	 with	 the	 Soviet	 system”	
(Trotsky	1972,	245).	He	then	further	elaborated:	
The	bureaucracy	has	not	yet	created	social	supports	for	 its	dominion	in	the	form	of	special	
types	of	property.	It	is	compelled	to	defend	state	property	as	the	source	of	its	power	and	its	
income.	In	this	aspect	of	its	activity	it	still	remains	a	weapon	of	proletarian	dictatorship.	
The	 attempt	 to	 represent	 the	 Soviet	 bureaucracy	 as	 a	 class	 of	 “state	 capitalists”	 will	
obviously	 not	 withstand	 criticism.	 The	 bureaucracy	 has	 neither	 stocks	 nor	 bonds.	 It	 is	
recruited,	 supplemented	 and	 renewed	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 an	 administrative	 hierarchy,	
independently	of	any	special	property	relations	of	its	own.	The	individual	bureaucrat	cannot	
transmit	 to	 his	 heirs	 his	 rights	 in	 the	 exploitation	of	 the	 state	 apparatus.	 The	bureaucracy	
enjoys	its	privileges	under	the	form	of	an	abuse	of	power	[…].	(Trotsky	1972,	chap.	9)	
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For	 Moreno	 the	 basic	 uncertainty	 haunting	 the	 privileged	 position	 of	 Soviet-style	
bureaucracies	 was	 still	 true	 as	 late	 as	 the	 1980s,	 and	 he	 gave	 similar	 reasons	 to	
Trotsky’s	about	why	the	bureaucracy	was	not	a	capitalist,	hence	propertied,	class:	
The	bureaucrat	is	thus	unstable	[…]	because	is	dependent	on	others	[…].	A	landowner	owns	
his	land;	no	bureaucrat	is	the	owner	of	his	post.	He	is	dependent	on	the	post	and,	therefore,	
lives	 nervously.	 Does	 the	 one	 above	me	 like	me	 or	 not?	 [The	 bureaucracy]	 lacks	 stability,	
does	not	have	 class	 certainty,	 and	 lives	 in	 a	 chimera.	 Is	 very	weak	 in	 this	 sense,	 though	 is	
terribly	counter-revolutionary	by	that	same	reason.	She	does	not	want	the	working	class	to	
move	a	single	millimetre;	she	does	not	leave	her	any	space.	(Moreno	1982,	57)	
More	telling	perhaps,	the	sole	long-term	economic	crisis	that	provoked	the	collapse	
gave	another	blow	to	the	state	capitalism	theory	as	the	Soviet	Union	was	supposedly	
a	higher	stage	of	capitalism.	However,	Cliff	and	his	supporters	“could	hardly	conceive	
of	 a	 collapse	 of	 state	 capitalism	 and	 the	 regression	 to	 a	 ‘lower’	 stage	 of	 private	
capitalism	 which	 that	 could	 imply”	 (Linden	 2009,	 258).	 In	 my	 view,	 these	
theoreticians	 had	mistaken	 a	 contingent	 historical	 product	 (the	 totalitarian	 Soviet	
Union)	for	a	teleological	historical	stage	(the	consummation	of	capitalism).	
2.2.2	The	so-called	capitalist	Cuba	
Recent	 Cuba	has	 been	defined	 as	 a	 ‘state	 capitalism’	 by	 academics	 such	 as	 Rafael	
Rojas	(2010)	and	Carmona	Báez	(2004).	As	already	mentioned,	this	concept	belongs	
to	 the	 theories	 developed	 by	 revisionist	 figures	 within	 the	 Trotskyite	 movement	
intended	to	re-characterise	the	Soviet	Union	and	Eastern	Europe	after	WW2.	
Hence	 for	 Rojas	 (2010,	 61)	 “Lefort	 and	 Castoriadis	 would	 not	 have	 hesitated	 to	
consider	[Cuba	an]	authoritarian	state	capitalism.”	For	his	part,	Carmona	Báez	(2004,	
23-6)	 has	 adapted	 Tony	 Cliff’s	 theory	 of	 “bureaucratic	 state	 capitalism”.	However,	
Rojas	has	not	developed	his	definition	 in	detail,	as	 if	asking	the	reader	to	trust	the	
framework	of	Lefort	and	Castoriadis	and	its	suitability	for	Cuba.	In	contrast,	Carmona	
Báez	has	discussed	thoroughly	his	Cliff-ean	approach	to	Cuba.	
To	 start	 with,	 Castoriadis/Lefort	 did	 not	 use	 the	 term	 ‘state	 capitalism’,	 let	 alone	
‘authoritarian	 state	 capitalism’	 as	 Rojas	 (2010)	 claims.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	
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disdainfully	rejected	this	notion,	which	Linden,	again,	captured	in	his	comprehensive	
study	on	the	different	Marxist	theorisations	of	the	Soviet	Union:	
Castoriadis	 later	 explained,	 that	 he	 regarded	 ‘state	 capitalism’	 as	 ‘an	 almost	 completely	
meaningless	 expression’	 creating	 ‘a	 disastrous	 confusion	 […],	 for	 it	 makes	 one	 think	 that	
capitalism’s	economic	laws	continue	to	hold	after	the	disappearance	of	private	property,	of	
the	market,	and	of	competition,	which	is	absurd.’	(Castoriadis	quoted	in	Linden	2009,	116)	
Instead,	Castoriadis/Lefort	referred	to	the	Soviet	Union	as	‘bureaucratic	capitalism’,	
a	label	with	which	they	“wanted	to	emphasise	specifically	the	fact	that,	in	the	Soviet	
Union,	exploitation	and	oppression	had	persisted	despite	the	elimination	of	classical	
private	 property”	 (Linden	 2009,	 117).	 However,	 setting	 subtleties	 apart,	 it	 can	 be	
argued	that	Castoriadis/Lefort’s	approach	was	not	at	odds	with	state-capitalist	ones	
like	 Cliff’s,	 which	 is	 what	 Linden	 (2009,	 107-126)	 implies	 when	 he	 groups	 them	
together	as	part	of	the	‘theories	of	state	capitalism’	developed	in	1941-56.	
In	a	similar	yet	more	disputable	point,	Rojas	has	wrongly	attributed	‘state	capitalist’	
credentials	to	Moreno,	an	author	actually	adhering	to	workers’	state	theory.	
Rojas’s	assessment	of	Moreno	is	as	follows:	
[T]his	Argentinian	Trotskyist	makes	some	of	the	most	serious	criticisms	that	have	been	made	
to	the	Cuban	Revolution	from	the	Latin	American	left.	Following	the	central	ideas	of	Trotsky,	
Moreno	argued	that	the	history	of	the	20th	century	obliged	to	consider	a	stage	[…]	in	which	
capitalism	was	not	overcome	by	the	workers’	self-government	but	by	a	long	phase	of	“state	
capitalism”,	 led	 by	 a	 governmental	 bureaucracy.	 In	 his	 essay,	 Moreno	 referred,	
fundamentally,	 to	 three	 “frozen	 socialist	 revolutions”	 in	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 Soviets’,	 the	
Chinese,	and	the	Cuban.	(Rojas	2011,	np)	
Nonetheless,	I	am	afraid	that	in	the	essay	quoted	by	Rojas,	Moreno	never	mentioned	
state	 capitalism	 theory.	 Instead,	 he	 defines	 Cuba	 as	 a	 ‘workers’	 state’	 –	 where	 a	
frozen	 or	 deformed	 revolution	 produced	 a	 totalitarian	 political	 regime	 led	 by	 a	
family’s	government,	the	Castro’s	(Moreno	1984,	11,	61,	68).	Thus,	a	careful	reading	
of	Rojas’	sources	results	in	an	objection	to	Rojas	himself.	One	can	only	wonder	why	
Rojas	has	 so	blatantly	misstated	 the	authors	he	 relies	on	 to	make	his	 case.	 In	 any	
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event,	 one	 can	 only	 draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 Cuba	 as	 state	
capitalism	advanced	by	him	cannot	be	taken	seriously.	
Carmona	 Báez,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 has	 indeed	 developed	 a	 distinct	 approach.	 In	 the	
original	conceptualisation	of	Cuba	as	a	state	capitalism,	Cliff’s	collaborators	asserted	
that	 the	 Caribbean	 island	 was	 “an	 international	 tentacle	 of	 Russian	 state	 capital”	
(Binns	and	González	1980,	33).	However,	this	is	a	simplistic	view	that	overlooks	that	
Cuba	was	not	a	servant	or	satellite	but	a	junior	partner	of	the	Soviet	Union	(Farber	
2011,	125),	in	a	type	of	relationship	analogous	to	the	one	that	has	existed	between	
Israel	and	the	United	States	(Gleijeses	2002,	373-4).	In	this	sense,	Soviet-aided	large	
Cuban	military	incursion	in	Angola	in	1975-6	was	read	by	the	Cliff-eans	as	the	proof	
that	 Fidel	 Castro	 was	 a	 “Brezhnev’s	 agent”	 that	 provided	 “much	 cheaper”	 troops	
than	 the	Red	Army	 (Binns	and	González	1980).	The	 reality,	however,	was	 so	much	
different.	 As	 a	 high	 Soviet	 foreign	 officials	 later	 acknowledged,	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
Angola	mission	originated	 in	Havana,	not	Moscow	–	which	proved	converging,	not	
imposed	 interests	 between	 the	 USSR	 and	 Cuba	 (Domínguez	 1986,	 133-5).	
Furthermore,	had	Cuba	been	a	Soviet	lackey,	why	would	it	have	been	able	to	survive	
the	collapse	of	its	master?	Such	is	the	question	Carmona	deals	with.	
Carmona	 in	 turn	proposed	an	 innovation	 to	Cliff’s	 theory	 in	 light	of	 the	 survival	of	
Cuba	to	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	(hence	its	subsidy	to	the	island’s	economy):	
I	would	accept	Cliff’s	argument	that	since	production	relations	are	essentially	the	same	and	
the	 law	of	value	continues	 to	exist,	Cuba’s	mode	of	production	 in	many	aspects	 resembles	
bureaucratic	 state	 capitalism;	 possibly	 a	 decentralised	 bureaucratic	 state	 capitalism.	
(Carmona	Báez	2004,	25)	
However,	 the	 politics	 of	 Carmona	 are	 at	 odds	with	 Cliff’s	 tradition	 for	 the	 former	
accepts	state	capitalism’s	theory,	but	giving	it	a	positive	twist	–	instead	of	lamenting	
its	capitalist	character,	one	should	celebrate	that	at	least	Cuba	was	not	a	deformed	
entity	like	the	Soviet	Union.	This	is	what	transpires	in	Carmona’s	approach	to	Cuba’s	
survival,	which	he	looks	as	some	sort	of	evolution	of	the	state-capitalist	creature:	
Few	 Marxists	 anticipated	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 national	 industries	 under	 still	 state-
controlled	economies.	The	experience	[…]	concerning	Cuba’s	new	enterprise	system,	totally	
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negates	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 centralised	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 a	 central	
bureaucracy.	There	is	a	new	development	that	emanated	from	the	economic	crisis	that	Cuba	
experienced	 during	 the	 early	 1990s.	 […]	 I	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 state-run	 economies	 are	
capable	of	surviving	global	pressures	to	return	or	transit	to	private	competitive	capitalism	by	
adjusting	 their	 own	 lines	 of	 production	 in	 order	 for	 them	 to	 resemble	 those	 of	 private	
companies,	thereby	making	themselves	more	competitive.	(Carmona	Báez	2004,	25)	
Nonetheless,	by	depicting	the	1990s	‘decentralisation’	of	the	Cuban	foreign	sector	as	
an	evolution	(in	the	sense	of	progress)	of	state	capitalism,	Carmona	tells	more	about	
his	 normative	 settings	 than	 about	 Cuba.	 While	 Carmona	 notes	 that	 the	 Cuban	
leadership	 “often	 shy	 away	 from	 critiquing	 their	 own	 production	 relations”	 (2004,	
25),	 he	 makes	 the	 controversial	 claim	 that	 “the	 ideas	 that	 are	 promoted	 by	 the	
vanguard”	are	“currently	demanded	by	the	general	population”	(2004,	41).	Of	course	
one	would	like	to	know	whether	Carmona	confers	on	the	political	system	of	Cuba	an	
unacknowledged	 yet	 implicit	 claim	 to	 universality.	 Regarding	 this,	 one	 is	 rather	
tempted	to	evoke	Rojas’	quip	 that	many	of	“those	who	endorse	 the	regime	of	 the	
island	uncritically	[…]	would	never	accept	a	single-party	system	or	capitalism	of	the	
state	in	Rome,	Paris,	London	or	Washington”	(Rojas	2010,	62).	
On	 the	other	hand,	 if	Carmona’s	basic	argument	 is	 that	Cuba	avoided	a	“return	 to	
private	 competitive	 capitalism”	 through	 the	 decentralisation	 of	 its	 “state-run”	
economy,	 whence	 does	 he	 derive	 the	 insistence	 on	 calling	 it	 ‘capitalist’?	 My	
contention	 here	 is	 that	 Carmona’s	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 trapped	 in	 an	 inadequate	
theoretical	jacket.	While	he	provides	evidence	for	the	1990s	decentralisation	of	the	
Cuban	 economy,	 he	 takes	 for	 granted	 that	 the	 formation	 he	 is	 dealing	 with	 is	 a	
capitalism	of	the	state.	Nevertheless,	the	case	is	that	there	is	no	native	bourgeoisie	
(i.e.	 capitalist	 class	 in	 the	 Marxian	 sense	 of	 the	 term)	 in	 Cuba	 since	 the	 1960s	
expropriations	launched	by	the	revolutionary	state	–	and	this	makes	a	difference.	
I	 hope	 that	 the	 previous	 discussion	 suffices	 to	 illustrate	 the	 lack	 of	 theoretical	
coherence	 behind	 the	 definition	 of	 Cuba	 as	 a	 case	 of	 ‘state	 capitalism’.	 Instead,	 I	
insist	defining	 it	 as	a	non-capitalist	 formation.	Although	 it	 is	not	enough	 to	 raise	a	
negative	 concept	 –	 namely	 one	 based	 on	 what	 is	 not	 (indeed,	 if	 Cuba	 is	 non-
capitalist,	then	what	it	is?)	–	arguably	this	term	provides	a	better	starting	point.	
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2.3	Trotsky	reconsidered	
The	question	of	whether	Trotsky’s	analysis	retained	any	value	at	all	after	WW2	–	a	
key	 question	 in	 some	 theories	 earlier	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 –	 is,	 at	 bottom,	
originated	in	a	faulty	posturing	of	the	analyst.	To	illuminate	this	claim	I	will	use	to	my	
advantage	Žižek’s	 challenge	 to	an	equivalent	question	 regarding	 the	contemporary	
value	of	‘the	idea	of	communism’	activated	by	Karl	Marx	in	the	19th	century:	
Adorno	begins	his	Three	Studies	on	Hegel	with	a	 rebuttal	of	 the	 traditional	question	about	
Hegel	exemplified	in	the	title	of	Benedetto	Croce’s	book	What	is	Living	and	What	is	Dead	in	
the	 Philosophy	 of	 Hegel?	 Such	 a	 question	 presupposes,	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 author,	 the	
adoption	of	an	arrogant	position	as	judge	of	the	past;	
Alternatively,	he	suggests:	
but	 when	 we	 are	 dealing	 with	 a	 truly	 great	 philosopher	 the	 real	 question	 to	 be	 raised	
concerns	not	what	this	philosopher	may	still	tell	us,	what	he	may	still	mean	to	us,	but	rather	
the	opposite,	namely	what	we	are,	what	our	contemporary	situation	might	be,	 in	his	eyes,	
how	our	epoch	would	appear	to	his	thought.	And	the	same	should	apply	to	communism	[…].	
The	only	way	to	grasp	the	true	novelty	of	the	New	is	to	analyse	the	world	through	the	lenses	
of	what	was	“eternal”	in	the	Old.	(Žižek	2009a,	6)	
Although	Trotsky	was	not	a	philosopher,	Žižek	has	conferred	him	a	 ‘great’	 status	–	
one	that	emanates	from	a	political	continuum	from	Marx	to	Trotsky	via	Lenin.	
From	Marx	to	Lenin:	
Lenin	 violently	 displaces	 Marx,	 tears	 his	 theory	 out	 of	 its	 original	 context,	 planting	 it	 in	
another	historical	moment,	and	thus	effectively	universalizes	it.	(Žižek	2001,	3)	
From	Lenin	to	Trotsky:	
[P]erhaps,	 the	 signifier	 ‘Trotsky’	 is	 the	 most	 appropriate	 designation	 of	 what	 is	 worth	
redeeming	in	the	Leninist	legacy.	(Žižek	2007,	20)	
The	following	Žižekian	proposition	can	be	thus	formulated:	instead	of	reprimanding	
Trotsky	for	failing	to	predict	the	future	correctly	–	let	us	put	aside	for	a	moment	that	
nobody	knows	the	future,	never	mind	Trotsky	who	was	murdered	by	a	Stalinist	agent	
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before	the	war	broke	out	–	the	real	question	to	be	raised	was	how	the	new	situation	
(post-war	Stalinism)	would	have	appeared	to	his	thought?	
Such	 was	 the	 procedure	 attempted	 by	 Trotsky’s	 followers	 grouped	 in	 the	 Fourth	
International	 after	 an	 internal	 debate	 that	 lasted	 from	 1947	 to	 1951,	 when	 the	
organisation	 adopted	 the	 view	 advanced	by	 the	US-Americans	 Joseph	Hansen	 and	
Berth	 Cochran,	 for	whom	 the	 Soviet	 occupied	 countries	were	workers’	 states	 that	
had	 been	bureaucratically	 deformed	 from	 the	 beginning	 (Linden	 2009,	 106).	 Their	
not	only	stated	that	the	Stalinist	system	had	been	replicated	in	Eastern	Europe,	but	
they	derived	 this	 from	an	update	of	Trotsky’s	analysis.	The	key	argument	was	 that	
the	new	states	belonged	to	the	same	species	existing	in	the	Soviet	Union	at	the	time,	
but	its	formation	had	followed	a	different	historical	path:	not	through	degeneration	
of	an	emancipatory	project,	but	via	direct	recreation	of	the	degenerated	type.	
However,	 the	 choice	 of	 words	 (‘workers’	 state’)	 causes	 distracting	 objections.	 A	
typical	one	is	the	axiom	that	“you	cannot	have	a	workers'	state	without	the	workers	
having	power	to	dictate	what	happens	in	society”	(Cliff	1979,	np).	If	occupied	Eastern	
Europe	countries	were	not	in	the	hands	of	workers,	ergo	they	were	(they	could	not	
be	 other	 than)	 capitalists.	 Such	 reductionism	 is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 state	 capitalist’s	
objection	to	following	Trotsky	after	his	time	–	then	ex	post	facto	not	even	in	his	time.	
Linden	 (2009,	 315)	 has	 objected	 the	 ‘workers’	 state’	 notion	 along	 similar	 lines,	
signalling	the	contradiction	of	viewing	the	working	class	“as	being	economically	the	
ruling	class,	but	politically	powerless”.	In	his	view:	
The	peculiar	thing	is	that	[…]	in	a	planned	economy,	political	and	economic	power	cannot	be	
so	separated.	Whoever	formulated	and	supervised	the	implementation	of	the	plan,	and	thus	
possessed	political	power,	obviously	also	ruled	the	economy.	(Linden	2009,	315)	
However,	for	Trotsky	the	Soviet	Union	under	Stalin	was	still	a	workers’	state	not	 in	
the	sense	 that	workers	 remained	somehow	a	 ‘ruling	class’,	but	 rather	 in	 the	sense	
that	the	bourgeoisie	still	remained	defeated,	expropriated,	and	no	private	capitalists	
ran	the	economy.	Far	from	the	early	days	in	which	the	Soviet	Union	was	actually	run	
by	workers’	councils,	the	bureaucracy	had	removed	workers	from	power	but	it	had	
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not	 yet	 brought	 the	 bourgeoisie	 back.	 By	 defining	 the	 USSR	 as	 a	 ‘degenerated	
workers’	 state,’	 Trotsky	 implied	 that	 although	 this	 polity	 had	 ‘degenerated’	 into	 a	
bureaucratic	totalitarianism,	it	was	still	a	revolutionary	conquest	–	a	‘worker	state’.	
Although	 Trotsky	 was	 addressing	 USSR’s	 domestic	 politics,	 there	 was	 also	 an	
international	dimension	in	play.	With	World	War	II	(WW2)	at	the	doors,	sides	were	
to	be	taken,	and	Trotsky’s	theory	was	also	an	international	call	to	defend	the	USSR	
from	imperialist	and/or	Nazi	aggression.	As	the	sole	place	where	capitalists	had	been	
routed,	how	could	socialists	have	had	rejected	the	defence	of	a	workers’	state?	
Trotsky’s	work	was	thus	an	instrumental	tailor	made	answer	to	the	predicament	of	
the	 time.	While	 the	 external	 threat	 against	 the	 Soviets	 demanded	 its	 defence,	 its	
degeneration	demanded	the	removal	of	the	internal	threat:	Stalinism.	Reducing	the	
workers’	state	notion	of	Trotsky	to	its	bare	bones,	it	simply	means	non-capitalist.	In	
other	words,	if	the	countries	of	the	socialist	bloc	were	non-capitalist	formations,	the	
political	 implication	was	that	they	embodied	a	key	battlefield	 for	socialists:	ergo,	 it	
was	necessary	to	reclaim	these	polities	–	both	to	be	preserved	and	reinvented.	
In	this	sense,	Trotsky’s	approach	is	reminiscent	of	Lenin’s	hunch	that	“there	is	not	a	
single	phenomenon	which,	under	certain	conditions,	cannot	be	transformed	into	its	
opposite”	 (Lenin	 quoted	 by	 Lukács	 2009,	 76).	 As	 “there	 are	 no	 areas	 of	 the	 class	
struggle	 in	 which	 revolutionary	 (or	 counter-revolutionary)	 possibilities	 are	 not	
present”	(Ibid,	79),	for	Lukács	the	Leninist	gesture	par	excellence	 is	the	compulsion	
to	politically	intervene	in	order	to	modify	(and	even	lead)	the	course	of	events	is.	
‘The	 readiness	 is	 all.’	 […]	 [T]he	 figure	 of	 Lenin	 as	 the	 very	 embodiment	 of	 permanent	
readiness	 represents	 an	 ineradicable	 value	 –	 a	 new	 form	 of	 exemplary	 attitude	 to	 reality.	
(Lukács	2009,	97)	
From	this	perspective,	Trotsky’s	key	diagnose	was	that	the	Soviet	regime	embodied	
an	 unstable	 political	 equilibrium,	 namely	 on	 the	 brink	 of	 either	 rolling	 forward	 or	
backward	 –	 a	 crucial	 analytical	 suspense	 if	 one	 is	 to	monitor	 and	 exploit	 political	
opportunities.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Stalinism	was	an	interim	political	formation:	
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To	define	the	Soviet	regime	as	transitional,	or	intermediate,	means	to	abandon	such	finished	
social	 categories	 as	 capitalism	 (and	 therewith	 “state	 capitalism”)	 and	 also	 socialism.	 But	
besides	being	completely	 inadequate	 in	 itself,	such	a	definition	 is	capable	of	producing	the	
mistaken	idea	that	from	the	present	Soviet	regime	only	a	transition	to	socialism	is	possible.	
In	reality	a	backslide	to	capitalism	is	wholly	possible.	(Trotsky	1972,	chap.	9)	
Trotsky’s	approach	 thus	echoed	Lenin’s	grasp	 that	 the	 future	 is	not	and	cannot	be	
written	in	advance.	If	the	1917	Russian	Revolution	had	created	a	‘worker	state’	as	a	
step	 forward	 to	socialism,	a	 ‘degeneration’	of	 it	under	Stalin	meant	a	 step	back	 to	
capitalism.	 From	 this	 it	 followed	 that	 there	 were	 two	mutually	 excluding	 political	
outcomes,	the	winner	of	which	could	only	be	decided	by	struggle:	
The	USSR	thus	embodies	 terrific	contradictions.	But	 it	 still	 remains	a	degenerated	workers’	
state.	Such	is	the	social	diagnosis.	The	political	prognosis	has	an	alternative	character:	either	
the	 bureaucracy,	 becoming	 ever	more	 the	 organ	 of	 the	world	 bourgeoisie	 in	 the	workers’	
state,	will	overthrow	the	new	forms	of	property	and	plunge	the	country	back	to	capitalism;	
or	 the	 working	 class	 will	 crush	 the	 bureaucracy	 and	 open	 the	 way	 to	 socialism.	 (Trotsky	
1938b,	np)	
Thus,	 the	 concepts	 of	 both	 degenerated	 and	 deformed	 workers’	 state	 simply	
embodied	 the	 militant	 presentation	 of	 an	 otherwise	 unexciting	 definition:	 non-
capitalism	–	hopefully	not	capitalist	again	/	potentially	put	right	via	struggle.	
Of	course	the	suspense	ended	with	the	disintegration	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	late	
1980s,	when	capitalism	was	restored	as	a	result.	The	die	had	been	cast.	Only	after	a	
large	 privatisation	 process,	 a	 layer	 of	 “lucky”	 bureaucrats	 turned	 into	 a	 capitalist	
class	 proper,	 not	 before.	 Two	 academics	 later	 summarised	 how	 Trotsky’s	 class	
analysis	helped	to	grasp	the	capitalist	restoration	that	followed	the	fall	of	the	USSR:	
Trotsky	had	long	ago	argued	that	the	elite	would	find	its	privileged	position	unsatisfactory,	as	
(under	Soviet	conditions)	it	depended	upon	the	temporary	control	of	office.	Far	better,	from	
their	 point	 of	 view,	 to	 guarantee	 their	 advantage	 and	 make	 it	 heritable	 across	 the	
generations	in	the	same	way	as	ruling	groups	in	other	societies:	by	the	private	ownership	of	
property	and	wealth.	(Kryshtanovskaya	and	White	1996,	730)	
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However,	even	if	Trotsky	was	right,	it	is	also	true	that	his	expectation	that	Stalinism	
would	 either	 suffer	 a	 workers’	 revolt	 or	 a	 capitalist	 restoration	was	 wrong,	 as	 it	
encompassed	two	mutually	excluding	scenarios	that	ultimately	mixed	up.	
As	Žižek	has	put	it:	
The	ultimate	irony,	however,	 is	that	the	two	opposite	outcomes	predicted	by	Trotsky	seem	
to	have	combined	 in	a	 strange	way:	what	enabled	 the	nomenklatura	 to	become	the	direct	
owners	 of	 the	 means	 of	 production	 was	 the	 resistance	 to	 their	 political	 rule,	 whose	 key	
component	–	at	 least	 in	some	cases	(Solidarity	 in	Poland)	–	was	the	workers’	revolt	against	
the	nomenklatura.	(Žižek	2002,	130)	
The	rising	new	technocracy	of	collapsing	Soviet	Union	had	managed	to	get	popular	
support	for	their	plans	by	using	socialist	language.	The	new	elite	argued	they	would	
now	“free”	the	state	enterprises	from	the	hands	of	the	“bureaucracy”	as	a	cover	for	
the	spontaneous	privatisation	of	state	assets	by	former	top	bureaucrats	–	a	process	
witnessed,	advised	and	later	reported	by	Western	neoliberals	(e.g.	Boycko,	Shleifer,	
and	Vishny	1995).	As	the	workers’	revolts	did	not	coalesce	into	a	power	alternative	
that	 reinvented	 the	 system,	 the	 morphing	 elite	 kept	 the	 upper	 hand,	 filled	 the	
political	vacuum,	and	advanced	their	interests.	
Yet	 the	 question	 can	 still	 be	 raised	 of	 Stalinist	 survival	 through	 WW2,	 which	 is	
another	so-called	proof	of	Trotsky´s	theoretical	mistakes.	As	the	USSR	neither	went	
through	capitalist	 restoration	nor	democratic	 renewal	–	quite	 the	contrary,	 it	even	
expanded	 its	 influence	 and	 socio-political	 model	 as	 an	 outcome	 of	WW2	 –	 some	
rejected	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 ‘workers’	 state’	 as	 a	 transitory	 equilibrium,	 and	 instead	
theorised	a	stable	status	quo:	 ‘state	capitalism’.	As	opposed	to	this,	Mandel	 (1979,	
65)	 had	 argued	 that	 “the	 secular	 trend	 is	 and	 remains	 that	 posed	 by	 Trotsky	 […].	
However,	 the	 time-scale	 was	 obviously	 wrong”.	 Mandel	 thus	 removed	 the	 time	
factor	present	 in	Trotsky’s	work,	which	 is	a	procedure	whose	consistency	has	been	
objected	by	Linden	insofar	as	with	such	move	
The	 force	 of	 Trotsky’s	 argument	 is	 thereby	 undone,	 because	 the	 specific	 (and	 Marxian)	
considerations	which	originally	brought	the	author	of	The	Revolution	Betrayed	 to	his	 thesis	
	
52	
are	 now	 tacitly	 eliminated,	 and	 replaced	 by	 an	 abstract	 generality	 [“the	 secular	 trend”].	
(Linden	2009,	314)	
Two	 observations	 can	 be	 made.	 Firstly,	 despite	 the	 confidence	 of	 this	 assertion,	
Linden	 does	 not	 actually	 elaborate	 why	 the	 time	 factor	 would	 be	 a	 matter	 of	
Marxian	orthodoxy.	Second,	his	objection	leaves	two	theoretical	alternatives:	
1. Either	a	new	theory	is	proposed	instead	of	Trotsky’s;	or,	
2. The	lag-time	is	consistently	explained.	
The	first	path	 is	the	one	actually	 followed	by	state-capitalism	theory,	which	turned	
out	 to	 be	 both	 theoretically	 and	 factually	 incoherent	 as	 I	 discussed	 in	 the	 last	
section.	 As	 for	 the	 second	 path,	 it	 has	 remained	 largely	 unexplored	 by	 Marxists,	
which	 is	 why	 Linden	 has	 a	 point	 in	 claiming	 that	 Mandel’s	 explanation	 was	
unsatisfactory	 and	 abstract.	 If	 Trotsky’s	 “time-scale	 was	 obviously	 wrong”,	 as	
Mandel	claimed,	would	not	have	been	reasonable	to	explain	the	actual	timing?	
To	be	sure,	Trotsky	sensed	that	totalitarianism	could	only	be	a	short-lived	regime	as	
for	him	“naked	dictatorship”	could	only	be	“temporary”:	
A	totalitarian	régime,	whether	of	Stalinist	or	Fascist	type,	by	 its	very	essence	can	be	only	a	
temporary	transitional	régime.	Naked	dictatorship	in	history	has	generally	been	the	product	
and	the	symptom	of	an	especially	severe	social	crisis,	and	not	at	all	of	a	stable	régime.	Severe	
crisis	 cannot	 be	 a	 permanent	 condition	 of	 society.	 A	 totalitarian	 state	 is	 capable	 of	
suppressing	social	contradictions	during	a	certain	period,	but	it	is	incapable	of	perpetuating	
itself.	The	monstrous	purges	in	the	USSR	are	most	convincing	testimony	of	the	fact	that	the	
Soviet	society	organically	tends	toward	ejection	of	the	bureaucracy.	(Trotsky	1939a,	np)	
So	why	did	not	Stalinism	fall	as	‘soon’	as	was	it	was	supposed	to?	
Perhaps	one	way	to	deal	with	this	question	is	to	argue	that	what	fell	in	1991	was	not	
exactly	 Stalinism.	 In	other	words,	what	 if	 the	Soviet	 totalitarian	 regime	 typified	by	
Trotsky	 and	 Serge	 had	 already	 receded	 (well	 before	 1991)	 in	 favour	 of	 an	
arrangement	that	rendered	more	palatable	the	status	quo	entrenched	by	Stalin?	
Here	I	would	like	to	introduce	another	distinction:	that	between	the	political	system	
and	the	regime	–	the	former	referring	to	a	certain	set	of	institutions,	and	the	latter	
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to	how	that	set	is	articulated.	From	this	proposition	it	follows	that	if	the	totalitarian	
regime	 cannot	 be	 a	 “permanent	 condition”	 (i.e.	 is	 “transitional”),	 a	 theoretical	
possibility	is	that	it	becomes	less	“severe”	in	order	to	succour	and	prolong	the	same	
political	system.	Hence	the	set	of	Stalinised	institutions	remains	intact	yet	less	cruel.	
As	I	will	elaborate	in	the	next	chapter,	after	a	stage	of	maximum	enthusiasm	under	
an	 autocratic	 leader,	 totalitarian	 rule	 can	 slacken	 off	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 as	 to	
crystallise	into	a	new	type	of	regime:	post-totalitarianism;	for	example,	Russia	after	
Stalin	or	China	after	Mao.	Here	is	where	mainstream	political	science	can	help.	
Summary	
In	this	chapter	I	 introduced	a	‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxist	conceptualisation	of	the	20th	
century	 communist	 systems.	 To	 do	 this	 I	 recovered	 the	 framework	 developed	 by	
Trotsky	in	the	1930s	to	understand	the	Soviet	Union	under	Stalin	as	a	‘non-capitalist’	
formation	with	a	‘totalitarian’	regime	–	a	framework	that	has	also	been	applied	(as	I	
do	 in	 this	 thesis)	 to	 the	 Cuban	 polity	 after	 the	 revolution	 of	 1959.	 My	 basic	
definitions	are	that	an	anti-capitalist	socioeconomic	arrangement	has	been	in	place	
since	the	Cuban	revolution	undertook	an	anti-capitalist	path	in	the	1960s,	while	the	
totalitarian	regime	has	undergone	changes	that	I	will	address	in	the	next	chapters.	
However,	to	define	Cuba	as	a	non-capitalist	totalitarianism,	from	the	Left,	means	to	
oppose	 the	view	that	denies	 that	Cuba	 is	a	 ‘totalitarian’	 regime,	and	also	 the	view	
that	denies	it	is	a	‘non-capitalist’	formation.	Supporters	of	the	Cuban	political	system	
who	 instead	 argue	 that	 Cuba	 is	 some	 sort	 of	 ‘democracy’	 usually	 hold	 the	 first	
position,	while	the	second	position	is	related	to	a	distinct	‘non-Soviet-like’	view	that	
sees	Cuba	and	all	20th	century	communist	systems	alike	as	‘state	capitalist’	systems.	
On	the	one	hand,	I	contended	that	the	political	design	of	Cuba’s	communist	system	
was	based	on	 the	 institutional	 framework	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	which	was	 far	 from	
had	provided	an	example	of	 ‘democracy’.	On	 the	other,	 I	 also	 contended	 that	 it	 is	
inadequate	 to	 talk	 about	 ‘capitalism’	 when	 the	 native	 bourgeoisie	 (the	 capitalist	
class)	has	been	expropriated,	as	all	20th	century	communist	revolutions	did.	
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Overall,	in	this	chapter	I	have	recapitulated	the	Marxist	grasp	of	‘totalitarian’	rule	–	a	
conceptualisation	that	I	will	connect	in	the	next	chapter	to	the	literature	of	Political	
Science	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 ‘post-totalitarian’	 transitions.	 As	 I	 anticipated	 in	 the	
introduction,	this	connection	has	the	potential	to	bridge	a	gap	in	the	Marxist	stance	
that	pioneered	the	definition	of	the	20th	century	communist	systems	as	totalitarian	
ones.	 As	Marxism	has	 long	 lacked	 an	 analytical	 framework	 to	 analyse	 the	 political	
evolution	of	 this	 regime	type,	 the	comparative	politics’	 theory	of	 ‘post-totalitarian’	
development	of	communist	systems	can	help	to	overcome	this	deficit.	
If	 in	 this	chapter	 I	 introduced	the	basic	political	concepts	 to	approach	Cuba,	 in	 the	
next	 one	 I	 articulate	 them	 into	 a	 theory	 of	 political	 development.	 The	 resulting	
framework	is	what	informs	the	analysis	of	the	empirical	evidence	in	later	chapters.	
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3.	The	theory	of	post-totalitarian	Cuba	
With	 the	 downfall	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 which	 had	 largely	 subsidised	 the	 Cuban	
economy	 (Mesa	 Lago	 2000,	 2012,	 Pérez-López	 2003),	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 Island	
would	change	somehow	in	order	to	deal	with	the	new	circumstances.	Many	analysts	
took	for	granted	that	both	the	collapse	of	Communism	in	Cuba	and	the	rise	of	liberal	
democracy	 were	 around	 the	 corner.	 Typical	 of	 this	 mood	 was	 the	 book	 entitled	
“Castro’s	Final	Hour”,	by	Oppenheimer	(1992).	It	was	expected	that	Cuba	would	re-
enact	 the	 communist	 collapse	 just	 seen	 in	 Europe.	 The	 downfall	 seemed	 not	 a	
matter	of	 if	but	when.	Since	Cuba	belonged	to	 the	same	family	and	depended	too	
much	on	it,	the	contagion	of	political	disintegration	seemed	a	natural	consequence.	
But	Cuba	survived…	Other	analysts	then	underscored	the	challenge	this	case	posed	
for	 “realism	 in	 international	 relations,	 and	 liberal	 constitutionalism	 in	 comparative	
politics”:	its	“political	exceptionalism”,	the	argument	goes,	makes	Cuba	a	“hard	case”	
that	“test[s]	the	limits	of	our	standard	terminology”	(Whitehead	2007,	21,	24).	This	
line	of	inquiry	thus	resulted	in	the	overemphasis	on	the	uniqueness	of	Cuba.	
The	 approach	 adopted	 here,	 in	 contrast,	 intends	 to	 circumvent	 both	 liberal	
democratic	obsessions	and	the	comparative	scepticism	of	the	exceptionality	view.	To	
do	so,	I	will	rely	on	the	utility	of	the	post-totalitarian	regime-type	advanced	by	Linz	
and	Stepan	(1996).	On	account	of	this,	 in	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	 I	will	 first	
explain	how	the	Marxist	foundation	of	this	work	has	engaged	with	the	literature	on	
post-totalitarian	rule.	Then	in	the	second	section	I	will	discuss	the	properties	of	post-
totalitarian	rule	and	the	theory	of	 its	evolution	developed	by	Saxonberg	 (2013)	 for	
the	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 communist	 survival	 in	 Cuba,	 China,	 North	 Korea	 and	
Vietnam	–	this	theory,	in	a	modified	manner,	informs	the	rest	of	this	study.	
In	the	third	section,	however,	I	will	argue	against	Saxonberg’s	characterisation	of	the	
Cuban	 case	 as	 (in	 rough	 terms)	 another	 North	 Korea	 (a	 dynastic	 polity,	 the	 latter	
being	more	brutal).	Instead,	I	will	endorse	and	explain	the	already	existing	notion	of	
‘charismatic	 post-totalitarian’	 rule	 in	 Cuba	 after	 1990	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Saavedra	
1997,	Mujal-León	and	Busby	2001).	How	can	I	use	Saxonberg’s	theory	and	reject	his	
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analysis	of	the	Cuban	case	at	the	same	time?	My	argument	here	 is	that	Saxonberg	
has	poorly	applied	his	own	model	to	the	analysis	of	post-Soviet	Cuban	communism.	
Finally,	in	the	last	section	I	‘insert’	the	theory	of	charismatic	authority	of	Max	Weber	
into	 Saxonberg’s	 theory	 of	 post-totalitarianism.	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 theoretical	
articulation	 can	 lay	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 Cuba	 after	 2006.	Hence	 I	
develop	a	model	to	explain	why	the	withdrawal	of	the	charismatic	founder	of	a	post-
totalitarian	polity	can	cause	a	turn	to	(pragmatic)	legitimacy	based	on	performance	–	
ergo,	suggesting	a	political	path	that	Saxonberg’s	theory,	as	it	is,	is	unable	to	see.	In	
doing	so,	I	also	challenge	one	assumption	of	Saxonberg,	namely	that	any	attempt	of	
communist	 systems	 to	 improve	 the	 economy	 undermines	 its	 socialist	 claims	 to	
legitimacy	–	ergo,	 I	explain	why	 ‘market	socialism’	 is	a	 feasible	solution.	Of	course,	
the	specific	analysis	of	Cuba	under	Raúl	is	the	object	of	later	chapters.	
3.1	Marxist	handling	of	transitology	
In	the	previous	chapter	I	argued	that	Cuba	could	be	understood	as	a	bureaucratically	
deformed	workers’	state	or	as	a	totalitarian	non-capitalist	formation.	Although	both	
terms	are	compatible,	the	second	one	allows	appreciating	the	nature	of	the	political	
regime	–	whose	development	I	discussed	in	this	chapter.	Thus,	while	I	do	agree	with	
Farber	 (2006,	2011)	 in	 that	 the	Cuban	revolution	after	1959	followed	a	totalitarian	
path,	 I	 contend	 that	 relying	on	 this	 concept	 alone	 for	 the	whole	period	 thereafter	
fails	to	capture	the	changes	the	regime	has	experienced	since	its	inception.	
In	 the	 introduction	 I	 explained	 the	 conceptual	 need	 to	 complement	 the	 Marxist	
conceptualisation	 of	 ‘totalitarian’	 Cuba	 with	 the	 literature	 on	 ‘post-totalitarian’	
regimes	developed	by	mainstream	Political	Science.	I	also	justified	the	articulation	of	
these	 traditions	 on	 very	 pragmatic	 grounds,	 namely	 that	 Political	 Science	 has	
undertaken	 the	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 ‘surviving’	 Communist	 systems,	 while	
contemporary	Marxism	has	not.	Thus,	my	argument	goes,	there	are	valuable	insights	
that	the	Left	do	not	need	to	re-invent	from	scratch	about	the	survival	of	(whatever	is	
left	of)	the	Communist	system	in	China,	Cuba,	North	Korea,	and	Vietnam.	
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Moreover,	the	Marxist	tradition	admits	the	pragmatic	use	of	transitology-made	tools	
because	 both	 literatures	 have	 compatible	 views	 regarding	 the	 term	 ‘regime’.	 To	
begin	 with,	 Marxists	 have	 long	 argued	 that	 societies	 are	 regulated	 by	 a	 set	 of	
(preferably	 state)	 institutions	 through	 which	 a	 dominant	 class	 rules.	 For	 instance,	
Moreno	(1984,	8)	defined	the	‘regime’	as	a	“certain	articulation	of	state	institutions”,	
while	Trotsky	 (1969,	chap.	3)	defined	 the	 ‘revolution’	as	“a	political	 struggle	which	
the	 classes	 wage	 not	 with	 bare	 hands	 but	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 ‘political	
institutions’	 (parties,	 etc.)”.	 Hence,	Moreno	 nails	 equilibrium	 down,	 while	 Trotsky	
underscores	the	struggle	that	precedes	and	shapes	any	such	equilibrium.	By	merging	
these	two	complementary	definitions	into	a	single	historical	materialist	construct,	it	
can	be	said	that	a	‘regime’	is	the	result	of	an	ongoing	or	concluded	political	struggle	
synthesised	in	a	specific	institutional	framework	ruling	a	certain	society.	
Following	a	different	 intellectual	 trajectory,	 Latin	American	political	 scientists	have	
coined	 similar	 notions.	 Rodríguez	 Araujo	 (2010,	 36),	 for	 instance,	 understands	 the	
‘regime’	 as	 “a	 form	 of	 the	 state	 that	 depends	 on	 the	 correlation	 of	 social	 and	
political	forces	in	a	given	country	and	at	a	given	moment”.	Similarly,	Mujal-León	and	
Saavedra	 (1997,	117)	have	noted	that	a	 regime	“comprises	a	way	of	 ‘ordering’	 the	
relations	 between	 state	 and	 society	 and,	 consequently,	 every	 regime	 presupposes	
‘equilibrium’”	–	as	opposed	to	“a	situation	of	mere	transition”.	By	way	of	integration,	
Rodríguez	Araujo,	like	Moreno,	stresses	equilibrium;	and,	like	Trotsky,	also	highlights	
its	political	 formation.	Mujal-Leon	and	Saavedra,	 for	 their	part,	 take	a	 step	 further	
and	include	in	their	definition	the	transition	from	one	regime	to	another.	
This	said,	where	the	above-mentioned	traditions	clearly	diverge	is	in	their	politics.	If	
in	the	previous	chapter	I	sketched	what	a	‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxist	political	vantage	
point	may	mean	 in	contemporary	Cuba,	 in	the	rest	of	 this	section	 I	will	clarify	why	
this	perspective	is	incompatible	with	the	underlying	standpoint	of	transitology.	
As	 a	 sub-discipline	 within	 Political	 Science,	 Transition	 Studies	 or	 transitology	
acquired	 wide	 influence	 with	 the	 seminal	 four-volume	 book	 Transitions	 from	
authoritarian	rule	(O'Donnell,	Schmitter,	and	Whitehead	1986a,	b,	c,	O'Donnell	and	
Schmitter	1986).	One	of	 the	political	events	 that	motivated	the	three	co-editors	of	
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the	 “transitions”	 project	 was	 the	 overthrow	 of	 military	 dictatorships	 in	 Latin	
America,	 which	 was	 expected	 to	 inspire	 similar	 developments	 in	 other	 countries.	
Hence	the	goal	of	the	work	was	to	provide	a	framework	to	grasp	and	hopefully	guide	
political	actors	in	further	transitions	from	‘authoritarianism’	to	‘democracy.’	
In	order	to	support	these	transitions	in	Latin	America	and	elsewhere,	these	authors	
proposed	an	elite-friendly	approach	that	deliberately	left	hot	topics,	such	as	wealth	
distribution,	 for	 the	 future.	 O’Donnell	 (1996),	 for	 example,	 suggested	 that	 Latin	
American	 elites	 could	 accept	 liberties	 such	 as	 free	 press	 and	 elections	 if	 they	 felt	
confident	 enough	 about	 not	 envisaging	 any	 substantial	 loss	 of	 privilege	 –	 an	
expectation	 that	 experience	 seemed	 to	 corroborate	 (Weyland	 2004).	 The	 primary	
goal	of	 these	 scholars	 in	 the	mid-1980s	was	 to	achieve	 some	sort	of	ground	 floor:	
democracy.	 If	 such	 an	 institutional	 framework	was	 installed,	 it	 could	 later	 channel	
hot	potatoes	like	social	justice.	As	one	scholar	has	noted:	
The	new	enemy	was	no	so	much	 the	 ruling	classes	or	 imperialism	but	authoritarian	 rulers,	
and	the	tacit	agreement	was	that	property	relations	would	not	be	touched	in	a	transition,	all	
of	which	explains	why	the	socialist	agenda	was	either	downplayed	or	deferred.	(Arditi	2008,	
64)	
The	 standard	 rebuff	 of	 transitology	 concerns	 teleology	 of	 course.	 In	 this	 account,	
transitologists	are	fundamentally	wrong	due	to	one	“core	assumption”,	namely	that	
“any	 country	 moving	 away	 from	 dictatorial	 rule	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 country	 in	
transition	 toward	 democracy”	 (Carothers	 2002,	 6).	However,	 if	 the	 contributors	 of	
Transitions	 from	 authoritarian	 rule	 had	 seen	 liberal	 democracy	 as	 the	 natural	
endpoint	of	modern	political	transitions,	why	would	have	they	bothered	with	helping	
that	 regime	 to	actually	emerge?	Quite	 the	contrary,	 teleological	expectations	have	
been	mostly	resisted	by	researchers	of	transition	as	was	later	proved	by	Gans-Morse	
(2004)	in	a	comprehensive	examination	of	their	academic	papers.	
The	problem	lies	elsewhere.	By	sponsoring	the	liberal	democratic	regime	as	the	best	
possible	endpoint	of	any	modern	political	transition,	analysts	frequently	proceed	as	
if	asking	their	object/s	of	study:	why	don’t	you	become	a	liberal	democracy?	
	
59	
For	 example,	 Whitehead	 (2007,	 16)	 has	 raised	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	
“exceptionalist”	political	 trajectory	of	Cuba	“may	 impede	a	 standard	constitutional	
democracy”	 after	 “the	 inflexibility	 of	 the	 Castro	 regime	 begins	 to	 relax”.	 Thus,	 in	
order	to	lay	the	ground	for	a	comparative	study,	Whitehead	advances	‘constitutional	
liberalism’	 as	 the	 standard	 against	 which	 the	 Cuban	 case	 must	 be	 measured.	
Curiously,	he	justifies	this	analytical	strategy	on	the	grounds	that	“it	may	offer	some	
escape	 from	 the	 rigid	 ideological	 stereotypes”	 (Whitehead	 2007,	 17).	 Ironically,	 in	
trying	to	bypass	ideology	assisted	by	a	supposedly	neutral	‘standard’,	he	comes	back	
to	 ideology	 by	 presenting	 his	 own	 standard	 as	 ideology-free	 –	 a	 typical	 regression	
into	ideology	“at	the	very	point	where	we	apparently	step	out	of	it”	(Žižek	1994,	13).	
This	has	an	explanation.	As	it	is	widely	reminded,	when	Communism	finally	collapsed	
in	 former	 USSR	 and	 East	 Europe,	 Francis	 Fukuyama	 (1992)	 became	 famous	 for	
diagnosing	that	we	have	reached	the	“End	of	History”,	namely	the	triumph/reign	of	
liberal	democracy.	Although	Fukuyama	has	been	refuted	time	and	again,	its	political	
message	 summarises	 the	 ideological	 atmosphere	 after	 1991:	 anything	 better	 to	
democratic	 capitalism	 is	 impossible.	 But	 perhaps	 with	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	
sparked	in	2008,	such	an	assumption	is	not	as	self-evident	as	in	previous	years.	
If	 one	 is	 to	 fuel	 some	 optimism,	 perhaps	we	 are	witnessing	 a	 hegemonic	 crisis,	 a	
symptom	of	which	is	political	morbidity	–	a	situation	that	Antonio	Gramsci	defined	as	
that	where	“the	old	is	dying	and	the	new	cannot	be	born”.	He	further	explained:	
If	 the	 dominant	 class	 has	 lost	 consensus,	 i.e.	 is	 no	 longer	 leading,	 but	 only	 ‘dominant’,	
exercising	 coercive	 force	 alone,	 this	 means	 precisely	 that	 the	 great	 masses	 have	 become	
detached	 from	 their	 traditional	 ideologies,	 and	 longer	 believe	 what	 they	 used	 to	 believe	
previously,	etc.	(Gramsci	1971,	275-6)	
The	potential	loss	of	consensus	around	the	virtues	of	dominant	ideologies	since	2008	
arguably	explains	that,	in	stark	contrast	to	Whitehead,	O’Donnell	later	challenged	his	
own	assumptions	–	even	displacing	himself	from	standard	liberal	democracy.	In	one	
of	 his	 last	 yet	unnoticed	 interviews,	when	asked	about	 the	persistent	poverty	 and	
inequality	 in	 Latin	 America	 despite	 democratic	 transition,	 this	 ‘founding	 father’	 of	
transitology	adopted	an	unexpected	and	partisan	radical	stance:	
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I	think	we	need	policies	authentically	and	simultaneously	democratic	and	socialist,	and	that	
by	 being	 so	 they	 open	 a	wide	 door	 to	 the	 active	 participation	 of	 the	 popular	 and	middle	
classes.	 In	our	[Latin	American]	countries	we	are	still	 far	away	from	this	 [...].	 [On	Cuba,]	by	
what	I	have	learned	about	the	tendencies	you	mention,	all	my	values	and	desires	go	to	the	
choice	you	support,	both	socialist	and	democratic.	It	would	be	wonderful	that	at	the	end	of	
this	thorny	road,	it	managed	to	get	realised!	(O'Donnell	and	Chaguaceda	2011,	np)	
What	 if	–	 let	us	conjecture	–	O’Donnell’s	 final	and	unperceived	 theoretical	gesture	
hinted	an	immanent	critique	of	liberalism	–	at	a	larval	yet	genuine	stage?	
For	Adorno,	the	critical	academic	 is	such	insofar	as	s/he	radicalises	key	concepts	 in	
orders	 to	 push	 them	 to	 their	 logical	 conclusion.	 This	 why	 for	 him	 the	 task	 of	
immanent	critique	is	to	transform	“the	concepts,	which	it	brings,	as	it	were,	from	the	
outside,	into	what	the	object,	left	to	itself,	seeks	to	be,	and	confront	it	with	what	it	
is.	It	must	dissolve	the	rigidity	of	the	temporally	and	spatially	fixed	object	into	a	field	
of	tension	of	the	possible	and	the	real”	(Adorno	quoted	by	Benhabib	1994,	80).	
From	this	Adornian	perspective	 I	draw	the	proposition	that	O’Donnell’s	call	 for	 the	
“active	participation	of	the	popular	and	middle-classes”	hints	that	liberal	democracy,	
left	to	itself,	does	not	encourage	the	participation	of	most	citizens.	In	this	light,	the	
potential	 compensatory	 role	 O’Donnell	 sees	 in	 socialist	 policies	 perhaps	 confronts	
liberal	democracy	with	what	it	is:	a	regime	at	odds	with	social	justice.	
As	clarified	at	the	beginning	of	this	section,	this	study	does	not	take	for	granted	the	
rarely	contested	assumption	of	liberal	democracy	as	the	ideal	political	regime	–	and	
in	regards	to	Cuba	I	may	add	that	I	am	sympathetic	to	O’Donnell’s	late	aspirations.	
Yet	another	step	further	can	be	taken:	what	if	the	exclusion	criticised	by	O’Donnell	is	
not	a	deviation	but	a	structural	feature	of	‘really	existing’	liberal	democracies?	After	
all,	it	can	be	argued	that	liberal	democracy	has	fused	largely	contradictory	elements,	
such	 as	 democracy	 and	 a	 capitalist	 economy	 (Geuss	 2001,	 Žižek	 2009b).	 What	 if	
contemporary	democracies	need	to	be	freed	from	the	capitalist	burden?	
Hence	 let	us	 imagine	a	 free	election	 in	Cuba	that	decided	to	restore	capitalism.	Of	
course,	 the	 standard	 reaction	 would	 be	 to	 celebrate	 that	 election	 as	 a	 legitimate	
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(democratic)	 achievement	 –	 as	 if	 the	 virtue	 of	 the	 founding	 act	 (a	 free	 election)	
determined	 the	virtue	of	what	 comes	next.	However,	 the	democratic	origin	of	 the	
act	would	not	prevent	it	from	unleashing	an	antidemocratic	process	thereafter.	
Who	would	be	 the	owners	of	what	has	been	collectively	built	 in	Cuba	since	1959?	
How	can	be	democratically	sorted	out	who	will	be	bourgeois	and	who	will	not?	
I	find	this	predicament	reminiscent	of	the	1980s	transitions	from	authoritarian	rule	
and	state-led	economies	across	most	Latin	America:	“even	if	the	free-market	system	
–	that	is,	the	end	product	of	neoliberal	reform	–	is	compatible	with	democracy,	the	
process	 of	 neoliberal	 reform	 might	 not	 be”	 (Weyland	 2004,	 136).	 Adapted	 to	
mainstream	 desires	 about	 Cuba,	 this	 insight	 can	 be	 rephrased	 as	 follows:	 even	 if	
capitalism	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 end	 product	 of	 capitalist	 restoration	 –	 is	 compatible	with	
liberal	democracy,	the	process	of	capitalist	restoration	might	not	be.	
The	 joint	 analytical	 approach	 followed	 in	 this	 study	 is	 thus	neither	 ambivalent	nor	
indifferent	 towards	 the	 political	 goals	 of	 the	 Marxist	 tradition	 and	 mainstream	
Political	Science	–	i.e.	the	former	aims	at	transitions	from	capitalism,	while	the	latter	
pursues	 the	 transition	 to	 liberal	 democracy.	 In	 consequence,	 although	 the	Marxist	
tradition	is	congenial	to	the	democratic	ideals	implied	in	transitology,	it	discords	with	
their	fusion	with	capitalist	economic	relations.	However,	even	if	the	Marxist	tradition	
diverges	 from	 the	political	 goals	of	 transitology,	both	 traditions	may	well	 share	an	
interest	 in	 rigorously	 grasp	 political	 change.	 In	 practical	 analytical	 terms,	 the	
pragmatist	realism	of	this	thesis	seeks	to	better	diagnosing	a	polity,	while	bearing	in	
mind	that	the	literatures	in	question	diverge	in	political	treatment.	
Thus,	although	transitology	is	central	for	this	study	since	it	applies	important	insights	
for	 the	 analysis	 of	 regime	 change,	 it	 also	 rejects	 and	 challenges	 its	 implicit	 anti-
communist	stance	disguised	as	scholarly	engagement.	The	latter	point	will	be	clearer	
throughout	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 chapter’s	 theoretical	 discussion,	where	 the	 reader	will	
find	a	socialist	realignment	and	critique	of	transitology	whenever	needed.	
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3.2	The	post-totalitarian	regime-type	
The	 seminal	 regime-change	 framework	 developed	 by	 O’Donnell,	 Whitehead	 and	
Schmitter	revolved	around	‘authoritarian’	and	‘democratic’	regimes.	Herein	lies	the	
importance	of	the	subsequent	classic	work	of	Juan	J.	Linz	and	Alfred	Stepan	(1996),	
where	 they	 put	 forth	 a	 full	 typology	 of	 contemporary	 regimes:	 1)	 democracy,	 2)	
authoritarianism,	 3)	 totalitarianism,	 4)	 post-totalitarianism,	 and	 5)	 sultanism.	With	
this	work,	they	managed	to	set	up	a	single	comprehensive	theory	that	shed	light	on	
the	changes	in	Post-Communist	Europe,	Latin	America,	and	Southern	Europe.	
Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	42)	identified	four	“constituent”	or	“defining”	characteristics	
of	 regimes:	 leadership,	 ideology,	 pluralism,	 and	 mobilisation.	 Based	 on	 these	
dimensions,	they	defined	the	features	of	the	five	regime	types	they	proposed.	
Table	1.	Defining	Characteristics	of	Totalitarian	and	Post-totalitarian	Regimes	
Characteristic	 Totalitarianism	 Post-totalitarianism	
Pluralism	
	
No	 significant	 economic,	 social,	 or	
political	 pluralism.	 Official	 party	 has	 de	
jure	 and	 de	 facto	 monopoly	 of	 power.	
Party	 has	 eliminated	 almost	 all	
pretotalitarian	pluralism.	No	 space	 for	a	
second	economy	or	parallel	society.	
	
Limited,	 but	 not	 responsible	 social,	
economic,	 and	 institutional	 pluralism.	
Almost	 no	 political	 pluralism	 because	
party	 still	 formally	 has	 monopoly	 of	
power.	 May	 have	 "second	 economy,"	
but	 state	 still	 the	 overwhelming	
presence.	 Most	 manifestations	 of	
pluralism	 in	 "flattened	 polity"	 grew	 out	
of	tolerated	state	structures	or	dissident	
groups	consciously	formed	in	opposition	
to	 totalitarian	 regime.	 In	 mature	 post-
totalitarianism	 opposition	 often	 creates	
"second	culture"	or	"parallel	society."	
Ideology	
	
Elaborate	 and	 guiding	 ideology	 that	
articulates	 a	 reachable	 utopia.	 Leaders,	
individuals,	 and	 groups	 derive	 most	 of	
their	 sense	of	mission,	 legitimation,	and	
often	 specific	 policies	 from	 their	
commitment	to	some	holistic	conception	
of	humanity	and	society.	
	
Guiding	ideology	still	officially	exists	and	
is	 part	 of	 the	 social	 reality.	 But	
weakened	 commitment	 to	 or	 faith	 in	
utopia.	 Shift	 of	 emphasis	 from	 ideology	
to	 programmatic	 consensus	 that	
presumably	 is	 based	 on	 rational	
decision-making	 and	 limited	 debate	
without	too	much	reference	to	ideology.	
Mobilisation	
	
Extensive	 mobilization	 into	 a	 vast	 array	
of	 regime-created	 obligatory	
organizations.	 Emphasis	 on	 activism	 of	
cadres	 and	 militants.	 Effort	 at	
mobilization	of	enthusiasm.	Private	life	is	
decried.	
	
Progressive	 loss	 of	 interest	 by	 leaders	
and	 nonleaders	 involved	 in	 organizing	
mobilization.	 Routine	 mobilization	 of	
population	 within	 state	 sponsored	
organizations	 to	 achieve	 a	 minimum	
degree	of	conformity	and	compliance.	
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Many	"cadres"	and	"militants"	are	mere	
careerists	 and	 opportunists.	 Boredom,	
withdrawal,	 and	 ultimately	 privatization	
of	 population's	 values	 become	 an	
accepted	fact.	
Leadership	
	
Totalitarian	 leadership	 rules	 with	
undefined	 limits	 and	 great	
unpredictability	 for	 members	 and	
nonmembers.	 Often	 charismatic.	
Recruitment	 to	 top	 leadership	 highly	
dependent	 on	 success	 and	 commitment	
in	party	organization.	
	
Growing	 emphasis	 by	 post-totalitarian	
political	 elite	 on	 personal	 security.	
Checks	 on	 top	 leadership	 via	 party	
structures,	 procedures,	 and	 "internal	
democracy."	 Top	 leaders	 are	 seldom	
charismatic.	 Recruitment	 to	 top	
leadership	restricted	to	official	party	but	
less	 dependent	 upon	 building	 a	 career	
within	 party's	 organization.	 Top	 leaders	
can	 come	 from	 party	 technocrats	 in	
state	apparatus.	
	
Source:	Taken	from	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	44-5)	
	
Crucially,	the	post-totalitarian	regime	is	different	from	the	other	four	in	which	it	“is	
not	a	genetic,	but	an	evolutionary	type”	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996,	293)	–	i.e.	it	results	
from	an	overall	relaxation	of	another	polity:	totalitarianism.	In	regards	to	totalitarian	
rule,	Linz	(2000,	4)	would	explain	that	his	approach	to	that	concept	was	based	on	“an	
intellectual	 need	 to	 distinguish	 a	 particular	 historical	 form	 of	 regime	 and	 society	
from	other	nondemocratic	polities”.	Therefore,	in	contrast	to	Arendt	(1962),	‘terror’	
was	not	at	the	centre	of	his	typology,	not	the	 least	because	“the	 limits	of	terror	 in	
Cuba	 influenced	 my	 thinking	 towards	 the	 view	 that	 totalitarianism	 did	 not	
necessarily	require	terror	n	the	scale	of	the	Soviet	Union”	(Linz	2000,	5).	
In	order	to	distinguish	the	fully-fledged	post-totalitarian	regime	from	its	totalitarian	
origin,	Linz	and	Stepan	(see	Table	1)	benchmarked	such	a	transition	according	to	the	
four	defining	characteristics	they	used	to	disaggregate	the	concept	of	‘regime’.	
If	one	is	to	summarise	Table	1,	it	can	be	said	that	the	emergence	of	post-totalitarian	
rule	is	marked	by	the	following	changes	on	each	regime’s	defining	characteristics:	
- pluralism:	‘institutional	pluralism’	in	contrast	with	the	previous	uniformity;	
- ideology:	‘the	faith’	in	the	guiding	ideology	weakens;	
- mobilisation:	mass	mobilisation	lessens	and	only	aims	‘to	achieve	a	minimum	
degree	of	conformity	and	compliance’;	and	finally,	
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- leadership:	‘top	leaders	are	seldom	charismatic’	due	to	the	establishment	of	
‘checks	on	top	leadership’	produced	by	the	institutional	pluralism.	
The	development	of	this	regime	largely	depends	on	whether	post-totalitarianism	is	
reached	 “by	 choice”	 (implying	 a	 certain	 liberalisation	 from	 the	 leadership),	 “by	
decay”	(ideology	grows	meaningless	and	mobilisation	may	degenerate	into	ritual),	or	
“by	 societal	 conquest”	 (struggle	 of	 civil	 society’s	 groups	 forces	 reform)	 (Linz	 and	
Stepan	 1996,	 293-4).	 However,	 the	 latter	 case	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 the	 first	 two	
alternatives:	will	the	leadership	decide	to	embrace	the	new	situation	or	not?	
Hence	 after	 the	 initial	 stage	of	 “early	 post-totalitarianism”,	 there	 are	 two	possible	
developments	 that	 encompass	 a	 continuum	 varying	 from	 “frozen	 post-
totalitarianism”	 (when	 decay	 allows	 no	 further	 evolution),	 to	 “mature	 post-
totalitarianism”	 (when	 political	 choices	 propel	 further	 reform)	 (Linz	 and	 Stepan	
1996,	42,	294).	The	three	post-totalitarian	subtypes	are	defined	as	follows:	
Early	post-totalitarianism	is	very	close	to	the	totalitarian	ideal	type	but	differs	from	it	at	least	
in	one	key	dimension,	normally	 some	constraints	on	 the	 leader.	There	can	be	 frozen	post-
totalitarianism	 in	which,	despite	 the	persistent	 tolerance	of	some	civil	 society	critics	of	 the	
regime,	almost	all	 the	other	control	mechanisms	of	 the	party-state	stay	 in	place	 for	a	 long	
period	 and	do	not	 evolve.	Or	 there	 can	be	mature	 post-totalitarianism	 in	which	 there	 has	
been	 significant	 change	 in	 all	 the	 dimensions	 of	 the	 post-totalitarian	 regime	 except	 that	
politically	the	leading	role	of	the	official	party	is	still	sacrosanct.	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996,	42)	
As	this	conceptual	framework	was	intended	to	explain	the	different	transitions	away	
from	Communism	(defined	as	Communist	Party-led	regimes,	not	 (of	course)	as	 the	
end-state	envisaged	by	Marx	and	Engels),	 Linz	 and	Stepan’s	 empirical	 contribution	
was	a	lengthy	documentation	of	post-communist	transitions	in	Eastern	Europe.	Their	
central	argument	was	that	“the	style	and	consequences	of	the	transition	depended	
greatly	[…]	on	the	specific	post-totalitarian	subtype	found	in	each	individual	country”	
(Linz	 and	 Stepan	 1996,	 294).	 In	 consequence,	 they	 advanced	 a	 regime-type	
classification	 of	 some	 salient	 cases	 before	 their	 departure	 from	 communist	 rule.	
According	to	this	pre-transition	taxonomical	effort,	Bulgaria	as	late	as	1988	belonged	
to	 the	early	 variant	 of	 post-totalitarian	 rule,	which	 then	experienced	a	 leadership-
controlled	transition;	Hungary	from	1982	to	1988,	to	the	mature	variant,	which	then	
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experienced	a	negotiated	transition;	and,	Czechoslovakia	from	1977	to	1989,	to	the	
frozen	type,	which	then	experienced	a	transition	after	the	regime	collapsed	(Linz	and	
Stepan	1996,	294).	
In	 the	 assessment	 of	 Saxonberg	 (2013,	 13),	 the	 above-mentioned	 “regime	 type	
approach	offers	a	good	explanation	of	how	regimes	collapse	when	they	eventually	
do	 collapse.”	However,	what	 if	 they	do	not	 fall?	To	be	sure,	 this	question	 is	at	 the	
heart	of	Saxonberg´s	comparative	study	of	communist	survival	in	Cuba,	China,	North	
Korea	 and	 Vietnam.	 Thus,	 while	 he	 accepts	 the	 typology	 of	 Linz	 and	 Stepan,	
Saxonberg	did	not	add	a	new	study	of	transitions	from	Communism.	Instead,	he	has	
integrated	 the	 analysis	 of	 non-transitions	 into	 the	 field	 so	 as	 to	 understand	 why	
some	 regimes	 fall	 and	 others	 survive.	 As	 a	 result,	 he	 managed	 to	 take	 the	 post-
totalitarian	approach	out	of	its	focus	on	East	Europe,	and	pursued	its	generalisation	
to	the	study	of	Communist	rule	as	a	whole	–	regardless	of	region.	
Saxonberg’s	point	of	departure	is	the	explanatory	power	he	grants	to	ideology	in	the	
rise	and	development	of	Communist	systems:	
All	types	of	legitimacy	are	based,	namely,	on	the	belief	in	something,	which	makes	a	degree	
of	 voluntary	 compliance	possible.	However,	while	 communist	 regimes	do	not	worry	 about	
legitimacy	during	their	totalitarian	stage,	ideology	does	play	a	major	role	in	motivating	their	
cadres	to	embark	on	a	“messianic”	mission	to	change	society.	(Saxonberg	2013,	16-7)	
Furthermore,	 you	 know	 that	 a	 post-totalitarian	 transition	 is	 already	 there	because	
ideology	has	adopted	a	key	role	after	the	decline	of	revolutionary	fervour:	
Once	this	messianic	phase	ends,	the	regime	begins	to	 institutionalize	 itself.	At	this	stage,	 it	
needs	 to	 gain	 the	 support	 of	 the	 apparatchiks	 and	 of	 certain	 sectors	 of	 the	 intellectual	
stratum	and	working	class.	It	is	at	this	point	that	the	regime	enters	the	early	post-totalitarian	
phase,	where	 it	 uses	Marxism-Leninism	 as	 a	 legitimizing	 religion	 to	 ensure	 the	 support	 of	
these	key	groups.	(Saxonberg	2013,	17)	
One	 caveat	 applies	 here.	 Of	 course	 I	 do	 not	 agree	 with	 Saxonberg’s	 definition	 of	
communism	as	a	“political	religion”,	which	implies	a	derogatory	connotation	to	any	
ideas	different	from	the	liberal	democratic	ones.	(Besides,	 if	one	gets	‘picky’,	 it	can	
be	 argued,	 following	 Benjamin	 (1991,	 100-3),	 that	 capitalism	 is	 a	 religion.)	 For	 his	
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part,	 Žižek	 (2002,	 130)	 has	 taken	 the	 intellectual	 risk	 to	 argue	 that	 “despite	 its	
horrors	and	failures”,	the	Communist	regimes	still	harboured	valuable	politics:	
[A]lthough	 the	Communist	 regimes,	 in	 their	positive	content,	were	mostly	a	dismal	 failure,	
generating	terror	and	misery,	 they	simultaneously	opened	up	a	certain	space,	 the	space	of	
utopian	 expectations	 which,	 among	 other	 things,	 enabled	 us	 to	 measure	 the	 failure	 of	
actually	existing	Socialism	itself.	(Žižek	2002,	131)	
Therein	 “the	 radical	 ambiguity	 of	 Stalinist	 ideology	 which,	 even	 at	 its	 most	
'totalitarian',	still	exudes	an	emancipatory	potential”	(Žižek	2002,	131).	The	specific	
purpose	 of	 making	 that	 point	 is	 to	 highlight	 that	 the	 continuous	 vindication	 of	
socialist	 ideas	“provided	the	spectators	with	new	ethical	standards	by	which	reality	
was	 to	 be	 measured”	 (Žižek	 2002,	 132).	 Therefore,	 instead	 of	 conceptualising	
‘Marxism-Leninism’	 as	 an	obscurantist	 tool	 that	 a	 regime	 “uses”	 at	 its	discretion	–	
i.e.	a	religion	–	I	have	opted	to	differentiate	the	set	of	ideas	that	both	enabled	and	
constrained	 the	 Communist	 regimes	 simply	 as	 ‘ideology’.	 With	 this	 theoretical	
caveat	I	intend	to	substitute	the	pejorative	connotation	of	Saxonberg’s	definition	for	
the	more	analytical	term	of	‘ideology’,	as	inscribed	in	the	field	of	ideological	analysis	
recently	mapped	by	Maynard	(2013).	Stripped	from	its	anti-communist	orientation,	I	
have	 still	 extracted	 from	 Saxonberg’s	 comparative	 study	 his	 model	 of	 regime	
formation	–	which	is	the	model	that,	in	a	modified	form,	guides	my	analysis.	
Saxonberg’s	 basic	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 ideological	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 early	 post-
totalitarian	regime	is	eventually	undermined	by	the	failures	of	the	centrally	planned	
economy	 (CPE).	When	 this	 reaches	 a	 certain	 critical	 point,	 the	 regime	 enters	 the	
“late	post-totalitarian”	phase	marked	by	the	growth	of	economic-based	legitimacy:	
The	 communist	 regimes	 lose	 their	 grand-future	 oriented	 beliefs	 and	 instead	 promise	
improves	 living	standards.	Consequently	they	try	to	reach	some	sort	of	social	contract	with	
the	population	in	order	to	induce	it	to	“pragmatically	accept”	that	given	certain	external	and	
internal	constraints,	the	regime	is	performing	reasonably	well.	(Saxonberg	2013,	18)	
As	 this	 shift	 is	 likely	 to	 produce	 a	 crisis,	 the	 regime	 either	 moves	 in	 a	 “freezing”	
direction	(the	reformist	path	is	stopped	or	reversed)	or	a	“maturing”	one	(reformist	
path	continues).	Thus,	instead	of	Linz	and	Stepan’s	notions	of	“frozen”	or	“mature”,	
	
67	
this	 model	 observes	 “freezing”	 or	 “maturing”	 tendencies,	 so	 as	 to	 add	 a	 more	
dynamic	connotation	to	the	processes	of	political	change	(Saxonberg	2013,	16).	
Applying	this	model,	Saxonberg	proposes	that	China	and	Vietnam	had	long	been	on	a	
maturing	 post-totalitarian	 path.	 While	 European	 Communism	 exhibited	 a	 loss	 of	
ideological	legitimacy	due	to	the	mistaken	belief	that	the	CPE	model	was	superior	to	
the	 performance	 of	 advanced	 capitalism,	 China	 and	 Vietnam	 lost	 their	 ideological	
legitimacy	because	 they	have,	 ironically,	 restored	 capitalism:	 “it	 seems	 communist	
countries	have	had	 to	choose	between	either	 losing	 their	 ideological	 legitimacy	by	
sticking	 to	 their	 ideology	 and	 having	 it	 fail,	 or	 giving	 up	 their	 ideology	 in	 order	 to	
meet	 their	 economic	 goals”	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 272).	 Hence	 the	 Chinese	 and	
Vietnamese	 regimes	would	have	prevailed	because	 they	bypassed	 their	 ideological	
decline	by	basing	their	legitimacy	on	the	promise	to	deliver	economic	success.	
Saxonberg	also	introduced	a	set	of	criteria	on	the	likelihood	of	uprisings:	
A	 revolutionary	 situation	 emerges	 if	 (a)	 there	 is	 an	 economic	 crisis	 or	 downturn;	 (b)	
expectations	 for	wide-ranging	 reform	or	more	 radical	 change	 are	 arising	 (and	 are	 likely	 to	
reaching	a	breaking	point	if	they	are	not	met);	and	(c)	the	regime	does	something	to	anger	
the	population.	(Saxonberg	2013,	23)	
In	this	model	a	revolutionary	situation	is	more	likely	to	emerge	in	the	“late”	stage	of	
post-totalitarian	rule	because	by	then	“the	regime	has	lost	its	ideological	legitimacy”,	
which	 means	 that	 the	 opposition	 is	 more	 willing	 to	 “confront	 the	 regime	 more	
directly”,	and	the	regime	itself	“is	less	likely	to	shoot,	because	the	rulers	themselves	
no	longer	believe	in	their	ideology”	(Saxonberg	2013,	24-5).	
Saxonberg	 also	 contests	 the	 previous	 characterisation	 of	 Poland	 and	 Romania	 as	
impure	 or	 hybrid	 cases	 of	 Poland	 and	 Romania.	 Linz	 and	 Stepan	 (1996,	 255)	 had	
suggested	 that	 Poland	 never	 fully	 fitted	 the	 totalitarian	 type,	 instead	 calling	 this	
country’s	 regime	 an	 ‘authoritarian	 communism’.	 Conversely,	 Saxonberg	 (2013,	 15)	
contends	that	although	Poland	was	never	fully	totalitarian,	after	1956	it	experienced	
a	 similar	 post-totalitarian	 relaxation	 and	 development.	 Hence	 he	 introduced	 the	
notion	 of	 “failed	 totalitarianism”,	which	 he	 used	 not	 only	 for	 Poland	 before	 1956,	
but	 also	 to	 characterise	 “other	 regimes	 that	 were	 never	 able	 to	 consolidate	 their	
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power	 fully,	 as	 in	 Ethiopia,	 Grenada,	 and	Nicaragua”	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 16).	 In	 the	
case	of	Romania,	instead	of	conceptualising	Ceausescu’s	regime	as	a	totalitarianism	
turned	into	sultanism	as	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	344)	did,	Saxonberg	(2013,	17,	132)	
revisited	the	case	and	defined	it	as	an	early	post-totalitarian	regime	that	froze	into	
“patrimonialism”	 –	 he	 uses	 the	 latter	 term	 instead	 of	 “sultanism”	 to	 avoid	 the	
cultural	stereotype	that	associates	this	regime	type	with	the	Middle	East.	
Finally,	Saxonberg	(2013,	303-32)	also	uses	the	term	‘patrimonialism’	to	grasp	both	
North	Korea	and	Cuba,	because	in	both	cases	power	has	been	transferred	within	the	
same	(sultanistic)	 family	–	from	father	to	son,	 in	North	Korea;	and	from	brother	to	
brother,	in	Cuba.	However,	as	I	will	discuss	throughout	the	rest	of	this	thesis,	such	a	
characterisation	 is	 inadequate	 in	 regards	 to	 Cuba	 –	 not	 least	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
beyond	Raúl	and	Fidel	there	is	no	other	family	member	in	the	line	of	succession.	
3.3	The	(charismatic)	Cuban	hybrid	
Originally	developed	for	the	comparative	analysis	of	European	Communism,	Eusebio	
Mujal-León	 applied	 the	 typology	 of	 post-totalitarian	 transitions	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	
Cuban	communism.	As	a	result,	he	conceptualised	post-1990	Cuba	as	a	“charismatic	
early	 post-totalitarianism”	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Saavedra	 1997,	Mujal-León	 and	 Busby	
2001)	 –	 incidentally,	 a	 solution	 that	 Linz	 (2000,	 10)	 later	 agreed	with.	 As	 a	 hybrid	
regime-type,	Mujal-León’s	 term	highlighted	a	nuanced	deviation	of	 the	Cuban	case	
from	the	early	post-totalitarian	ideal	type	constructed	by	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996).	
The	counter-intuitive	hybridity	argument	was	that	in	the	post-totalitarian	adaptation	
of	post-Soviet	Cuba,	the	relevance	of	Fidel	Castro’s	charisma	had	“increased	by	the	
scope	of	the	crisis	in	the	1990s”;	i.e.	“the	crisis	spawned	by	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	
Union	[…]	made	him	even	more	indispensable”	(Mujal-León	and	Busby	2001,	11,	15).	
Mujal-León	and	Saavedra	had	explained	this	paradoxical	process	in	few	words:	
[T]he	charisma	of	Fidel	Castro	has	been	one	of	the	key	elements	to	understanding	the	Cuban	
process.	At	 this	height	of	 the	century,	Castro’s	charisma	has	turned	 into	the	main	regime’s	
means	 of	 support.	 [...]	 In	 other	words,	 the	 attenuation	 of	 the	 totalitarian	 elements	 of	 the	
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regime	has	meant	a	decisive	increasing	in	the	relative	weight	of	charisma	in	regards	to	other	
alternative	sources	of	legitimacy.	(Mujal-León	and	Saavedra	1997,	119)	
As	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	45)	had	defined	the	leadership	of	the	totalitarian	regime-
type	as	“often	charismatic”,	the	peculiarity	of	Cuba	as	conceptualised	by	Mujal-León	
was	not	so	much	the	presence	of	charismatic	authority,	but	 its	persistence	beyond	
the	 regime	 type	 in	 which	 such	 element	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 endemic.	 Ironically	
indeed,	the	early	post-totalitarian	ideal	type	was	originally	defined	as	“very	close	to	
the	 totalitarian	 ideal	 type”	 but	 differing	 from	 it	 “at	 least	 in	 one	 key	 dimension,	
normally	some	constraints	on	the	leader”	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996,	42).	
However,	Saxonberg	ignores	this	application	of	the	framework	of	Linz	and	Stepan	to	
the	analysis	of	communist	survival	 in	Cuba.	Comparing	the	historical	perspective	of	
Mujal-León	and	Saxonberg	on	the	development	of	Cuban	Communism,	both	authors	
converge	in	the	view	that	Cuba	was	already	entering	the	early	post-totalitarian	stage	
before	the	fall	of	the	Soviets	(Mujal-León	and	Busby	2001,	8,	Saxonberg	2013,	139-
40).	In	both	accounts,	by	1970	the	regime	was	abandoning	the	totalitarian	stage	and	
had	started	to	institutionalise	itself	along	Soviet	lines,	a	turning	point	being	the	First	
Congress	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Cuba,	 celebrated	 in	 1975.	 Accordingly,	 from	
1970	 to	 1985	 the	 regime	 pursued	 a	 ‘timid	 economic	 reform’	 –	 a	 minor	 yet	
‘pragmatic’	 decentralisation	 of	 economic	 management	 when	 compared	 to	 the	
previous	‘idealism’	o	the	initial	years	of	the	Revolution	(Mesa	Lago	2012,	32).	
Then	 from	1985	 until	 1991,	 as	 a	 reaction	 against	Gorbachev	 reforms,	 Fidel	 Castro	
unleashed	 what	 he	 called	 the	 Rectification	 campaign	 of	 errors	 and	 negative	
tendencies.	 From	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 economic	 policy,	 Mesa-Lago	 (2012,	 25)	
identified	this	period	as	a	new	‘idealist’	cycle.	In	regards	to	this	political	interim	point	
(and	from	that	intervening	period	onwards)	Mujal-León	and	Saxonberg	diverge.	
For	Saxonberg	(2013,	305),	“in	reaction	to	Gorbachev’s	reforms,	the	[Cuban]	regime	
began	to	move	increasingly	in	a	freezing	direction”.	On	the	other	hand,	Mujal-León	
and	Busby	(2001,	10)	concluded	that	the	late	1980s	had	brought	the	“end	of	the	first	
Cuban	 transition	 to	 post-totalitarianism”	 and	 thus	 a	 (temporary)	 “return	 to	 the	
totalitarian	schemes	and	mobilization	politics	of	 the	past”.	Although	the	difference	
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between	both	approaches	is	not	apparent	at	first	sight,	its	analytical	implications	are	
significant	after	a	closer	examination.	To	be	sure,	the	freezing	post-totalitarian	path	
detected	 by	 Saxonberg	 and	 the	 totalitarian	 revival	 signalled	 by	 Mujal-León	 and	
Busby	does	not	necessarily	oppose	each	other	(considering	that	both	terminologies	
capture	the	political	 regression	 in	 late	1980s	Cuba	when	compared	to	 the	1970-85	
period).	 However,	 concepts	 matter	 and,	 in	 this	 case,	 this	 leads	 to	 a	 diverging	
characterisation	of	the	Cuban	regime	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1991.	
In	the	1980s,	85%	of	Cuba’s	foreign	trade	took	place	within	the	Council	 for	Mutual	
Economic	Assistance	(COMECON)	–	the	organ	of	the	socialist	bloc	for	such	purposes	
(Pérez-López	2003,	174).	As	can	be	imagined,	the	downfall	of	this	bloc	brought	acute	
economic	adversity	–	just	to	have	a	quick	glance,	Cuba’s	GDP	fell	32.8%	from	1990	to	
1993	according	to	official	figures	(CEPAL	2015).	In	response,	Fidel	Castro	proclaimed	
in	 1990	 a	 Special	 Period	 in	 Times	 of	 Peace,	 which	meant	 that	 a	 contingency	 plan	
originally	developed	 in	the	early	1980s	for	times	of	war	was	being	adopted	to	face	
the	 crisis	 (MINFAR	 2015).	 Obliged	 by	 the	 circumstances,	 the	 leadership	 launched	
several	 economic	 reforms	 in	 1993,	 including	more	 space	 for	 FDI,	 the	 expansion	of	
self-employment,	and	the	reintroduction	of	 farmers’	markets	–	 thus	switching	 to	a	
new	‘pragmatic’	cycle	in	the	periodization	of	Mesa	Lago	(2012,	36-41).	
Another	Cuban	economist	assessed	the	reform	of	the	1990s	in	these	terms:	
[Cuba]	 adopted	 economic	 policies	 that	 meant	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 more	 economic	
liberalisation,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 the	 implicit	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 potential	 of	 the	
market	 to	 stimulate	 centralised	 economies	 in	 stagnation	 or	 recession.	 (Miranda	 Parrondo	
2003,	41)	
Although	the	‘maturing’	tendencies	in	a	post-totalitarian	regime	are	not	reducible	to	
the	 presence	 of	 market	 reforms,	 Saxonberg	 has	 invariably	 interpreted	 them	 as	 a	
symptom	of	maturation	–	except	 for	Cuba,	which	seems	 (to	say	 the	 least)	 strange.	
Quite	the	contrary,	in	Saxonberg’s	account,	post-totalitarian	Cuba	kept	on	‘freezing’	
after	 1986-1991,	 throughout	 the	 1990s,	 and	 even	 as	 late	 as	 2013.	 The	 only	
innovation	was	 that	 Fidel	 in	 the	1990s	morphed	 into	a	dynastic,	 sultanistic	 leader,	
whom	started	a	Castro	lineage	confirmed	by	the	takeover	of	his	brother	in	2006.	
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According	 to	him,	 since	 the	 fall	 of	 the	Soviet	Union,	Cuba	 “had	gone	closer	 to	 the	
late	 post-totalitarian	 stage,	 and	 so	 had	 lost	 much	 of	 its	 ideological	 legitimacy”	
(Saxonberg	 2013,	 140).	Why?	Because	Cuba’s	 ideological	 legitimacy	 “was	 based	 in	
large	part	on	being	an	 important	part	of	a	world	communist	movement	 in	alliance	
with	the	Soviet	Union”	–	then,	by	1994	“the	Cuban	regime	had	clearly	left	the	early	
post-totalitarian	phase”	(Saxonberg	2013,	305).	This	analysis	is	nonetheless	shaky.	
Saxonberg’s	 selection	 of	 the	 year	 1994	 as	 the	 year	 in	 which	 the	 freezing	 post-
totalitarian	 path	 of	 Cuba	 was	 consolidated	 is	 no	 coincidence.	 As	 he	 explains,	 in	
“August	5,	1994,	hundreds	of	youths	rioted	on	Havana’s	broad	coastal	avenue,	the	
Malecón”	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 305).	 In	 comparison,	 the	 1989	 protests	 of	 Tiananmen	
Square,	in	Beijing,	did	not	make	Saxonberg	classify	China	at	the	time	as	a	‘freezing’	
regime.	 Quite	 the	 contrary,	 “after	 the	 repression	 of	 Tiananmen	 Square	 uprising,	
China	 advanced	 toward	 the	 late	 post-totalitarian	 stage	 in	 a	 maturing	 form,	 as	 it	
continued	with	economic	reforms”	(Saxonberg	2013,	32).	As	the	Maleconazo	was,	in	
fact,	 less	 violent	 than	 the	 clashes	 in	 Tiananmen	 Square	 –	 e.g.	 three	 dead	 versus	
several	hundreds	 (Aguirre	2002,	AI	2004)	–	 it	 is	clear	 that	Saxonberg’s	criterion	for	
detecting	a	‘maturing’	or	‘freezing’	trend	is	not	the	presence	of	protests.	
Discontent	only	 indicated	a	shift	from	the	early	to	the	 late	stage	–	 i.e.	the	protests	
proved	that	the	ideological	legitimacy	of	communist	rule	was	severely	undermined.	
Saxonberg’s	 key	 sign	 of	maturation	 is	 thus	 the	 restoration	 of	 capitalism.	 As	 China	
was	 undergoing	 such	 a	 process	 but	 1990s	 Cuba	was	 not,	 ergo	 the	 latter	 was	 still	
‘freezing’	despite	its	market	reforms.	However,	this	assessment	is	self-contradictory	
for	 Saxonberg	 (2013,	105)	has	 also	 classified	1970s	Yugoslavia	 as	 a	maturing	post-
totalitarian	 regime	 –	 a	 case	whose	 ‘self-management’	 embodied	 the	 paradigmatic	
“market	socialism”	of	that	time,	far	from	both	CPE	and	capitalism	(Montias	1970).	
This	is	not	to	say	that	post-Soviet	Cuba’s	economy	was	like	that	of	1970s	Yugoslavia,	
but	 the	 idea	 that	 Cuba	was	 ‘freezing’	 in	 the	 1990s	 is	 far	 from	had	 been	 the	 case.	
Conversely,	 Mujal-León	 and	 Busby	 (2001)	 argued	 that	 the	 partial	 totalitarian	
regression	 of	 1985-1991	was	 followed	by	 a	de-regression	 –	 i.e.	 the	 reactivation	 of	
post-totalitarian	survival	patterns	now	too	dependent	on	Fidel’s	charisma.	
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From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 four	 regime’s	 constituent	 characteristics	 (pluralism,	
ideology,	 mobilisation,	 and	 leadership),	 Mujal-León’s	 argument	 was	 that	 in	 post-
Soviet	Cuba	three	of	them	were	departing	from	the	attempt	at	totalitarian	revival	of	
1986-1991	 while	 the	 leadership	 actually	 remained	 totalitarian	 afterwards,	
specifically	 charismatic.	 In	 this	 account,	 Cuban	 communism	 experienced	 the	
reactivation	of	the	post-totalitarian	transition	since	the	1990s,	not	at	the	expense	of	
charisma,	 but	 as	 a	 political	 accommodation	 to	 truly	 difficult	 times	 directed	by	 the	
charismatic	leader	itself	–	bolstering	him	as	a	result.	
As	 to	whether	1990s	Cuba	was	 in	 the	early	or	 late	post-totalitarian	 stage,	 the	 two	
positions	 reviewed	 here	 actually	 converge	 despite	 the	 use	 of	 different	 terms.	
Saxonberg	 (2013,	 310)	 notes	 that	 after	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 collapsed,	 Fidel	 Castro	
pursued	 “pragmatic	 acceptance”	 based	 on	 the	 promise	 “to	 support	 the	 country’s	
generous	welfare	programs	and	 to	 stand	up	 to	 the	United	States	as	well”.	Curious	
indeed,	the	same	was	read	by	Mujal-León	and	Busby	as	the	proof	of	an	early	stage:	
The	 demise	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 its	 allies	 deprived	 the	 Cuban	 regime	 of	 an	 important	
ideological	 plank.	 In	 response,	 Castro	 directed	 the	 regime	 to	 reenergise	 its	 ideology	 by	
appealing	 to	 other	 core	 elements	 of	 its	 platform,	 including	 nationalism,	 social	 justice,	 and	
regional	solidarity.	(Mujal-León	and	Busby	2001,	12)	
So	 even	 if	 the	 regime	 no	 longer	 claimed	 to	 be	 part	 of	 an	 international	 utopia,	 it	
turned	 its	emphasis	 to	 the	native	 roots	of	 ‘Cuban	socialism’.	 In	other	words,	Marx	
and	 Lenin	 lost	 salience	 but	 José	Martí	 and	 Che	 were	 kept	 in	 the	 front.	 However,	
Saxonberg’s	 characterisation	 of	 the	 Cuban	 case	 depends	 too	much	 on	 forcing	 the	
‘late	 stage’	 label	 –	 i.e.	 failed	 ideology	 –	 because	 “patrimonial	 communism”	 arises	
from	 “the	 desire	 of	 ambitious	 leaders	 to	 overcome	 ideological	 decay	 by	
personalising	their	rule”	(Saxonberg	2013,	135).	In	any	case,	I	disagree	with	the	claim	
that	Cuba’s	 ideological	 legitimacy	was	 lost	 and	 that	a	patrimonial	 leader	emerged.	
Besides,	even	 if	one	agreed	with	the	 ‘personalisation’	of	Fidel’s	rule	 in	the	1990s	–
which	I	do	–	a	patrimonial	leadership	is	way	different	from	a	charismatic	one.	
Without	 using	 Linz	 and	 Stepan’s	 framework,	 other	 scholars	 have	 similarly	
underscored	the	charismatic	(not	‘patrimonial’)	nature	of	the	Cuban	leadership	–	the	
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persistence	of	which	“always	set	the	Cuban	case	apart	from	the	bureaucratic	state-
socialist	experiences	of	Eastern	Europe	and	the	Soviet	Union”,	as	Hoffmann	 (2009,	
234-5)	has	stressed.	 In	this	account,	Cuba	may	be	conceptualised	as	a	“charismatic	
state	 socialism”	 (Hoffmann	 2009,	 232).	 While	 I	 do	 agree	 with	 this	 hybridity	
underscored	by	Hoffman,	using	only	that	concept	for	the	whole	life	of	socialist	Cuba	
fails	 to	 capture	 its	most	 relevant	 political	 upheavals	 –	 except	 for	 the	 period	 after	
Fidel	stepped	down	in	2006,	which	he	has	defined	as	a	“bureaucratic	state	socialism”	
due	to	Raúl’s	farewell	to	charismatic	authority	(Hoffmann	2009,	242).	
Saxonberg’s	diagnosis	is	actually	taken	from	López	(2002),	for	whom	Cuba	became	a	
mixture	of	sultanism	and	frozen	post-totalitarianism	in	the	1990s.	López’s	influence	
(characterisation	 and	 feedback)	 on	 Saxonberg	 (2013,	 x-xi,	 139)	 has	 influenced	 the	
latter	 such	 that	 his	 Cuban	 case	 is	 affected	 by	 the	 analytical	misjudgements	 of	 the	
former.	 Hence	 if	 López	 has	 been	 criticised	 because	 he	 “systematically	 ignores	 the	
writings	of	Cuban	 scholars,	 even	 those	published	outside	Cuba”	 (Domínguez	2004,	
189),	an	analogous	criticism	can	also	be	applied	to	Saxonberg:	although	he	has	dealt	
with	 the	 work	 of	 some	 prominent	 Cuban	 academics,	 he	 has	 ignored	 the	 work	 of	
those	(Cuban	or	not)	who	have	dealt	with	Cuba	through	his	same	theoretical	lenses	–	
i.e.	the	regime-type	perspective	developed	by	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996).	
Indeed,	the	definition	of	Cuba	as	a	‘sultanistic’	regime,	as	López	(1997,	250)	argued,	
had	 already	 been	 objected	 to.	 Partially	 agreeing	 with	 the	 parallel	 López	 drew	
between	Fidel’s	overarching	role	and	that	of	both	Ceausescu	in	Romania	and	Kim	Il	
Sung	 in	North	 Korea,	Mujal-León	 and	 Busby	 (2001,	 11)	 “would	 not	 call	 the	 Cuban	
regime	‘sultanistic,’	not	 least	because	of	 its	reliance	on	 ideology	and	mobilization”.	
To	be	sure,	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	44-5)	stressed	that	in	the	sultanistic	regime	type	
there	is	“no	elaborate	or	guiding	ideology	[…]	outside	of	despotic	personalism”.	
In	addition,	despite	the	fact	that	López	“provides	recurrent	comparisons	to	regimes	
in	 former	communist	Czechoslovakia,	East	Germany,	and	Romania”,	he	“refuses	 to	
believe	that	Cuba’s	revolutionary	experience,	especially	during	the	1960s,	may	help	
to	explain	why	its	regime	has	lingered	longer”	as	Domínguez	(2004,	189)	has	put	it.	
In	other	words,	the	link	with	he	Soviets	was	not	the	sole	ideological	basis	of	Cuba.	A	
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problem,	then,	is	how	to	understand	ideological	legitimacy	–	a	point	I	will	return	to	
later.	
To	 summarise,	 I	 disagree	with	 Saxonberg´s	 claims	 that	 the	 Cuban	 post-totalitarian	
regime:	 a)	 has	 been	 ‘freezing’	 since	 1986,	 b1)	 has	 lost	 its	 ‘ideological	 legitimacy’	
since	1994,	and	b2)	 therefore,	 its	 leadership	had	 to	morph	 into	 ‘patrimonialist’	 (or	
sultanistic)	mode	to	survive.	In	contrast,	I	have	suggested,	the	reforms	of	the	1990s	
were	 far	 from	 ‘freezing’,	 the	 ‘ideological	 legitimacy’	 (although	 undermined)	 was	
reshaped,	and	the	charismatic	authority	of	the	regime	has	not	changed	in	the	period	
1959-2006.	
I	think,	however,	that	the	failure	of	Saxonberg	to	apply	his	own	model	to	the	Cuban	
case	cannot	lead	to	the	arrogant	conclusion	that	his	comparative	study	is	worthless.	
He	has	done	a	great	work	(a	work	that	I	admire)	comparing	the	trajectories	of	all	the	
communist	 systems	 produced	 by	 the	 20th	 century	 except	 four	 –	 he	 dealt	 with	
fourteen	cases!	In	fact,	as	will	become	increasingly	clearer,	this	thesis	owes	much	to	
the	 theoretical	 insights	 advanced	 by	 him.	 Therefore,	 I	 have	 opted	 to	 re-apply	 the	
framework	of	Saxonberg	to	the	Cuban	case	–	but	in	doing	so	I	have	felt	compelled	to	
(try	to)	improve	both	his	theory	and	our	understanding	of	the	Cuban	polity.	
3.4	Normalisation	after	charisma?	
Up	 to	 this	point,	 I	hope	 I	have	convinced	 the	 reader	 in	 that	 ‘charisma’	 is	a	 central	
concept	for	the	analysis	of	Cuban	politics.	 In	this	section,	 I	will	thus	 inscribe	such	a	
concept	in	the	framework	of	post-totalitarian	transitions	in	order	to	understand	the	
regime-type	 implications	 of	 charismatic	 dissipation.	 Redundant	 as	 it	 sounds,	 I	 will	
theoretically	 elaborate	 the	 expected	 re-equilibration	 of	 a	 charismatic	 early	 post-
totalitarian	regime	given	the	case	that	its	leadership	loses	its	charismatic	legitimacy.	
At	that	point,	I	will	ask	whether	such	a	model	fits	the	Cuban	case	–	i.e.	the	scenario	
where	the	dissipation	of	charisma	sparks	a	post-totalitarian	normalisation.	
By	 ‘normalisation’	 I	 understand	 the	 process	 through	 which	 the	 constituent	
characteristics	of	a	regime	converge	towards	the	same	regime-type.	In	other	words,	
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‘normalisation’	 simply	means	 the	end	of	 regime-type	hybridity	 –	e.g.	 a	 charismatic	
early	post-totalitarian	regime	becomes	less	charismatic,	ergo	more	post-totalitarian.	
A	 brief	 caveat	 is	 needed	 regarding	 the	 potential	 causal	 effects	 of	 charisma	 (or	 its	
absence),	a	theme	neglected	and	discredited	as	“Fidel-centrism”	by	Kapcia	(2014).	
To	be	 sure,	 I	mostly	agree	with	Kapcia’s	opposition	 to	1)	 “focus	exclusively	on	 the	
person	 and	 personality	 of	 Fidel	 Castro”	 (Kapcia	 2014,	 1);	 therefore,	 2)	 to	 the	
interpretation	of	Cuba’s	“complex	process	as	attributable	mainly,	or	even,	solely,	to	
one	person	[i.e.	Fidel]”	(Kapcia	2014,	7).	Nonetheless,	while	I	grant	charisma	(or	its	
decay)	 an	 explanatory	 power,	 Kapcia	 limits	 the	 influence	 of	 this	 variable	 to	
minimum,	punctuated	conjunctures:	 “it	 is	 clear	 that	he	 [Fidel]	played	a	key	 role	at	
moments	of	real	or	imminent	crisis”	(Kapcia	2014,	26).	Paradoxically,	Kapcia	has	also	
stressed	the	centrality	of	Fidel	in	Cuba’s	political	life	for	many	years:	
[Fidel’s	legacy	lies]	in	the	widespread	loyalty	that	he	commanded,	a	loyalty	which,	on	the	one	
hand,	 and	 as	 already	 observed,	 created	 a	 tendency	 for	many	 Cubans	 to	 personify	 ‘the	
Revolution’	 in	 him,	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 generated	 an	 enduring	 faith	 in	 his	 ability	 to	 find	
solutions.	(Kapcia	2014,	27)	
In	my	view,	I	do	think	that	Kapcia’s	insightful	notion	that	Fidel’s	influence	(charisma)	
is	better	understood	not	as	a	personal	quality	but	as	a	specific	social	relation	could	
be	taken	a	bit	further.	To	that	end,	rephrasing	Kapcia’s	words,	I	would	rather	locate	
the	 importance	 of	 “Fidel”	 not	 so	 much	 in	 his	 persona,	 but	 rather	 in	 the	 loyalty	
granted	to	him,	which	indicates	a	potentially	shaping	force	that	in	Weber’s	terms	is	
paramount.	 In	 short,	my	 contention	 is	 that	 although	 Kapcia	 registers	 the	 force	 of	
charisma,	he	nonetheless	underrates	it	in	analytical	terms.	
Perhaps	the	role	of	charismatic	 leadership	for	a	whole	regime’s	structure	 is	clearer	
when	charisma	itself	leaves	the	stage,	forcing	an	adaptation	at	the	upper	levels.	As	I	
will	argue	hereafter,	the	political	effects	of	the	finale	of	charisma	are	twofold:	1)	 it	
can	change	the	style	(and	power)	of	leadership;	hence,	2)	it	can	modify	the	claims	to	
legitimacy	made	by	the	political	elite	ruling	the	political	system.	
I	understand	charisma	as	defined	by	Max	Weber	in	his	classic	work	on	the	subject:	
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The	term	‘charisma’	will	be	applied	to	a	certain	quality	of	an	individual	personality	by	virtue	
of	 which	 he	 is	 considered	 extraordinary	 and	 treated	 as	 endowed	 with	 supernatural,	
superhuman,	or	at	least	specifically	exceptional	powers	or	qualities.	(Weber	1978a,	241)	
Thus,	 charisma	 is	not	a	 ‘thing’	but	a	 certain	 relationship.	This	 relational	dimension	
between	 the	charismatic	 leader	and	 its	 followers	 leads	us	 to	another	key	concept:	
legitimacy.	 In	Weber’s	 terms,	 legitimacy	 refers	 both	 to	 the	 consent	 granted	 to	 an	
order	by	 those	 subject	 to	 it	 and	 to	 the	way	 in	which	 such	a	belief	 is	 cultivated	by	
those	 in	 position	 of	 authority	 (Weber	 1978a,	 36,	 214).	 Weber	 theorised	 that	
legitimacy	may	be	claimed	on	three	analytically	different	grounds:	rational	(stressing	
the	 legality	 of	 the	 system),	 traditional	 (appealing	 to	 the	 sanctity	 of	 immemorial	
traditions),	 and	 charismatic	 (“resting	 on	 devotion	 to	 the	 exceptional	 sanctity,	
heroism	or	exemplary	character	of	an	individual	person”)	(Weber	1978a,	215).	
As	discussed	earlier,	Saxonberg	(2013,	17)	has	theorised	that	Communist	rule	starts	
in	a	‘messianic	phase’,	which	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996,	44-5)	identified	with	charismatic	
leadership.	To	be	sure,	different	totalitarian	Communist	states	built	the	legitimacy	of	
their	leadership	on	charismatic	grounds;	i.e.	on	the	devotion	to	Stalin	(Russia),	Mao	
(China),	Ho	Chi	Minh	(Vietnam),	Tito	(Yugoslavia),	Enver	Hoxha	(Albania),	Kim	Il-Sung	
(North	 Korea),	 or	 Fidel	 Castro	 in	 Cuba.	 Although	most	 post-totalitarian	 transitions	
were	 accompanied	 (or	 sometimes	 sparked)	 by	 the	 dissipation	 of	 the	 charismatic	
leadership,	no	theorist	of	post-totalitarian	rule	has	explained	the	underlying	causal	
process.	Here	is	where	I	argue	that	some	Weberian	notions	can	fill	the	gap.	
Weber	 (1978a,	246)	explained	 that	 “in	 its	pure	 form	charismatic	 authority	may	be	
said	 to	 exist	 only	 in	 statu	 nascendi.	 It	 cannot	 remain	 stable,	 but	 becomes	 either	
traditionalised	or	rationalised,	or	a	combination	of	both.”	Weber	termed	this	process	
the	‘routinisation	of	charisma’,	which	perhaps	he	made	clearer	in	this	formulation:	
When	the	tide	that	lifted	a	charismatically	led	group	out	of	everyday	life	flows	back	into	the	
channels	of	workaday	routines,	at	least	the	‘pure’	form	of	charismatic	domination	will	wane	
and	 turn	 into	 an	 ‘institution’;	 it	 is	 then	 either	 mechanized,	 as	 it	 were,	 or	 imperceptibly	
replaced	 by	 other	 structures,	 or	 fused	 with	 them	 in	 the	 most	 diverse	 forms,	 so	 that	 it	
becomes	a	mere	component	of	a	concrete	historical	structure.	(Weber	1978b,	1121)	
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The	dilemmas	facing	a	charismatic	community	–	and	by	this	I	understand	groups	like	
the	 Communist	 elites	 exemplified	 above	 –	 once	 the	 messianic	 fervour	 ends,	 are	
particularly	acute	when	the	‘problem	of	succession’	arises,	which	is	the	predicament	
opened	up	by	the	biological	disappearance	of	the	charismatic	leader	(Weber	1978a).		
In	their	post-totalitarian	transitions,	most	Communist	systems	replaced	charismatic	
leadership	by	“other	structures”,	following	a	path	that	Weber	would	have	identified	
with	 a	 form	 of	 rationalisation.	 According	 to	 Linz	 and	 Stepan	 (1996,	 45),	 the	 post-
totalitarian	 regime	 institutionalises	 “checks	 on	 top	 leadership”	 in	 their	 departure	
from	 regularly	 charismatic	 arrangements.	 Perhaps	 this	 change	 is	 less	 elusive	 if	 the	
typical	post-totalitarian,	non-charismatic	leadership	is	defined	as	a	‘collegial’	one.	
In	 Weber’s	 terms,	 collegiality	 refers	 to	 “specific	 social	 relationships	 and	 groups	
which	have	the	function	of	 limiting	authority”	(Weber	1978a,	271).	Empirically,	the	
“principle	 of	 collegiality	 […]	 is	 usually	 derived	 from	 the	 interest	 in	 weakening	 the	
power	of	persons	in	authority”	(1978a,	277).	To	avoid	conceptual	haze,	Weber	also	
stressed	 that	 “collegiality	 is	 no	 sense	 specifically	 democratic”	 –	 it	 is	 merely	 an	
arrangement	 “to	 prevent	 the	 rise	 of	 monocratic	 power”	 (Weber	 1978a,	 277).	 As	
charisma	is	inextricably	monocratic,	collegiality	indeed	presupposes	a	challenge	to	it.	
However,	 collegiality	 is	 neither	 specifically	 horizontal.	 In	 this	 sense,	 on	 a	 macro	
political	 scale,	Weber	also	 implied	that	a	preeminent	head	was	a	 typical	 feature	of	
collegial	teams	with	leadership	commitments	over	large	groups:	
Generally	 speaking,	where	 collegial	 bodies	 have	 had	 executive	 authority	 the	 tendency	 has	
been	for	the	position	of	the	leading	member	to	become	substantively	and	even	formally	pre-
eminent.	(Weber	1978a,	277)	
The	primus	inter	pares	is	the	head	of	a	type	of	collegial	body	that	Weber	also	terms	
“functional	collegiality	with	a	preeminent	head”	 (1978a,	272).	A	 typical	 “functional	
collegiality”	 –	 i.e.	 without	 a	 preeminent	 head	 –	 corresponds	 to	 a	 non-monocratic	
arrangement	where	“acts	are	subject	to	the	rule	that	a	plurality	of	individuals	must	
cooperate	 for	 the	 act	 to	 be	 valid”,	 either	 by	 unanimity	 or	 majority	 vote	 (Weber	
1978a,	272).	In	other	words,	the	concept	of	the	primus	inter	pares	implies	a	vertical	
insertion	on	a	horizontal	collegial	ideal	type.	
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Weber	theorises	the	relationship	between	a	functional	collegial	body	and	its	primus	
inter	pares	(whenever	there	is	such)	in	terms	of	mutual	dependence:	
[A]lthough	there	is	an	actually	monocratic	primus	inter	pares,	his	acts	are	normally	subject	to	
consultation	with	formally	equal	members,	and	disagreement	in	important	matters	may	lead	
to	 breaking	 up	 the	 collegial	 body	 by	 resignation,	 thus	 endangering	 the	 position	 of	 the	
monocratic	chief.	(Weber	1978a,	272)	
For	Weber,	“the	most	 important	example”	of	 this	 type	of	collegial	body	“is	 that	of	
the	 position	 of	 the	 British	 Prime	Minister	 in	 relation	 to	 his	 cabinet”	 (1978a,	 273).	
Overall,	 this	arrangement	 refers	 to	a	collective	body	of	equals,	 in	which	 the	acting	
head	of	them	needs	some	degree	of	endorsement	from	the	rest	of	the	team.	
Has	 “functional	 collegiality	 with	 a	 preeminent	 head”	 emerged	 in	 Cuba?	 This	 is	 an	
argument	 I	will	empirically	 substantiate	 in	 the	next	chapters,	 in	which	 I	argue	 that	
this	type	of	collegiality	has	indeed	replaced	charisma	in	the	Cuban	leadership.	
In	 contrast	 to	 what	 I	 will	 discuss	 about	 Cuba,	 (still)	 totalitarian	 North	 Korea	
experienced	a	process	of	traditionalisation	after	the	death	of	its	charismatic	leader.	
It	can	be	said	that	the	solution	to	the	“problem	of	succession”	after	Kim	Il-Sung	died	
was	 “the	 conception	 that	 charisma	 is	 a	 quality	 transmitted	 by	 heredity”	 (Weber	
1978a,	248).	Such	is	the	origin	of	the	Kim’s	dynasty,	from	father	to	son,	currently	led	
by	the	founder’s	grandson.	
But	what	 happens	 if	 collegiality	 takes	 over	 charismatic	 leadership	when	 the	 other	
three	 elements	 of	 the	 regime	 (mobilisation,	 ideology,	 and	 pluralism)	 have	 already	
adopted	early	post-totalitarian	features?	Firstly,	this	would	imply	that	for	some	time	
two	major	types	of	legitimacy	had	co-existed	in	that	Communist	system:	
1) Charismatic:	 as	 analysed	by	Mujal-León	and	Busby	 (2001)	 in	 regards	 to	 the	
renewed	role	of	Fidel	Castro’s	leadership	in	Cuba	during	the	1990s.	
2) Ideological:	as	theorised	by	Saxonberg	(2013)	as	a	highly	distinctive	feature	of	
a	post-totalitarian	regime	in	its	early	stage.	
If	 the	 first	 legitimacy	 dissipates	 then	 the	 regime	 will	 rely	 on	 the	 second.	 At	 that	
point,	the	regime	may	be	said	to	have	experienced	a	post-totalitarian	normalisation;	
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i.e.	 all	 the	 four	 defining	 characteristics	 of	 the	 regime	would	 align	with	 each	 other	
(hybridity	ends)	 in	a	converging	process	 towards	 the	early	post-totalitarian	 type	as	
developed	by	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996).	The	causal	chain	may	be	theorised	as	follows:	
once	 a	 formerly	 charismatic	 early	 post-totalitarianism	 loses	 its	 charismatic	
leadership,	 its	reliance	on	ideology	as	a	central	piece	of	 its	claims	to	legitimacy	will	
confront	 the	 regime	 sooner	or	 later	with	Saxonberg’s	dilemma,	 namely	 that	 it	will	
have	“to	choose	between	either	losing	their	ideological	legitimacy	by	sticking	to	their	
ideology	 and	 having	 it	 fail,	 or	 giving	 up	 their	 ideology	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 their	
economic	 goals”	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 272).	 As	 explained	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	
first	alternative	is	the	freezing	path,	and	the	second,	the	maturing	one.	
In	other	words,	Saxonberg	identifies	two	solutions	to	the	dilemma	he	proposes:	
• Sticking	to	the	centrally	planned	economy	(CPE)	
• Introducing	market	reforms	(capitalist	restoration)	
However,	 I	 propose	 a	 third,	 intermediate	 theoretical	 solution	 that	 destabilises	 the	
dilemma	 posed	 by	 Saxonberg	 and	 its	 presupposition	 that	 anti-capitalist	 economic	
formations	 are	 incompatible	 with	 market	 mechanisms.	 The	 third	 solution	 to	
Saxonberg’s	 dilemma	 would	 then	 be	 the	 following:	 instead	 of	 having	 to	 choose	
between	 socialist	 orthodoxy	 and	 economic	 pragmatism,	 ideology	 itself	 may	 be	
modified	 in	a	manner	 that	 redefines	 the	boundaries	of	 admissible	 economic	action	
according	 to	 socialist	 ideas.	 This	 possibility	 is	 what	 I	 term	 in	 this	 thesis	 ‘market	
socialism’.	 To	 use	 the	 language	 of	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 political	 analysis,	 the	
alternative	 I	 am	 advancing	 here	 presupposes	 a	 non-static,	 potentially	 mutable	
quality	of	 ideas	–	as	opposed	to	the	fixed	nature	of	Communist	 ideology	implied	in	
Saxonberg’s	approach	–	in	processes	of	political	change,	as	understood	by	authors	of	
what	has	been	called	the	ideational	turn;	for	Colin	Hay,	for	instance:	
Actors	 must	 interpret	 their	 context	 in	 order	 to	 act	 strategically	 […].	 Consequently,	
interpretations	of	the	environment	in	which	they	find	themselves	may	play	a	crucial	role	in	
shaping	 actors’	 behaviour	 with	 consequent	 effects	 for	 the	 process	 of	 political	 change.	
Moreover,	empirically,	changes	in	policy	are	often	preceded	by	changes	in	ideas.	(Hay	2002,	
166)	
	
80	
Kong	 (2014)	 has	 grouped	 the	 post-1990	 economic	 strategies	 of	 the	 surviving	
Communist	 systems	 in	 three	 different	 types:	 1)	 ‘mono-transition’	 (China	 and	
Vietnam),	2)	 ‘cautious	reform’	(Cuba),	and	3)	 ‘ultra-cautious	reform’	(North	Korea).	
For	him,	‘mono-transition’	refers	to	a	capitalist	restoration	under	the	same	political	
regime	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 East	 European	 countries	 that	 experienced	 the	 ‘dual	
transition’	 of	 capitalist	 restoration	 and	 regime	 change.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 “cautious	
reform	 strategy	 seeks	 to	 alleviate	 the	 problems	of	 the	 centrally	 planned	 economy	
(CPE)	while	 resisting	 transformation	 towards	 a	market	 economy”	 (Kong	 2014,	 73).	
Finally,	 the	 ‘ultra-cautious’	 approach	 seeks	 “to	 restore	 the	 CPE	 by	 limited	market	
measures“	(ibid.,	74)	–	hence	the	term	refers	to	the	stubbornness	of	orthodox	CPE.	
Cautious	reform	 in	Cuba	thus	refers	to	the	economic	reforms	of	the	Special	Period.	
But	things	have	changed	since	then.	 If	the	challenge	for	Cuban	policymakers	 in	the	
early	1990s	was	defined	in	terms	of	resisting	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	–	thus,	
the	end	of	its	subsidies	–	under	Raúl	it	was	about	overcoming	the	deficiencies	of	the	
economic	model	 itself.	 Keeping	 the	discussion	of	 the	previous	 chapters	 in	mind,	 a	
way	to	update	Kong’s	conceptualisation	of	the	emerging	Cuban	economic	strategy	in	
Raúl	Castro’s	presidency	after	the	adoption	of	market-socialist	ideas	is	as	follows:	
⎯ The	market	socialist	approach	seeks	to	improve	CPE	by	delegating	secondary	
functions	to	the	market	without	restoring	capitalism.	
Such	is	the	outcome,	I	will	argue,	of	the	revolt	led	by	Raúl	Castro	since	he	took	over	
the	 presidency	 of	 Cuba	 –	 temporarily	 since	 August	 2006;	 officially,	 since	 February	
2008	 –	 when	 he	 unleashed	 the	 current	 ‘pragmatic’	 cycle	 of	 economic	 policy.	
Although	this	cycle	 is	a	continuation	of	 the	one	that	took	place	between	1991	and	
1995,	the	main	cause	of	each	one	 is	different.	While	the	cycle	twenty	years	earlier	
was	sparked	after	imbalances	in	the	external	sector	of	the	economy,	the	leitmotiv	of	
the	current	cycle	has	been	focused	on	the	problems	of	the	internal	economy.	
If	 the	 ‘market	 socialist’	 solution	 to	 Saxonberg’s	 dilemma	were	 verified	 empirically,	
some	relevant	analytical	 implications	on	the	regime-type	would	follow.	On	the	one	
hand,	 an	 ideological	 change	 oriented	 to	 economic	 performance	would	 preclude	 a	
freezing	 direction.	On	 the	other,	 an	orientation	 to	 economic	 performance	without	
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giving	 up	 to	 ideology	 would	 still	 be	 distant	 from	 a	 fully-fledged	 mature	 post-
totalitarianism	 as	 seen	 today	 in	China	and	Vietnam.	Perhaps	an	 intermediate	 case	
could	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 an	 incipient	 maturing	 post-totalitarian	 regime.	 The	
central	claim	of	this	work	is	that	contemporary	Cuba	fits	this	definition.	
Therefore,	the	Cuban	case	would	fit	in	the	typology	of	surviving	Communist	systems	
as	proposed	in	Table	2,	which	classifies	their	regime-type	and	economic	policy.	
Table	2.	Economic	policy	and	regime-type	of	surviving	communist	systems	
	 Economic	strategy	 Regime	type	
China,	Vietnam	
	
Capitalist	restoration	
	
Maturing	post-totalitarian	
Cuba	
	
*	Market	socialism	
	
*	Maturing	post-totalitarian	
North	Korea	
	
Centrally	planned	economy	
	
Totalitarian	
	
Sources:	 Classification	 of	 economic	 strategy	 (except	 Cuba)	 based	 on	 Kong	 (2014);	
and	the	characterisation	of	regimes	(except	Cuba)	based	on	Saxonberg	(2013).	
	
*	This	is	the	argument	developed	in	this	study.	
	
This	 scheme	 presupposes	 thus	 that	 although	 Cuba	 belongs	 to	 the	 same	 type	 of	
regime	as	China	and	Vietnam,	the	Caribbean	case	has	a	different	economic	strategy.	
This	may	be	the	case	because	while	the	Asian	cases	have	 long	adopted	a	maturing	
path,	in	Cuba	this	kind	of	political	development	has	just	started.	
I	 would	 then	 distinguish	 two	 degrees	 of	 maturation:	 ‘minor’	 and	 ‘major’	 –	 each	
degree	in	turn	informs	and	conditions	correlated	economic	strategies.	Closer	to	the	
early	post-totalitarian	stage,	a	‘minor’	maturation	implies	an	ideological	adjustment	
that	has	not	broken	the	standard	Marxist	stance	against	the	private	property	of	the	
means	 of	 production.	 If	 this	 principle	 is	 compared	 to	 a	 taboo	 then	 a	 ‘major’	
maturation	occurs	when	the	taboo	 is	broken,	hence	annulling	the	key	Marxist	anti-
capitalist	 principle	 –	 e.g.	 contemporary	 China	 and	 Vietnam.	 Any	 maturing	 trend,	
either	 minor	 or	 major,	 if	 sparked	 as	 a	 regime’s	 response	 to	 the	 dissipation	 of	
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charisma,	 is	 another	 confirmation	 that	 charismatic	 decline	 sent	 economic	
performance	to	the	fore	as	a	compensatory	source	of	legitimacy.	
But	 what	 does	 ‘market	 reform’	 mean	 in	 a	 society	 where	 there	 are	 no	 native	
capitalists	as	in	Cuba?	The	view	adopted	here	is	that	in	a	Communist	system	where	
there	is	no	proper	capitalist	restoration,	‘market	reform’	means	a	decentralisation	of	
the	 former	 dominant	 centrally	 planned	 economy	 (CPE)	 and	 a	 diversification	 of	 its	
economic	agents	–	as	opposed	to	the	state	being	almost	the	only	player	in	town.5	
The	Cuban	development	would	thus	correspond	to	a	distinctive	political	path.	On	the	
one	hand,	its	ideological	departure	from	orthodox	CPE	precludes	a	freezing	path.	On	
the	other,	an	orientation	to	economic	performance	that	retains	socialist	ideology	is	
still	distant	from	the	current	Chinese	or	Vietnamese	maturing	path.		
Summary	
Building	 on	 the	 post-totalitarian	 regime	 type	 advanced	by	 Linz	 and	 Stepan	 (1996),	
Saxonberg	 (2013)	 proposed	 a	 theory	 of	 post-totalitarian	 evolution.	 As	 totalitarian	
rule	 is	 a	 temporary	 “messianic	 phase”,	 after	 a	 time	 “the	 regime	 begins	 to	
institutionalize	 itself”	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 17).	 A	 salient	 element	 of	 this	 process,	
however,	is	the	endurance	of	socialist	ideology	as	a	key	claim	to	legitimacy;	such	are	
the	basic	contours	of	the	early	post-totalitarian	stage.	Saxonberg’s	basic	argument	is	
that	 the	 ideological	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 early	 stage	 is	 eventually	 undermined	 by	 the	
failures	 of	 the	 CPE	model,	which	 pushes	 the	 regime	 to	 the	 “late	 post-totalitarian”	
stage,	marked	by	increasing	attention	on	the	economy	(Saxonberg	2013,	18).	
As	this	shift	is	likely	to	produce	a	crisis,	the	regime	either	moves	in	a	“freezing”	(the	
reformist	path	is	stopped	or	reversed)	or	a	“maturing”	direction	(the	reformist	path	
continues).	 Applying	 this	model,	 Saxonberg	 proposes	 that	 China	 and	 Vietnam	 had	
long	 been	 on	 a	 maturing	 post-totalitarian	 path.	 While	 in	 the	 European	 cases	 the	
ideological	legitimacy	was	lost	because	of	the	wrong	belief	that	CPE	was	superior	to	
advanced	capitalism,	China	and	Vietnam	would	have	lost	their	ideological	legitimacy	
																																																						
5	I	am	indebted	to	S.	Ludlam	for	the	decentralisation/diversification	distinction	to	grasp	Cuba	today.	
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because	 they	 have,	 ironically,	 restored	 capitalism	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 272).	 Hence	
these	 Asian	 regimes	 would	 have	 remained	 in	 power	 because	 they	 bypassed	 this	
ideological	tension	by	building	their	pragmatic	acceptance	on	capitalist	ground.	
However,	I	contended	that	Saxonberg	has	poorly	applied	his	own	model	to	focus	the	
survival	of	Cuba,	which	he	equates	to	North	Korea	arguing	that	in	both	cases	power	
has	been	transferred	within	the	same	family	–	from	father	to	son,	in	Pyongyang;	and	
from	 brother	 to	 brother,	 in	 Havana.	 In	 this	 account,	 since	 1986	 Cuba	 started	 to	
become	 a	 mixture	 of	 sultanism	 and	 frozen	 post-totalitarianism	 –	 i.e.	 the	 concept	
applied	by	Linz	and	Stepan	(1996)	to	Romania,	which	later	López	(2002)	extended	to	
Cuba,	 and	 that	 Saxonberg	 later	 applied	 to	 North	 Korea	 as	well.	 I	 argued	 that	 this	
characterisation	is	inadequate	in	regards	to	post-Soviet	Cuba:	on	the	one	hand,	the	
1990s	market	reforms	in	Cuba	were	far	from	‘freezing’,	on	the	other,	the	importance	
of	ideology	and	mobilisation	are	incompatible	with	the	‘sultanic’	regime	type.	
I	thus	adopted	the	definition	of	Mujal-Leon	and	Busby	(2001)	of	the	Cuban	polity,	in	
the	period	1991-2006,	as	a	 ‘charismatic	early	post-totalitarian’	 regime.	As	Linz	and	
Stepan	(1996,	45)	defined	the	typical	totalitarian	 leadership	as	“often	charismatic”,	
the	 peculiarity	 of	 Cuba	 according	 to	Mujal-León	 and	 Busby	 was	 not	 so	 much	 the	
presence	of	charisma,	but	 its	persistence	beyond	the	phase	 in	which	such	element	
seemed	endemic	–	incidentally,	a	solution	Linz	(2000,	10)	later	agreed	with.	
Thus,	 I	 theorised	why	 that	 the	 fall	 of	 Fidel	 Castro’s	 charisma	 had	 the	 potential	 to	
cause	a	post-totalitarian	normalisation	and	a	re-equilibration	of	legitimacy	via	a	new	
emphasis	on	(pragmatic)	economic	performance.	I	developed	this	explanatory	model	
through	 folding	 the	 theory	 of	 charismatic	 legitimacy	 of	 Weber	 (1978a)	 into	 the	
theory	 of	 post-totalitarian	 development	 of	 Saxonberg	 (2013).	 To	 create	 this	
alternative	 model,	 as	 I	 said,	 I	 first	 had	 to	 discard	 Saxonberg’s	 explanation	 of	 the	
Cuban	case	as	a	 ‘patrimonial	 freezing	post-totalitarian’	regime	since	1986.	Then,	 in	
my	modified	version	of	Saxonberg,	I	also	challenged	his	assumption	that	communist	
systems	 can	 only	 stick	 to	 CPE	 or	 restore	 capitalism.	 I	 have	 thus	 introduced	 the	
theoretical	possibility	of	market	socialism	–	i.e.	an	anti-capitalist	market	economy.	
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From	 this	 point	 onwards	 I	 will	 thus	 reapply	 my	 modified	 version	 of	 Saxonberg’s	
theory	to	the	analysis	of	Cuba	in	the	period	2006-2014.	In	other	words,	I	will	analyse	
how	 the	 ‘charismatic	 early	post-totalitarian’	 regime	has	 changed	after	 Fidel	Castro	
stepped	down.	As	my	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 dissipation	of	 a	 charismatic	 leadership	
may	have	produced	a	market-socialist	ideology,	I	will	focus	the	following	chapters	in	
these	two	dimensions:	the	leadership	and	the	ideology	of	the	Cuban	polity.	 	
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4.	Vicissitudes	of	Fidel	Castro’s	Cuba	
In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 summarise	 the	 development	 of	 leadership	 and	 ideology	 in	 Cuba,	
before	2006,	according	to	the	post-totalitarian	perspective	theorised	in	the	previous	
chapter.	 In	 the	 first	 section	 I	will	 thus	 introduce	a	concise	historical	background	of	
Cuba	from	1959	to	2006	–	i.e.	I	illustrate	the	development	of	the	Cuban	regime	in	a	
historical	 map	 that	 shows	 the	 alternation	 of	 ‘idealist’	 and	 ‘pragmatic’	 cycles	
identified	 by	Mesa	 Lago	 (2012).	 I	 expect	 that	my	 exploration	 of	 such	 a	 long-term	
picture	 (through	 the	 lenses	of	post-totalitarian	evolution)	will	 pave	 the	way	 to	my	
argument	 in	 regards	 to	 post-Fidel	 Cuban	 politics,	 namely	 that	 the	 decline	 of	
charismatic	authority	has	brought	the	‘idealist	cycles’	to	an	end.	
In	 the	 second	 section,	 I	 will	 outline	 the	main	 features	 and	 transformations	 of	 the	
Cuban	 leadership	 in	1959-2006.	Then,	against	a	backdrop	of	continuous	 ideological	
stigmatisation	of	market-based	 subjects,	 in	 the	 third	 section	 I	will	 explore	 the	 first	
(rare)	case	of	acceptance	of	a	non-socialist	economic	agent	before	2006.	
4.1	The	oscillation	of	Cuban	politics	
In	this	section	I	provide	a	concise	account	of	the	development	of	the	Cuban	regime	
aided	by	a	common	theme	in	the	academic	analysis	Cuba:	its	periodization	according	
to	a	basic	political	oscillation	throughout	its	history.	As	was	already	discussed	in	the	
last	chapter,	 the	non-linear	political	development	of	 this	 regime	has	even	 included	
partial	totalitarian	regressions.	The	purpose	of	this	section	is	thus	to	put	Cuba	under	
Fidel	Castro	in	historical	perspective,	according	to	this	thesis’	theoretical	lenses.	
Pérez-Stable	 (1999)	 has	 argued	 that	 one	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 Cuba	 has	 been	 its	
oscillation	between	‘mobilisation’	and	‘institutionalisation’.	In	this	account,	while	the	
former	prevailed	in	the	1960s,	the	latter	did	so	in	the	1970s	and	early	1980s.	But	in	
contrast	to	other	communist	polities,	in	Cuba	“institutionalization	never	reached	an	
irreversible	momentum”	 (Pérez-Stable	 1999,	 67).	 Facing	Gorbachev	 reforms	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union,	“[Fidel]	Castro	–	not	the	party	or	a	faction	of	it	–	called	for	cutting	back	
market	reforms	and	renewing	mobilizational	politics”.	After	this	political	regression	
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Cuba	stayed	“precariously	balanced	between	market	imperatives	and	mobilizational	
politics,	the	latter	thus	far	more	determinant”	(Pérez-Stable	1999,	67).	
For	 his	 part,	 Kapcia	 (2014,	 64)	 has	 divided	 Cuban	 politics	 in	 periods	 that	 can	 be	
distinguished	 “by	 the	 extent	 or	 absence	 of	 fluidity	 of	 the	 state	 and	 governing	
structures”.	For	him,	the	Cuban	political	system	has	been	marked	by	‘fluidity’	except	
for	the	period	of	‘institutionalisation’	from	1975	(1st	PCC	Congress)	to	1986	(start	of	
Rectification).	 The	 main	 difference	 of	 this	 with	 Pérez-Stable’s	 framework	 is	 the	
‘interregnum’	 of	 1970-75,	 when	 “the	 most	 Stalinist	 approach	 to	 culture	 was	
adopted”	(Kapcia	2014,	135).	
My	 point	 here	 is	 that	 different	 analysts	 (both	 advocates	 and	 critics)	 of	 the	 Cuban	
regime	 have	 tackled	 its	 oscillation	 through	 varied	 conceptual	 frames.	 Hence	 the	
periodization	 of	 Cuba’s	 socio-economic	 policy	 since	 1959	 has	 also	 been	 shaped	
according	to	one	or	another	oscillation’s	framework	in	mind	–	as	explained	below.	
Helen	Yaffe,	advocate,	asserts	 that	 “the	economic	history	of	 the	Cuban	Revolution	
can	 be	 portrayed	 as	 a	 pendulum	 swinging	 between	what	 is	 desirable	 and	what	 is	
necessary”	–	 she	calls	 this	 ‘the	Guevarista	pendulum’	as	 for	her	 “when	new	policy	
debates	 emerge,	 proposals	 are	 often	 phrased	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 proximity	 to	
Guevara’s	 analysis”	 (Yaffe	 2009,	 63).	 Based	 on	 this	 framework	 she	 divided	 Cuban	
economic	history	in	swings	‘away’	or	‘towards’	Guevara’s	ideas	as	follows:	1)	1965	–	
67	 (swing	 away);	 2)	 1967	 (swing	 towards);	 3)	 1970s	 (swing	 away);	 4)	 1986	 (swing	
towards);	 5)	 1991	 (swing	 away);	 and,	 6)	 2000	 (swing	 towards)	 (Yaffe	 2009,	 63-7).	
Using	Yaffe’s	terms,	I	would	add	the	most	recent	cycle:	7)	2007	(swing	away).	
Mesa-Lago,	critic,	has	similarly	noted	that	socio-economic	policy	in	socialist	Cuba	has	
alternatively	switched	from	‘pragmatic’	 (market	oriented)	 to	 ‘idealist’	 (anti-market)	
cycles.	As	shown	in	Table	3,	he	identifies	four	idealist	cycles,	three	pragmatic	cycles,	
and	 one	 stagnant	 cycle.	 While	 market	 reforms	 in	 the	 first	 pragmatic	 cycle	 were	
“cautious	 and	 timid”,	 in	 the	 second	 and	 third	 they	 “became	 bolder”.	 Conversely,	
“the	idealist	cycles	became	weaker	in	the	long	run”	(Mesa	Lago	2012,	24).	
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The	 only	 apparent	 difference	 between	Mesa-Lago’s	 periodization	 and	 Yaffe’s	 is	 in	
the	early	years	of	the	revolution.	For	Mesa-Lago,	the	cycle	of	1959-1966	can	actually	
be	divided	into	three	sub-cycles:	1)	“market	erosion”,	2)	“Soviet	orthodox	model	of	
central	 planning”,	 and	 3)	 “socialist	 debate	 between	 two	 alternatives	 (idealist	 and	
pragmatic)”	 (Mesa	 Lago	 2012,	 25).	 This	 last	 sub-cycle	 is	 what	 Yaffe	 sees	 as	 swing	
away	Guevara’s	ideas.	So	after	all	there	is	no	substantial	difference	in	periodization.	
Table	3.	Development	of	the	Communist	system	in	Cuba	
	 Economic	cycles	 Regime	type	 Political	cycles	
	
1959-1966	
	
1st	Idealist	(Spawn	of	
new	economic	policy)	
Totalitarian	 Mobilisation		
1966-1970	
	
2nd	Idealist	
(Radicalisation	of	
Guevarism)	
	
1971-1985	
	
1st	Pragmatic	(Moderate	
Soviet	Model)	
Transition	to	early	post-
totalitarian	 Institutionalisation	
	
1986-1990	
	
3rd	Idealist	
(“Rectification	of	
mistakes”)	
Freezing	path	or	incomplete	
totalitarian	comeback	 Mobilisation	
	
1991-1996	
	
2nd	Pragmatic	(Crisis	and	
market	reform)	
Charismatic	early	post-
totalitarian	
Mix	of	mobilisation	and	
institutionalisation,	with	a	
tilt	to	the	former*	
	
1997-2003	
	
Stagnant	(Deceleration	
and	paralysis	of	reform)	
	
2003-2006	
	
4th	Idealist	(Reversal	of	
reform)	
2007	→ 	
	
3rd	Pragmatic	(Structural	
reforms	of	Raúl)	
Transition	 to	 maturing	 post-
totalitarian**	 Institutionalisation
**	
	
Sources:	 Own	 elaboration	 based	 on	 Pérez-Stable	 (1999),	 Mujal-León	 and	 Busby	 (2001),	
Mujal-León	and	Buzón	(2009)	and	Mesa-Lago	(2012).	
*	I	am	assuming	that	Pérez-Stable’s	characterisation	of	1999	was	still	valid	until	Fidel	Castro	
stepped	down	in	2006.	
**	This	is	the	argument	of	this	study.	
	
Where	paths	clearly	diverge	is	in	identifying	the	force	driving	the	shifts	to	new	cycles.	
This	is	where	Yaffe’s	approach	turns	out	weak.	Her	“Guevarista	pendulum”	is	like	the	
eerie	appearance	of	some	kind	of	ethereal	spirit	that	comes	back	from	time	to	time	
to	fix	the	wrongdoings	of	Cuban	policymakers	–	as	if	“Che”	Guevara	was	a	wandering	
ghost	that	does	not	find	peace	in	the	fate	of	the	revolution.	Yaffe’s	acephalous	view	
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implies	that	the	desirability/necessity	pendulum	has	shaped	the	strategic	choices	of	
the	top	leadership,	not	(at	least	as	a	dialectic	supplement)	the	other	way	around.	
Conversely,	Mesa-Lago	does	not	hesitate	 to	underscore	 the	 key	 role	of	 the	Cuban	
leadership	at	every	new	turn.	Similarly	to	what	Pérez-Stable	implies,	he	argues	that	
the	 “ideas	 and	 decisions	 of	 Fidel	 Castro	 were	 the	 key	 internal	 factor	 in	 the	
generation	of	 	 [economic]	cycles	 for	48	years,	until	his	 illness	 in	2006”	 (Mesa	Lago	
2012,	26).	Both	founder	and	leader	of	the	regime,	Fidel	Castro’s	high	concentration	
of	 top	 offices	 gave	 his	 (‘idealist’)	 ideological	 preference	 for	 a	 centrally	 planned	
economy	an	unrivalled	leeway	in	shaping	economic	policy	for	a	long	time.	
While	Mesa-Lago	 acknowledges	 the	 role	 of	 external	 factors	 in	 the	 cycles	 (like	 the	
relations	with	 the	US,	 the	 former	Soviet	Union	and,	more	 recently,	Venezuela),	he	
also	emphasises	 that	Fidel’s	charismatic	 leadership	was	 the	constant	 force	pushing	
orthodox	policies	when	the	context	permitted	it.	In	this	light,	if	idealist	policies	were	
the	favourite	strategy	of	Fidel,	any	pragmatic	cycles	were	merely	tactical	retreats.	
From	an	overall	perspective,	if	the	economic	cycles	are	subsumed	into	the	sequence	
of	 major	 re-equilibrations	 of	 the	 Cuban	 regime,	 then	 it	 stands	 out	 that	 ‘idealist’	
cycles	 coincide	 with	 ‘mobilisational’	 politics,	 and	 ‘pragmatic’	 economics	 with	
‘institutionalisation’.	As	shown	in	Table	3,	this	link	is	clear-cut	at	least	in	the	period	
1959-1990.	
The	concepts	used	by	Mesa-Lago	(idealist	cycles	versus	pragmatic	cycles)	have	been	
challenged	by	Morris	(2014,	45),	for	whom	that	framework	repeats	a	“fundamental	
assumption	 of	 transition	 economics”;	 namely,	 that	 “efficiency	 and	 dynamism	 will	
only	 be	 maximized	 when	 the	 transformation	 from	 a	 ‘socialist	 planned’	 economic	
system	 to	 a	 ‘capitalist	 market’	 one	 is	 complete”.	 While	 I	 do	 agree	 with	 Morris’	
critique	of	Mesa-Lago’s	underlying	politics,	her	reluctance	to	describe	or	explain	any	
cycles	at	all	in	Cuba’s	socio-economic	policy	is	striking.	Thus,	in	order	to	standardise	
the	language	used	in	this	thesis	with	previous	research,	I	have	adopted	the	analytical	
framework	implied	in	Table	3	to	pinpoint	events	in	a	‘time-map’.	
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Table	 3	 also	 schematises	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Cuban	 communist	 system	
according	 to	 the	 regime-type	 perspective	 adopted	 in	 this	 study.	 In	 1959-1970,	
revolutionary	fervour	was	shaping	a	new	state;	i.e.	 it	was	a	totalitarian	regime	that	
relied	 on	 mobilisation	 and	 pursued	 idealist	 economic	 policies.	 1971-1985,	 for	 its	
part,	 was	 the	 period	 of	 Soviet-style	 institutionalisation;	 i.e.	 the	 regime	 was	 in	
transition	to	the	early	post-totalitarian	stage	–	hence	as	part	of	its	institutionalisation	
it	advanced	pragmatic	economic	policies.	In	the	period	1986-1990	Cuba	experienced	
in	 turn	 an	 incomplete	 return	 to	 totalitarianism:	 the	 regime	 returned	 to	 the	 high	
mobilisation	 of	 its	 subjects	 and	 switched	 to	 idealist	 economic	 policies.	 Then	 the	
disappearance	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	1990	brought	a	complex	adaptation	of	Cuba	to	
its	unexpected	loneliness	in	the	world.	
After	 1990,	 Cuba	 saw	 the	 co-existence	 of	 mobilisation	 and	 institutionalisation,	 a	
hybridity	captured	in	the	‘charismatic	post-totalitarian’	type	of	regime.	Nonetheless,	
it	 is	hardly	 the	case	 that	Cuba	remained	static	ever	since.	On	the	contrary,	as	 if	 to	
emphasise	 the	 contradictory	 nature	 of	 that	 type	 of	 regime,	 in	 1991-2006	 Cuba	
experienced	three	economic	cycles.	Perhaps	the	only	constant	defining	characteristic	
in	these	years	was,	of	course,	the	charismatic	leadership	of	Fidel	Castro.	
The	 historical	map	 implied	 in	 Table	 3	 can	 also	 be	 used	 to	 catch	 a	 glimpse	 of	 the	
analysis	I	will	undertake	from	this	point	onwards.	What	if	the	mobilisational	relapses	
of	 the	 regime	 have	 come	 to	 an	 end	 in	 the	 post-Fidel	 era?	 What	 if	 the	 end	 of	
charisma	anticipates	the	end	of	“idealist	cycles”	in	Cuba?	Indeed,	this	is	another	way	
to	present	the	central	claim	of	this	thesis;	i.e.	that	when	Fidel	Castro	stepped	down	
and	 Raúl	 Castro	 took	 over	 the	 Cuban	 leadership,	 the	 regime	 started	 to	 lose	 its	
charismatic	character	and	hence	became	increasingly	‘post-totalitarian’	proper.	
In	 terms	of	 the	political	cycles	 reviewed	 in	 this	section,	 the	argument	of	 this	study	
implies	that	mobilisation	would	have	receded	in	the	Cuban	political	horizon	–	laying	
the	ground	for	a	new	institutionalisation.	Thus,	the	new	(third)	pragmatic	economic	
cycle	launched	by	Raúl,	“the	strongest	during	the	revolution”	(Mesa	Lago	2012,	25),	
would	be	 the	 consequence	of	 a	post-totalitarian	normalisation	of	 the	 regime.	 If	 in	
the	1990s	Pérez-Stable	diagnosed	that	Cuba	was	caught	between	‘mobilisation’	and	
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‘normalisation’,	 the	 former	 would	 have	 finally	 lost	 the	 battle…	 Likewise,	
paraphrasing	 Yaffe,	 the	 ‘Guevarista	 pendulum’	 would	 have	 finally	 stopped	 –	 and	
would	have	done	it	in	the	farthest	place	it	had	ever	been	since	1959…	
Finally,	 two	 theoretical	 caveats	 are	 needed	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 historical	
intertwinement	of	changes	in	economic	policy	and	mobilisation	patterns	in	Cuba.	
First,	if	the	defining	characteristics	of	a	regime	are	leadership,	mobilisation,	ideology	
and	pluralism,	how	does	economic	policy	fit	any	discussion	on	regime	development?	
An	expedient	solution	to	this	question	 is	to	bring	 into	focus	(as	 I	do)	not	economic	
policy	per	se,	but	rather	the	ideological	controversies	that	precede	it	and	inform	it.	
Of	course	I	do	not	claim	that	economic	policy	summarises	the	whole	set	of	ideas	that	
informs	 the	 relationship	 between	 a	 state	 apparatus	 and	 its	 subjects.	 I	 simply	
presuppose	 that	 economic	 ideology	 is	 an	 important	 ingredient	 of	 that	 set,	 with	
potential	causal	effects	in	the	political	economy.	In	post-totalitarian	regimes	this	link	
is	especially	decisive	since	the	turning	point	from	the	‘early’	to	the	‘late’	stage	is	an	
ideological	 crisis	 that	 propel	 the	 revision	 of	 the	 CPE	 model,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	sections	in	regards	to	the	theory	of	Saxonberg	(2013).	
Second,	 what	would	 account	 for	 the	 intertwinement	 of	mobilisation	 patterns	 and	
economic	 policy?	 A	 possibility	 is	 that	 the	 disjointed	 cohabitation	 of	 charisma	 and	
post-totalitarian	 change	 has	 been	 a	 source	 of	 a	 ceaseless	 conflict	 between	 two	
discordant	 imperatives:	 mobilisation	 (totalitarian	 logic)	 and	 institutionalisation	
(post-totalitarian	logic).	In	practice,	in	Cuba	this	has	been	materialised	in	consecutive	
periods	 where	 one	 of	 the	 two	 imperatives	 (temporarily)	 prevails	 over	 the	 other.	
Crucially,	 these	 shifts	 and	 economic	 policy	 have	 walked	 hand	 in	 hand;	 i.e.,	 while	
periods	of	mobilisation	have	generally	been	accompanied	by	‘idealist’	policy	cycles,	
institutionalisation	has	similarly	seen	‘pragmatic’	cycles	alongside.	
An	extra	caveat:	for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	am	assuming	that	the	opportunities	and	
constraints	 placed	on	pluralism	 in	 Cuba,	 have	 ran	 alongside	 the	 opportunities	 and	
constraints	placed	on	the	other	three	regime’s	defining	characteristics.	This	is	not	to	
say	 that	pluralism	 is	not	 important.	This	 simply	means	 that	 if	 the	 regime	 is	 said	 to	
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have	undergone	a	freezing	turn,	I	assume	that	that	process	also	affected	pluralism	–	
although	this	dimension	is	not	the	object	of	exhaustive	research	in	this	thesis.	
4.2	Leadership:	the	FAR-PCC	ruling	coalition	
Cuba	never	fitted	fully	comfortable	in	the	family	of	communist	systems.	In	contrast	
to	 the	other	 countries	of	 really	 existing	 socialism,	 a	Communist	Party	did	not	 take	
over	 power	 in	 Havana.	 The	 organisation	 led	 by	 Fidel	 Castro	 that	 won	 the	 1959	
revolution	was	a	nationalist	guerrilla	that	only	later	took	on	an	anti-capitalist	path.	It	
was	only	after	two	years	in	power,	on	16	April	1961,	that	Fidel	Castro	declared	“the	
socialist	 character	 of	 the	 revolution”	 during	 a	 rally	 in	 Havana	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 US-
organised	 invasion	 at	 the	Bay	of	 Pigs	 (F.	 Castro	1961).	Nevertheless,	 this	 does	not	
mean	 that	 Cuban	 Communism	 developed	merely	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 US	 imperialism,	
which	 is	only	partly	 true:	 the	Cuban	 leadership	was	also	 favourably	predisposed	to	
such	path.	Farber	has	explained	this	structure/agency	dialectics	as	follows:	
Undoubtedly,	 the	 revolutionary	 leaders	 acted	 under	 serious	 internal	 and	 external	
constraints.	 […]	But	at	 least	as	 important	was	that	these	 leaders	 indeed	had	a	political	and	
ideological	 view	 of	 reality	 that	 shaped	 their	 perceptions	 of	 danger,	 the	 appropriate	
responses	 to	 it,	 and	 especially	 what	 they	 regarded	 as	 the	 desirable	 form	 of	 social	 and	
political	organization.	As	Ernesto	“Che”	Guevara	told	the	French	weekly	L’Express	on	July	25,	
1963,	 “Our	 commitment	 to	 the	 eastern	 bloc	 was	 half	 the	 fruit	 of	 constraint	 and	 half	 the	
result	of	choice.”	(Farber	2011,	19)	
Thus,	 in	Cuba	the	Party	was	formed	after	the	Communist	takeover,	whereas	 in	the	
other	 communist	 revolutions	 it	 was	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Rephrasing	 from	 the	
Bible:	 if	 in	 other	 countries	 ‘in	 the	 beginning	 there	was	 the	 Party’,	 in	 Cuba	 ‘in	 the	
beginning	there	was	Fidel’.	But	who	was	behind	Fidel?	To	answer	this	key	question,	I	
will	 turn	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 charismatic	 community,	 which	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “an	
organized	group	subject	to	charismatic	authority”	(Weber	1978a,	243).	Although	the	
term	 is	 wide	 enough	 to	 allow	 a	 variety	 of	 empirical	 references,	Weber	 applied	 it	
primarily	 to	 the	 inner	 circle	 of	 the	 charismatic	 leader	 –	 his	 “administrative	 staff”,	
made	up	by	his	“followers”	or	“disciples”	–	as	is	clear	in	the	ideal	type	he	developed:	
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[A	 charismatic	 community]	 is	 based	 on	 an	 emotional	 form	 of	 communal	 relationship.	 The	
administrative	staff	of	a	charismatic	leader	does	not	consist	of	“officials”;	 least	of	all	are	its	
members	 technically	 trained.	 It	 is	 not	 chosen	on	 the	basis	 of	 social	 privilege	nor	 from	 the	
point	 of	 view	 of	 domestic	 or	 personal	 dependency.	 It	 is	 rather	 chosen	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
charismatic	 qualities	 of	 its	 members.	 The	 prophet	 has	 his	 disciples;	 the	 warlord	 his	
bodyguard;	 the	 leader,	 generally,	 his	 agents.	 There	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 appointment	 or	
dismissal,	no	career,	no	promotion.	There	is	only	a	call	at	the	instance	of	the	leader	on	the	
basis	of	the	charismatic	qualification	of	those	he	summons.	(Weber	1978a,	243)	
It	 must	 not	 be	 so	 controversial	 to	 define	 Cuba’s	 top	 leadership	 as	 a	 charismatic	
community	 around	 Fidel	 Castro.	Mujal-León	 (2011,	 154)	 calls	 this	 elite	 the	partido	
fidelista,	 “the	 core	 of	 the	 ruling	 class”	 distinguished	 by	 “their	 dependence	 and	
unswerving	 loyalty	toward	the	comandante	en	 jefe”	–	 i.e.	the	Commander	 in	Chief,	
Fidel	Castro.	Such	 ‘party’	 is	seen	by	Mujal-León	as	the	staff	of	a	charismatic	 leader	
(Fidel)	at	the	top	of	a	contemporary	political	regime.	Mujal-León’s	notion	of	‘partido	
fidelista’	is	thus	reminiscent	of	Weber’s	definition	of	a	‘charismatic	community’:	
By	neither	having	a	program	nor	 formal	structure,	 it	 is	not	a	party	 [the	partido	 fidelista]	 in	
the	strict	sense;	but	its	members,	defined	around	the	nucleus	of	veteran	mountain	guerrillas,	
have	 not	 doubted	 their	 vocation	 of	 political	 power	 and	 have	 been	 recognisable	 by	 their	
loyalty,	commitment	and	deference	toward	the	figure	and	leadership	of	Fidel	Castro.	(Mujal-
León	and	Buzón	2009,	35)	
Of	course	Kapcia	would	dismiss	the	notion	of	a	partido	fidelista	for	its	Fidel-centrism.	
However,	he	has	conversely	well	captured	the	charismatic	quality	not	of	the	leader	
but	 of	 the	 leadership’s	 “inner	 circle”,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 “historic	 pedigree”	 of	 its	
members.	Hence	the	Cuban	leadership	has	been	shaped	according	to:	
a	hierarchy	of	 respect,	power	and	 influence,	dependent	 largely	on	 the	 individuals	 ‘historic’	
pedigree,	within	a	structure	that	resembled	an	onion	rather	than	a	pyramid,	with	real	power	
at	the	centre	(an	‘inner	circle’),	outside	which	were	layers	of	lesser	influence,	weakening	the	
further	from	the	‘core’	now	went.	(Kapcia	2014,	81)	
To	 be	 sure,	 the	 “inner	 circle”	 has	 always	 been	 the	 nucleus	 of	 veteran	 mountain	
guerrilla,	 known	 in	 Cuba	 as	 the	 historical	 generation	 (in	 Spanish,	 the	 “generación	
histórica”	 or	 “los	 históricos”).	 They	 fought	 in	 the	Rebel	Army	 (Ejército	Rebelde)	 of	
the	Sierra	Maestra	that	 in	1959	toppled	down	the	dictator	Fulgencio	Batista.	Some	
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late	iconic	figures	of	the	historical	generation	still	revered	in	Cuba	today	are	Camilo	
Cienfuegos	and	 (of	course)	Ernesto	“Che”	Guevara.	Kapcia	notes,	however,	a	more	
subtle	differentiation	within	that	Cuban	“core”:	
What	 constituted	 that	 ‘core’	was	 still	 clear	 (with	 some	exceptions,	most	notably	Guevara):	
participation	in	the	Moncada	[1935],	the	Granma	landing	[1956]	and	the	Sierra	[1956-1959].	
[…]	 [W]hat	 really	mattered	 for	 authority	was	 combat	 experience,	 especially	 as	 a	 guerrilla;	
indeed,	 the	unity	of	 the	ex-guerrillas	 remained	one	evident	 feature	of	 the	Revolution	until	
the	2000s.	However,	that	unity	had	subtle	variations:	thus,	while	those	who	had	participated	
in	the	Sierra	struggle	were	considered	part	of,	or	close	to,	the	inner	group,	those	who	were	
there	 from	 the	 early	 days	 of	 December	 1956	 were	 especially	 anointed.	 Moreover,	 those	
among	 them	 who	 were	 also	 veterans	 of	 either	 the	 Moncada	 or	 Bayamo	 attacks	 of	 1953	
(twenty-one	of	the	eighty-two	who	landed	on	the	Granma:		Aladro	Cardoso	et	al.	2007:	22-2)	
were	clearly	among	the	innermost	inner	group.	(Kapcia	2014,	81)	
From	1959	to	2006,	Fidel	was	the	unrivalled	leader	of	the	historical	generation,	thus	
of	 the	 elite	 ruling	 Cuba.	 Of	 course	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 charisma	 acted	 in	 an	
institutional	vacuum	or	that	it	was	the	sole	political	force.	The	partido	fidelista	rather	
prevailed	because	it	developed	an	“interwoven	core”	formed	by	the	“two	hegemonic	
political	 institutions	in	the	country”:	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	(FAR)	and	the	
Communist	 Party	 of	 Cuba	 (PCC)	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 2009,	 18).	 Likewise,	 a	
friendly	observer	of	Cuba	with	a	military	career	in	Canada	and	key	elite	connections	
in	Havana,	has	defined	the	FAR	and	the	PCC	as	the	“two	main	pillars”	of	the	Cuban	
state	–	of	which	Fidel	Castro	remained	“the	key	figure”	(Klepak	2005,	51).	
Applying	Weber’s	insights	around	the	“routinisation	of	charisma”,	if	charisma	“in	its	
pure	 form”	 only	 exists	 in	 statu	 nascendi	 and	 thus	 it	 must	 eventually	 be	 either	
“traditionalised”	or	 “legalised”	 (Weber	 1978a,	 246);	 therefore	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 FAR-
PCC	 ruling	 coalition	 was	 a	 form	 of	 legal-rational	 routinisation	 of	 Fidel	 Castro’s	
charismatic	authority.	This	process	is	perceptible	in	Mujal-León’s	summary:	
[Fidel	Castro]	exerted	a	charismatic	leadership	both	within	the	elite	and	in	the	Cuban	society,	
but	 its	 authority	has	also	had	an	 institutional	 side	of	which	 the	PCC	and	 the	FAR	have	not	
been	the	only	tools,	but	certainly	the	most	important	ones.	(Mujal-León	and	Buzón	2009,	35)	
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In	similar	terms,	but	ignoring	the	role	of	the	FAR,	Hoffmann	has	also	stressed	the	co-
existence	of	charisma	and	institutionalisation	in	Cuba	throughout	the	Fidel	era:	
[T]he	dualism	of	charismatic	and	 legal-rational	elements	was	still	 reflected	 in	Fidel	Castro’s	
very	titles.	He	acquired	the	titles	of	the	state-socialist	nomenclature,	and	official	declarations	
named	him	as	First	Secretary	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Cuban	Communist	Party	and	
President	of	the	Council	of	Ministers	and	of	the	Council	of	State;	yet	his	foremost	title	never	
ceased	 to	 be	 that	 of	 the	 Comandante	 en	 Jefe	 –	 a	 title	 found	 neither	 in	 the	 country’s	
constitution	nor	in	the	party’s	statutes.	(Hoffmann	2009,	238)	
The	relation	between	the	FAR-PCC	has	not	been	constant.	It	has	varied	across	time	
depending	on	external	and	internal	political	factors	affecting	Cuba.	At	the	beginning,	
perhaps	 not	 so	 surprisingly,	 the	 FAR	 and	 the	historical	 generation	 embedded	 in	 it	
prevailed	 over	 the	 PCC,	 which	 was	 created	 in	 1965	 –	 a	 process	 that	 Klepak	 has	
summarised	in	his	classic	book	on	the	Cuban	armed	forces:	
Key	 individuals	 came	 to	 hold	 both	 Party	 and	 military	 positions	 of	 importance.	 The	 FAR	
seemed	to	have	much	the	better	of	it.	In	most	senses,	the	PCC	was	being	subordinated	to	the	
military	 and	 not	 the	 reverse.	 Perhaps	more	 important,	 there	was	 to	 be	 only	 one	 chain	 of	
command,	whatever	influential	Soviet	practice	seemed	to	suggest,	and	that	chain	was	to	be	
dominated	by	MINFAR,	and	not	by	the	Party	structures.	(Klepak	2005,	44)	
The	 FAR	 was	 the	 heir	 of	 the	 Ejército	 Rebelde	 of	 former	 guerrilla	 fighters	 as	 “the	
insurgents	became	 the	armed	 forces	of	 the	 republic”	 (Klepak	2005,	 42).	Gen.	Raúl	
Castro	was	the	head	of	the	FAR	since	its	inception	in	October	1959	until	2008	when	
he	was	promoted	to	the	Presidency.	Thus,	the	precedence	of	the	FAR	in	relation	to	
the	 PCC	 is	 not	 simply	 chronological	 –	 it	 conditioned	 how	 the	 state	 apparatus	was	
shaped	and	by	whom.	The	relevance	of	this	peculiarity	of	the	Cuban	case,	 from	an	
institutional	 view,	 was	 well	 summarised	 by	 Baloyra	 (1996,	 2):	 “There	 was	 a	
revolutionary	army	before	there	was	a	party	of	the	revolution	and	the	main	mission	
of	that	army,	is	to	guarantee	the	survival	of	the	revolution,	not	of	the	Party”.	
Kapcia	 has	 of	 course	 rejected	 “the	 notion	 that	 Cuba	 is	 a	 military-run	 system”;	
crucially	 for	 him,	 “we	 should	 remember	 that	 the	 FAR	 has	 its	 own	 party	 cells	 and	
structure,	 belonging	 firmly	 and	 loyally	 to	 the	 party-led	 system”	 (2014,	 8).	While	 I	
would	accept	this	caveat,	I	would	simultaneously	challenge	the	implication	that	Cuba	
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is	simply	a	Party-run	system,	with	the	FAR	definitely	subordinated	to	it.	Since	1963,	
after	 tensions	with	 civilian	 cadre	 leading	 political	 education	 in	military	 units,	 Raúl	
Castro	decided	 that	only	military	personnel	 could	 serve	as	FAR	political	 instructors	
(Walker	1995).	From	then	on,	the	Party	was	built	through	a	fidelista	method	 in	the	
civilian	sphere,	and	a	raulista	method	in	the	military,	as	explained	by	Jorge	Risquet6	
in	the	50th	anniversary	of	the	“initial	act	of	Party	building	in	the	FAR”:	
While	 the	building	of	 the	Party	 followed	 the	 fidelista	method	 in	 the	civilian	 life,	 it	became	
necessary	to	create	the	ways	to	adapt	this	model	to	the	conditions	of	a	military	institution,	
with	its	chain	of	command	and	exclusive	discipline.	Such	was	a	task	of	the	FAR	Minister	[Raúl	
Castro]	[…].	A	commission	presided	by	the	FAR	Minister	elaborated	the	method	to	start	the	
work	of	creating	the	party	organs	in	the	armed	forces.	The	method	for	[party]	assemblies	in	
FAR	 units,	 must	 not	 affect	 the	 inherent	 principles	 to	 any	 armed	 institution,	 such	 as	
hierarchies	and	military	discipline.	(Risquet	Valdés	2013,	np)	
Therefore,	 the	 FAR’s	 high	 command	 is	 not	 only	 in	 charge	 of	 political	 instruction	
within	the	military;	it	is	also	assured	that	its	chain	of	command	will	also	be	applied	to	
its	internal	party	structure.	If	the	FAR	is	politically	loyal	to	the	project	epitomised	by	
the	 PCC,	 its	 communist	 engagement	 is	 rather	 one	 of	 its	 own.	 Hence	 FAR-PCC	
relations	seem	to	follow	a	model	closer	to	a	partnership	than	to	subordination.	
Partially	 explaining	 this,	 it	was	 not	 until	 1975	 that	 the	 PCC	 held	 its	 1st	 Congress	 –	
despite	being	formally	founded	in	1965.	To	be	sure,	it	was	during	the	1970s	“process	
of	institutionalisation”,	when	the	Soviet-style	institutional	framework	was	replicated	
in	Cuba,	that	the	Party	was	finally	enshrined	in	the	newly	adopted	constitution	as	the	
“leading	 force	 in	 state	 and	 society”,	 expanding	 its	 influence	 on	 state	 bureaucracy	
(Hoffmann	2009,	Mujal-León	2011).	The	fact	that	the	PCC	was	not	the	producer	but	a	
product	of	the	Cuban	revolutionary	state,	surely	prefigured	its	relative	weakness	and	
subordination	to	the	partido	fidelista,	as	suggested	by	Mujal-León:	
																																																						
6	Jorge	Risquet	played	a	key	role	in	these	initial	efforts	as	political	chief	of	the	Eastern	Army	(one	of	
the	three	territorial	divisions	of	the	FAR).	He	was	a	PSP	cadre	who	joined	the	Sierra	Maestra	guerrilla	
in	 1958.	 As	member	 of	 the	 PCC	 Political	 Bureau	 from	1975	 to	 1991,	 he	 led	 the	 Cuban	 negotiation	
team	at	the	end	of	the	war	in	Angola	in	1988.	He	is	currently	a	Central	Committee	member.	
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The	PCC	had	always	been	a	secondary	actor	on	the	Cuban	scene.	[…]	Although	the	PCC	had	
ample	 parcels	 of	 power,	 it	 did	 not	 rule	 Cuba.	 The	 core	 of	 the	 ruling	 class	 held	 high	 party	
positions,	but	what	distinguished	them	was	their	dependence	and	unswerving	loyalty	toward	
the	comandante	en	jefe	(commander	in	chief).	(Mujal-León	2011,	154)	
What	were	the	tasks	of	the	PCC	once	institutionalised	within	the	regime?	
Within	 this	 partido	 fidelista,	 the	 PCC	 was	 responsible	 for	 administering	 the	 party-state	
bureaucracy	 and	 coordinating	 the	 mass	 organizations	 that	 organized,	 directed	 and	
channelled	participation	in	Cuban	society.	(Mujal-León	2011,	154)	
To	keep	a	 long	 story	 short,	 the	basic	 argument	of	Mujal-León	and	Buzón	 (2009)	 is	
that	after	the	creation	and	consolidation	of	the	state	in	1961-1970,	Cuba	entered	a	
long	 and	 stable	 period	 of	 Soviet-style	 institutionalisation	 until	 1986	 during	 which	
FAR-PCC	functions	were	highly	specialised.	In	those	years,	the	Armed	Forces	and	the	
Party	 focused	 on	 the	 international	 and	 national	 arena,	 respectively.	 The	 FAR-PCC	
relation	evolved	into	some	form	of	stable	equilibrium	between	peers,	each	of	them	
taking	care	of	equally	 relevant	political	 tasks.	The	Party	was	 in	 charge	of	domestic	
policy	 on	 the	 Island	 while	 the	 Armed	 Forces	 pursued	 military	 missions	 abroad	 in	
convergence	with	Moscow’s	foreign	policy.	The	problems,	of	course,	came	later.	
Table	4.	FAR-PCC	division	of	labour	from	1959	to	2006	
	 FAR	priorities	 PCC	priorities	 Main	process	
	
1961-1970	
	
-	National	defence	
-	Internal	security	
-	Social	tasks	
-	Mobilisation	of	people	
-	Consolidation	of	party	and	
mass	organisations	
Creation	of	the	state,	
mobilisation	and	guerrilla	
internationalisation	
	
1970-1986	
	
-	National	defence	
-	International	intervention	 -	Domestic	policy	
Institutionalisation,	
specialisation	and	new	
internationalism	
	
1986-1991	
	
-	National	defence	
-	Adaptation	to	downsizing	
-	Adaptation	to	purges	
-	Domestic	policy	minus	
economic	management	
-	Adaptation	to	purges	
Great	transformation	
	
1991-2006	
	
-	National	defence	
-	Internal	security	
-	Economic	management	
-	Mass	politisation	
-	Ideological	watchdog	
Survival,	end	of	autarky	
and	regime’s	transition	
	
Sources:	Own	elaboration	based	on	Mujal-León	and	Buzón	(2009).	
	
Overall,	Mujal-León	and	Buzón	identify	four	stages	in	the	FAR-PCC	relationship	in	the	
period	 1959-2006,	 as	 summarised	 in	 Table	 4.	 On	 each	 period,	 the	 relative	 power	
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within	the	partido	fidelista	of	each	of	its	two	pillars	varied	according	to	the	changes	
in	 their	 specific	 tasks.	 After	 several	 years	 of	 Soviet-style	 institutionalisation,	 Fidel	
Castro	 launched	 the	 Campaign	 of	 Rectification	 of	 Mistakes	 as	 a	 reaction	 to	 (and	
rejection	of)	Gorbachev	reforms	–	which	was	a	reversal	of	Cuba’s	first	transition	to	
post-totalitarianism	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 All	 in	 all,	 Fidel	 Castro’s	
focus	 switched	 to	 mobilisation	 again.	 In	 Weber’s	 language,	 from	 1986	 to	 1991,	
Cuba’s	charismatic	authority	reasserted	its	control	over	its	legal-rational	legs.	
In	1986-1991,	both	 the	FAR	and	 the	PCC	 suffered	deep	crisis	 and	 transformations.	
The	 PCC	 suffered	 the	 purge	 of	 “almost	 all	 Party	 cadres	 in	 charge	 of	 economic	
management	 and	 the	 planning	 agencies”	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 2009,	 48).	 As	 a	
result,	the	historical	generation	“recovered	much	territory	lost	in	the	previous	years”	
of	 institutionalisation	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 2009,	 49).	 The	 FAR	 did	 not	 have	 it	
better	 as	 it	 entered	 into	 a	 critical	 period	 whose	 initial	 episode	 was	 the	 purge	 of	
General	Arnaldo	Ochoa,	 last	 chief	of	 the	Cuban	mission	 in	Angola,	and	one	of	 two	
generals	at	the	time	with	the	title	of	Hero	of	the	Revolution.	
Kapcia	has	captured	the	mood	shaping	what	Cubans	called	the	Angola’s	syndrome:	
[T]he	 returning	 officers,	 used	 to	 a	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 and	 prestige	 […],	 might	 become	
frustrated	 at	 finding	 not	 a	 ‘land	 fit	 for	 heroes’	 but	 a	 crisis-ridden	 and	 again	 besieged	
Revolution.	(Kapcia	2000,	206)	
Although	 Ochoa	 was	 accused	 of	 corruption	 and	 drug	 trafficking,	 his	 case	 remains	
largely	a	puzzle.	His	trial	and	execution	looked	more	like	a	political	response	by	the	
Castro	 brothers	 to	 some	 (undisclosed)	 behind-the-scenes	 crisis	 prompted	 by	 the	
juxtaposed	effect	of	the	return	of	all	Cuban	troops	from	Angola	to	a	land	witnessing	
(and	opposing)	Gorbachev	reforms	in	the	USSR	(Preston	1989).	
Besides	 Ochoa,	 four	 other	 persons	 were	 executed;	 14	ministers,	 vice-ministers	 or	
directors	 of	 state	 companies	 had	 been	 dismissed;	 over	 5%	 of	 the	 PCC	 Central	
Committee	 had	 been	 expelled;	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Interior	 had	 been	 jailed	
(subsequently	 dying	 of	 a	 heart	 attack	 in	 prison)	 along	 with	 eighteen	 top	 officers	
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subordinated	to	him;	and,	several	thousand	of	officers	in	the	FAR	and	the	Ministry	of	
the	Interior	(MININT)	had	been	purged	(Fogel	and	Rosenthal	1994,	33,	151).	
The	 era	 of	 FAR	 military	 involvement	 abroad	 had	 ended	 and	 its	 purge	 ironically	
facilitated	its	adaptation	to	the	subsequent	economic	crisis	sparked	by	the	fall	of	the	
Soviet	 Union.	 As	 the	 state	 budget	 collapsed,	 Raúl	 Castro	 downsized	 the	 FAR	 from	
300,000	 in	 full-time	service	 in	1990	 to	 “well	under	100,000	and	still	 falling”	within	
the	next	three	years	(Klepak	2015,	76).	Overall,	the	FAR	and	the	PCC	emerged	from	
these	 turbulent	 years	 more	 loyal	 to	 the	 (once	 again	 prominent)	 charismatic	
leadership	of	Fidel	Castro,	while	their	roles	were	redefined	according	to	the	new	top	
priority	of	the	regime	after	1991:	survival.	Therefore:	
While	 the	 PCC	 acted	 as	 ideological	 watchdog	 headed	 political	 and	 administrative	
management	in	the	national	territory,	the	FAR	(or	at	least	an	important	sector	within	it)	was	
the	responsible	of	dealing	with	the	economic	problems.	(Mujal-León	and	Buzón	2009,	62)	
The	 Soviet	 Union	 had	 fallen	 and	 Cuba	was	 alone	 in	 a	 hostile	world:	 a	 communist	
island	 in	 a	 sea	 of	 capitalism.	 Abandoned	 to	 its	 own	 resources	 and	 with	 no	 more	
external	economic	subsidies,	Cuba	pursued	economic	reforms	in	the	1990s	to	cope	
with	the	new	situation.	Crucially,	the	role	of	private	actors	increased,	including	joint	
ventures	with	foreign	capital	mainly	 in	tourism	and	in	the	extraction	of	copper	and	
oil.	The	FAR	played	a	major	role	 in	this,	commissioning	part	of	 its	personnel	to	the	
management	of	joint	ventures	(Klepak	2005)	–	an	obvious	choice	for	the	task	given	
the	 expertise	 acquired	 since	 1987,	 when	 the	 military	 introduced	 the	 “System	 of	
Enterprise	Improvement”	(SPE,	for	its	acronym	in	Spanish)	in	its	enterprises.	Such	a	
system,	based	on	managerial	techniques	developed	in	capitalist	countries,	was	later	
intended	 to	be	extended	 to	 the	 rest	of	 the	 state	companies	 (Consejo	de	Ministros	
1998).	Since	then,	important	personalities	of	military	background	started	to	outstand	
as	executives,	as	was	the	case	of	Ramiro	Valdés,	one	of	the	six	vice	presidents	of	the	
Council	of	Ministers	and	member	of	the	PCC’s	Political	Bureau.7	He	was	not	the	only	
																																																						
7 He had been dismissed in 1985 as MININT head for apparent frictions with Raúl Castro, but 
gradually overcame his decline as director of Grupo de la Electrónica – the state company that in Cuba 
controls the production and import/sale of electronic goods and services, software and hardware. 
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one.	The	Tourism	Ministry,	a	key	institution	of	the	post-Soviet	Cuban	economy,	is	led	
by	Colonel	Manuel	Marrero	Cruz,	former	director	of	Grupo	Gaviota,	an	emblematic	
enterprise	of	the	tourist	industry	developed	by	FAR	managerial	expertise.	
Apart	 from	 its	 significant	 incursion	 in	 economic	 activities,	 the	 FAR	 had	 also	 been	
handed	 over	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior	 (MININT)	 in	 1989.	 By	
contrast,	the	PCC	did	not	surmount	the	contraction	of	its	power	suffered	during	the	
institutional	earthquake	of	1986-1991.	For	Mujal-León	and	Buzón	(2009,	57)	the	PCC	
after	1991	“focused	on	two	fields	–	the	political	and	the	ideological”.	While	the	Party	
was	not	irrelevant	at	all,	it	was	not	as	multifaceted	as	the	Armed	Forces.	
Overall,	 in	 the	 period	 1991-2006	 “the	 PCC	 and	 the	 FAR	 remained	 the	 central	
components	of	the	partido	fidelista	until	the	dawn	of	the	21st	century”	(Mujal-León	
and	 Buzón	 2009,	 65).	 And	 of	 course,	 Fidel	 Castro,	 remained	 the	 leader	 of	 the	
charismatic	community	whose	core	was	the	historical	generation.	The	differentiation	
of	tasks	between	the	FAR	and	the	PCC	had	suffered	variations	and	re-equilibrations	
along	time	but	the	two	of	them	were	still	the	key	ruling	coalition	in	Cuba.	
4.3	Ideology:	the	case	of	the	managers	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 behind	 the	 idealist/pragmatic	 alternation	 of	
economic	cycles,	Mesa	Lago	(2012)	equally	highlighted	that	Fidel’s	preferences	were	
always	 inclined	 towards	 orthodox	 CPE	 –	 despite	 temporary	 and	 often	 unwished	
tactic	retreats.	 Ideologically	speaking,	 this	means	that	the	Fidel	era	was	marked	by	
one	constant:	the	stigmatisation	of	market-based	economic	actors.	However,	there	
was	one	exception	to	this	rule:	the	case	of	the	managers.	They	were	born	on	the	eve	
of	 the	 Special	 Period	 and	 were	 integrated	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 being	 stigmatised	 –	
afterwards.	 Their	 case	 is	 relevant	 for	 comparative	 analysis	with	 future	 integration	
processes	during	Raúl’s	presidency,	as	will	be	explored	later	on	in	this	thesis.	
When	Ernesto	“Che”	Guevara,	then	Industries	Minister,	attended	in	March	1964	the	
United	 Nations	 Conference	 on	 Commerce	 and	 Development	 held	 in	 Geneva,	
Switzerland,	he	denounced	the	foreign	investments	as	“penetration	instruments	in	a	
developing	 country”,	 which	 therefore	 represented	 “a	 danger	 for	 world	 commerce	
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and	peace”	(CFT	1964).	Later	on,	with	the	downfall	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	economic,	
political	and	military	sponsor	of	the	Cuban	regime	after	1959,	things	would	change.	
Although	the	second	pragmatic	cycle	of	economic	policy	has	been	located	in	1991-96	
(Mesa	Lago	2012),	reform	in	Cuba’s	foreign	sector	had	already	started.	In	1984,	the	
Soviet	 Union	 had	 complained	 in	 a	 COMECON	 meeting	 in	 Havana	 about	 Cuba’s	
untrustworthy	commercial	commitments	(Pérez-López	2003,	158).	In	response,	Cuba	
started	 to	build	 trade	 relations	beyond	 the	 socialist	bloc	–	which	became	 the	only	
available	strategy	after	the	socialist	bloc	itself	collapsed,	opening	the	Special	Period.	
In	1990,	the	first	foreign	direct	 investment	 in	socialist	Cuba	started	operations:	the	
Hotel	 Sol	 Palmeras,	 with	 capital	 from	 the	 Spanish	 chain	 Sol	 Meliá.	 Fidel	 Castro,	
whom	presided	over	the	inauguration,	signalled	that	Cuba,	by	its	own	means,	would	
have	managed	 to	 develop	 the	 beaches	 of	 Varadero	 “in	 thirty,	 thirty-five,	 forty,	 or	
forty-five	 years”	 (CFT	 1990,	 9).	 For	 him,	 this	 opening	 represented	 a	 “historical”	
moment	 in	 response	 to	 technological	 and	 scientific,	 “non-ideological”	 needs.	
Nevertheless	–	despite	the	wishes	of	the	Commander	 in	Chief	–	 it	was	precisely	an	
ideological	change	what	had	just	occurred:	an	 imperialist	 instrument	had	just	been	
turned	into	a	legitimate	tool	of	economic	cooperation	and	development.	
The	 ideological	green	 light	given	by	 the	 leadership	 to	 the	 reform	of	Cuba’s	 foreign	
sector	 kicked	off	 a	 full	 reorientation	of	 the	 country’s	 international	 trade	 relations.	
Exposed	 to	 the	 world	 market	 “overnight”,	 Cuba	 launched	 a	 new	 type	 of	 state	
enterprise	 oriented	 to	 the	 world	 market	 –	 frequently	 in	 partnership	 with	 foreign	
capital.	Its	mission	was	to	collect	hard	currency	through	exports,	which	would	enable	
newly	isolated	Cuba	to	fund	its	import	needs.	Such	state	enterprises	gave	birth	to	a	
new	corporate	subject	in	socialist	Cuba:	the	managers	(“empresarios”,	in	Spanish)	–	
the	native	directors	of	the	state	companies	operating	in	the	new	foreign	sector.	
Before	the	1990s,	“empresario”	was	equivalent	to	bourgeois	and	hence	 implied	an	
antagonistic	 subject	 that	 deserved	 ideological	 condemnation.	 Accordingly,	 Ernesto	
“Che”	Guevara	always	used	the	term	“directores”	(literally	“directors”,	in	English)	to	
refer	 to	 those	 in	 charge	of	 leading	 state	 companies	 in	 Cuba,	 as	 in	 his	 speeches	of	
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October-November	1961	(Guevara	1977).	As	a	result,	the	later	emergence	of	Cuban	
managers	working	in	 joint	ventures	with	FDI	was	equivalent	to	the	emergence	of	a	
native	intruder;	in	other	words,	an	ideological	outsider.	
A	 Cuban	 sociologist	 has	 cautiously	 captured	 the	 challenge	 the	managers	 posed	 to	
the	 ideology	 of	 the	 regime	 for	 it	 was	 “necessary	 to	 consider	 their	 demonstrative	
effect,	 in	 the	social	 inter-subjectivity,	of	 the	advantages	and	 legitimacy	of	 the	non-
state	sector”	 (Espina	2008,	136).	 In	 the	same	vein,	Bobes	 (2000,	36)	observed	that	
the	 “economic	 practices”	 introduced	 in	 the	 1990s	 had	 contributed	 to	 “erode	 the	
collectivist	 and	 egalitarian	 values”.	 Therefore,	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 “group	
identities”,	 like	 the	managers,	 could	 be	 said	 to	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 “ruptures	
with	the	revolutionary	social	order”	in	Cuba	(Bobes	2000,	49).	
Revealing	a	revision	in	the	regime’s	official	ideology,	the	managers	would	no	longer	
be	 called	primarily	 “cadre”	or	 “directors”.	 Such	 ideological	distortion/adaptation	 is	
what	I	analyse	in	the	rest	of	this	section	in	order	to	grasp	the	underlying	pattern.	
The	 ideological	 irruption	 of	 the	 “empresarios”	 can	 be	 observed	 through	 the	
concomitant	 rise	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Cuba,	 an	
institution	 attached	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Trade	 (MINCEX,	 for	 its	 acronym	 in	
Spanish)	 that	 defines	 itself	 as	 “an	 association	 of	 enterprises	 […]	 with	 recognition	
before	the	organisms	of	the	State”	(Cámara	de	Comercio	2015b).	Originally	focused	
on	the	promotion	of	Cuban	exports	 internationally,	the	Chamber	 later	developed	–	
as	an	effect	of	the	reforms	of	the	Special	Period	–	the	intention	of	speaking	for	the	
“empresariado	cubano”	(roughly	translated	as	“Cuban	business	community”).	
Created	 in	 1963	 by	 the	 Law	 1091,	 the	 Cuban	 Chamber	 substituted	 –	 with	 new	
structure	and	objectives	–	another	organism	with	the	same	name	founded	in	1927.	
The	latter,	for	its	part,	was	the	heir	of	an	institution	founded	in	Havana	in	1876.	
The	Chamber	of	Commerce	dates	back	to	the	19th	century,	in	very	colonial	times,	when	on	
May	1st,	1876	 it	was	founded	the	“Havana’s	General	Council	of	Commerce”,	grouping	 in	 its	
leadership	 a	 group	 of	 traders	 and	 industrialists	 tied	 to	 the	 merchant	 interests	 of	 the	
metropolis	[Spain].	(Cámara	de	Comercio,	3)	
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The	interests	of	the	old	Cuban	bourgeoisie	were	“represented	and	defended	by	the	
[old]	Chamber	of	Commerce”	(Cámara	de	Comercio,	13).	Once	Fulgencio	Batista	was	
overthrown	in	1959	and	the	revolutionary	government	started	the	expropriation	of	
the	 bourgeoisie	 in	 Cuba,	 this	 social	 class	 disappeared	 on	 the	 island.	 On	 this	 new	
political	 context,	 “the	 employees	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 themselves	
requested	 the	 intervention	of	 the	 revolutionary	 authorities”	 (Cámara	 de	Comercio	
2015b).	 Consequently,	 the	 aforementioned	 Law	 1091	 explains	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
new	 Chamber	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 needs	 “in	 regards	 to	 foreign	 trade”	 of	 the	 new	
“economic	structure”	created	by	the	“Revolution”	(Consejo	de	Ministros	1963b).	
In	 its	 early	 years,	 the	 main	 task	 of	 the	 Chamber	 was	 the	 organisation	 of	 Cuba’s	
participation	 in	commercial	or	even	cultural	 fairs	and	exhibitions,	both	at	home	or	
abroad.	 Additionally,	 from	 1973	 onwards	 the	 Chamber	 took	 over	 as	 the	 Cuban	
state’s	agent	of	industrial	property	for	international	purposes	(CFT	1988,	5).	
However,	from	1963	to	1980	only	a	few	companies	were	members	of	the	Chamber.	
In	 an	 interview	 the	 Chamber’s	 ex-president	 Carlos	 Martínez	 Salsamendi	 declared	
that	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 foundation,	 the	 organisation	 had	 51	 members,	 “of	 which	
nineteen	 were	 of	 foreign	 trade,	 functioning	 as	 monopolies,	 and	 the	 others	 were	
groups	 of	 enterprises	 called	 consolidated,	 big”	 (in	 CFT	 1997,	 7).	 However,	 the	
membership	 must	 have	 diminished	 in	 1965	 when	 several	 of	 these	 monopolistic	
groups	were	fused	together	(CFT	1965,	np).	Later,	in	the	1980s,	the	Chamber	grew	as	
a	result	of	the	Law	of	Foreign	Investments	of	1984	–	the	first	of	 its	kind	in	socialist	
Cuba.	 In	 1989,	 the	 Chamber	 now	 had	 94	 companies	 affiliated	 to	 it	 (Cámara	 de	
Comercio	2000).	
At	the	present,	the	mission	of	the	Chamber	is	“to	promote	the	development	of	the	
affiliated	Cuban	enterprises,	for	the	wellbeing	of	the	national	economy”	(Cámara	de	
Comercio	 2015b,	 np).	 All	 Cuban	 companies	 related	 to	 the	 foreign	 sector	 of	 the	
economy	can	apply	for	membership	(Consejo	de	Ministros	1963a,	b),	which	includes	
joint	ventures	since	1990.	Each	company	is	expected	to	pay	an	annual	membership	
fee,	the	amount	of	which	depends	on	its	sales	volume	(Cámara	de	Comercio	2015a).	
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Voluntary	 affiliation	 and	 self-financing	 are	 traditions	 that	 persist	 from	 the	 pre-
revolutionary	 predecessor	 of	 the	 Chamber.	 Given	 these	 rules,	 the	membership	 of	
this	organisation	can	be	read	as	an	index	of	its	size.	Figure	1	shows	the	rapid	grow	of	
the	Chamber	of	Commerce	after	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union:	
	
From	1989	to	2003,	 the	Chamber’s	membership	 increased	9.4	 times	at	an	average	
annual	growth	rate	of	18%.	These	have	been	the	golden	years	of	the	Chamber.	The	
decline	in	the	number	of	members	after	2003	coincides	with	the	last	‘idealist	cycle’	
of	 economic	 policy	 in	 Cuba,	 which	 spanned	 from	 2003	 to	 2006.	 As	 this	 period	
accounts	 for	 the	 last	years	of	Fidel’s	 rule,	 it	will	be	tackled	 in	 the	next	section.	For	
now	 it	 suffices	 to	 note	 that	 despite	 the	 Chamber	 has	 not	 seen	 a	 new	 increase	 in	
membership	since	2003,	by	that	time	it	had	already	developed	a	new	identity.	The	
Chamber’s	 outstanding	 expansion	 after	 1989	 due	 to	 the	 reorientation	 of	 Cuba’s	
foreign	trade	 led	to	 its	conversion	 into	a	corporate	organisation:	 it	emerged	as	the	
voice	of	the	Cuban	businessmen.	
The	shift	 from	export	promotion	to	corporate	representation	was	 incubated	 in	 the	
1990s	and	completed	 in	2001.	The	evidence	that	accounts	for	this	change	 is	 in	the	
documents	discussed	by	the	Members’	General	Assembly	(MGA)	of	the	Chamber.	On	
each	MGA,	 the	managers	are	given	a	Memory	 and	a	Chamber’s	Plan	 –	 “Memoria”	
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Figure	1.	Membership	of	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	of	Cuba,	1989-2008.	
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and	 “Plan	 Cameral”,	 respectively,	 in	 Spanish;	 the	 former	 being	 the	 report	 of	 last	
year’s	activities;	and	the	latter,	the	plan	for	the	year	ahead.	
The	1999	Memory,	for	instance,	proposed	“a	vision	of	the	Chamber	[…]	for	the	year	
2003,	in	which	it	stands	out	as	a	potential	institution	that	represents	the	associated	
business	sector”	(Cámara	de	Comercio	2000,	25).	This	is	arguably	the	first	time	that	
the	Chamber	raises	this	 intention.	As	soon	as	a	year	 later,	the	Chamber	states	as	a	
fact	its	new	representative	character	in	the	2000	Memory:	
The	 Chamber,	 in	 its	 character	 of	 representative	 institution	 of	 the	 business	 community	
[empresariado]	 in	 the	 national	 sphere,	 has	 kept	 on	 the	 rise	 the	 close	 working	 and	
coordination	 links	 with	 the	 Organisms	 of	 the	 State’s	 Central	 Administration	 and	 the	
provincial	 governments.	 The	presence	 and	 active	 participation	of	 different	working	 groups	
and	 commissions	 has	 enabled	 the	 Chamber	 to	 know	 and	 work	 with	 the	 strategies	 and	
policies	 of	 the	 different	 national	 organisms,	 as	 well	 as	 transfer	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
[Chamber’s]	associates. (Cámara	de	Comercio	2001,	4)	
By	2002,	the	membership	of	the	Chamber	had	increased	eight	times	in	a	decade.	In	
this	context,	the	Chamber	concluded	that	“the	current	membership	guarantees	the	
institution	a	high	power	 to	convene	 that	makes	 it	a	business	 forum	par	excellence	
where	the	members	have	the	possibility	to	discuss	the	problems	affecting	them	and	
take	 their	 opinions	 and	 proposals	 to	 the	 authorities	 on	 topics	 under	 their	 scope”	
(Cámara	 de	 Comercio	 2003,	 8).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 regime	 had	 just	 recognised	
legitimate	collective	interests	to	the	Cuban	managers	via	the	Chamber.	
In	 the	 2002,	 2002,	 and	 2006	 Memories,	 the	 Chamber	 underscored	 its	 “role	 of	
spokesperson	of	 the	 interests	of	 the	Cuban	business	 community”	 (2003,	 17,	 2006,	
18,	2007a,	16).	In	2007,	the	Chamber’s	Plan	offered	a	clearer,	positive	definition:	
What	 are	 the	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce?	 Normally,	 the	 Chambers	 of	 Commerce	 are	
autonomous	 non-profit	 organisations	 created	 to	 protect	 and	 develop	 the	 interests	 of	
commerce	and	industry,	locally	and	nationally.	Their	basic	goal	is	economic	development.	In	
particular,	 it	 aims	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 its	members	 in	 the	 commercial,	
industrial	 and	 services	 sectors;	 in	 a	 very	 real	 sense,	 the	 members	 themselves	 are	 the	
Chamber	of	Commerce.	(Cámara	de	Comercio	2007b,	5)	
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Right	 after	 the	 paragraph	 above,	 appears	 the	 question	 “What	 is	 the	 Cuban	
Chamber”;	the	answer:	“it	represents	the	Cuban	business	sector	associated	to	it”.	
In	 practice,	 however,	 the	 Chamber	 does	 not	 play	 a	 policymaking	 role,	 but	 an	
advisory	 one	 subordinated	 to	 the	 MINCEX.	 And	 as	 if	 to	 paraphrase	 Schmitter’s	
seminal	 definition	 of	 corporatism	 as	 a	 monopolistic	 system	 of	 representation	
recognised	 and	 controlled	 by	 the	 state,	 the	 head	 of	 the	 MINCEX	 defined	 the	
Chamber	 as	 an	 “indispensable	 advisor,	 […]	 the	 most	 suitable	 institution	 to	 put	
together	the	concerns	and	initiatives	of	the	national	and	foreign	business	community	
linked	 to	 the	 foreign	 trade	 so	 as	 to	 take	 them	 to	 the	 relevant	 organisms	 and	
institutions”	 (CFT	 2008,	 np).	 The	 subordinated	 character	 of	 the	 Chamber	 was	
prefigured	in	its	leadership	structure,	as	designed	in	1963	and	unaltered	since	then.	
The	 three	 leading	bodies	of	 the	Chamber	 are	 its	Members’	General	Assembly,	 the	
Leadership	Council,	and	 the	Executive	Committee.	The	MGA	 is	 supposed	 to	be	 the	
“superior	 organism	 of	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce”,	 which	 is	 composed	 “of	 all	 its	
active	members”	 (Consejo	 de	Ministros	 1963b,	 art.	 5,	 6).	 This	 framework,	 maybe	
inherited	from	the	pre-1959	traditions	of	the	Chamber,	was	never	put	into	practice	
until	 1987,	 when	 Julio	 García	 Oliveras,	 president	 of	 the	 Chamber	 in	 1986-92,	
convened	an	MGA	for	 the	 first	 time	 (CFT	1992,	73).	 In	spite	of	García’s	attempt	 to	
revive	this	tradition,	Carlos	Martínez	Salsamendi,	Chamber’s	president	in	1993-1999,	
would	later	acknowledge	in	1997	that	the	MGA’s	system	had	not	really	worked:	
[I]n	reality	it	has	not	worked	like	that	[Law	1091],	which	even	rules	that	the	directing	council	
of	the	Chamber	has	representatives	of	its	associated	members,	but	that	has	neither	worked	
that	way.	We	are	working	 for	 these	 regulations	 to	be	 fulfilled.	But	 for	 this	 to	 happen,	 it	 is	
needed	an	appealing	content	for	the	associated	members.	(CFT	1997,	7)	
To	 be	 sure,	 the	 Chamber	 would	 later	 manage	 to	 institutionalise	 the	 MGA’s.	
However,	 the	MGA	 does	 not	 select	 the	 Chamber’s	 Executive	 Committee,	which	 is	
“integrated	 by	 a	 President,	 Vice-President,	 and	 a	 Secretary,	 appointed	 and	 freely	
removed	 by	 the	Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Trade”	 (Consejo	 de	Ministros	 1963b,	 art.	 8).	
Besides	 this,	although	 the	MGA	 is	entitled	 to	elect	 three	members	 that	along	with	
the	Executive	Committee	form	the	Leadership	Council	of	the	Chamber,	the	latter	is	
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less	powerful	than	the	former.	While	the	powers	of	the	Council	are	defined	through	
verbs	 like	 “to	 know”	 and	 “to	 propose”,	 the	 Committee	 is	 enabled	 to	 “exercise”,	
“prepare”	and	“enforce”	(Consejo	de	Ministros	1963a,	chap.	6,	7).	Thus,	the	Council	
advises	and	the	Committee	(i.e.	the	MINCEX)	decides.	
Therefore,	 although	 the	 Chamber	 is	 not	 a	 “mass	 organisation”	 –	 i.e.	 there	 are	 no	
“masses”	of	managers	–	its	relation	with	the	Cuban	state	is	also	a	corporatist	one.	As	
such,	the	Chamber	displays	a	state/non-state	duality.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Chamber	
is	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 state	 because	 the	MINCEX	 appoints	 its	 leadership.	 On	 the	
other,	 the	 Chamber	 is	 not	 either	 a	 mere	 extension	 of	 the	 state	 in	 as	 long	 as	 it	
channels	concerns	of	 the	“empresarios	cubanos”.	And	the	point	 is:	 the	regime	had	
ideologically	recognised	a	new	corporate	subject	in	Cuba,	the	“businessmen”.	
If	 in	Fidel’s	 times	 the	exceptional	 figure	of	 the	communist	businessman	working	 in	
the	world	market	had	already	emerged,	what	else	would	happen	during	Raúl’s?	
Summary	
To	put	the	‘charismatic	early	post-totalitarian’	regime	type	in	historical	perspective,	I	
folded	 it	 into	 the	 main	 periodization	 efforts	 of	 communist	 Cuba.	 A	 key	 theme	 in	
these	 matters	 is	 the	 division	 of	 Mesa-Lago	 (2012)	 of	 Cuba’s	 economic	 history	 in	
‘idealist	cycles’	and	‘pragmatic	cycles’.	In	the	post-totalitarian	perspective	of	Cuba,	I	
have	 interpreted	 the	 former	 cycles	with	 ‘freezing’	 tendencies,	 and	 the	 latter	 with		
‘maturing’	ones.	 In	this	discussion,	 I	 identified	the	 leadership	of	Fidel	Castro	as	the	
main	 force	aborting	 the	 ‘pragmatic	 cycles’,	which	has	 led	me	 to	ask	whether	after	
2006	(when	Fidel	stepped	down)	the	‘idealist	cycles’	have	come	to	an	end.	
Then	I	introduced	a	succinct	historical	background	of	the	leadership	and	ideology	of	
the	Cuban	regime	in	the	period	1959-2006	–	i.e.	Cuba	under	Fidel	Castro.	I	discussed	
key	elements	of	the	leadership,	namely,	the	role	of	the	revolutionary	veterans	who	
won	 the	1959	 revolution	and	 since	 then	constituted	 the	 ‘inner	 circle’	of	 the	 ruling	
elite	(Kapcia	2014),	and	also	the	significance	of	the	FAR-PCC	relationship	as	the	two	
main	institutional	pillars	of	the	political	system	(Klepak	2005,	Mujal-León	and	Buzón	
2009).	Using	the	framework	of	Max	Weber	–	advanced	in	the	theoretical	discussion	
	
107	
of	 the	previous	 chapter	 –	 the	Cuban	 ‘inner	 circle’	may	be	 seen	 as	 the	 staff	 of	 the	
charismatic	leader	Fidel	Castro,	while	the	FAR-PCC	ruling	coalition	can	be	understood	
as	the	legal-rational	routinisation	of	charismatic	authority.	
In	 regards	 to	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 Cuban	 regime,	 I	 followed	 a	 different	 strategy:	 I	
assumed	 that	 the	 stigmatisation	 of	 market-based	 subject	 was	 a	 constant.	 In	 the	
previous	 chapter	 I	 had	 introduced	 the	 periodization	 of	 Mesa	 Lago	 (2012),	 who	
argues	that	the	CPE	model	pursued	in	Cuba	experienced	under	Fidel	Castro	idealist	
and	pragmatic	cycles	–	the	former	being	Fidel’s	preferred	ones,	and	the	latter	mere	
tactical	retreats.	Thus,	in	this	chapter	I	argued	that	the	last	idealist	cycle	under	Fidel	
(1991-1996)	 brought	 the	 first	 (partial)	 ideological	 revision	 of	 the	 CPE	 model,	 as	
happened	with	 the	 insertion	of	Cuban	managers	 into	 the	world	market	–	 this	was	
the	only	case	of	acceptance	of	a	non-traditional	socialist	subject	before	2006.	
Both	the	persistence	of	a	charismatic	leadership	and	the	first	ideological	revisions	on	
the	 CPE	 model	 would	 shape	 the	 political	 opportunities	 and	 constraints	 that	 Raúl	
Castro	 faced	when	 he	 took	 over	 in	 2006.	 The	 charismatic	 post-totalitarian	 regime	
would	 thus	 confront	 the	 loss	 of	 its	 charismatic	 founder,	 while	 the	 accumulated	
failures	of	the	CPE	model	compounded	the	political	challenges	ahead.	As	the	‘early	
post-totalitarian’	 stage	 is	 defined	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	CPE	 ideological	 legitimacy	 is	
still	solid	(Saxonberg	2013),	the	regime	would	need	to	reform	the	economy	or	have	
its	 ideological	 legitimacy	further	undermined	and	face	the	consequences	–	but	this	
time	without	Fidel’s	charisma	as	an	always-reliable	source	of	legitimacy.	
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5.	The	revolt	of	Raúl	Castro	
This	 chapter	 covers	 the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro	before	 the	Sixth	Party	Congress,	
which	 was	 held	 in	 April	 2011.	 To	 begin	 with,	 in	 the	 first	 section	 section	 I	 will	
summarise	 the	political	 context	 in	 Cuba	 at	 the	 time	 Fidel	 Castro	 stepped	down	as	
President	 in	 2006	 –	 i.e.	 the	 regime	 as	 Raúl	 Castro	 received	 it.	 After	 this	 historical	
turning	point,	I	will	argue	that	the	next	period	in	Cuban	politics	was	marked	by	Raúl’s	
efforts	aimed	at	creating	the	conditions	for	instituting	a	new	type	of	leadership	and	a	
new	economic	model.	Cuba	thus	underwent	a	revolt	launched	by	the	upper	levels	of	
the	regime,	and	the	Sixth	Congress	would	become	its	culmination.	
However,	Raúl	was	temporary	head	of	state	from	July	2006	to	February	2008,	which	
in	practice	excluded	this	period	from	any	overt	political	offensive.	But	I	 include	this	
period	in	the	analysis	not	so	much	as	to	find	any	revolt	in	it,	but	in	order	to	shed	light	
on	the	signs	that	prefigured	the	new	vision	that	later	informed	the	changes.	
Cuba,	I	argue,	lived	a	three-year	revolt	thereafter	(2008-2011),	during	which:	
⎯ The	charismatic	attributes	of	the	leadership	were	largely	removed	
⎯ The	CPE	orthodoxy	of	the	ruling	ideology	was	challenged	in	public	
This	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 parts.	 In	 the	 first	 one,	 I	 deal	 with	 Raúl	 Castro’s	
provisional	 time	 in	office.	 In	the	second,	 I	cover	the	revolt	he	 launched	after	being	
appointed	new	President	of	Cuba	in	order	to	prepare	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	
5.1	Cuba	when	Fidel	stepped	down	
In	this	section	I	will	explore	the	political	context,	or	‘initial	conditions’,	in	which	Raúl	
Castro	took	over	the	leadership	of	Cuba	in	2006.	The	term	‘initial	conditions’	refers	
to	 the	 value	 of	 certain	 key	 variables	 at	 a	 given	 time	 defined	 as	 the	 starting	 point	
(t=0).	The	starting	point	is,	of	course,	the	moment	when	Fidel	Castro	handed	over	his	
duties	to	his	deputy	and	younger	brother	Raúl.	The	variables	of	interest	are,	as	have	
been	specified,	leadership	and	economic	strategy.	
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Fidel	 Castro	 had	 already	 suffered	 some	 minor	 health	 setbacks	 that	 had	 already	
highlighted	 his	 old	 age.	 On	 June	 23,	 2001,	 Fidel	 had	 fainted	 during	 a	 speech	 in	
Havana	 before	 70,000	 supporters.	 Then,	 in	 October	 2004,	 he	 accidently	 tumbled	
whilst	leaving	the	stage	after	a	speech	in	Villa	Clara	attended	by	30,000	people	–	on	
that	occasion	he	fractured	both	a	knee	and	an	upper	arm.	Although	these	personal	
minutiae	may	look	politically	irrelevant,	this	could	hardly	be	the	case	in	a	regime	that	
built	much	of	its	legitimacy	on	the	importance	of	one	individual.	
Kapcia	has	well	summarised	the	political	relevance	of	Fidel’s	deteriorating	health:	
As	he	fell	(twice)	and	as	his	legendary	ability	to	lecture	Cubans	for	hours	on	end,	improvising	
and	 illustrating	 arguments	 with	 a	 seemingly	 endless	 stream	 of	 well-memorised	 facts	 and	
data,	 began	 to	 decline,	 loyal	 Cubans	 started	 to	 fear	 the	 stability	 and	 flexibility	 of	 the	
government.	Thus	a	crucial	element	of	the	system’s	(and	the	old	inner	circle’s)	credibility	and	
legitimacy	began	to	be	undermined.	(Kapcia	2014,	181)	
What	was	at	stake	in	Fidel’s	health	condition	was	no	less	than	Weber’s	problem	of	
the	 succession	 of	 a	 charismatic	 leader,	 thus	 of	 the	 future	 of	 a	 regime	 that	would	
need	to	accommodate	in	one	way	or	another	to	the	loss	of	one	of	its	pillars.	As	if	to	
avoid	 any	 potential	 perceptions	 of	 political	 vacuum,	 Cuban	 TV	 channels	 were	
ordered	 to	 pan	 away	 from	 Fidel	 if	 any	 trouble	 arose	 –	 a	 decision	 reported	 by	
journalist	Marc	Frank	(2013,	33)	illustrates	the	regime’s	predicament	around	the	role	
of	its	long-time	leader.	
In	mid-2006	 Fidel	 Castro	 fell	 gravely	 ill,	 interrupting	 his	 time	 in	 office	 for	 the	 first	
time	since	1959.	In	the	night	of	31	July	2006,	thirteen	days	before	his	80th	birthday,	a	
handwritten	“Proclamation”	by	Fidel	was	read	by	one	of	his	aides	at	the	time,	Carlos	
Valenciaga,	on	national	TV.	 In	 that	 text,	 Fidel	 “provisionally”	delegated	 to	75-year-
old	 Raúl	 his	 positions	 of	 First	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Party,	 Commander	 of	 the	 Armed	
Forces,	 and	President	 of	 the	Council	 of	 State	 and	Ministers	 (F.	 Castro	 2006a).	 The	
change	proved	 fluid	and,	 in	contrast	 to	 the	excitement	and	expectations	 in	Miami,	
there	were	no	signs	of	unrest	in	Cuba	as	post-Fidel	times	plainly	emerged.	
Furthermore,	the	problem	of	who	would	have	succeeded	Fidel,	given	the	case	of	his	
absence,	 had	 long	 been	 sorted	 out	 from	 Fidel’s	 perspective.	 He	 had	 openly	
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designated	 his	 brother	 Raúl	 Castro	 as	 successor	 well	 from	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
revolution,	and	again	in	the	1990s.	The	first	time	ever	Fidel	unveiled	his	brother	as	
the	next	in	line,	in	January	1959,	was	to	warn	enemies		“that	if	he	were	assassinated,	
his	 successor	would	 be	 harsher	 and	more	 radical”	 (Farber	 2013,	 np).	 The	warning	
made	 sense	given	Raúl’s	 reputation	at	 the	 time	as	 a	 communist	hardliner,	both	 in	
action	and	ideology.	Before	Fidel	set	up	the	group	that	would	become	the	26th	July	
Movement	 that	 won	 the	 1959	 revolution,	 Raúl	 had	 been	 a	member	 of	 the	 youth	
wing	 of	 the	 Popular	 Socialist	 Party	 (PSP),	 the	 name	 adopted	 by	 the	 Cuban	
communists	aligned	to	Moscow.	Almost	 forty	years	 later,	when	Fidel	promoted	his	
brother	 again	 as	 his	 successor,	 it	was	 during	 the	 5th	 Party	 Congress	 in	 1997,	most	
probably	signalling	Fidel’s	concerns	over	his	own	death.	
By	2006,	Cuba	was	in	the	third	year	of	its	fourth	‘idealist	cycle’	–	when	Fidel	Castro	
put	 forward	 a	 “reversal	 of	 the	 reform”	 encouraged	 by	 advantageous	 economic	
treaties	 with	 Venezuela	 (Mesa	 Lago	 2012,	 44-49).	 As	 part	 of	 this,	 the	 number	 of	
Cuban	joint	ventures	with	foreign	capital	fell	from	its	peak	of	403	in	2002	to	203	in	
2006	(MINVEC	2008).	Overall,	Fidel	had	launched	a	“recentralisation”	process	of	the	
economy:	 foreign	 currency	 savings	 in	 Cuba	 were	 centralised	 by	 the	 Central	 Bank,	
taxes	 to	 self-employed	 rose,	 and	 state	 companies	 lost	 decision-making	 power	 on	
revenues	(Mesa	Lago	2012,	Sweig	2007).	The	Chamber	explained	the	relative	decline	
of	its	membership	as	the	result	of	“fusions,	extinctions	or	changes	in	the	purpose”	of	
several	 affiliated	 enterprises,	 joint	 ventures	 included,	 and	 the	 failure	 to	 pay	 the	
annual	membership	fees	of	several	others	(Cámara	de	Comercio	2007a,	4).	
Encouraged	by	the	alliance	with	Hugo	Chávez’s	Venezuela,	Fidel	Castro	had	partially	
dismantled	some	developments	produced	by	the	economic	policies	adopted	 in	 the	
1990s	Special	Period.	The	backdrop	of	this	trend	was	the	rise	of	Hugo	Chávez,	whom	
by	2003	was	firmly	in	power	and	had	already	pushed	forward	a	partnership	with	his	
political	mentor,	Fidel	Castro.	Perhaps	the	most	salient	agreement	was	the	exchange	
of	 Cuban	 doctors	 for	 Venezuelan	 oil.	 Although	 the	 Cuban	 side	 actually	 provided	
more	 than	 doctors	 and	 its	 assistance	 also	 included	 military	 and	 educative	 advice	
(Marcano	 2014),	 Caracas	 covered	more	 than	 the	 costs	 incurred	 by	 Havana	 (Mesa	
Lago	2012,	2013).	
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Overall,	Fidel	was	never	happy	with	the	economic	reforms	introduced	to	cope	with	
the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	as	he	made	clear	in	the	5th	Party	Congress	of	1997:	
It	 is	 bitter	 this	 struggle	 in	 the	 economic	 field,	 tremendously	 bitter,	 difficult,	 hard.	 […]	
Sometimes	the	sick	has	to	ingest	some	unpleasant	medication	or	go	through	certain	surgical	
procedures	and	treatments	that	leave	a	sizable	dose	of	suffering.	(F.	Castro	1997)	
Therefore,	 Fidel	 must	 have	 read	 the	 appearance	 of	 Hugo	 Chávez	 in	 the	 Cuban	
political	 landscape	 as	 the	 chance	 to	 free	 the	 country	 from	 some	 “unpleasant	
medication”.	Along	with	the	‘recentralisation’,	Fidel	re-launched	the	Battle	of	Ideas	–	
a	youth	movement	created	and	directly	 led	by	him	since	 late	1999.	Back	then,	 the	
movement	started	with	the	original	goal	of	bringing	back	home	the	boy	Elián,	who	
had	survived	a	sea	trip	to	Florida	where	his	mother	and	the	other	passengers	died.	
His	father,	who	lived	in	Cuba,	wanted	his	son	back.	In	front	of	the	US	Interest	Section	
in	 Havana,	 the	 Young	 Communists	 organised	 weekly	 rallies	 demanding	 the	
repatriation	of	 the	boy,	which	would	occur	 in	 June	2000.	Nonetheless,	 the	weekly	
rallies	continued	now	under	the	banner	of	the	Battle	of	 Ideas,	with	the	purpose	of	
reinvigorating	socialist	ideas	and	anti-imperialism	in	Cuba	(Frank	2013,	36-39).	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 Cuba’s	 old	 alternation	 between	 institutionalisation	 and	
mobilisation,	the	Battle	“had	signalled	that	the	pendulum	of	participation	had	again	
swum	 firmly	 away	 from	 […]	 formal	 structures	 and	 towards	 ‘participation	through	
(passionate)	 mobilization’”	 (Kapcia	 2014,	 162).	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 2003-2006	
‘recentralisation’	of	the	economy,	Fidel	took	the	Battle	of	Ideas	to	a	new	level	as	he	
mobilised	 “former	 dropouts	 turned	 social	 workers,	 teachers,	 art	 instructors,	 and	
health	workers	as	the	battering	rams	against	creeping	corruption”	(Frank	2013,	39).	
In	 a	 famous	 speech	 at	 Havana	University	 in	 2005,	 Fidel	 defined	 and	 defended	 his	
intention	behind	the	re-launch	of	the	Battle	of	Ideas:	
At	 the	 moment,	 while	 I’m	 talking	 to	 you	 about	 this	 […]	 we	 are	 working,	 we	 are	 moving	
towards	 full	 changes	 in	 our	 society.	 We	 have	 to	 change	 again,	 because	 we	 have	 gone	
through	some	very	difficult	times,	and	these	inequalities	and	injustices	have	arisen,	and	we	
are	going	to	change	this	situation.	(F.	Castro	2005)	
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From	a	grassroots	perspective,	the	renewed	Battle	of	Ideas	was	visible	in	the	urban	
landscape	as	the	youth	movement	extended	its	reach	to	the	economy:	
[T]housands	of	student-age	youths	 took	over	gas	stations	and	started	working	 in	 refineries	
and	riding	 in	 fuel	 trucks	where	 it	 turned	out	up	to	half	of	 the	precious	resource	was	being	
stolen.	 The	 young	 people	 also	 raided	 bakeries,	 looking	 for	 stashed	 wheat	 and	 lard	 and	
checking	 how	 many	 rolls	 were	 needed	 to	 meet	 a	 neighbourhood	 quota,	 then	 adjusting	
wheat	and	other	deliveries	accordingly.	(Frank	2013,	39)	
At	the	leadership	level,	the	fourth	‘idealist	cycle’	would	also	bring	some	changes.	The	
Battle	of	 Ideas	had	grown	into	an	extra	 institutional	apparatus	that	was	embedded	
into	 the	 regime	as	Fidel	Castro’s	watchdog	–	an	unchecked	 tool	of	 the	charismatic	
leader	 to	keep	 in	check	 the	 legal-rational	 foundations	of	Cuban	communism.	Most	
probably,	the	Battle	of	Ideas	developed	frictions	within	the	FAR-PCC	ruling	coalition	
and	its	core:	the	historic	generation.	Again,	the	observations	of	journalist	Marc	Frank	
prove	useful	to	sense	the	uneasiness	experienced	at	the	top	leadership:	
The	movement	called	the	Battle	of	Ideas	was	headquartered	alongside	[Fidel]	Castro’s	office.	
Youth	leaders	gained	tremendous	power	as	representatives	of	Castro’s	revolutionary	will	and	
newfound	 [political]	 wealth.	 They	 worked	 parallel	 to,	 and	 sometimes	 bossed	 around,	
government	and	Communist	Party	officials.	(Frank	2013,	38)	
Nonetheless,	the	Battle	of	Ideas	was	not	alone	as	an	extra	official	tool	directly	led	by	
Fidel.	 In	 a	 sense,	 the	 Battle	 was	 only	 the	 most	 visible	 and	 recent	 element	 of	 a	
broader	 apparatus	 created	 by/for	 the	 charismatic	 leader	 in	 1975:	 the	 Equipo	 de	
Coordinación	y	Apoyo	al	Comandante	en	Jefe	–	Support	Team	of	the	Commander	in	
Chief,	 also	 simply	 known	 as	 the	 “Grupo	 de	Apoyo”.	 According	 to	Mastrapa	 (2001,	
476),	this	team	was	an	estimated	twenty-member	“parallel	structure	of	government	
that	 answers	 to	 only	 Castro	 and	 is	 an	 extension	 of	 his	 power”.	 This	 staff	 had	 the	
authority	 to	order	ministers	what	had	 to	be	done	 in	his/her	domain,	which	 is	why	
“other	government	officials	resent	them	and	their	power”	(Mastrapa	2001,	480).	
The	Grupo	had	gained	more	political	weight	as	a	result	of	the	Special	Period,	which	is	
consistent	 with	 the	 hypertrophy	 of	 charisma	 after	 1990	 (the	 charismatic	 post-
totalitarian	turn	of	the	regime	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter).	Roughly	speaking,	
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if	the	Battle	of	Ideas	had	become	“Fidel	Castro’s	favourite	project	since	late	1990s”	
(Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 2009,	 71),	 it	 was	 no	 coincidence	 that	 it	 looked	 like	 the	
younger	sibling	of	his	favourite	political	tool	since	late	1990s,	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo.	
LeoGrande	(2014)	has	summarised	the	development	of	the	Grupo:	
During	the	Special	Period,	he	came	to	rely	more	and	more	on	his	personal	staff	[the	Grupo	de	
Apoyo],	composed	of	young	acolytes	whom	Fidel	had	plucked	from	the	ranks	of	the	Union	of	
Young	 Communists	 (UJC).	 The	Grupo	 evolved	 into	 a	 kind	 of	 shadow	 cabinet,	 operating	 at	
Fidel’s	 behest	 outside	 the	 normal	 lines	 of	 authority	 of	 party	 and	 state.	 The	Grupo	 had	 a	
reputation	 for	 conservatism	–	 being	more	 Fidelista	 than	 Fidel	 –	 and	Cubans	 dubbed	 them	
“los	Talibanes”	for	their	rigid	ideological	conservatism.	(LeoGrande	2014,	64)	
Chair	of	 the	Battle	of	 Ideas,	Otto	Rivero	was	 the	 leader	of	 the	Young	Communists	
(UJC,	by	its	acronym	in	Spanish)	when	Fidel	recruited	him	to	lead	the	campaign	for	
Elián.	Leader	of	the	UJC,	Rivero	stepped	down	in	2004	in	order	to	take	over	as	Vice-
President	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 –	 at	 the	 age	 of	 36,	 this	 rise	 had	 been	 the	
quickest	one	ever	 from	the	UJC	to	a	ministerial	post.	However,	Rivero	was	not	the	
only	 young	 leader	 recruited	 by	 Fidel	 to	 the	 top	 bypassing	 the	 official	 institutional	
lines	 in	 record	 time.	 Other	 leaders	 had	 followed	 the	 fast-tracking	 path	 from	
University	students’	union	leaders	to	the	leadership	of	the	Young	Communists,	then	
to	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo,	and	eventually	to	the	Council	of	Ministers.	
Although	Rivero	“skipped”	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	stage,	he	was	also	seen	as	part	of	the	
Taliban	 group	 that	went	 through	 it.	 By	 the	 time	 Fidel	 stepped	down	 in	 2006,	 two	
other	members	of	 the	Council	of	Ministers	 came	 from	that	charismatic	apparatus.	
They	 were	 Carlos	 Lage	 and	 Felipe	 Pérez	 Roque.	 The	 two	 of	 them	were	 the	most	
powerful	members	of	the	Cuban	leadership	that	came	from	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo.	
Lage,	 the	most	 senior	Taliban,	was	 39	when	 he	 joined	 the	 Council	 of	Ministers	 in	
1990	as	secretary	of	 its	Executive	Committee	–	he	would	 later	become	member	of	
the	 Council	 of	 State	 and	 of	 the	 Party’s	 Politburo.	 He	 had	 overseen	 the	 economic	
reforms	of	the	1990s	and	because	of	his	young	age	in	comparison	with	the	historical	
generation,	he	was	expected	to	have	a	leading	role	in	the	post-Fidel	leadership.	
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For	 his	 part,	 Pérez	 Roque	 had	 been	 the	 youngest	 minister	 ever	 when	 he	 was	
appointed	head	of	Foreign	Relations	at	the	age	of	34,	which	also	made	him	the	first	
officer	 of	 that	 level	 to	 have	 been	 born	 after	 the	 1959	 revolution.	 He	 was	 the	
individual	most	explicitly	seen	as	Fidel’s	man	–	in	Granma	his	ministerial	promotion	
was	 cheered	 for	 being	 “familiarised	 as	 few	with	 the	 ideas	 and	 thoughts	 of	 Fidel”	
(Consejo	de	Estado	1999,	np).	
Finally,	 a	 minister-in-waiting	 perhaps	 could	 be	 seen	 in	 Carlos	 Valenciaga,	 Fidel’s	
personal	secretary	and	last	co-ordinator	of	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	–	he	would	read	on	
Cuban	national	television	the	famous	“Proclamation”	of	Fidel	when	he	fell	ill.	
In	 inverse	 relation	 to	 Fidel’s	 reliance	 on	 his	 Talibanes,	 the	 Party	 lost	 Fidel’s	 close	
attention	as	 its	First	Secretary.	Therefore,	while	 the	 first	 five	Party	Congresses	had	
more	 or	 less	 respected	 the	 five-year	 intervals	 between	 them	 as	 mandated	 in	 its	
statutes	(in	1975,	1980,	1985,	1991,	and	1997),	the	6th	Congress	took	place	fourteen	
years	 after	 the	 last	 one,	 in	 2011	 –	 when	 Fidel	 had	 already	 stepped	 down.	 The	
postponement	 of	 the	 Sixth	 Congress	 reflected,	 besides	 renewed	 mobilisation,	 “a	
continuing	 weakness	 of	 the	 institutional	 apparatus	 of	 governance,	 political	
communication	 and	 involvement”,	 as	 Kapcia	 (2014,	 163)	 assessed.	 It	 equally	
reflected	a	disregard	(disappointment?)	of	Fidel,	First	Secretary	of	the	Party,	towards	
regular	Cuban	 institutions,	which	was	palpable	 in	his	growing	preference	 for	direct	
intervention	 through	 extra	 official	 channels	 controlled	 by	 him.	 When	 Raúl	 Castro	
took	over	in	2006,	the	Fidelista	style	of	leadership	had	its	days	numbered.	
5.2	The	provisional	leader	(2006-2008)	
5.2.1	Leadership:	two	models	of	succession	
Even	critics	of	‘Fidel-centrism’	have	acknowledged	the	predicament	of	the	leadership	
around	the	loss	of	Fidel	–	hence	confirming	the	serious	situation	faced	by	the	elite:	
While	Fidel	may	have	never	exercised	the	supposedly	total	power	that	his	critics	had	always	
alleged	and	that	the	‘totalitarian’	label	assumed,	[…]	the	fact	was	that	most	Cubans	[…]	had	
always	believed	in	his	capacity	to	guide,	lead	and	decide	cleverly	and	with	awareness	of	what	
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they	felt.	Once	that	was	removed,	or	at	least	undermined,	the	rot	had	set	in,	and	a	new	form	
of	governance	had	to	be	found.	(Kapcia	2014,	181)	
As	I	will	discuss	in	this	section,	there	were	two	models	of	political	succession	within	
the	 top	 leadership	 at	 the	 time	 Fidel	 stepped	 down:	 1)	 appointment	 of	 a	 new	
charismatic	leader,	or	2)	advancing	a	collegial	leadership	(discarding	charisma).	Raúl	
supported	the	second	alternative,	which	is	the	one	that	prevailed.	
In	hindsight,	Raúl’s	departure	from	charismatic	legitimacy	was	perceptible	from	the	
first	month	of	his	provisional	 takeover	 in	2006,	when	he	openly	acknowledged	his	
discreet	style	–	as	opposed	to	the	ever-present	style	of	his	brother	Fidel:	
It	 is	not	my	habit	 to	appear	with	 frequency	 in	public,	except	 in	 the	required	moments.	 […]	
Besides,	I	have	always	been	discreet.	That	is	my	character	and,	by	the	way,	I	clear	up	that	I	
plan	 to	keep	 like	 this.	But	 that	 is	not	 the	 fundamental	 reason	why	 I	do	not	appear	on	 the	
media	frequently;	it	simply	has	not	been	necessary.	(R.	Castro	in	Barredo	2006,	np)	
For	Hoffmann	 (2009,	 240),	 such	 a	 stylistic	 shift	 “goes	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 a	 turn	 to	
more	collective	leadership,	in	which	Raúl	Castro	is	a	primus	inter	pares	rather	than	a	
towering	 leader.”	 Connected	 to	 this,	 the	new	 leadership	 style	of	 Raúl	 brought	 the	
last	idealist	cycle	to	an	end	–	including	here	the	mobilisational	politics	epitomised	in	
the	 Battle	 of	 Ideas.	 To	 grasp	 Raúl’s	 political	 gesture,	 it	 will	 help	 putting	 it	 in	
comparative	perspective	versus	 the	 charismatic	model	of	 succession	hinted	by	 the	
Grupo	de	Apoyo.	Indeed,	the	Talibanes	aimed	at	a	leading	role	in	post-Fidel	Cuba.	
By	 2006,	 almost	 a	 decade	 had	 elapsed	 since	 Fidel,	 the	 charismatic	 leader,	 had	
fortified	 his	 weight	 via	 the	 Taliban	 extra-institutional	 apparatus	 embedded	 in	 the	
Council	of	State,	the	top	body	of	the	Cuban	state	apparatus.	As	a	result,	when	Fidel	
stepped	aside	that	year,	the	FAR-PCC	ruling	coalition	and	the	historical	generation	at	
its	core	were	confronted	with	the	fate	of	that	charismatic	outgrow.	
According	to	Mujal-León,	alongside	the	“proclamations	of	unflinching	loyalty”	of	the	
Talibanes,	“could	be	heard	their	claims	to	the	mantle	of	succession”	(2011,	156).	 It	
was	 Pérez	 Roque	 who	 expressed	 this	 more	 clearly	 in	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 National	
Assembly	 in	December	2005,	 in	 front	of	all	 the	 leaders	–	Fidel	Castro	 included.	On	
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that	occasion,	Pérez	Roque	(2005,	np)	reflected	on	what	had	to	be	done	“when	there	
is	the	vacuum	no	one	can	fill”	in	reference	to	the	time	when	the	historic	generation	
were	 gone.	His	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 “underscored	 the	 charismatic	 character	 of	
Cuban	socialism	 in	order	 then	to	sketch	a	model	of	an	explicitly	charismatic	 rather	
than	 institutional	 succession”,	 as	 Hoffmann	 (2009,	 238)	 has	 put	 it.	 Hence,	 after	
defining	(and	praising	several	times)	the	authority	of	Fidel	as	one	that	“comes	from	
the	 example”	 and	 socialism	 as	 “the	 science	 of	 example”,	 Pérez	 Roque	 (2005,	 np)	
concluded:	 “As	 long	 as	 this	 country	 has	 a	 leadership	 based	 on	 example...	 this	
treasure…	 it	 is	 invincible”.	 For	 Hoffmann	 (2009,	 238),	 such	 conclusion	 a	 was	 “as	
uninstitutional	 as	 could	 be”	 and	 represented	 a	 ”model	 of	 succession	 that	 is	
diametrically	opposed”	to	the	one	pursued	by	Raúl	Castro	since	Fidel	fell	ill.	
Addressing	 the	 same	 succession	 problem,	 Raúl	 not	 only	 discarded	 any	 kind	 of	
transmission	of	Fidel’s	charisma	to	the	future:	he	buried	it.	As	early	as	July	2006,	just	
before	Fidel	fell	ill,	Raúl	had	“emblematically	bid	farewell	to	the	Fidelista	leadership”	
when	he	made	clear	“that	neither	he	nor	any	other	successor	was	to	take	on	the	title	
of	“Comandante	en	Jefe”	(Hoffmann	2009,	240).	Raúl	made	that	statement	in	a	rally	
with	FAR	officials,	demanding	their	loyalty	to	the	Party:	
The	special	trust	granted	by	the	people	to	the	founding	leader	of	the	Revolution	cannot	be	
transmitted,	as	if	 it	was	an	inheritance,	to	those	who	hold	the	main	leadership	posts	of	the	
country	in	the	future.	The	Commander-in-Chief	of	the	Cuban	Revolution	is	one	and	only	one,	
and	 only	 the	 Communist	 Party	 […]	 can	 be	 the	 worthy	 heir	 of	 the	 trust	 deposited	 by	 the	
people	in	its	leader.	(R.	Castro	2006b)	
This	solution	defined	Cuba’s	succession	problem	not	in	terms	of	who	would	succeed	
this	 or	 any	 other	 leader	 (transmission	 of	 charisma),	 but	 in	 terms	 of	 which	
institutional	 arrangement	 will	 constrain	 and	 guide	 the	 power	 of	 any	 future	
leadership	 (principle	of	collegiality).	To	use	Weber	 terms,	 instead	of	 following	“the	
conception	that	charisma	is	a	quality	transmitted	by	heredity”	(Weber	1978a,	248),	
Raúl	 Castro	 “replaced	 [it]	 by	 other	 structures”	 (Weber	 1978b,	 1121),	 namely	 the	
Communist	Party	of	Cuba.	As	a	result,	Raúl	would	shape	the	post-charismatic	Cuban	
leadership	according	to	“the	“principle	of	collegiality”,	which	“is	usually	derived	from	
the	interest	in	weakening	the	power	of	persons	in	authority”	(1978a,	277).	
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Condensing	the	shift	from	the	last	cycle	of	mobilisations,	Raúl	“quietly	downgraded”	
the	 Battle	 of	 Ideas	 movement	 following	 Fidel’s	 illness	 (Kapcia	 2014,	 38)	 –	 hence,	
both	 the	 Commander-in-Chief’s	 office	 and	 the	 next-door	 Battle’s	 headquarters	
remained	empty	 since	 then	 (Frank	2013,	39,	203).	 Similarly,	 as	 if	 to	highlight	 their	
coming	fall	on	disgrace,	the	Talibanes	were	now	jokingly	dubbed	the	huerfanitos	or	
little	orphans	for	Fidel	was	no	longer	in	the	driving	seat	(Farber	2008,	np).	
As	 this	 charismatic	 apparatus	 was	 not	 rooted	 either	 in	 the	 Party	 or	 the	 Armed	
Forces,	and	its	political	weight	largely	depended	on	Fidel,	 its	days	certainly	seemed	
numbered	–	a	situation	that	was	compounded	by	Raúl’s	known	institutions-building	
approach.	To	use	a	Latin	American	phrase	based	on	a	novel’s	title	by	Gabriel	García	
Márquez,	 the	fall	of	 the	Talibanes	 resembles,	 in	hindsight,	a	chronicle	of	a	 foretold	
death.	For	example,	Farber	had	forecasted	the	political	death	of	the	Talibanes	before	
it	actually	occurred,	comparing	their	case	with	the	fate	of	Mao’s	personal	staff	after	
his	death,	when	Deng	Xiaoping	asserted	his	power	as	China’s	new	head	of	state:	
China’s	transition	is	a	good	example	against	which	to	compare	the	role	of	the	Talibanes:	their	
equivalents	were	the	“Gang	of	Four”	types	who	stood	for	the	old	Stalinist	system.	They	were	
no	match	 for	Deng	and	what	he	promised:	 an	 improved	 standard	of	 living	 and	 relief	 from	
Mao’s	endless	mobilizations	and	arbitrariness.	(Farber	2008,	np)	
Raúl’s	first	blow	to	Fidelismo,	as	expressed	in	the	extra-institutional	apparatus	of	the	
charismatic	leader	–	in	particular,	the	leadership’s	members	whose	rise	was	related	
to	 it	 –	may	 be	 dated	 in	 February	 2007	 –	 just	 half	 a	 year	 after	 being	 provisionally	
appointed	head	of	state.	 In	a	UJC	national	meeting,	Raúl	talked	with	the	attendees	
about	the	new	cadre	policy	(“política	de	cuadros”,	in	Spanish)	for	the	organisation:	in	
order	 to	be	eligible	 for	 a	 full-time	 leadership	post,	 the	 youth	 cadre	will	 need	 five-
year	‘real’	job	experience.	After	including	Felipe	Pérez	Roque	and	Carlos	Lage	(both	
present	 in	 the	 meeting)	 among	 those	 “who	 thought	 they	 were	 leaders	 since	
childhood”,	 Raúl	 mocked	 their	 lack	 of	 professional	 experience	 on	 their	 fields	 of	
college	 training:	 “I	 would	 not	 send	 him	 [Felipe,	 engineer]	 to	 work	 on	 a	
thermoelectric	 because	 he	 can	 break	 it”	 or	 “I	 would	 not	 let	 him	 [Carlos,	 doctor]	
inject	me”	(García	Ríos	2007,	np).	Unveiling	his	vision	of	the	succession	problem,	a	
cathartic	Raúl	concluded:	“it	is	our	duty	to	open	the	path	to	the	new	generations	[…],	
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but	not	to	test-tube	leaders”	(García	Ríos	2007,	np).	This	open	and	sarcastic	rebuke	
of	Fidel’s	fast-tracking	promotion	of	young	leaders	was	a	forewarning	of	the	fate	of	
the	 Grupo	 de	 Apoyo	 caucus	 and	 its	 ramifications:	 it	 would	 be	 obliterated	 in	 the	
coming	period.	
The	provisional	character	of	Raúl’s	Presidency	turned	permanent	 in	February	2008.	
As	expected,	there	would	have	come	a	moment	in	which	either	Fidel	came	back	to	
office	 or	 a	 new	 arrangement	 was	 settled	 for	 his	 “Proclamation”	 of	 August	 2006	
implied	that	the	Commander	in	Chief	would	probably	return	to	his	duties.	
Despite	the	calmness	surrounding	the	torch	passing	from	Fidel	to	Raúl,	the	former’s	
proclamation	 read	on	TV	 to	accomplish	 it	was	not	at	all	obvious.	Hoffmann	 (2009)	
has	 a	 point	 in	 reminding	 two	 alternative	 succession	 routes:	 1)	 Fidel	 himself	 had	
openly	expected	either	the	Politburo	or	the	National	Assembly	to	“meet	and	elect”	
Raúl	as	successor	 if	“something”	happened	to	him	(F.	Castro	2007a,	620);	which	2)	
was	legally	unnecessary	as	the	Cuban	Constitution	already	specifies	that:	“In	case	of	
absence,	 illness	 or	 death	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State,	 the	 First	 Vice-
President	substitutes	him	in	his	functions”	(República	de	Cuba	1992,	art.	94).	
If	the	proclamation	was	not	needed	for	Raúl	to	supplant	Fidel,	then	why	was	it	used?	
It	 is	the	Weberian	analysis	of	succession	to	charismatic	authority	which	makes	evident	why	
the	 handwritten	 proclama	 was	 needed:	 it	 was	 the	 symbolic	 gesture	 that	 succession	 to	
leadership	 was	 not	 determined	 through	 the	 legal-institutional	 process	 (the	 deputy	 takes	
over)	 or	 through	 designation	 by	 the	 corresponding	 administrative	 staff	 (the	 National	
Assembly	or	Politburo)	alone,	but	was	rather	enacted	as	“the	designation	on	the	part	of	the	
original	charismatic	leader	of	his	own	successor”.	(Hoffmann	2009,	237)	
The	fact	that	Raúl	had	long	been	the	second-in-command	and	that	his	time	in	office	
began	as	the	choice	of	 the	charismatic	 leader,	who	(not	the	 least)	happened	to	be	
his	brother,	has	misled	observers	that	see	in	such	a	move	a	dynastic	succession	like	
that	 of	 the	Kim	 family	 in	North	Korea	 (e.g.	 Saxonberg	2013).	However,	 as	 counter	
intuitive	as	 it	seems,	such	was	 far	 from	being	the	case.	Although	 in	the	transfer	of	
power	 from	Fidel	 to	Raúl	 their	 brotherly	 bond	was	 indeed	 “a	 vital	 resource	 […]	 in	
resolving	the	issue	of	succession”,	yet	that	was	not	a	case	of	“a	transfer	of	charisma	
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by	heredity”,	as	Hoffmann	(2009,	243)	has	extensively	substantiated.	Far	from	trying	
to	establish	a	Castro	dynasty	akin	to	the	Kim’s	in	North	Korea,	Raúl	said	goodbye	to	
charismatic	 rule	 and	 has	 instead	 put	 forward	 “a	 much	 more	 institutions-based	
model”	(Hoffmann	2009,	242).	In	other	words,	Raúl	would	not	seek	the	transmission	
of	charisma	onto	him,	but	its	dismantling	–	a	process	he	set	in	motion	in	2008.	
In	the	electoral	system	of	Cuba,	the	National	Assembly	of	the	Popular	Power	(ANPP,	
by	 its	 acronym	 in	 Spanish)	 is	 renewed	 every	 five	 years.	 Largely	 controlled	 by	 the	
Party,	this	electoral	process	reaches	a	point	 in	which	the	renewed	body	meets	and	
elects	the	deputies	that	will	join	the	thirty-one	members	Council	of	State,	including	
its	president,	 first	vice	present,	 five	vice	presidents	and	a	secretary.	This	Council	 in	
turn	 appoints	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers,	 every	 member	 of	 which	 runs	 a	 ‘state’s	
administration	 organ’	 on	 a	 daily	 basis.	 In	 the	 2008	 elections,	 as	 Fidel	 Castro	 was	
unsurprisingly	 re-elected	a	member	of	 the	ANPP,	 the	 speculation	over	whether	he	
would	 be	 appointed	 President	 one	more	 time	would	 only	 end	when	 Fidel	 himself	
declined	 the	 potential	 nomination	 for	 that	 position.	 He	 did	 so	 in	 a	 “Message”	
published	in	Granma	on	19th	February,	some	days	before	the	Assembly’s	meeting:	
To	 my	 dearest	 compatriots,	 who	 have	 recently	 honoured	 me	 so	 much	 by	 electing	 me	 a	
member	 of	 the	 Parliament	 where	 so	 many	 agreements	 should	 be	 adopted	 of	 utmost	
importance	 to	 the	 destiny	 of	 our	 Revolution,	 I	 am	 saying	 that	 I	 will	 neither	 aspire	 to	 nor	
accept,	 I	 repeat,	 I	will	 neither	 aspire	 to	 nor	 accept	 the	 positions	 of	 President	 of	 the	 State	
Council	and	Commander	in	Chief.	(F.	Castro	2008a)	
As	a	consequence,	Raúl	Castro	would	formally	(no	longer	provisionally)	take	over	as	
President	of	the	Council	of	State	and	Ministers.	Raulismo	was	now	fully	on	board.	
5.2.2	Ideology:	a	change	of	tack	
As	for	the	 ideas	 informing	economic	policy	 in	Cuba,	 they	also	 followed	the	pattern	
described	 in	 the	 last	 section	 about	 leadership.	 In	 2006-2008	 Raúl	 signalled	 his	
intention	of	 reforming	 the	economy,	 and	he	would	 actually	 take	 some	bold	 steps.	
But	the	new	direction	would	only	emerge	more	clearly	after	February	2008.	
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Although	 Raúl	 Castro	 did	 not	 introduce	 any	 spectacular	 reforms	 when	 he	 was	
provisional	president,	he	inaugurated	a	new	governing	style	since	the	early	days.	In	
his	reporting	from	Havana,	Marc	Frank	captured	interesting	anecdotes.	According	to	
his	sources,	Raúl	“sent	out	word	to	the	ministries	asking	what	they	would	do	if	Hugo	
Chávez	was	not	around	the	next	day”	(Frank	2013,	68).	Similarly,	 in	a	meeting	with	
young	people	inefficiently	renovating	hospitals	under	the	Battle	of	Ideas,	Raúl	asked	
the	 also	 present	 health	minister	 and	 construction	minister	 “why	 the	 kids	 were	 in	
charge	of	renovating	hospitals	in	the	first	place”	(Frank	2013,	69).	
For	Frank,	the	“change	of	tack”	was	perceptible:	
And	so	the	anecdotes	kept	coming	those	first	months.	True	or	false,	they	circulated	through	
the	 system	 signalling	 there	 was	 indeed	 a	 new	 administration	 with	 the	 same	 ideology	 but	
quite	a	different	approach.	(Frank	2013,	69)	
However,	 there	 is	 enough	 evidence	 to	 argue	 that	 Raúl’s	 “different	 approach”	was	
different	enough	so	as	to	turn	the	“same	ideology”	into	a	different	one.	Cuba	was	on	
the	verge	of	experiencing	 the	 ideological	 relaxation	of	orthodoxy,	 sometimes	even	
going	as	far	as	outlining	the	basic	definitions	of	a	new	economic	doctrine.	
As	early	as	October	2006,	ordinary	Cubans	had	available	signals	of	the	new	times.	In	
that	month,	the	official	newspaper	Juventud	Rebelde	published	blunt	reports	in	the	
Sunday	edition	about	the	problems	in	the	economy.	For	instance:	
The	 current	 irregularities	 in	 the	 country's	 services,	 in	 the	midst	 of	 the	 search	 for	 a	 better	
economic	model,	has	meant	Cuba	still	does	not	have	a	retail	and	services	sector	that	satisfies	
people's	expectations.	(Juventud	Rebelde	2006,	np)	
According	to	Frank	(2013,	69),	this	was	the	first	time	since	Fidel	fell	ill	that	the	local	
media	told	the	public	that	Cuba	was	 in	“search	for	a	better	economic	model”.	This	
language	would	evolve	and	adopt	various	forms,	but	the	essence	would	still	be	the	
same:	the	acknowledgment	of	the	need	of	change.	
Also	 relevant,	 the	 lines	 quoted	 above	 were	 part	 of	 a	 piece	 informing	 that	 an	
academic	team	had	been	set	up	to	study	socialist	property	relations.	Some	members	
of	 that	 team	had	a	 long	 record	advocating	 reform,	but	now	 their	 proposals	 finally	
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matched	 an	 appropriate	 context	 for	 them	 to	 be	 heard.	 For	 instance,	 one	 of	 the	
academics	interviewed	by	Juventud	Rebelde	(2006,	np),	Luis	Marcelo	Yera,	asserted	
that	 “the	 theory	 that	 came	 from	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 skewed”.	 For	 him,	 it	 was	
necessary	 “to	 achieve	 the	 adequate	 balance	 between	 centralisation	 (strategic	
decisions)	 and	decentralisation	 (operative	 decisions),	mixed	 up	 frequently”	 –	 thus,	
his	policy	advice	was	to	delegate	“more	decisions	to	workers’	collectives”	in	order	to	
overcome	“bureaucratic	constraints”	 (Juventud	Rebelde	2006,	np).	To	be	sure,	 this	
was	not	the	first	time	Yera	advocated	workers’	control.	In	an	older	academic	article,	
he	 had	 already	 proposed	 that	 leasing	 from	 the	 state	 to	 democratic	 workers’	
collectives	(co-ops)	was	“the	lost	paradigm	of	Marx	and	Engels”	(Yera	2004,	10-13).	
Although	the	leasing	scheme	was	later	adopted	during	Raúl	Castro’s	presidency,	 its	
original	democratic	edge	was	not.	But	it	is	worth	it	noticing	that	the	ideological	roots	
of	the	new	economic	cycle	were	substantially	Cuban.	
On	December	2006,	Raúl	polled	Party	militants	on	what	the	most	pressing	popular	
concerns	were	–	the	economy	topping	the	results.	Then	on	January	2007,	Raúl	asked	
Party	cadre	on	economic	commissions	(municipal	and	provincial)	and	on	enterprises	
to	debate	and	submit	proposals	to	improve	economic	performance	without	leading	
to	bigger	budgets	 (Frank	2013,	71).	The	 results	of	 this	process	were	not	disclosed,	
but	it	was	another	preparing	step	in	the	direction	of	reform.	
The	 first	public	acknowledgment	on	 the	need	of	economic	change	would	come	on	
26th	July	2007.	By	far	the	most	 important	date	 in	the	Cuban	political	calendar,	that	
year’s	edition	marked	the	first	major	speech	of	Raúl	to	Cubans	as	(provisional)	head	
of	 state.	 After	 criticising	 how	 the	 country	was	 run	 economically,	 but	 insisting	 that	
“not	 everything	 can	 be	 sorted	 out	 immediately”,	 he	 expressed	 the	 need	 of	
“structural	and	conceptual	changes”	as	a	prerequisite	of	success	 (R.	Castro	2007c).	
However,	 there	 were	 ideological	 limits:	 “What	 a	 Cuban	 revolutionary	 will	 never	
question	is	our	decision	which	can	never	be	given	up	of	building	socialism”	(ibid.).	
Then	 in	September	2007	around	800,000	Communist	Party	members	and	a	 similar	
number	 of	 Young	 Communists	 were	 asked	 to	 discuss	 this	 speech	 and	 gather	
“opinions,	suggestions	and	proposals”	(Frank	2013,	73).	This	exercise	would	then	be	
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replicated	 outside	 the	 Party,	 in	 the	 1st	 public	 discussion	 on	 the	 Cuban	 economy	
among	ordinary	citizens	between	October	and	December	2007,	the	results	of	which	
would	kick	off	the	process	to	“forge	the	consensus	that	defines	what	is	most	rational	
and	 convenient”	 (R.	 Castro	 2007b).	 An	 interesting	 feature,	 consistent	 with	 the	
corporatist	 logic	 of	 the	 Cuban	 regime,	 is	 the	 direct	 appeal	 to	 the	 general	 public	
through	 the	 mass	 organisations,	 which	 in	 this	 case	 were	 summoned	 in	 order	 to	
encourage	outside	pressure	aimed	at	the	orthodox	bureaucracy	inside	the	Party	and	
the	state	from	outside,	as	I	will	argue	later.	
In	 terms	of	 the	political	attitude	towards	market	subjects,	by	the	time	Fidel	Castro	
stepped	down	in	2006	the	Cuban	managers	were	still	the	only	ones	accepted	by	the	
regime.	Although	the	managers	had	long	been	on	the	road	towards	full	 integration	
(co-option	 through	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 being	 a	 key	 element	 of	 this),	 their	
ideological	 harmonisation	 would	 only	 be	 completed	 under	 Raúl.	 If	 in	 the	 Special	
Period	the	managers	had	just	appeared	(so	to	say)	and	been	co-opted	(as	discussed	
in	the	last	chapter),	after	2006	the	regime	praised	and	inscribed	their	activity	within	
socialist	ideology.	In	short,	the	figure	of	the	communist	businessman	was	born.	
The	Chamber’s	quarterly	magazine	Cuba	Foreign	Trade	(CFT)	–	published	in	Spanish	
and	 English	 –	 had	 always	 translated	 “empresario”	 as	 “business	 representative”,	
“business	 person”,	 or	 “businessman”.	 Sometimes	 the	 latter	 term	 was	 even	 re-
translated	to	Spanish	–	hence	the	Cuban	managers	were	presented	as	“hombres	de	
negocios”	–	literally,	“businessmen”	(CFT	2006,	14,	2009,	2014a,	7).	However,	it	was	
only	when	Fidel	stepped	down	that	the	meaning	of	the	term	was	elaborated.	
Paradoxically,	 the	communist	businessman	was	born	when	the	golden	years	of	 the	
Chamber	 were	 gone.	 As	 was	 shown	 in	 Figure	 1	 (chapter	 4),	 in	 2002-2005	 its	
membership	was	over	800	companies,	reaching	a	peak	of	886	in	2003.	After	this,	in	a	
delayed	 effect	 (with	 intruding	 resonance	 in	 the	 Raúl	 era)	 of	 the	 “reversal	 of	 the	
[Special	Period’s]	reform”	that	according	to	Mesa	Lago	(2012,	44-49)	was	pursued	by	
Fidel	in	2003-2006,	the	Chamber’s	membership	gradually	fell	from	761	members	in	
2006	to	678	in	2013	(CFT	2014b,	4).	This	fluctuation	is	explained	by	FDI	presence	in	
Cuba,	which	after	a	boom	 in	 the	1990s	was	 forced	 to	decline	after	2003,	as	Pérez	
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Villanueva	(2014,	41)	–	a	Cuban	economist	critical	of	restrictions	on	FDI	–	has	noted.	
However,	he	also	notes	that	despite	the	fall	in	the	number	of	companies	with	foreign	
capital,	those	remaining	have	matured	(Pérez	Villanueva	2014,	42)	–	e.g.	their	sales	
grew	in	their	respective	niches	in	the	world	market	(Domínguez	2012,	218).	
Similarly,	although	 the	contraction	of	 the	Chamber	was	 real,	 it	was	also	 relative	 in	
front	 of	 its	 previous	 boom	 –	when	 its	membership	 grew	 from	 94	 to	 721	 in	 1989-
2001.	 Furthermore,	 despite	 the	 Chamber’s	membership	 decreased,	 the	 underlying	
ideological	 identity	of	 the	managers	also	matured.	Hence	 the	 regime	had	not	only	
given	up	the	mistrust	towards	FDI	as	expressed	in	Che’s	primal	hostility,	but	now	the	
Cuban	 managers	 could	 see	 themselves	 as	 ‘businesspeople’.	 But	 even	 if	 Cuba’s	
engagement	 with	 FDI	 in	 the	 1990s	 did	 not	 tear	 apart	 the	 socialist	 claims	 to	
legitimacy,	the	emergence	of	Cuban	“empresarios”	still	needed	to	make	sense	under	
such	 claims.	 This	 tension	 was	 dealt	 with	 after	 2006	 when	 the	 managers	 were	
enrolled	in	revolutionary	lectures.	
In	 the	 2006	 Chambers’	 General	 Assembly,	 the	 MINCEX	 head	 explained	 to	 the	
attending	managers	 that	 their	export-oriented	activities	were	part	of	 the	“selfless”	
determination	 “to	 keep	 open	 the	 external	 markets	 of	 the	 country”	 despite	 “the	
economic	 war	 of	 the	 United	 States	 against	 our	 country”	 (in	 CFT	 2006,	 np).	 As	 is	
known,	anti-imperialism	has	traditionally	been	a	key	element	of	Cuban	revolutionary	
nationalism	–	the	ideology	to	which	the	managerial	activities	have	been	aligned.	
The	 regime’s	 call	 for	 the	managers	 to	 export	 in	 the	 name	 of	 anti-imperialism	 and	
national	 pride	 is	 an	 ideological	 revision/innovation	 for	 it	 bridges	 the	 former	 gap	
between	 business	 and	 revolution	 in	 Cuba.	 In	 2007,	 the	 then	 President	 of	 the	
Chamber	of	Commerce,	Raúl	Becerra	Egaña,	explained	the	coherence	of	managerial	
activities	with	Cuban	socialism,	presenting	the	former	as	an	offspring	of	the	latter:		
[A]ll	of	us	who	perform	in	the	world	of	foreign	trade	should	particularly	remember	that	Che	
was	a	precursor	in	the	field	of	Cuba’s	international	commercial	policy.	(CFT	2007,	8)	
As	 if	 to	complete	 this	view,	Rodrigo	Malmierca	 (MINCEX’s	head)	would	 later	argue	
that	“an	export	enterprise	must	be	an	example	[…],	above	all,	in	the	defence	of	the	
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principles	 of	 our	 Revolution”	 (CFT	 2009,	 np).	 Besides,	 the	 integration	 of	 the	
managers	 into	 socialist	 ideology	 did	 not	 lack	 praise	 for	 them.	 Hence	when	 García	
Oliveras	was	awarded	for	his	work	 in	the	Chamber	during	 its	2007	GM,	he	avowed	
his	 “great	 respect	 for	all	 those	who	have	a	 responsibility	as	enterprise	directors	 in	
the	economy”	 (CFT	2007,	8).	 Later,	during	 the	Second	Business	Forum	of	 the	Non-
Aligned	Movement,	held	in	Havana,	the	then	head	of	the	MINCEX,	Raúl	de	la	Nuez,	
told	 the	 public,	 composed	 of	 foreign	 and	 national	 managers,	 that	 the	
“businessmen…	 are	 the	 cell	 of	 economic	work”	 (in	 CFT	 2008,	 np).	 This	metaphor,	
possibly	unprecedented,	contains	a	swift	and	drastic	break	with	official	ideology,	for	
which	the	central	actor	of	 the	economy	 is	 the	working	class	–	as	 the	Cuban	media	
still	 insists.	 Although	 this	 metaphor	 never	 reappeared	 in	 CFT	 and	 was	 possibly	 a	
simple	 gaffe,	 it	 serves	 to	 appreciate	 the	 positive	 atmosphere	 around	 the	 Cuban	
business	community.	 Indeed,	had	the	managers	been	seen	as	a	 threat,	 they	would	
have	 never	 been	 called	 the	 vanguard	 of	 the	 economy	 by	 the	 MINCEX.	 Not	
surprisingly,	 the	 then	 Chamber’s	 president	 (in	 a	 GM	 speech)	 would	 reach	 the	
conclusion	that	a	way	to	“stimulate	the	socioeconomic	development	of	the	country”	
was	by	“promoting	the	progress	of	the	Cuban	business	community	associated	to	the	
Chamber	of	Commerce”	(CFT	2009,	np).		
5.3	Paving	the	way	to	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	(2008-2010)	
5.3.1	Leadership:	dismantling	charisma	
When	 Raúl	 swore	 in	 as	 Cuba’s	 new	 President	 at	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 he	made	
explicit	his	legal-rational	solution	to	the	succession,	hence	discarding	his	accession	as	
a	 new	 charismatic	 leader.	 This	 time	 he	 resorted	 to	 the	 constitution	 to	 repeat	 his	
stance	for	which	the	successor	of	Fidel	Castro	could	not	be	other	than	the	Party:	
Only	the	Communist	Party	[…]	can	be	the	worthy	heir	of	the	trust	deposited	by	the	people	in	
its	leader.	[The	Party]	is	the	utmost	leading	force	of	society	and	state,	and	this	is	established	
by	Article	5	of	our	Constitution,	which	was	approved	in	a	referendum	by	exactly	97.7%	of	the	
voters.	(R.	Castro	2008c)	
	
125	
Almost	immediately,	a	new	political	landscape	started	to	unfold	in	Cuba	since	then,	
both	in	the	leadership	and	style	of	government:	
Raúl	moved	into	a	higher	gear	(after	the	hiatus	of	two	years	of	relative	inertia	and	following	
the	 2008	 National	 Assembly	 elections)	 and	 began	 to	 reshape	 the	 political	 structures	 and	
personnel	 to	suit	his	agenda	rather	than	the	(by	now	embarrassingly	 inefficient	and	costly)	
Battle	of	Ideas.	(Kapcia	2014,	174-75)	
In	 this	 section	 I	will	 focus	 on	 identifying	what	 exactly	was	 cut	 off	 from	 the	 top	 in	
order	 to	 prove	 that	 the	 charismatic	 character	 of	 the	 leadership	 (Fidelismo)	 was	
largely	dismantled	–	a	move	that	laid	the	ground	for	the	subsequent	introduction	of	
a	collegial	style	(Raulismo),	which	would	be	effectuated	in	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	
Raúl	Castro	soon	revamped	the	top	leadership	by	promoting	revolutionary	veterans	
to	top-level	posts	and	dismissing	the	leaders	that	rose	through	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	
caucus.	These	initiatives,	introduced	during	a	one-year	timespan,	not	only	indicated	
that	 a	 new	 chief	 was	 now	 firmly	 in	 power	 –	 they	 also	 bore	 witness	 to	 Raúl’s	
interpretation	of	what	kind	of	leadership	Cuba	needed	after	Fidel	(and	himself).	
In	 Cuba,	when	 the	National	 Assembly	 elects	 the	 President	 it	 actually	 appoints	 the	
whole	Council	of	State	–	the	President	being	the	head	of	this	body.	Therefore,	when	
Fidel	 declined	 to	 this	 post	 in	 February	 2008,	 it	 was	 not	 only	 imminent	 that	 Raúl	
Castro	would	take	over	at	last,	but	also	the	speculation	over	who	would	be	the	new	
First	 Vice	 President	was	 inevitable	 –	 i.e.	 the	 first	 one	without	 a	 Castro	 last	 name.	
Marc	 Frank	 found	 in	 the	 excited	 atmosphere	 of	 the	 Havana-based	 community	 of	
foreign	journalists	and	diplomats	a	sample	of	a	general	feeling:	most	observers	were	
expecting	the	promotion	of	Carlos	Lage	to	the	post	of	second-in-command:	
Among	those	who	did	follow	such	matters,	there	was	a	great	deal	of	speculation	over	who	
would	become	the	first	vice	president.	Most	people	put	their	money	on	Carlos	Lage.	He	was	
a	relatively	young	man,	apparently	being	groomed	for	the	job,	and	his	role	for	more	than	a	
decade	 as	 the	 highly	 visible	 executive	 secretary	 of	 the	 Council	 of	Ministers	 in	many	ways	
resembled	that	of	prime	minister.	(Frank	2013,	107)	
In	other	words,	nobody	was	expecting	José	Ramón	Machado	Ventura	to	get	that	job.	
A	 relatively	 unnoticed	 apparatchik,	 Machado	 was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 historic	
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generation	known	as	an	orthodox	hardliner.	Another	major	promotion	the	same	day	
Raúl	was	named	President,	was	that	of	Julio	Casas	Regueiro,	another	revolutionary	
veteran	 whom	 then	 became	 vice	 president	 and	 new	 minister	 of	 the	 FAR	 –	 ergo,	
succeeding	Raúl	in	the	latter	post.	Overall,	12	of	the	31	members	of	the	new	Council	
of	 State	 had	 participated	 in	 the	 1959	 revolution,	 and	 “the	 average	 age	 of	 the	 top	
eight	positions	was	over	seventy”	(Frank	2013,	109).	
In	April	2008,	some	new	promotions	would	come.	Raúl	Castro	would	propose,	during	
a	 PCC	 Central	 Committee	meeting,	 that	 general	 Ramiro	 Valdés	 (another	histórico)	
and	General	Álvaro	López	Miera	(known	as	Raúl’s	protégée)	joined	the	Politburo.		
According	to	an	undisclosed	source	of	journalist	Marc	Frank,	catholic	Cardinal	Ortega	
asked	 Raúl	 Castro,	 during	 a	 visit	 to	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 in	 2010,	 why	 he	 had	
promoted	so	many	military	members	 in	his	government:	“Raúl	said	simply	that	the	
country	was	in	crisis	and	he	had	turned	to	men	he	knew	and	trusted,	and	that	this	
would	change	over	time”	(Frank	2013,	204).	Although	these	nominations	were	made	
with	a	certain	leadership’s	project	in	mind,	at	that	time	it	was	not	clear	which	project	
was	that.	For	now	it	suffices	to	appreciate	that	Raúl’s	promotions	would	soon	prove	
to	have	been	made	in	anticipation	to	the	dismissals	that	would	come	next.	
In	 short,	 the	 top	 leaders	nurtured	around	 the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	would	be	 removed	
one	by	one.	The	first	to	fall	 from	was	Hassan	Pérez	 in	September	2008,	who	was	a	
leading	 figure	of	 the	UJC	at	 the	 time	and	 then	appointed	 teacher	 in	a	 FAR	college	
(Cubaencuentro	2008);	one	month	 later,	Carlos	Valenciaga,	 the	 last	 coordinator	of	
the	Grupo	de	Apoyo,	was	dismissed	and	assigned	to	the	National	Library	(Hernández	
Busto	2008b,	a).	Vice	president	Otto	Rivero	would	be	sacked	later.		
Speculation	would	thus	arise	concerning	the	fate	of	the	most	powerful	‘graduates’	of	
the	Grupo	de	Apoyo,	Felipe	Pérez	Roque	and	Carlos	Lage.	They	would	be	dismissed	in	
March	 2009	 –	 representing	 the	 ‘final	 touch’	 of	 the	 restructuring	 of	 the	 cabinet	
started	by	Raúl	thirteen	months	ago	when	his	presidency	kicked	off.	
In	 a	 Council	 of	 State	meeting,	 Raúl	 Castro	 played	 video	 footage	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
Council	showing	Lage	talking	to	Valenciaga	in	a	party	also	attended	by	Pérez	Roque	
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held	 one	 year	 earlier,	 just	 the	 night	 before	 Raúl	 took	 over	 as	 President	 and	
announced	the	first	changes	to	the	cabinet.	 In	that	conversation	Lage	 lamented	he	
had	not	been	promoted	to	first	vice	president,	despite	Castro’s	orders	to	Politburo	
members	 to	 keep	 the	 new	 appointments	 a	 secret	 until	 they	 became	 officially	
announced.	Raúl	argued	that	the	true	purpose	of	that	party	was	to	celebrate	Lage’s	
expected	promotion,	based	on	 the	 confessions	of	a	 Spanish	businessman	 that	had	
been	detained	for	being	found	to	be	working	with	Spain’s	intelligence	services.	The	
businessman,	 of	 Cuban	 origin,	 had	 become	 a	 close	 friend	 of	 both	 Lage	 and	 Pérez	
Roque.	Raúl	managed	to	get	rid	of	Pérez	Roque	and	Lage	charging	them	for	having	
failed	to	respect	their	elder	leaders	and	for	causing	intelligence	breaches.	
Next	day,	 the	Consejo	de	Estado	 (2009)	 released	 the	official	 announcement	of	 the	
changes.	A	career	diplomat,	Bruno	Rodríguez,	substituted	Pérez	Roque.	As	for	Lage,	
General	José	Amado	Ricardo	Guerra,	then	FAR’s	chief	secretary,	would	take	over	as	
secretary	of	the	cabinet.	Otto	Rivero	was	also	finally	dismissed	as	the	transfer	of	the	
programs	 under	 the	 (now	 all	 gone)	 Battle	 of	 Ideas	 to	 the	 relevant	ministries	 had	
been	completed	and	now	handed	over	to	the	revolutionary	veteran	Ramiro	Valdés.	
In	 toto,	 the	 whole	 top-leadership’s	 reshuffle	 in	 general,	 and	 the	 expulsion	 of	 the	
“test-tube	leaders”	in	particular,	“reflected	Raúl	Castro’s	preference	for	trustworthy	
loyalists	who	respected	 institutional	boundaries	and	rules”	(Mujal-León	2011,	156).	
Far	away	from	any	model	of	transmission	of	charisma	–	either	to	the	personal	staff	
(Grupo	de	Apoyo)	or	by	heredity	(founding	a	Castro	dynasty)	–	“Raúl	Castro’s	thesis	
that	the	answer	to	succession	is	institutionalization	has	carried	the	day”,	leading	to	
an	overall	regime	transition	“to	a	much	more	 institutions-based	model”	(Hoffmann	
2009,	239,	242).	In	orthodox	Weberian	terms,	this	proved	that	the	charismatic	claims	
to	legitimacy	of	the	regime	had	been	discharged	in	favour	of	legal-rational	ones.	
In	the	official	note	about	the	fall	of	the	Talibanes,	the	dismissals	were	portrayed	as	a	
renewed	effort	towards	 institutionalisation,	paraphrasing	a	point	Raúl	Castro	made	
in	his	first	address	as	new	President:	“institutionalisation	is	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	
invulnerability	of	the	Revolution	in	the	political	field,	so	we	must	work	in	its	constant	
improvement”	(Consejo	de	Estado	2009,	np).	There	was	nothing	left	of	the	Grupo	de	
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Apoyo	–	its	surviving	remnants,	a	few	low	profiled	staff	members,	would	be	fired	in	
May	 2009	 (Hernández	 Busto	 2009,	 np).	 Fidel’s	 fast-track	 routes	 for	 handpicked	
talented	 youth	 to	 top	 leadership	 had	 been	 closed.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 qualitative	
change	might	have	been	obscured	by	the	public	support	Fidel	Castro	gave	to	the	fall	
of	 his	 former	 protégés	 –	 accusing	 them	 of	 having	 fallen	 prey	 to	 the	 “honey	 of	
power”,	 which	 caused	 “illusions”	 in	 the	 “external	 enemy”	 (F.	 Castro	 2009a).	 Fidel	
even	 explicitly	 rejected	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 cabinet	 changes	 were	 a	 substitution	 of	
“Fidel’s	 men”	 by	 “Raúl’s	 men”.	 Equally	 noteworthy	 was	 Raúl’s	 spotless	 lack	 of	
criticism	 of	 Fidel	 while	 besieging	 the	 Fidelista	 style	 of	 leadership	 he	 had	 finally	
vanquished.	
As	Mujal-León	has	noted:	
These	talibanes	had	been	Fidel	Castro’s	 favourites,	but	 in	moving	against	them	Raúl	Castro	
never	criticized	his	brother	or	undermined	his	image.	Too	much	joined	the	two	brothers.	Not	
only	 was	 Raúl	 co-architect	 of	 the	 revolution,	 but	 his	 own	 claim	 to	 legitimacy	 was	 also	
inextricably	 tied	 to	 Fidel.	 In	 removing	 these	 “test	 tube	 leaders,”	 Raúl	 signalled	 that	 he	
intended	to	place	his	own	imprint	on	the	successor	generation.	(Mujal-León	2011,	156)	
In	 this	 sense,	 both	 Fidel’s	 public	 endorsement	 of	 the	 new	 leadership	 and	 Raúl’s	
unrelenting	praise	for	Fidel	were	like	the	two	sides	of	the	same	coin…	a	coin	that	had	
just	flipped	with	Raúl’s	side	now	facing	up.	At	this	point	it	is	important	to	highlight	an	
important	peculiarity	of	the	Cuban	succession:	it	occurred	during	the	lifetime	of	the	
charismatic	 leader.	 Fidel	 would	 not	 simply	 disappear	 from	 the	 political	 scene;	 he	
would	adopt	the	role	of	legitimator	of	the	successor	leadership.	Fidel	soon	started	to	
write	 regular	 op-eds	 in	Granma,	 in	 a	 section	 entitled	 “Reflections	 of	 the	 comrade	
Fidel”.	 In	 them	 he	 only	 occasionally	 addressed	 domestic	 Cuban	 politics	 –	 and	 his	
endorsement	to	the	Raúl’s	cabinet	overhaul	was	one	of	those	few	exceptions.	
Hoffmann	explained	this	Raúl-Fidel	interdependency	in	Weberian	terms:	
[T]he	Cuban	case	 shows	 that	 the	 transfer	of	 legitimacy	 from	charismatic	authority	 is	not	a	
one-time	affair	as	the	Weberian	notion	of	“designation	by	the	charismatic	leader”	suggests.	
Such	 designation	 may	 be	 a	 necessary,	 but	 not	 necessarily	 a	 sufficient,	 condition.	 As	 the	
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charismatic	leader	becomes	the	legitimator,	the	successor	government	needs	to	continually	
validate	its	actions	through	recourse	to	his	legacy.	(Hoffmann	2009,	241)	
At	 least	 for	 some	 time,	 Raúl’s	 leadership	 thus	 appeared	 “critically	 dependent	 on	
recourse	 to	 the	 charismatic	 leader	 for	 legitimacy”	 due	 to	 a	 “power-sharing	
arrangement	between	the	outgoing	leader	and	his	successor”	(Hoffmann	2009,	241).	
However,	Fidel	would	lose	relevance	in	the	political	scene	bit	by	bit,	not	least	due	to	
old	 age.	 In	 this	 sense,	 when	 Raúl	 Castro	 and	 Barack	 Obama	 announced	 the	
normalisation	 of	 relations	 between	 the	 United	 States	 and	 Cuba	 on	 17	 December	
2014	–	a	diplomatic	breakthrough	agreed	after	half	a	century	–	Fidel	only	gave	his	
opinion	 over	 a	 month	 later.	 Fidel	 expressed	 in	 an	 op-ed	 both	 his	 support	 to	 the	
diplomatic	process	(with	caution)	and	to	“the	President	of	Cuba”	(with	distance)	–	in	
the	past	simply	referred	to	as	“Raúl”	or	“comrade	Raúl”	by	Fidel	–	but	acknowledging	
that	 he	 had	 not	 “exchanged	 a	 word”	 about	 it	 (F.	 Castro	 2015).	 Likewise,	 a	 few	
months	 earlier	 Fidel	 complained	 in	Granma	 that	 he	 had	 not	 been	 notified	 of	 the	
death	 of	 a	 Cuban	 sports’	 figure	 he	 admired	 (F.	 Castro	 2014a),	 which	 exposed	 the	
extent	to	which	he	had	been	sidelined.	Despite	Fidel	acting	as	legitimator	of	Raúl	for	
a	while,	the	latter	would	consolidate	a	new,	own-merited,	leadership	team.	
In	any	case,	by	mid-2009	an	era	 in	 the	Cuban	top	 leadership	had	 just	ended	and	a	
new	 one	 had	 begun.	 Both	 the	Grupo	 de	 Apoyo	 and	 the	Battle	 of	 Ideas	 had	 been	
dismantled	and	their	leading	representatives	disgraced.	
5.3.2	Ideology:	relaxing	CPE	orthodoxy	
After	Raúl	Castro	was	officially	sworn	new	President	of	Cuba	 in	February	2008	and	
thus	 the	 cabinet	 started	 to	 change,	 the	 ideological	 revolt	 unravelled	more	 clearly.	
The	 first	 political	 signal	 that	 a	 new	era	 had	 arrived	was	 the	 removal	 of	 “excessive	
prohibitions”	(R.	Castro	2008c).	In	particular,	Cubans	were	allowed	in	March	2008	to	
buy	computers	and	DVD	players,	rent	cars	and	book	rooms	in	hotels;	also,	they	were	
offered	mobile	phone	services	for	the	first	time	(Frank	2013,	115).	
The	 relaxation	 of	 orthodoxy	 required	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 soul-searching,	 as	 was	
noticeable	 in	Raul’s	 first	address	 to	 the	National	Assembly	as	 fully-fledged	head	of	
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state	 in	26th	July	2008.	 In	that	event,	Raúl	made	a	rare	public	acknowledgement	of	
the	 tensions	 in	 the	 elite,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 intimate	 personal	 level.	 After	
emphasising	twice	that	in	the	near	future	there	would	be	“eliminated	wrong	free-of-
charge	entitlements	and	the	excess	of	subsidies”,	he	told	the	deputies	how	such	and	
related	plans	afflicted	him	when	going	to	bed:	“In	sleepless	nights,	which	many	times	
are	caused	by	these	subjects,	I	say:	we	are	building	socialism”	(R.	Castro	2008b).	Raúl	
then	went	on	 to	 justify	 the	path	his	 government	was	embarking	on,	 by	distancing	
himself	from	tenets	of	the	Fidel	era	–	instead	offering	a	new	vision:	“Socialism	means	
social	 justice	 and	 equality,	 but	 equality	 of	 rights,	 of	 opportunities,	 not	 of	 income.	
Equality	 is	not	egalitarianism”	 (R.	Castro	2008b).	 Even	 if	 it	 is	 true	 that	Marx	never	
advocated	equality	of	income	–	which,	by	the	way,	was	not	the	case	in	Cuba	either	–	
Raúl’s	remarks	served	to	make	clear	to	everyone	that	even	long-standing	features	of	
the	Island’s	economy,	like	the	ration	book,	were	being	called	into	question.	
The	Cuban	economy	suffered	two	external	shocks	 in	2008.	Not	only	had	the	global	
financial	crisis	had	a	negative	impact	on	Cuba,	but	also	the	Hurricanes	Gustav	and	Ike	
that	hit	the	Island	in	August	and	September,	respectively.	As	a	result:	
The	 terms	of	 trade	 fell	 34.3%,	 the	worst	decline	of	 the	decade,	due	 to	 the	 collapse	of	 the	
world	market	price	of	nickel,	Cuba’s	main	export,	and	the	escalation	in	world	prices	of	oil	and	
food,	Cuba’s	 two	most	 significant	 imports.	 […]	 [The	hurricanes]	 caused	 losses	estimated	at	
US$	 9,722	million,	 mainly	 in	 housing	 and	 food	 production,	 which	 required	 an	 increase	 in	
imports	 from	17.6	per	cent	of	GDP	 in	2007	to	23.3	per	cent	 in	2008,	the	highest	degree	of	
dependence	on	imports	in	the	decade.	(Mesa-Lago	and	Vidal-Alejandro	2010,	694)	
The	reform,	in	any	case,	did	not	stop	but	actually	became	bolder.	In	July	2008	Raúl	
signed	the	Decree-Law	No.	259,	which	authorised	a	 leasing	program	of	 idle	 land	to	
private	 farmers	 and	 corporate	 bodies	 in	 order	 to	 “increase	 food	 production	 and	
reduce	 its	 importation”	 (Consejo	 de	 Estado	 2008).	 Hagelberg	 and	 Álvarez	 (2009)	
have	summarised	the	problems	in	the	Cuban	agriculture	up	to	that	point:	
[In	2002-2007]	the	area	under	cultivation	in	the	country	had	shrunk	by	603,000	hectares,	or	
16.8%,	while	 the	 area	 totally	 idle,	 i.e.,	 not	 used	 even	 for	 pasture,	 had	 grown	 by	 32.1%	 to	
some	1,230,000	hectares,	constituting	18.6%	of	all	agricultural	land.	(Hagelberg	and	Álvarez	
2009,	230)	
	
131	
Two	years	after	 the	Decree-Law	No.	259,	 Juventud	Rebelde	reported	that	1	million	
hectares	had	been	transferred,	of	which	46%	was	producing	(Lescaille	Durand	2010).	
Despite	this	“big	structural	change	in	land	tenancy”,	food	production	had	not	taken	
off	by	 then,	 as	Hagelberg	 (2011,	111)	discussed.	 Even	by	2012	output	had	not	 yet	
taken	 off,	 according	 to	 official	 figures	 discussed	 by	 the	 Cuban	 economist	 Nova	
González	 (2013,	 63),	 whom	 concluded	 that	 “land	 transfer	 is	 a	 necessary	 but	 not	
sufficient	 condition”.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 production	 shortfall,	 since	 2008	 the	
political	debate	had	shifted	from	whether	idle	land	should	be	transferred	to	private	
hands	at	all	to	whether	the	land	transfer	itself	was	enough.	Yet	this	structural	reform	
was	just	the	beginning.	
On	December	2008,	Raúl	told	the	National	Assembly	that	his	ideological	revolt	would	
enter	into	a	higher	stage.	After	insisting	on	the	reduction	of	subsidies,	he	made	clear	
that	 “these	 issues	 are	 very	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 structural	 and	 conceptual	
transformation	 that	 shall	 be	 submitted	 to	 discussion	 to	 and	 approval	 by	 the	 Sixth	
Party	Congress”	(R.	Castro	2008d).	In	Cuban	politics,	this	meant	that	the	relaxation	of	
CPE	orthodoxy	was	not	merely	an	ephemeral	effervescence	–	it	would	continue	and	
would	be	institutionalised	in	the	overall	rationale	of	the	Party.	
By	April	2009,	the	leadership	had	just	got	rid	of	the	charismatic	apparatus	of	Fidel	in	
general	and	of	the	Talibanes	 in	particular,	as	covered	in	the	previous	section.	Soon	
after,	 the	 recently	 revamped	 Council	 of	Ministers	 approved	 an	 austerity	 plan	 that	
took	into	account	the	negative	impact	of	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	(Mesa-Lago	
and	 Vidal-Alejandro	 2010,	 711);	 and,	 in	 June	 2009,	 Marino	 Murillo	 (Economy	
Minister)	drew	a	plan	to	reform	the	Cuban	economy,	which	would	turn	out	to	be	a	
predecessor	of	what	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	discussed	in	2011	(Frank	2013,	160).	
Up	to	this	point,	a	telling	signifier	had	emerged	in	public	discourse:	“rationality”	–	as	
synonymous	 of	 taking	 care	 of	 the	 public	 finances	 responsibly.	 The	 unpronounced	
implication	 was	 clear:	 under	 Fidel’s	 leadership	 economic	 policy	 was	 irrational.	
Perhaps	aware	of	that	interpretation,	Raúl	credited	to	Fidel	the	new	direction:	
It	 is	 now	 imposed	 on	 us	 to	 invest	 our	 limited	 resources	with	 rationality,	 essentially	 in	 the	
obtaining	 of	 utilities	 that	 allow	 us	 to	 face	 the	 rising	 social	 spending	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
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production	 of	 food,	 import	 substitution,	 and	 export	 increasing,	 are	 still	 fundamental.	 Also	
savings,	which	as	comrade	Fidel	has	pointed	out,	 is	today	our	most	immediate	and	feasible	
source	of	revenues.	In	the	first	place,	[we	need	to	save]	fuel.	(R.	Castro	2008b)	
Then	in	the	December	2008	speech,	as	the	global	financial	crisis	ignited	in	that	year	
unravelled,	Raúl	extended	that	notion	from	savings	to	cuts	in	managers’	expenses:	
Consequently,	 it	has	been	decided,	among	other	measures,	to	reduce	by	50%	the	expenses	
contemplated	by	the	state	institutions	for	foreign	traveling	and	the	same	has	been	decided	
with	 respect	 to	 the	 business	 sector.	 The	 objective	 is	 not	 to	 reduce	 necessary	 tasks	 or	
negotiations	but	rather	to	act	more	rationally.	(R.	Castro	2008d)	
In	 August	 2009,	 the	 need	 of	 “rationality”	 was	 pushed	 another	 step	 further,	 now	
including	the	welfare	state;	i.e.	health	and	education:	
The	 same	 rational	 approach	 will	 be	 adopted	 with	 regards	 to	 other	 decisions	 concerning	
education,	healthcare	and	the	remaining	sectors	included	in	the	budget	in	order	to	eliminate	
simply	 unsustainable	 spending	 that	 have	 been	 mounting	 annually	 and	 that	 are	 not	 only	
rather	 inefficient	 but	 also	 have	 made	 some	 people	 impervious	 to	 the	 need	 to	 work.	 (R.	
Castro	2009c)	
This	last	quotation	is	from	an	address	to	the	National	Assembly	that	would	be	taken	
to	the	grassroots	for	discussion	–	the	second	such	exercise	since	Fidel	fell	 ill	 (Frank	
2013,	 166).	 That	 speech	 acknowledged	 again	 the	 precariousness	 of	 the	 Cuban	
economy,	 compounded	 by	 the	 combined	 effects	 of	 two	 hurricanes	 and	 a	 global	
financial	crisis.	Raúl	also	announced	the	creation	of	a	Comptroller	General	office	to	
confront	corruption	and	announced	that	 the	Party	Congress	would	be	rescheduled	
to	 2011	 –	 it	 was	 originally	 expected	 to	 take	 place	 in	 late	 2009.	 Finally,	 Raúl	 also	
repeated	his	stance	of	economic	 reform	within	 the	boundaries	of	an	anti-capitalist	
economy	–	now	extending	the	political	system	as	another	untouchable	topic:	
I	was	not	elected	President	 to	 restore	 capitalism	 in	Cuba	or	 to	 surrender	 the	Revolution.	 I	
was	elected	to	defend,	preserve	and	continue	to	perfect	socialism,	not	to	destroy	it.	[…]	
The	task	lying	ahead	of	the	Cuban	communists	and	all	of	our	people	is	great.	With	the	widest	
possible	popular	participation,	we	should	define	the	socialist	 society	 that	we	want	 to	build	
and	can	build	under	the	present	and	future	conditions	of	Cuba,	and	the	economic	model	that	
will	 rule	 the	 life	of	 the	nation	 to	 the	benefit	of	our	compatriots.	Also,	we	must	ensure	 the	
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impossibility	to	reverse	the	socio-political	regime	of	the	country,	which	is	the	only	guarantee	
of	its	true	independence.	(R.	Castro	2009c)	
The	 second	 consultation	would	 have	 a	 dispirited	 response	 from	 the	 grassroots.	 In	
contrast,	the	first	debate	in	2007	“had	created	a	great	deal	of	enthusiasm…	but	that	
was	 before	 the	 2008	 hurricanes	 devastated	 much	 of	 the	 island	 and	 before	 the	
financial	crisis	broke”,	as	Frank	 (2013,	166-67)	put	 it.	Now	 in	2009,	 the	purpose	of	
the	 national	 debate	 had	 a	 different	 twist,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 guide	 that	 the	 PCC	
leadership	sent	to	its	cadres	to	lead	the	grassroots’	meetings:	
This	time,	the	 idea	 is	not	to	solicit	critical	demands,	suggestions,	and	recommendations	for	
higher	bodies…	but	 to	stimulate	a	 response	 in	each	workplace	and	community	 to	confront	
and	solve	existing	problems.	(PCC	in	Frank	2013,	167)	
As	 part	 of	 the	 end	 of	 free-of-charge	 ‘irrationalities’,	 the	 closure	 of	 workplace	
lunchrooms	began	in	September	2009	–	instead,	each	worker	received	an	increase	in	
the	daily	salary	to	compensate	(Frank	2013,	164-66).	The	uneasiness	created	by	this	
measure,	added	to	the	unenthusiastic	second	consultation,	must	have	engendered	a	
feeling	of	frustration	in	the	leadership	–	as	reflected	in	the	Granma,	when	in	October	
that	year	its	then	director	published	an	op-ed	calling	the	Cubans	“pigeons”	that	walk	
with	the	“mouths	open”	as	the	state	gives	them	“everything”	(Barredo	2009,	np).	
In	 the	 National	 Assembly	 meeting	 of	 20	 December	 2009,	 as	 if	 to	 calm	 popular	
anxieties	in	the	Cuban	street,	Raúl	clarified	that	“the	changes	we	have	to	introduce	
in	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 economy”	 were	 designed	 “in	 order	 to	 strengthen	 our	
socialist	society”	–	in	that	same	speech,	all	the	enterprise	of	economic	change	led	by	
Raúl	 Castro	 was	 finally	 summarised	 in	 a	 catchphrase:	 “the	 update	 of	 the	 Cuban	
economic	model”	 (R.	 Castro	 2009b).	 The	 notion	 of	update-of-the-model	 had	 been	
born,	and	it	would	articulate	the	Cuban	language	of	economic	reform	from	then	on.	
On	 the	 same	 day,	 Marino	 Murillo	 (Economy	 Minister)	 explained	 to	 the	 National	
Assembly	 that	 in	 order	 to	 find	 more	 “efficient”	 economic	 “alternatives”,	 some	
“experiments”	 had	 been	 launched	 to	 “lighten	 the	 burden	 on	 the	 state	 in	 some	
services	offered”	(Murillo	2009,	np).	He	did	not	say	it	at	the	time,	but	he	referred	to	
the	 transfer	 of	 a	 number	 of	 barbershops	 to	 the	 barbers	 by	 the	 state	 in	 leasing	
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arrangements	 (Leyva	 2011c,	 np)	 –	 an	 experiment	 carried	out	 in	 five	municipalities	
that	informed	a	general	state’s	retreat	to	be	announced	later	in	2010.	
The	 excitement	 over	 these	 experiments	 gave	 the	 reformist	 impetus	 a	 refreshed	
enthusiasm.	 In	February	2010,	 in	a	meeting	with	 top	officials,	Murillo	attacked	the	
“paternalistic”	policies	and	made	the	case	for	a	state’s	retreat	from	small	economic	
activity	 (Frank	 2013,	 175).	 If	 in	 December	 2009	 Raúl	 had	 been	 cautious	 –	 “there	
cannot	be	space	for	the	risks	of	improvisation	and	haste…	we	have	no	right	to	make	
mistakes”	(R.	Castro	2009b)	–	in	April	2010	he	conferred	a	new	intrepid	aura	to	his	
call	to	“update”	or	“upgrade”	(actualización,	in	Spanish)	socialism	in	Cuba:	
We	 are	 convinced	 that	 we	 need	 to	 break	 away	 from	 dogma	 and	 assume	 firmly	 and	
confidently	the	ongoing	upgrading	of	our	economic	model	in	order	to	set	the	foundations	of	
the	irreversibility	of	the	Cuban	socialism	and	its	development.	(R.	Castro	2010c)	
As	can	be	noted,	the	upgrade-of-the-socialist-model	notion	repeats	the	compromise	
between	orthodoxy	and	change,	between	reform	and	the	respect	of	principles.	This	
tension	 would	 become	 a	 distinctive	 feature	 of	 economic	 reform	 throughout	 the	
presidency	 of	 Raúl	 Castro.	 Sometimes	 orthodoxy	 would	 discourage	 change,	 but	
sometimes	 reform	would	 catalyse	 it.	 Such	 instability	would	 be	 translated	 into	 the	
actual	 implementation	 of	 reform.	 Henken	 (quoted	 by	 Rathbone	 2014,	 np)	 would	
later	jokingly	compare	the	Cuban	rhythm	of	economic	reform	to	a	Caribbean	dance:	
“I	call	it	Raúl’s	mambo	–	two	steps	forward,	one	step	back”.	I	will	come	back	to	this	
tension	later,	but	from	now	it	suffices	to	note	its	ideological	origin	in	the	early	days.	
Summary	
In	the	first	section	of	this	chapter	I	‘zoomed	in’	the	immediate	political	context	that	
preceded	Raúl’s	takeover.	–	i.e.	the	last	period	of	Fidel	in	power.	In	those	years	the	
role	 of	 an	 extra	 charismatic	 staff	 grew	 (the	 Grupo	 de	 Apoyo),	 while	 yet	 another	
‘idealist	 cycle’	 entered	 the	 stage	between	2003	 and	2006.	Hence	 the	 last	 years	 of	
Cuba	under	Fidel	may	be	seen	as	a	freezing	charismatic	post-totalitarian	regime.	To	
be	sure,	Raúl	would	bring	an	anti-charismatic	and	anti-freezing	political	turn.	
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Then,	from	2006	to	2010,	I	showed	that	the	Cuban	regime	experienced	the	fall	of	the	
charismatic	 character	 of	 its	 leadership	 as	 well	 as	 the	 dislocation	 of	 the	 CPE	
orthodoxy.	 The	Cuban	 leadership	 lived	not	only	 the	 stepping	down	of	 Fidel	 Castro	
but	the	dismantlement	of	the	parallel	government	directly	linked	to	him,	the	Grupo	
de	 Apoyo.	 Such	 a	 charismatic	 apparatus,	 rooted	 on	 the	 will	 and	 power	 of	 Fidel’s	
charismatic	 authority,	 lacked	 any	 solid	 institutional	 ground	 to	 deter	 any	 serious	
strike.	Raúl	 disposed	of	 it	 and	advanced	a	new	 type	of	 leadership,	which	 (as	 I	will	
later	 discuss)	 only	 fully	 emerged	 after	 the	 Sixth	 Party	 Congress	 elected	 the	 new	
Politburo.	Also,	since	he	took	over	as	provisional	head	of	state,	Raúl	implemented	a	
new,	 rational	 style	 of	 economic	management	 –	 far	 away	 from	 Fidel’s	 last	 years	 in	
office.	Later,	when	he	took	full	charge	of	the	presidency,	not	only	a	structural	reform	
was	implemented	(the	land	leasing	program)	but	Raúl	was	also	vocal	about	the	need	
of	“conceptual	changes”	in	order	to	“update”	the	Cuban	economic	model.	Thus,	the	
legitimacy	 of	 CPE	 orthodoxy	 had	 been	 called	 into	 question.	 A	 top-led	 revolt	 was	
sweeping	Cuba,	imposing	a	new	dynamic	to	the	regime,	ergo	to	Cuban	politics.	
By	2010,	it	made	sense	the	Gramscian	assessment	of	the	Cuban	sociologist	Haroldo	
Dilla,	whom	summarised	the	political	situation	as	one	in	which	“the	old	is	dying	and	
the	new	cannot	be	born”	(Dilla	Alfonso	2010,	9).	However,	the	‘new’	would	indeed	
be	born,	although	one	had	to	wait	until	April	2011,	in	the	Sixth	Party	Congress,	when	
Raúl’s	revolt	turned	into	a	political	victory	that	would	accelerate	the	pace	of	change	
on	the	Island	and	shape	the	regime	along	new	and	clearer	lines.	In	other	words,	by	
2010	the	regime	was	no	longer	‘freezing’	or	‘charismatic’.	Post-totalitarian	Cuba	was	
on	the	verge	of	change,	as	the	events	at	the	levels	of	leadership	and	ideology	in	the	
period	2006-2010	attested,	and	the	events	afterwards	would	confirm.	
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6.	The	victory	of	Raúl	Castro	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 discuss	 the	 culmination	 of	 Raúl	 Castro’s	 revolt:	 the	 Sixth	 Party	
Congress	held	in	April	2011,	when	–	as	I	will	argue	–	a	new	type	of	leadership	was	set	
up	and	a	new	type	of	ideology	was	given	the	green	light.	The	basic	argument	is	that	
the	subsequent	period	was	marked	by	two	political	changes:	
⎯ The	adoption	(ratification)	of	collegial	leadership	
⎯ The	adoption	(crystallisation)	of	market	socialist	ideology	
These	 sweeping	 changes	 occurred	 after	 his	 government	 had	 responded	 to	 the	
generational	 succession	 of	 the	 ageing	 Cuban	 dirección	 histórica	 with	 the	 finale	 of	
charisma,	and	after	an	ideological	relaxation	of	CPE	made	it	possible	to	dislodge	the	
last	‘idealist	cycle’	of	economic	policy.	
This	 chapter	 is	 divided	 into	 two	parts.	 In	 the	 first,	 I	 discuss	 the	 final	 seven-month	
advance	towards	the	2011	Congress,	which,	when	it	finally	took	place,	elected	a	new	
(type	of)	Politburo	and	approved	the	ideological	metamorphosis	of	economic	policy.	
Then	 in	 the	second	part	 I	analyse	how	Raúl	Castro	capitalised	on	his	victory	at	 the	
Sixth	Party	Congress	to	reshape	the	polity’s	leadership	and	ideology	in	2011-2014.	
6.1	The	battle	of	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	(2010-2011)	
The	 march	 to	 the	 Sixth	 Congress	 started	 in	 1	 August	 2010,	 when	 Raúl	 told	 the	
National	Assembly	that	the	 leadership	of	both	the	Party	and	the	state	had	decided	
two	weeks	earlier	“a	group	of	measures	to	accomplish,	in	stages,	the	downsizing	of	
the	 considerably	 inflated	workforce	 in	 the	 state	 sector”	 (R.	 Castro	 2010a).	 Such	 a	
move,	Raúl	stressed,	would	be	made	up	by	a	proportional	 increase	of	employment	
opportunities	in	the	private	sector	–	notably,	an	expansion	of	self-employment:	
The	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 also	 agreed	 to	 expand	 the	 exercise	 of	 self-employment	 and	 its	
utilisation	as	another	alternative	of	employment	for	the	redundant	workers,	 lifting	several	
present	 prohibitions	 for	 granting	 new	 [self-employment]	 licences	 and	 for	 trading	 some	
products,	relaxing	the	rules	for	hiring	workforce.	(R.	Castro	2010a)	
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The	highlight	is	mine	for	that	phrase	was	the	first	explicit	sign	of	official	acceptance	
of	the	self-employed.	In	the	Cuban	context,	defining	the	self-employed	as	“another	
alternative”	 shall	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 were	 now	 regarded	 a	
legitimate	actor	of	 the	Cuban	economy.	Although	this	phenomenon	will	be	 further	
analysed	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 it	 is	worth	 underscoring	 that	 such	 a	major	 signal	 of	
market	 acceptance	 in	 the	 context	 of	 labour	 restructuring	 plans	 prefigured	 the	
ideological	content	of	pre-Congress	discussions	inside	and	outside	the	Party.	
Then	on	13	September	2010,	the	CTC	(2010)	endorsed	the	labour	plans	announced	
by	Raúl	and	made	explicit	the	goal	of	firing	500,000	state	workers	by	March	2011.	As	
documented	by	Mesa-Lago	(2010),	the	original	plan	was	to	alleviate	these	layoffs	by	
adding	465,000	Cubans	in	the	same	period	to	the	private	sector	–	250,000	of	which	
would	 be	 self-employed	 workers	 (‘cuentapropistas’).	 In	 a	 country	 with	 a	 total	
workforce	 of	 5.1	 million	 people,	 this	 reform	 was	 a	 big	 overhaul.	 In	 another	 step	
forward,	 soon	 after	 the	 legislation	 to	 monitor	 the	 layoffs	 and	 a	 new	 (friendlier)	
legislation	regulating	self-employment	were	issued	(MTSS	2010a,	b).	
At	this	point,	“Raúl	Castro	and	his	associates	obviously	felt	that	they	had	arrived	at	a	
critical	 juncture	 and	 needed	 the	 endorsement	 of	 the	 highest	 party	 institution	 to	
strengthen	 their	hand”,	as	Farber	 (2011,	279)	has	put	 it.	Nevertheless,	Raúl	would	
leave	nothing	to	chance.	The	state	layoffs	and	the	new	stance	to	the	market	would	
not	be	decided	by	the	Party	Congress,	whose	task	would	rather	be	to	legitimise	the	
new	facts	on	the	ground	and	to	devise	the	ways	to	adapt	the	regime	to	them.	
The	call	for	the	Congress	itself	would	finally	be	announced	in	November	2010,	during	
a	 visit	 of	 Hugo	 Chávez	 to	 Havana	 to	 celebrate	 the	 10th	 anniversary	 of	 the	 Cuba-
Venezuela	partnership.	Calling	the	Congress	in	the	presence	of	Chávez	was	akin	to	a	
present	to	him,	symbolising	the	importance	given	by	Raúl	to	that	relationship.	
If	Raúl	Castro	had	already	defined	his	goal	as	“updating	socialism”,	on	this	occasion	
he	revealed	how	the	Party	would	be	aligned	towards	the	same	objective:	
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[T]he	Sixth	Congress	will	 focus	on	 the	solution	of	 the	problems	of	 the	economy	and	 in	 the	
fundamental	 decisions	 of	 the	 updating	 of	 the	 Cuban	 economic	model,	 and	will	 adopt	 the	
Guidelines	of	Economic	and	Social	Policy	of	the	Party	and	the	Revolution.	(R.	Castro	2010b)	
The	Guidelines	(Lineamientos,	in	Spanish)	were	the	only	document	to	be	discussed	in	
the	Congress	and	it	was	intended	to	serve	as	the	political	tool	to	recast	the	Party’s	
mind-set.	On	top	of	that,	the	Lineamientos	would	first	be	discussed	in	the	grassroots,	
within	 and	 outside	 the	 Party,	 hence	 launching	 the	 third	 public	 debate	 on	 the	
economy:	
The	 Congress	 is	 not	 just	 the	meeting	 of	 those	 elected	 as	 delegates,	 but	 also	 the	 previous	
process	of	discussion	by	the	militancy	and	by	all	the	population	of	the	guidelines.	(R.	Castro	
2010b)	
The	 Lineamientos	 consisted	 of	 291	 paragraphs	 sketching	 future	 reforms	 grouping	
them	on	different	 topics:	 financial	policy,	monetary	policy,	 tourism,	 foreign	sector,	
internal	market,	and	others.	The	restructuring	of	the	Cuban	workforce	was	a	salient	
issue	of	the	document,	but	it	was	part	of	a	wider	agenda.	However,	the	Lineamientos	
were	very	general	and	ambiguous	at	times,	as	Mujal-León	has	put	in	a	nutshell:	
Many	 of	 the	measures	 it	 advocated	 (increasing	 labor	 productivity	 and	 agricultural	 output	
while	 reducing	 the	 size	 of	 the	 state	 and	 eliminating	monetary	 and	 exchange	 rate	 duality)	
made	good	sense,	but	the	document	sometimes	read	like	a	laundry	list	that	lacked	strategic	
vision.	Making	socialism	“irreversible”	was	its	stated	objective,	but	the	Lineamientos	offered	
no	 definition	 of	 Cuban	 socialism,	 other	 than	 to	 say	 that	 it	 did	 not	mean	 “egalitarianism.”	
(Mujal-León	2011,	157)	
Since	they	were	released,	the	Lineamientos	were	discussed	at	a	national	level	for	the	
next	 three	months	 in	 two	 stages:	 the	 first,	 within	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	 PCC;	 and,	 the	
second,	aimed	at	the	rest	of	the	population	through	the	mass	organisations	of	 the	
PCC	 (in	workplaces,	 schools,	 neighbourhoods,	 etc.).	 In	 the	 preparation	 of	 its	 Sixth	
Congress,	 the	 Party	 repeated	 the	 role	 it	 had	 played	 in	 the	 two	 previous	 national	
consultations,	and	acted	as	a	political	thermometer	of	the	leadership	to	measure	the	
popular	mood	about	economic	issues.	But	in	this	occasion,	the	grassroots	would	not	
discuss	 a	 speech	 of	 Raúl,	 but	 a	 long	 official	 Party	 document.	 The	 objective	 of	 this	
process	as	set	out	by	Raúl	Castro	was	clear:	“there	will	be	gathered	up	and	analysed	
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the	opinions	and	suggestions,	which	will	be	taken	 into	account	 for	the	adoption	of	
the	document	[the	definitive	Lineamientos]	by	the	Congress”	(R.	Castro	2010b).	
Consistent	with	its	long-established	political	practice,	the	PCC-led	consultation	ruled	
out	 any	 challenge	 from	 the	 grassroots	 –	 i.e.	 the	 chance	 to	 collectively	 submit,	 let	
alone	vote,	alternative	proposals.	Unlike	standard	union	democracy,	the	process	was	
carried	out	via	vertical	atomised	spaces	where	Party	cadres	listened	to	the	opinions	
and	complaints	of	the	Cuban	citizens.	Farber	criticised	this	as	follows:	
Thus,	 this	 discussion	 process,	 rather	 than	 having	 been	 a	 democratic	 debate,	 let	 alone	
democratic	 decision-making,	 was	 far	 more	 akin	 to	 a	 nationwide	 oral	 suggestion-and-
complaint	 box.	 The	 CCP	 leaders	 responded	 to	 the	 thousands	 of	 opinions	 that	 the	 Cuban	
people	submitted	to	them	much	like	the	owners	and	managers	of	a	capitalist	enterprise	who	
implement	those	suggestions	that	they	find	most	helpful	to	run	their	business	and	pacify	the	
labour	force.	The	discussion	process	that	was	carried	out	in	Cuba	was	not	even	comparable	
to	collective	bargaining,	let	alone	political	and	economic	democracy.	(Farber	2011,	285)	
While	this	was	very	much	the	case,	the	consultation	was	also	real.	 If	eyebrows	can	
be	 justifiably	 raised	 before	 Raúl’s	 depiction	 of	 the	 consultation	 as	 a	 “genuine	
democratic	exercise”	 (R.	Castro	2010d),	one	can	be	equally	 struck	by	 the	ability	of	
this	top-down	approach	to	engage	the	public	more	effectively	than	standard	liberal	
democracy.	All	in	all,	the	three	national	debates	Cuba	lived	from	2006	to	2011	rather	
proved	that	the	corporatist	model	of	PCC-led	participation	was	still	in	good	shape.	
The	 consultation	 thus	 allowed	 the	 PCC	 to	 weigh	 the	 popular	 mood,	 ergo	 to	 re-
calibrate	the	rhythm	of	reform	to	keep	opposition	at	manageable	levels.	In	January	
2011,	 a	 meeting	 of	 an	 “expanded”	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 scrapped	 the	 six-month	
deadline	of	500,000	layoffs	in	favour	of	an	open-ended	approach	(Frank	2013,	240).	
Similarly,	the	ambitious	plans	of	self-employment’s	expansion	faced	a	new	reality:	
In	March	2011,	when	the	first	stage	had	to	be	accomplished,	there	had	been	created	138.000	
net	 self-employment	 posts,	 just	 55%	 of	 the	 goal;	 besides,	 all	 of	 them	where	 ‘unlinked	 to	
work’	 (former	 rather	 than	 new	 unemployed)	 and	 a	 substantial	 part	 of	 them	 already	
performed	illegally	these	activities	and	simply	legalised	them.	[…]	On	28	February	2011	Raúl	
Castro	 acknowledged	 the	 impossibility	 of	 fulfilling	 the	 goal	 […];	 he	 did	 not	 define	 a	 clear	
period	to	accomplish	it	and	vaguely	referred	to	the	Five-Year	Plan.	(Mesa-Lago	2011,	14)	
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Hence	 the	 restructuring	of	Cuban	workforce	 turned	out	 to	be	 far	more	 timid	 than	
the	original	intrepid	plan.	Overall,	Raúl	seemed	to	have	fully	accelerated	reform	just	
to	 slam	 on	 the	 brake	 a	 second	 later.	 But	more	 than	 an	 aborted	 agenda,	 this	was	
simply	a	new	turn	to	a	cautious	stance,	as	he	later	acknowledged	when	he	told	the	
PCC	 Congress	 that	 the	 changes	 would	 proceed	 “slowly	 but	 steadily”	 (R.	 Castro	
2011a).	
Officially,	 163	 079	 meetings	 took	 place	 nationwide	 in	 order	 to	 discuss	 the	
Lineamientos	 “within	 the	different	organisations”,	 involving	8	913	838	participants	
that	produced	3	019	471	interventions	and	579	911	“opinions”	(PCC	2011a,	13).	As	a	
result	of	this	process,	68%	guidelines	were	modified	and	36	new	were	created.	The	
explicit	intention	of	this	process	was	“to	create	a	national	consensus	on	the	features	
that	 should	 characterize	 the	 country’s	 Social	 and	 Economic	 Model”,	 as	 Raúl	
explained	to	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	in	the	opening	speech	(R.	Castro	2011a).	As	the	
case	 for	 a	 new	 model	 had	 been	 taken	 to	 apparently	 every	 corner	 of	 Cuba,	 the	
pressure	from	both	the	leadership	and	the	grassroots	deterred	any	overt	opposition	
in	the	Party	to	the	relaxation	of	orthodoxy.	Raúl	reassured	the	Congress:	
I	can	assure	you	that	the	Guidelines	are	an	expression	of	our	people’s	will,	contained	in	the	
policy	of	the	Party,	the	Government	and	the	State,	to	update	the	Economic	and	Social	Model	
in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	 continuity	 and	 irreversibility	 of	 Socialism	 as	 well	 as	 the	 economic	
development	 of	 the	 country	 and	 the	 improvement	 of	 the	 living	 standard	 of	 our	 people	
combined	with	the	indispensable	formation	of	ethical	and	political	values.	(R.	Castro	2011a)	
After	 the	 Congress	 approved	 the	 final	 version	 of	 the	 Lineamientos,	 they	 were	
republished	 after	 the	 event	 in	 a	 three-column	 format.	 The	 first	 two	 columns	
contrasted	the	original	version	with	the	final	one,	leaving	the	third	column	to	explain	
why	each	 item	had	been	modified	–	more	often	than	not	reporting	the	number	of	
opinions	behind	each	change.	There	were	fifteen	guidelines	that	prompted	over	six	
thousand	 opinions	 each,	 referring	 to	 health,	 education	 and	 daily	 live	 issues	
intertwined	with	an	oblique	defence	of	socialist	ideology	(Ludlam	2011).	
The	 guideline	 that	 attracted	 most	 opinions	 (54,979)	 contained	 the	 proposal	 to	
eliminate	 the	 ration	 book	 –	 a	 proposal	 that	 was	 not	 repeated	 in	 the	 definitive	
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Lineamientos	due	to	its	obvious	unpopularity.	In	second	place,	in	response	to	32,171	
opinions,	a	new	guideline	was	added:	it	demanded	price	stability	in	essential	goods	
offered	by	non-state	actors	–	in	Cuba	the	emerging	private	sector	is	not	referred	to	
as	‘private’	but	as	‘non-state’,	which	is	another	index	of	the	ideological	difficulties	in	
coming	 to	 terms	with	 the	economic	changes.	As	price	stability	was	not	part	of	 the	
original	Lineamientos,	its	appearance	revealed	the	concerns	of	Cubans	regarding	the	
retreat	 of	 CPE	 orthodoxy.	 However,	 although	 the	 government	 adapted	 its	 original	
intentions	to	the	popular	disquiet	–	as	reflected	in	the	modified	guidelines	–	it	made	
clear	it	would	not	give	up	in	reforming	the	economy.	In	this	sense,	three	guidelines	
of	 the	 final	Lineamientos	paraphrased	Raúl’s	warning	that	“excessive	subsidies	and	
inappropriate	 free-of-charge	 entitlements”	 –	 subsidios	 excesivos	 y	 gratuidades	
indebidas	–	would	be	ended	(PCC	2011b,	guidelines	69,	142,	173).	
From	 a	 more	 strategic	 perspective,	 despite	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 articulated	 economic	
development	 project,	 let	 alone	 a	 new	 theory	 of	 socialist	 economics,	 the	
Lineamientos	still	exude	the	rudiments	of	CPE-market	 love.	The	guideline	that	most	
explicitly	 elaborated	 the	 departure	 from	 CPE	 orthodoxy	 was	 the	 first	 one,	 which	
stated	that	in	the	new	socialism	of	Cuba,	“planning	will	take	the	market	into	account,	
influencing	 upon	 it	 and	 considering	 its	 characteristics”	 (PCC	 2011b,	 guideline	 1).	
Although	this	is	rather	a	clumsy	engagement	with	the	market	–	treating	it	as	an	alien	
from	 outer	 space	 whose	 features	 are	 yet	 to	 be	 discovered	 –	 it	 epitomises	 the	
ideological	 hardship	 of	 the	 Party	 in	 coming	 to	 terms	with	 the	 ‘updating’	 of	 Cuban	
socialism.	 In	 spite	 of	 these	 tensions,	 the	 second	 guideline	 was	more	 confident	 in	
championing	 foreign	 investment,	 co-ops,	 private	 farmers,	 and	 self-employment	 as	
partners	 of	 “the	 socialist	 state	 enterprise”	 (the	 “main	 form	 of	 the	 national	
economy”)	in	the	quest	for	“efficiency”	(PCC	2011b,	guideline	2).	
The	Sixth	Party	Congress	also	elected	a	new	Politburo,	which	was	the	final	touch	of	
Raúl’s	 consolidation	 of	 power.	 Although	 I	 will	 discuss	 in	 the	 next	 chapter	 the	
contours	of	the	new	leadership,	I	have	already	anticipated	the	basic	argument:	there	
emerged	 a	 new	 type	 of	 leadership	 that	 reflected	 Raúl’s	 long-term	 solution	 to	 the	
succession	problem.	Of	course	the	issue	of	the	new	Politburo	had	not	been	part	of	
the	visible	face	of	the	Congress	and	it	was	only	announced	at	the	end	of	it.	What	had	
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been	 public	 about	 the	 Congress	was	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 Lineamientos…	and	 the	
public	 acknowledgement	 that	 the	 new	 leadership	 had	 based	 its	 legitimacy	 on	 the	
explicit	promise	of	fulfilling	them.	
The	Congress	also	named	Marino	Murillo,	on	the	same	day	he	was	elected	Politburo	
member,	 the	 Chief	 of	 the	 Permanent	 Government’s	 Commission	 for	 the	
Implementation	and	Development	of	the	Lineamientos.	Raúl	Castro	explained	to	the	
Congress	that	this	post	was	created	due	“to	the	strategic	significance	of	updating	the	
economic	model	and	developing	the	national	economy”	(R.	Castro	2011b).	
Once	more,	 now	 in	 the	 closing	 speech	 of	 the	 Congress,	 Raúl	 emotionally	 stressed	
that	his	economic	reform	was	no	surrender	of	the	históricos	to	capitalism:	
As	 for	me,	 I	assume	this	 last	assignment	with	 firm	conviction	and	 I	pledge	my	honour	 that	
the	chief	mission	of	the	First	Secretary	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Communist	Party	of	
Cuba	that	gives	meaning	to	his	life	is	to	defend,	preserve	and	continue	to	improve	Socialism,	
and	to	never	allow	the	return	of	the	capitalist	regime.	(R.	Castro	2011b)	
Changes	kept	going	during	the	rest	of	2011	but	now	endorsed	at	the	highest	possible	
level	within	the	Cuban	institutional	framework	–	i.e.	a	special	Commission	had	been	
set	up	to	oversee	the	economic	reforms.	However,	labour	restructuring	remained	a	
thorny	issue,	as	reflected	in	the	decision	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	on	May	2011,	to	
freeze	 all	 the	 existing	 state	 posts	 and	 extend	 the	 redundancies	 timetable	without	
providing	new	dates	(Prensa	Latina	2011).	In	the	meantime,	as	if	to	wait	for	a	better	
political	 weather,	 the	 government	 launched	 a	 better-received	 group	 of	 reforms,	
related	to	the	relaxation	of	unpopular	restrictions.	
First,	 in	 August	 2011,	 Raúl	 announce	 that	 he	 and	 his	 team	 were	 “working	 on	
updating	the	emigration	policy”	(R.	Castro	2011c).	The	law	in	question	would	come	
in	2012.	Then	in	October,	were	issued	a	new	legalisation	authorising	the	buying	and	
selling	of	cars	and	houses	(Leyva	2011b,	Leyva	and	Puig	Meneses	2011)	–	measures	
that	were	not	 in	 the	original	Lineamientos	 but	which	where	 included	by	 the	Party	
Congress	 because	Cubans	 had	 asked	 for	 them	 in	 the	 consultation	 (PCC	 2011a,	 43,	
45).	 Killing	 two	birds	with	one	 stone,	 these	 reforms	allowed	 the	 state	 to	deliver	 a	
blow	 to	 the	 black	market	while	 opening	 a	 new	 source	 of	 taxes	 at	 the	 same	 time.	
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Finally,	 in	November,	 some	 restrictions	were	 lifted	 on	 internal	migration	 from	 the	
provinces	 to	 Havana	 (Consejo	 de	 Ministros	 2011b).	 I	 will	 come	 back	 to	 these	
liberalising	measures	later.	
Then	in	November,	a	different	group	of	reforms	was	passed,	directly	related	to	the	
departure	 from	 CPE	 and	 towards	 decentralisation.	 First,	 the	 Sugar	 Ministry	 was	
abolished	and	was	replaced	by	a	state	company:	Sugar	Group	(Grupo	Azucarero,	 in	
Spanish)	 (Delgado	 Guerra,	 Varela	 Pérez,	 and	 Leyva	 2011).	 On	 December	 2011,	 all	
barbershops	 and	 beauty	 parlours	 were	 handed	 over	 to	 the	 barbers,	 now	 legally	
turned	 into	 self-employed	 (Leyva	 2011c),	 and	 farmers	were	 authorised	 to	 directly	
sell	 their	produce	 to	 the	 tourist	 industry	 in	 the	open	market	 (Puig	Meneses	2011).	
Then	on	the	same	month,	the	self-employed	and	small	farmers	were	offered	banking	
services,	 loans	 included;	 similarly,	 all	 Cubans	 could	 now	 apply	 for	 loans	 for	 house	
repairs	 (Leyva	2011a).	 Just	before	the	end	of	the	year,	the	government	announced	
that	 in	 2012,	 over	 2,000	 services	 workshops	 (employing	 7,000	 Cubans)	 would	 be	
leased	to	workers,	which	would	thus	become	self-employed	–	a	model	based	on	the	
barbershops	(MINCIN	2011,	Frank	2013,	264).	In	a	similar	vein,	in	order	to	diversify	
small	private	activity,	 in	April	2012	the	official	press	disclosed	that	some	urban	co-
operatives	had	been	launched	at	an	experimental	level	(Puig	Meneses	2012).	
6.2	The	new	contours	of	Cuba	(2011-2014)	
6.2.1	Leadership:	the	rise	of	collegiality	
In	this	chapter	I	divide	the	analysis	of	the	transformed	Cuban	leadership	into	three	
dimensions:	1)	the	role	of	the	leader,	2)	the	composition	of	the	‘inner	circle’,	and	3)	
the	FAR-PCC	relation.	The	argument	is	that	the	leader	is	now	expected	to	no	longer	
be	a	charismatic	one,	but	a	primus	inter	pares;	that	the	‘inner	circle’	 is	expected	to	
fill	 the	 upcoming	 vacuum	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 veterans	 by	 the	 FAR-PCC	 coalition;	
and,	that	the	balance	of	the	ruling	coalition	has	been	tilted	towards	the	military.	
The	Cuban	primus	inter	pares	
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After	 definitely	 burying	 any	 charismatic	 model	 of	 succession	 in	 2008-2009,	 Raúl	
would	complete	the	introduction	of	his	own	model	 in	April	2011,	 in	the	Sixth	Party	
Congress.	The	rationale	of	the	new	model	had	already	been	clarified	since	mid-2009:	
There	are	those	who	say	that	in	the	US	power	circles	they	are	betting	on	the	demise	of	the	
historic	generation	of	the	Revolution,	a	sinister	bet	on	the	so-called	“biological	factor”,	that	
is,	the	death	of	Fidel	and	of	all	of	us.	(R.	Castro	2009c)	
Raúl’s	answer	to	this	predicament	was	clear-cut;	the	FAR-PCC	coalition	was	the	heir:	
Those	 who	 think	 this	 way	 are	 doomed	 since	 the	 successive	 generations	 of	 revolutionary	
patriots,	 first	 of	 all	 our	magnificent	 youth,	will	 never	 be	 ideologically	 disarmed,	 and	 along	
with	 them	and	the	Party	 in	 the	 frontline	will	 stand	the	Mambises	of	 the	20th	Century:	our	
glorious	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces	which	this	 time	did	walk	victoriously	 into	Santiago	de	
Cuba	on	January	1st,	1959,	headed	by	their	Commander	in	Chief.	(R.	Castro	2009c)	
In	 a	 crucial	 step	 towards	 the	 legal-rational	 substitution	 of	 charisma,	 the	 2011	
Congress	would	announce	 the	adoption	of	 collegiality,	 as	expressed	 in	 term	 limits.	
Complementarily,	the	Sixth	Congress	would	elect	a	new	Party	leadership.	
As	 collegiality	 refers	 to	 “specific	 social	 relationships	 and	 groups	 which	 have	 the	
function	of	limiting	authority”	(Weber	1978a,	271),	term	limits	can	be	understood	as	
a	 form	 of	 collegial	 relation.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 (usually)	 lifelong	 duration	 of	
charismatic	 authority,	 the	 introduction	 of	 term	 limits	 revealed	 the	 intention	 of	
turning	 to	 a	 less	 monocratic	 arrangement.	 As	Weber	 (1978a,	 277)	 explained,	 the	
“principle	 of	 collegiality	 […]	 is	 usually	 derived	 from	 the	 interest	 in	 weakening	 the	
power	of	persons	 in	authority.”	This	new	policy	was	disclosed	by	Raúl	Castro	 in	his	
main	 speech	 to	 the	 Sixth	Congress,	 and	was	 approved	almost	 a	 year	 later	when	a	
Party	Conference	included	it	as	one	of	the	goals	of	its	new	Cadre	Policy:	
Objective	n.	76:	To	prepare	the	gradual	renovation	of	cadre	in	leadership	posts,	establishing	
term	 limits	 by	 time	 and	 age	 according	 to	 the	 functions	 and	 complexity	 of	 each	 [post’s]	
responsibility.	 Limit	 to	 a	 maximum	 of	 two	 five-year	 consecutive	 periods	 the	 [individual]	
performance	of	the	highest	political	and	state	posts.	(PCC	2012c,	7)	
This	 legally	 turned	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Cuban	 state	 into	 the	 leading	 member	 of	 a	
collegial	 body,	 which	 Weber	 calls	 primus	 inter	 pares	 whose	 “acts	 are	 normally	
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subject	 to	 consultation	 with	 formally	 equal	 members,	 and	 disagreement	 in	
important	matters	may	lead	to	breaking	up	the	collegial	body”	(Weber	1978a,	272).	
Thus,	the	figure	of	the	primus	inter	pares	as	implied	in	Raúl’s	term	limits,	is	required	
to	 seek	 a	 degree	 of	 peers’	 endorsement	 to	 secure	 a	 second	 period	 in	 office	 –	 as	
opposed	(let	us	repeat)	to	the	lifelong	charismatic	title	of	Commander-in-Chief.	As	a	
result,	Raúl	Castro	has	institutionalised	a	predictable	mechanism	of	circulation	of	the	
top	 offices,	 which	may	 ease	 the	 generational	 renewal	 of	 the	 leadership	 after	 the	
historical	generation	 is	gone.	 In	this	sense,	the	term	limits	 look	 like	an	 institutional	
device	 to	 solve	 intra-elite	 conflicts	 –	 which,	 of	 course,	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 a	 step	
towards	democratisation.	
As	if	to	highlight	the	seriousness	of	this	reform,	two	years	later	Raúl	Castro	(2013b)	
confirmed	in	a	speech	to	the	National	Assembly	that	“this	will	be	my	last	term”.	 In	
that	 same	event,	which	also	 confirmed	his	 second	and	 last	presidential	 term,	Raúl	
anticipated	 that	 the	 term	 limits	 in	 top	posts	would	be	 introduced	 in	 the	 country’s	
constitution.	One	 day	 before	 this	 announcement	was	made,	 Raúl	 even	 joked	with	
journalists	about	his	eventual	end	of	term:	“I	will	 resign.	 I	am	going	to	be	82	years	
old;	I	have	the	right	to	retire.	Do	not	you	believe	me?”	(quoted	by	El	País	2013,	np).	
The	 new	 rule	 implies	 more	 control	 on	 top	 leaders	 and	 potential	 changes	 in	 the	
government’s	design.	For	instance,	it	can	be	imagined	that	a	future	leadership	splits	
between	different	individuals	the	posts	of	head	of	government,	head	of	the	PCC	and	
head	of	 the	FAR.	To	grasp	 this	 latter	 scenario,	 let	us	 imagine	 that	Raúl	Castro	dies	
during	 his	 second	 term	 (2013-2018)	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 leadership	 intact.	 In	 that	
case,	 the	Second	Secretary	of	 the	PCC,	 José	Ramón	Machado	Ventura,	would	 take	
over	as	First	Secretary;	the	First	Vice-President,	Miguel	Díaz-Canel,	would	take	over	
as	 President	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 State	 and	Ministers.	 This	 situation	 can	 dissolve	 the	
figure	of	the	primus	inter	pares	 in	favour	of	a	typical	“functional	collegiality”	where	
the	“acts	are	subject	to	the	rule	that	a	plurality	of	individuals	must	cooperate	for	the	
act	to	be	valid”,	either	by	unanimity	or	majority	vote	(Weber	1978a,	272).	 In	other	
words,	 a	 collective	 leadership	 may	 well	 emerge	 in	 the	 future	 Cuban	 political	
landscape.	
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In	the	meantime,	it	is	now	a	fact	that	Raúl	Castro’s	presidency	will	end	in	2018.	As	a	
result,	this	would	bring	to	an	end	the	rule	of	the	historic	generation	in	Cuba	–	hence	
bringing	to	the	fore	the	status	of	the	FAR-PCC	ruling	coalition.	
Prefiguring	the	new	‘inner	circle’:	
Having	 received	 the	 legacy	of	a	 charismatic	 leader,	Raúl	Castro	 resembles	a	 Janus-
faced	figure	“with	a	legitimacy	that	comes	from	the	past…	but	concerned	about	the	
future”,	 as	 Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 (2009,	 67)	 have	 put	 it.	 If	 Raúl	 always	 was	 the	
answer	to	Fidel’s	succession,	another	problem	still	has	to	be	sorted	out	since	“there	
is	 no	 ‘equivalent	 Raúl’	 for	 Raúl”	 (Valdés	 2004,	 251).	 Perhaps	 this	 is	 another	
dimension	 of	 the	 ‘succession	 problem’:	 not	 of	 the	 charismatic	 leader,	 but	 of	 the	
charismatic	community	itself.	If	one	recalls	Kapcia’s	definition	of	the	‘inner	circle’	as	
the	centre	of	the	onion	of	power	filled	by	the	revolutionary	veterans,	Raúl	Castro	has	
clearly	defined	the	next	occupiers	of	the	vacuum	to	come:	the	FAR	and	the	PCC.	
To	catch	a	glimpse	of	the	conditions	in	which	collegiality	is	expected	to	operate	after	
the	historic	generation	is	gone,	it	is	worth	it	looking	at	the	patterns	of	Party	Politburo	
membership	since	Fidel	Castro	stepped	down,	as	is	shown	in	Table	5.	
The	Politburo	that	Raúl	Castro	‘received’	in	July	2006	was	very	different	from	the	one	
elected	in	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	almost	five	years	later.	Only	nine	of	the	twenty-
one	Politburo	members	of	2006	were	re-elected	in	2011,	when	the	body	was	sized	
down	to	fifteen	members.	In	addition	to	this,	the	proportion	of	leaders	with	military	
background	 increased	while	 the	historic	generation	 remained	a	key	element.	Most	
than	half	of	the	membership,	twelve	in	2006,	held	political	careers	in	the	Party,	and	
two	of	 them	had	been	 fast-tracked	via	 in	 the	Grupo	de	Apoyo.	By	2011,	 the	 latter	
had	already	been	dismantled,	while	the	number	of	active	FAR	leaders	equalled	PCC’s	
(five	to	five).	However,	considering	members	with	a	substantial	military	background	
(FAR	 background	 +	 revolutionary	 veterans),	 the	 actual	 ratio	 of	 ‘proper’	 civilian	 to	
other	Politburo	members	was	one	to	three	(five	PCC	in	a	fifteen-member	body).	
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Table	5.	Members	of	PCC	Politburo,	2006,	2011	and	2015	
Name	 2006a	 2011b	 2015c	 Background	 Entrance/Exit	
Fidel	Castro	Ruz	 x	 	 	 REV	 Declined	re-election	
Raúl	Castro	Ruz	 x	 x	 x	 REV	 	
Leopoldo	Cintra	Frías	 x	 x	 x	 FAR	 	
Esteban	Lazo	Hernández	 x	 x	 x	 PCC	 	
Abelardo	Colomé	Ibarra	 x	 x	 x	 FAR	 	
Ramón	Espinosa	Martín	 x	 x	 x	 FAR	 	
José	Ramón	Machado	Ventura	 x	 x	 x	 REV	 	
Miguel	Díaz-Canel	Bermúdez	 x	 x	 x	 PCC	 	
Julio	Casas	Regueiro	 x	 x	 	 REV	 Died	after	2011	election	
Juan	Almeida	Bosque	 x	 	 	 REV	 Died	in	2009	
José	Ramón	Balaguer	Cabrera	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Misael	Enamorado	Dager	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Concepción	Campa	Huergo	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Abel	Prieto	Jiménez	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Pedro	Ross	Leal	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Ulíses	Rosales	del	Toro	 x	 	 	 FAR	 Not	re-elected	in	2011	
Carlos	Lage	Dávila	 x	 	 	 GA-PCC	 Removed	in	2009	
Pedro	Sáez	Montejo	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Removed	in	2009	
Jorge	Sierra	Cruz	 x	 	 	 PCC	 Removed	in	2010	
Yadira	García	Vera	 x	 	 	 GA-PCC	 Removed	in	2010	
Ricardo	Alarcón	de	Quesada	 x	 x	 	 PCC	 Removed	in	2013	
Ramiro	Valdés	Menéndez	 	 x	 x	 REV	 Added	in	2008	
Alvaro	López	Miera	 	 x	 x	 FAR	 Added	in	2008	
Salvador	Mesa	Valdés	 	 x	 x	 PCC	 Added	in	2008	
Lázara	Mercedes	López	Acea	 	 x	 x	 PCC	 Added	in	2011	
Jorge	Marino	Murillo	 	 x	 x	 FAR-TECH	 Added	in	2011	
Adel	Yzquierdo	Rodríguez	 	 x	 x	 FAR	 Added	in	2011	
Bruno	Eduardo	Rodríguez	Parrilla	 	 	 x	 PCC-TECH	 Added	in	2012	
	
Key:	REV	=	Revolutionary	Generation;	FAR	=	Military;	PCC	=	Cuban	Communist	Party;	GA=	Support	
Group	of	the	Commander-in-Chief;	TECH	=	Technocrat.	
	
Sources:	Granma	and	Juventud	Rebelde;	data	for	2011	taken	from	Mujal-León	(2011,	160).	
	
a	Membership	at	the	moment	Fidel	Castro	stepped	down	in	July	2006.	
b	Results	of	the	election	at	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	in	April	2011.	
c	Membership	as	of	February	2015.	
	
Raúl	would	indeed	explain	the	persistence	of	“históricos”	in	the	new	Politburo	to	the	
Sixth	Party	Congress’	attendees	in	the	following	terms:	
[S]ome	veterans	of	the	historic	generation	remain,	and	it	is	only	natural,	for	it	is	one	of	the	
consequences	 of	 the	mistakes	made	 in	 this	 area	 and	 criticized	 in	 the	 Central	 Report,	 the	
same	 that	 prevent	 us	 today	 from	having	 a	 reserve	 of	mature	 and	 sufficiently	 experienced	
replacements	to	take	over	the	main	positions	in	the	country.	(R.	Castro	2011d)	
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Besides	 the	acknowledgement	 that	he	and	his	generation	 (without	criticising	Fidel)	
had	failed	to	rejuvenate	the	top	leadership	(in	over	fifty	years!),	Raúl	also	addressed	
the	pre-eminence	of	Politburo	members	with	leading	posts	in	the	Armed	Forces:	
As	you	can	see,	we	have	in	the	Political	Bureau	a	proper	representation	of	leading	chiefs	of	
the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces.	This	is	only	logical	and	to	explain	it	I	will	quote	some	lines	
included	 by	 comrade	 Fidel	 in	 his	 Central	 Report	 to	 the	 First	 Party	 Congress:	 “The	 Ejército	
Rebelde	was	the	soul	of	the	Revolution.	The	new	homeland	emerged	free,	beautiful,	strong	
and	 invincible	 from	 its	 victorious	weapons…	When	 the	Party	was	 founded…	our	Army,	 the	
heir	 to	 the	 bravery	 and	 patriotic	 purity	 of	 the	 Ejército	 Libertador	 whose	 struggles	 it	 had	
carried	on	victoriously,	placed	in	 its	hands	the	banners	of	the	Revolution	and	became	from	
then	 on	 and	 forever	 its	 most	 loyal,	 disciplined,	 humble	 and	 staunch	 follower.”	 (R.	 Castro	
2011d)	
And	if	there	were	doubts	of	the	FAR	leading	role	within	the	Party,	Raúl	continued:	
I	have	plenty	of	reasons	to	assert	that	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces,	which	I	am	proud	to	
have	served	as	a	minister	for	nearly	49	years,	will	never	renounce	that	role	and	will	carry	on	
defending	the	people,	the	Party,	the	Revolution	and	Socialism.	(R.	Castro	2011d)	
Military	 pre-eminence	 has	 also	 been	 reflected	 in	 the	 core	 team,	 those	 Politburo	
members	 with	 a	 simultaneous	 appointment	 in	 the	 Council	 of	 State,	 as	 shown	 in	
Table	6.	From	2008	to	2011,	from	the	nine	members	of	the	core	team,	those	from	
the	historical	generation	and	with	backgrounds	in	the	armed	forces	increased	from	
six	to	seven.	Although	these	seven	members	still	belonged	to	the	core	team	in	2015,	
by	then	the	number	of	Party	‘civilians’	had	already	increased	from	two	to	four	since	
the	Sixth	Party	Congress,	for	a	new	total	of	eleven	members	of	the	elite	of	the	elite.	
In	2015,	the	Politburo	was	still	essentially	the	same	since	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	
Bruno	Rodríguez,	Minister	of	Foreign	Relations,	had	been	promoted,	while	Ricardo	
Alarcón,	 former	president	of	 the	National	Assembly,	had	been	 removed.	The	most	
important	new	developments	since	2011,	qualitatively	speaking,	were	others.	
Following	the	Sixth	Congress,	Mujal-León	appreciated	a	new	role	of	the	FAR:	
The	novelty	 lies	 not	 so	much	 in	 the	 dominant	 role	 of	 the	 FAR	 (which	 harkens	 back	 to	 the	
origins	of	the	revolution	when	a	triumphant	rebel	army	defeated	Fulgencio	Batista	and	then	
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consolidated	 power)	 as	 in	 the	 role	 that	 military	 technocrats	 play	 in	 spearheading	 the	
implementation	of	economic	reforms.	(Mujal-León	2011,	159)	
Jorge	Marino	Murillo,	the	rising	technocrat	in	charge	of	the	Lineamientos	approved	
by	the	Sixth	Congress,	was	playing	an	analogous	role	to	that	played	by	Carlos	Lage	in	
the	 1990s.	 However,	 they	 embody	 two	 different	 kinds	 of	 technocrats:	 Lage	 (a	
doctor)	was	groomed	in	the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	after	leading	the	UJC,	whereas	Murillo	
rose	through	the	state	apparatus	after	studying	economics	in	a	military	academy.	
Table	6.	Members	of	PCC	Politburo	with	Joint	Appointments	to	the	Council	of	State	
	 Status	in	the	Council	of	State	 	 	
Politburo	member	 2008a	 2011b	 2015c	 Background	 Year	of	Birth	
Raúl	Castro	Ruz	 President	 President	 President	 REV	 1931	
José	Ramón	Machado	Ventura	 1st	VP	 1st	VP	 VP	 REV	 1930	
Ramiro	Valdés	Menéndez	 	 VP	 VP	 REV	 1932	
Abelardo	Colomé	Ibarra	 VP	 VP	 Member	 FAR	 1939	
Esteban	Lazo	Hernández	 VP	 VP	 	 PCC	 1944	
Miguel	Díaz-Canel	Bermúdez	 	 	 1st	VP	 PCC	 1960	
Leopoldo	Cintra	Frías	 Member	 Member	 Member	 FAR	 1941	
Alvaro	López	Miera	 	 Member	 Member	 FAR	 1943	
Salvador	Mesa	Valdés	 	 Member	 VP	 PCC	 1941	
Julio	Casas	Regueiro	 VP	 VP	 	 REV	 1936	
Juan	Almeida	Bosque	 VP	 	 	 REV	 1927	
José	Ramón	Balaguer	Cabrera	 Member	 	 	 PCC	 1932	
Carlos	Lage	Dávila	 VP	 	 	 GA-PCC	 1951	
Lázara	Mercedes	López	Acea	 	 	 VP	 PCC	 1964	
Jorge	Marino	Murillo	 	 Member	 Member	 FAR-TECH	 1961	
Bruno	Eduardo	Rodríguez	Parrilla	 	 	 Member	 PCC-TECH	 1958	
	
Key:	VP	=	Vice	President;	REV	=	Revolutionary	Generation;	FAR	=	Military;	PCC	=	Cuban	Communist	
Party;	GA=	Support	Group	of	the	Commander-in-Chief;	TECH	=	Technocrat.	
	
Sources:	Granma	and	Juventud	Rebelde;	data	for	2011	taken	from	Mujal-León	(2011,	161).	
	
a	Membership	at	the	moment	Raúl	Castro	took	over	as	President	in	February	2008.	
b	Membership	as	of	September	2011.	
c	Membership	as	of	February	2015.	
	
The	 Congress	 also	 chose	 Adel	 Yzquierdo	 Rodríguez	 to	 be	 new	 Politburo	member,	
whom	then	took	over	as	Minister	of	Economy	and	Planning,	replacing	Murillo	in	the	
post	he	had	held	since	he	joined	the	Council	of	State	in	2009.	Yzquierdo	had	in	the	
past	been	chair	of	the	Entrepreneurial	System	of	the	FAR	and	chief	of	the	Direction	
of	Planning	and	Economy	of	the	FAR.	 In	September	2014,	Murillo	–	while	retaining	
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the	post	of	chief	of	the	Lineamientos	–	was	re-appointed	Minister	of	Economy	and	
Yzquierdo	 became	 his	 deputy	 (First	 Vice-Minister).	 In	 any	 case,	 FAR-trained	
appointees	ran	the	Cuban	economy.	
Not	only	had	Raúl	Castro	replaced	civilian	technocrats	by	military	ones	(Murillo	 for	
Lage),	 but	 also	his	 reform	agenda	was	 closer	 to	earlier	market	 experiments	of	 the	
military	than	to	the	CPE	orthodoxy	of	the	PCC	–	which	explains	Yzquierdo’s	rise.	
Another	crucial	change	occurred	during	the	2013	National	Assembly	that	confirmed	
Raúl	 Castro	 for	 his	 second	 and	 last	 presidential	 period.	 On	 that	 occasion,	 Miguel	
Díaz-Canel	was	promoted	for	the	post	of	First	Vice	President	of	the	Council	of	State	–	
the	first	time	ever	that	a	revolutionary	veteran	did	not	held	that	position.	
In	that	meeting,	Raúl	Castro	portrayed	the	rise	of	Díaz-Canel	to	heir	apparent	as	part	
of	the	former’s	concern	over	his	own	mortality	and	the	overall	generational	shift:	
We	must	guarantee	the	executive	unity	in	the	apex	of	government	and	state	power	in	front	
of	 any	 contingency	 caused	 by	 the	 loss	 of	 the	 maximum	 leader	 […].	 This	 decision	 [of	
promoting	 Díaz-Canel]	 has	 particular	 historical	 transcendence	 because	 it	 represents	 a	
defining	step	in	the	configuration	of	the	future	leadership	of	the	country.	(R.	Castro	2013b)	
Equally	 significant,	 the	appointment	of	 the	new	 successor	was	 consistent	with	 the	
new	institutionalisation.	Recalling	his	break	with	the	model	of	succession	embodied	
in	the	fast-tracking	Grupo	de	Apoyo,	Raúl	highlighted	that	“comrade	Díaz-Canel	is	no	
upstart	or	improvised”	(R.	Castro	2013b),	praising	him	for	his	rise	“from	the	bottom”,	
in	his	profession,	up	to	Party	leadership	in	two	provinces	–	for	ten	years	in	Villa	Clara	
and	six	in	Holguín	–	before	reaching	the	Politburo	and	a	Ministry.	
If	one	 looks	at	 the	 ‘core	team’	without	the	revolutionary	veterans,	what	 is	 left	 is	a	
FAR-PCC	collegial	alliance	that	prefigures	the	contours	of	the	next	leadership.	
López	Acea	is	currently	the	head	of	the	Party	in	Havana.	Mesa	Valdés,	then	head	of	
the	 CTC	 (a	 Party	 mass	 organisation),	 had	 also	 been	 a	 PCC	 provincial	 leader	 in	
Camagüey.	Interestingly,	of	the	sixteen	provincial	Party	leaders,	only	two	of	them	do	
not	belong	 to	 the	PCC’s	Central	Committee	 (PCC	2015).	 If	 the	background	of	Díaz-
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Canel,	 López	 Acea	 and	 Mesa	 Valdés	 signals	 a	 pattern	 of	 future	 ‘core	 team’	
membership,	then	provincial	leadership	emerges	as	a	potential	pool	of	top	leaders.	
In	 regards	 to	 FAR	 representation	 in	 the	 ‘core	 team’,	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 pattern	 of	
membership	 in	 the	 ‘core	 team’	 beyond	 the	 revolutionary	 veterans.	 Although	 it	
would	be	odd	if	the	FAR	Minister,	currently	Cintra	Frías,	were	set	aside,	the	role	of	
military	 leaders	will	 be	a	 key	 subject	 in	 the	Seventh	Party	Congress,	 scheduled	 for	
April	2016	(Juventud	Rebelde	2015),	when	a	new	Politburo	is	going	to	be	elected.	
The	status	of	the	FAR-PCC	coalition:	
The	Cuban	armed	forces	have	historically	had	a	qualitatively	superior	and	different	
role	when	compared	to	other	socialist	experiences	–	both	in	relation	to	internal	and	
foreign	 policy,	 and	 state	 economic	 management	 (Mujal-León	 and	 Buzón	 2009,	
Domínguez	2009).	During	his	presidency,	Raúl	Castro	has	tilted	the	balance	of	FAR-
PCC	power	towards	the	former	(Mujal-León	2011).	If	it	is	true	that	the	leadership	of	
both	the	PCC	and	FAR	work	as	a	team	at	the	highest	spheres	of	the	Cuban	regime,	it	
is	telling	Raúl’s	reliance	on	the	military	to	carry	his	reformist	agenda	and	launch	“a	
bigger	 market	 opening”	 –	 a	 move	 that	 stands	 in	 opposition	 to	 “the	 more	
conservative	group	entrenched	in	the	party’s	bureaucracy”	(Dilla	Alfonso	2010,	13).	
Not	only	has	the	FAR	taken	over	economic	policymaking,	but	also	the	Party	has	been	
forced	to	self-impose	a	ban	on	any	temptation	of	meddling	in	the	economy.	This	was	
the	most	remarkable	outcome	of	the	First	Party	Conference	besides	the	adoption	of	
term	limits.	As	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	(April	2011)	had	focused	on	the	changes	in	
the	economy,	 the	Conference	 (January	2012)	 attempted	 to	 adapt	 the	Party	 to	 the	
recently	approved	Lineamientos	 and	 to	 the	end	of	charisma.	As	a	 result,	 the	PCC’s	
scope	in	the	economy	was	reduced	and	top	posts	were	now	subjected	to	term	limits.	
As	the	latter	element	has	already	been	discussed,	I	will	turn	to	the	other	aspect.	
Between	the	Congress	and	the	Conference,	Raúl	had	already	showed	his	teeth	in	a	
public	warning:	“all	bureaucratic	 resistance	to	the	strict	 fulfilment	of	 the	Congress’	
agreements	 […]	 will	 be	 useless”	 (R.	 Castro	 2011c).	 This	 and	 several	 other	 similar	
blunt	 statements	 signalled	 that	 Raúl’s	 government	 regarded	 “an	 urgent	 shift	 in	
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political	 culture	 to	 be	 a	 condition	 of	 successful	 economic	 reform”	 (Ludlam	 2012,	
252).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 Conference	 outlined	 what	 was	 expected	 from	 the	 Party	
afterwards.		A	key	theme	was	“the	purpose	to	definitely	eliminate	from	the	methods	
of	 the	 Party,	 the	 interference	 and	 substitution	 of	 the	 functions	 and	decisions	 that	
belong	 to	 the	Government	 and	 administrative	 entities”	 (PCC	 2012a,	 4).	 Therefore,	
the	Conference	approved	a	call	 to	“free”	–	 liberar	–	the	núcleos	zonales	 (territorial	
grassroots	party	cells)	“from	all	those	activities	that	does	not	relate	to	the	aim	of	its	
work	in	the	community”	(PCC	2012a,	4).	Thrown	into	a	new	habitat,	the	Party’s	role	
had	virtually	changed	from	policymaking	to	policy	advice	and	support.	
LeoGrande	has	synthesised	what	was	at	stake	in	such	a	move:	
With	economic	recovery	key	to	regime	stability,	the	party	gave	in	to	the	temptation	to	usurp	
management	responsibilities	from	provincial	and	local	government	–	‘bossiness’,	Raúl	Castro	
called	it	at	the	Party’s	First	National	Conference	in	2012.	In	so	doing,	it	neglected	its	political	
task	of	cultivating	regime	support	at	the	grassroots.	(LeoGrande	2015,	381)	
The	PCC	would	emerge	from	its	Conference	with	a	mandate	to	sort	out	the	co-option	
of	the	new	economic	subjects,	as	was	publicly	acknowledged	in	the	Granma	pages:	
The	participants	[of	the	PCC’s	Conference]	expressed	their	approval	to	the	call	to	strengthen	
the	political	and	ideological	work	in	a	differentiated	and	personalised	manner	towards	those	
who	perform	different	modalities	of	non-state	economic	management	and	at	the	same	time	
combat	 the	 existing	 prejudices	 around	 them,	 which	 was	 thoroughly	 debated	 both	 in	 its	
socio-economic	and	legal	implications.	(PCC	2012b,	5)	
In	consequence,	 the	Documento	Base	–	 the	guiding	document	of	 the	Conference	–	
called	the	Party	militants	to	“favour	the	direct	contact	with	the	masses”,	“strengthen	
the	national	unity	around	the	Party	and	the	Revolution”,	or	to	“improve	the	political	
attention	 to	 those	 performing	 diverse	 modalities	 of	 non-state	 economic	
management”	 (PCC	 2011c,	 6-7).	 In	 general,	 the	 Party	 Conference	 revealed	 the	
leadership’s	fears	of	alienating	the	growing	non-state	sector.	Hence	the	Documento	
Base	 insisted,	 sometimes	 repeatedly,	 in	 the	 need	 of	 “systematically	 evaluate	 the	
effects	resulting	from	the	social	and	economic	measures”	(PCC	2011c,	6).	
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6.2.2	Ideology:	the	rise	of	market	socialism	
The	depth	of	the	reforms	has	led	Mesa-Lago	(2012,	49)	to	conclude	that	Raúl	Castro	
introduced	“the	strongest”	‘pragmatic’	cycle	of	economic	policy	in	socialist	Cuba.	As	
opposed	to	 the	 ‘idealist’	 cycles	where	 the	Cuban	 leadership	stuck	 to	“anti-market”	
central	 planning,	 the	 new	 pragmatic	 cycle	 has	 seemingly	 reached	 a	 point	 of	 no	
return:	“the	alternative	of	returning	to	a	new	idealist	cycle	seems	impossible	today”,	
in	the	words	of	Mesa-Lago	(2012,	52).	Although	this	author	does	not	elaborate	why	
this	would	be	the	case,	I	have	located	the	long-term	robustness	of	Raúl’s	reforms	in	
a	fundamental	ideological	break	of	this	pragmatic	cycle	with	the	past.	
My	argument	is	that	such	a	‘fundamental	ideological	break’	lies	in	the	shift	from	the	
rejection	of	the	market	to	its	acceptance.	I	will	 illustrate	this	point	by	exploring	the	
integration	of	self-employment	–	a	key	non-state	sector	–	into	the	ruling	ideology.	
I	will	also	argue	that	the	regime’s	ideology,	for	its	part,	has	in	turn	been	modified	by	
the	 acceptance	 of	 the	 market.	 Hence	 CPE-market	 love	 started	 to	 replace	 CPE	
orthodoxy.	In	other	words,	market	socialism	is	becoming	the	ruling	ideology.	
The	market	is	pardoned:	
I	 have	 already	 described	 the	 legitimisation	 of	 the	managers,	 which	 started	 in	 the	
1990s	and	were	completed	in	the	early	years	of	Raúl	Castro’s	presidency.	In	the	case	
of	 the	self-employed,	 their	 integration	occurred	 in	a	brief	period	as	a	 result	of	 the	
Sixth	Party	Congress.	The	cases	of	both	market-based	subjects	were	similar.	
I	 have	 identified	 three	 steps	 in	 the	 integration	 of	market-based	 subjects.	 The	 first	
step	is	the	legitimisation	of	the	economic	activity	in	itself	–	an	ideological	acceptance	
that	takes	the	form	of	praise.	As	this	type	of	actor	was	ostracised	in	the	past,	its	new	
depiction	has	been	accompanied	by	reassuring	that	the	old	bad	days	are	gone	and	
that	 a	 new,	 friendly,	 astrosphere	has	 emerged.	 The	next	 ideological	 operation	has	
been	 the	 integration	of	 the	actor	 into	 socialist	 ideology.	 This	 takes	 the	 form	of	 an	
ideological	innovation	that	turns	an	intruder	into	a	friend,	underscoring	that	the	new	
insiders	are	not	at	odds	with	the	ruling	ideology	or	the	pre-eminence	of	the	state.	
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The	 first	 two	 levels	 (praise	and	 integration)	are	 reciprocal	 for	 the	validation	of	 the	
actor	is	a	prerequisite	for	its	integration	into	the	ruling	ideology	and	vice	versa.	The	
third	level	is	an	organisational	effect	of	the	former:	co-optation	through	corporatist	
representation,	 which	 leads	 to	 what	 can	 be	 termed	 fully-fledged,	 institutionalised	
integration.	
By	2010,	the	post-Soviet	foreign	sector	of	the	economy	was	seen	as	here	to	stay	–	
despite	partial	setbacks	that	 in	any	case	would	not	reverse	the	new	trade	relations	
of	Cuba.	However,	an	entirely	different	environment	reined	in	the	internal	economy,	
where	other	market-based	subjects	bolstered	in	the	1990s	were	never	embraced.	
Although	 the	 quantity	 of	 self-employed	 Cubans	 had	 increased	 from	 50,000	 in	 the	
1980s	 to	 121,000	 in	 1994	 after	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 Decree-Law	 No.	 141	 in	 1993,	
thereafter	 the	 numbers	 followed	 an	 “erratic	 behaviour”	 (Vidal	 Alejandro,	 Pérez	
Villanueva,	 and	González-Corzo	2011,	 np).	 Such	 a	 fluctuation	 reveals	 the	back	 and	
forth	of	the	regime’s	relation	with	the	self-employed,	as	can	be	seen	in	Figure	2.	
	
Behind	the	up	and	downs	 in	the	size	of	self-employment,	Henken	(2008)	 identified	
one	 constant:	 the	 ideological	 ostracism	 of	 this	 economic	 activity.	 Therefore,	 he	
forecasted	a	grim	future	for	non-state	actors,	like	the	notorious	small	restaurants:	
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Figure	2.	Self-employed	workers	in	Cuba,	1994-2009	
Source:	Cuban	National	Statistic	OfXice.	
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The	 aura	 of	 illegitimacy	 that	 accompanies	 any	 independent	 economic	 activity	 and	 the	
government’s	 antagonistic	 attitude	 towards	 self-employment	 effectively	 condemns	 these	
private	restaurateurs	to	an	informal,	provisional	existence.	(Henken	2008,	169)	
To	 be	 sure,	 from	 1994	 to	 2006	 the	 regime	 basically	 viewed	 self-employment	 as	 a	
necessary	 evil	 or	 even	 as	 a	 capitalist	 embryo	 that	 threatened	 to	 undermine	 the	
Revolution	 from	 within.	 In	 1997	 Raúl	 Valdés	 Vivó,	 then	 director	 of	 the	 Party’s	
ideological	 training	 school	 and	 Central	 Committee’s	 member,	 warned	 in	 Granma	
that	 self-employment	 could	 “introduce	 a	 social	 force	 that	 sooner	 or	 later	 would	
serve	the	counterrevolution”	because	they	were	"piranhas…	capable	 in	a	minimum	
time	of	devouring	a	horse	down	to	the	bones”	(in	Rice	1997,	np).	
Such	an	“aura	of	illegitimacy”,	according	to	Henken,	had	a	legal	foundation:	
[T]he	 state’s	 antagonistic	 legal	 framework	 creates	 an	 ideological	 environment	 where	
entrepreneurship,	even	when	legal,	is	still	not	considered	legitimate.	(Henken	2008,	175)	
Although	Henken	 sufficiently	demonstrates	 that	Cuban	 laws	effectively	deteriorate	
the	ideological	environment	of	the	self-employed,	I	would	rather	invert	the	causality	
here.	 Thus,	 my	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 legal	 framework	 is	 not	 the	 origin	 of	 the	
ideological	adversity,	but	the	other	way	around.	It	was	the	reluctance	of	the	regime	
to	 legitimise	this	private	activity	what	explained	the	 legal	animosity	 towards	them.	
As	 it	 was	 hostility	 against	 “piranhas”	 (i.e.	 a	 legitimate	 hostility)	 while	 it	 lasted	 it	
effectively	worsened	an	already	harsh	ideological	climate	for	the	self-employed.	
Therefore,	when	Raúl	Castro	 legitimised	self-employment	 in	August	2010	as	a	valid	
“alternative”	 for	Cubans	–	as	discussed	 in	the	first	section	of	 this	chapter	–	 its	size	
now	followed	not	an	erratic	but	a	stable	pattern,	even	within	a	non-capitalist	set	of	
laws.	Starting	in	2008,	the	number	of	licences	for	self-employment	did	not	ever	pull	
back	as	in	the	past.	Moreover,	as	shown	below	in	Figure	3,	it	consistently	grew	after	
Raúl’s	watershed	of	late	2010	–	when	he	announced	the	labour	restructuring	plans.		
In	 October	 2010,	 the	 new	 ideological	 attitude	 of	 the	 regime	 towards	 the	 self-
employed	was	ratified	when	the	Granma	positively	included	their	economic	activity	
within	a	strategy	aimed	to	“increase	levels	of	productivity	and	efficiency”,	explicitly	
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rejecting	 and	 departing	 from	 “those	 conceptions	 that	 condemned	 the	 self-
employment	 almost	 to	 extinction	 and	 stigmatised	 those	 who	 decided	 to	 join	 it,	
legally,	in	the	1990s	decade”	(Martínez	Hernández	2010,	np).	In	other	words,	at	that	
point,	 Cuba	 had	 finally	 granted	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 owners	 of	 small	 restaurants	 and	
cafés,	 repair	 workshops,	 shoemakers,	 taxi	 drivers,	 bed	 and	 breakfasts	 catering	
foreign	tourists,	et	cetera.	
	
If	in	1994-2010	the	size	of	self-employment	roughly	fluctuated	between	110,000	and	
170,000,	by	 the	end	of	2011	 it	had	more	 than	doubled	 its	 size	 in	comparison	with	
October	 2010,	 from	156,000	 to	 363,000.	 This	 historical	 increase	occurred	within	 a	
new	regulatory	system	and	tax	regime	approved	in	October	2010	(Consejo	de	Estado	
2010,	 MTSS	 2010a),	 which	 was	 “dramatic	 and	 sweeping	 when	 compared	 to	 the	
policies	 implemented	 between	 1996	 and	 2006”	 (Ritter	 and	Henken	 2014,	 127).	 In	
causal	terms,	the	legal	innovation	was	a	consequence	of	the	new	ideological	climate	
set	in	motion	by	Raúl’s	leadership,	further	validated	in	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	
In	2010,	after	praising	self-employment	as	“another	alternative	of	employment”	 in	
August	–	again,	an	alternative	now	as	valid	as	any	other,	not	the	“piranha”	option	–	
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Figure	3.	Self-employed	workers	in	Cuba,	2010-2015	
Sources:	Juventud	Rebelde,	Trabajadores,	and	Cubadebate.		
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and	when	the	call	for	the	Sixth	Party	Congress	had	already	been	made,	Raúl	closed	
the	year	elaborating	the	“necessary	change	of	mind”	he	pursued:	
[W]e	 have	 arrived	 at	 the	 conclusion	 that	 self-employment	 is	 one	 more	 alternative	 for	
working-age	citizens,	aimed	at	increasing	the	supply	of	goods	and	services	to	the	population,	
which	could	rid	the	State	of	those	tasks	so	that	it	could	focus	on	what	is	truly	decisive,	what	
the	Party	and	 the	Government	should	do	 is,	 first	and	 foremost,	 facilitate	 their	work	 rather	
than	generate	stigmas	and	prejudices	against	them,	much	less	demonize	them.		Therefore	it	
is	 fundamental	 that	we	modify	 the	existing	negative	approach	 that	quite	a	 few	of	us	have	
towards	this	form	of	private	job.	(R.	Castro	2010e)	
At	the	same	time,	Raúl	reassured	the	pre-eminence	of	socialist	(state-led)	productive	
units	and	hence	of	the	secondary	status	of	self-employment,	which	in	any	case	was	
now	portrayed	as	a	junior	partner	rather	than	a	parasitic	companion:	
When	 defining	 the	 features	 that	 ought	 to	 characterize	 the	 building	 of	 a	 new	 society,	 the	
classics	of	Marxist-Leninism	–	particularly	Lenin-	stated,	among	other	things,	that	the	State,	
on	behalf	of	all	the	people,	should	keep	the	ownership	over	all	the	basic	production	means.	
(R.	Castro	2010e)	
As	 this	 intervention	 was	 made	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 grassroots	 discussion	 of	 the	
Lineamientos,	 it	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 aiming	 to	 encourage	 Cubans	 to	 push	 the	
debate	towards	the	new	ideological	boundaries	proposed	by	the	 leadership.	And	 if	
there	were	doubts	on	the	leadership’s	break	with	CPE	orthodoxy,	Raúl	insisted:	
The	 steps	 we	 have	 been	 taking	 and	 shall	 take	 towards	 broadening	 and	 relaxing	 self-
employment	are	the	result	of	profound	meditations	and	analysis	and	we	can	assure	you	this	
time	there	will	be	no	going	back.	(R.	Castro	2010e)	
Moreover,	 Raúl	 warned	 that	 the	 self-employed	 workers	 would	 not	 only	 be	
considered	legitimate,	but	their	interests	would	be	fully	integrated	into	the	regime:	
Cuba’s	Workers’	Central	and	 its	 respective	national	 trade	unions	are	currently	studying	the	
forms	 and	methods	 to	 organize	 the	 provision	 of	 assistance	 to	 this	 [self-employed]	 labour	
force	 […].	 	We	should	defend	 their	 interests	–	 I	 repeat	–	we	should	defend	 their	 interests,	
just	as	we	do	with	any	other	citizen	[…].(R.	Castro	2010e)	
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After	 this	 speech,	 Cuba	 basically	 experienced	 the	 repetition	 of	 the	 pattern	
summarised	 in	 the	 triad:	 1)	 praise	 of	 the	market-based	 subject,	 2)	 reassurance	 of	
socialist	 ideology,	and	3)	corporatist	co-option	of	 the	market-based	subject.	Hence	
this	three-step	sequence	of	conversion	of	a	former	intruder	into	a	friend	was	visible	
in	other	interventions	of	Raúl	Castro	after	this	seminal	speech	of	December	2010.	
It	 goes	 without	 saying	 that,	 later,	 self-employment	 would	 be	 a	 key	 topic	 in	 the	
debates	of	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	In	the	opening	speech	of	that	event,	as	further	
confirmation	 to	 the	 delegates	 of	 where	 the	 ideological	 boundaries	 ought	 to	 be	
displaced,	Raúl	praised	self-employment,	again,	as	“an	alternative	endorsed	by	the	
current	 legislation”	 that	 deserved	 “the	 support,	 assistance	 and	 protection	 of	 the	
officials	at	all	levels”	(R.	Castro	2011a).	Then,	again,	he	reassured	them	that	this	was	
not	at	odds	with	socialist	economic	strategy:	
The	growth	of	the	non-public	sector	of	the	economy,	far	from	an	alleged	privatization	of	the	
social	property	as	some	theoreticians	would	have	us	believe,	is	to	become	an	active	element	
facilitating	 the	 construction	 of	 socialism	 in	 Cuba	 since	 it	 will	 allow	 the	 State	 to	 focus	 on	
raising	the	efficiency	of	the	basic	means	of	production,	which	are	the	property	of	the	entire	
people,	while	relieving	itself	from	the	management	of	those	activities	that	are	not	strategic	
for	the	country.	(R.	Castro	2011a)	
Following	the	Congress,	the	participation	structures	of	the	Party	started	to	act	upon	
the	new	 ideological	 turn.	On	the	eve	of	 the	Party	Conference	of	 January	2012,	 the	
Granma	 stated	 that	 the	 CTC	 had	 already	 affiliated	 80%	 of	 the	 self-employed	 to	
existing	 trade	 unions,	 according	 to	 their	 branch	 of	 industry.	 For	 that	 news	 story,	
Granma	 reporter	 Febles	 Hernández	 (2012)	 interviewed	 CTC	 chief	 and	 Politburo	
member	 Salvador	 Valdés	Mesa,	 whom	 confirmed	 that	 the	 self-employed	 workers	
were	now	seen	as	any	other	worker,	ergo	subject	to	corporatist	representation:	
We	 represent	 on	 an	 equal	 basis,	 either	 state	 or	 non-state,	 all	 the	workers	 of	 the	 country,	
with	the	mission	of	organising	them,	assist	their	 job	training,	and	elevate	their	political	and	
economic	culture.	(Valdés	Mesa	quoted	by	Febles	Hernández	2012,	4)	
Certainly,	 co-option	 would	 not	 be	 free	 of	 contradictions.	 Ironically,	 it	 was	 a	 self-
employed,	communist	militant,	delegate	from	Havana	to	the	PCC	Conference,	whom	
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expressed	the	unfriendliest	opinion	about	self-employment	transmitted	on	Cuban	TV	
as	 part	 of	 the	 coverage	 of	 the	 event.	 He	made	 such	 an	 intervention	 in	 the	 PCC’s	
Commission	of	Ideological	Policy,	 in	which	he	supported	the	engagement	proposed	
by	the	leadership,	though	not	as	part	of	acceptance,	but	rather	as	pest	control:	
I	 remember	when	 the	 Party	 in	 the	municipality	 had	meetings	with	militant	 self-employed	
workers	around	twice	a	year.	This	has	been	lost	but	has	to	be	recovered	because	there	are	
men	 earning	 500	 or	 600	 pesos	 daily,	 sometimes	 more	 […],	 hence	 their	 way	 of	 thinking	
changes.	The	enemy	is	waiting	for	us	to	have	an	internal	problem	arisen	here,	so	we	have	to	
strengthen	the	political	work	with	the	self-employed.	(Broadcasted	by	TVC	2012)	
In	 other	words,	 the	 Fidelista	 piranha	 vision	was	 not	 yet	 totally	 buried	 in	 the	 PCC;	
however,	it	was	now	the	Raulista	anti-stigma	vision	that	had	the	upper	hand.	
Cuban	market	socialism:	
The	Cuban	market	 socialist	 ideology	emerged	as	a	consequence	of	an	evolution	of	
the	upgrade-of-the-model	notion	into	a	prosperous-and-sustainable-socialism	one.	
Both	 the	 Congress	 and	 Conference	 of	 the	 PCC	 had	 paved	 the	 way	 to	 further	
diversification	 of	 non-state	 actors.	 In	 July	 2012,	 Raúl	 announced	 the	 experimental	
approval	of	some	urban	co-ops	and	the	expansion	of	transferals	of	small	state	shops	
to	its	workers	via	leasing	agreements,	now	turned	self-employed.	In	response	to	this,	
the	 regime	 repeated	 the	 formula	of	befriending,	praising,	 and	co-option.	 Firstly,	 to	
scale	down	ideological	fears,	Raúl	again	made	a	socialist	defence	of	his	reforms:	
[These	decisions]	would	allow	the	state	to	free	 itself	 from	the	administration	of	a	group	of	
products	and	services	of	secondary	character	so	as	to	focus	on	improving	the	management	
of	 the	 fundamental	 means	 of	 production	 that	 will	 retain	 the	 condition	 of	 socialist	 state	
enterprise,	 which	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 Guideline	 n.	 2,	 is	 the	 main	 form	 of	 the	 national	
economy.	(R.	Castro	2012a)	
One	year	later	Raúl	would	insist	that	the	creation	of	“non-agricultural	co-operatives”	
and	 the	 expansion	 of	 self-employment	 was	 aiming	 to	 “free	 the	 state	 from	 non-
fundamental	 productive	 activities	 and	 services	 in	 order	 to	 focus	 in	 the	 long-term	
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development	program”	(R.	Castro	2013c).	Then	at	the	20th	Congress	of	the	CTC,	Raúl	
combined	the	praise	for	non-state	actors	with	the	need	to	co-opt	them:	
[I]t	has	been	promoted	the	growth	of	forms	of	non-state	management	in	our	economy,	the	
workers	 of	 which	 earn	 considerably	 superior	 incomes	 to	 those	 of	 the	 state	 (either	
bureaucratic	or	business)	sector.	This	reality,	which	does	not	surprise	anybody,	cannot	lead	
us	to	stigmatise	the	self-employed	and	co-op	workers,	whom	most	of	them	have	joined	the	
union	movement,	 obey	 the	 rules	 and	 fulfil	 their	 fiscal	 obligations.	 […]	 CTC’s	work	 is	more	
complex	in	light	of	a	growing	non-state	sector	of	the	economy,	where	the	methods	and	style	
traditionally	applied	in	the	state	sector	are	not	applicable.	(R.	Castro	2014b)	
The	quotation	above	contains	a	new	element:	the	acceptance	of	rising	inequalities	in	
Cuba’s	economic	strategy,	an	issue	no	longer	treated	as	a	tactic	retreat	but	as	a	non-
strategic	 inconvenience.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	 then	 three-year-old	 upgrade-of-the-
economic-model	notion	had	already	been	entwined	with	an	ideological	newborn:	the	
prosperous-and-sustainable-socialism	 notion.	 The	 latter’s	 birth	 was	 on	 December	
2012	(R.	Castro	2012c),	but	it	was	more	clearly	shaped	two	months	later:	
The	Party	Congress	has	defined	the	path	to	update	the	Cuban	economic	model	and	achieve	a	
prosperous	and	sustainable	socialist	society	–	a	less	egalitarian	but	fairer	society.	(R.	Castro	
2013b)	
Now	the	goal	was	prosperity,	with	 inequality	being	a	side	effect	not	 to	become	an	
obstacle	to	updating	the	economic	model	–	an	ideological	break	with	the	old	ascetic	
politics	 of	 the	 Cuban	 elite	 since	 Che’s	 times	 (Farber	 2015).	 To	 be	 sure,	 Raúl	 had	
justified	 the	 retreat	of	 “egalitarianism”	since	 the	Sixth	Party	Congress	 invoking	 the	
principle	 of	 socialist	 distribution:	 “From	each	 in	 accordance	with	 his	 ability	 and	 to	
each	in	accordance	with	his	labour”	(R.	Castro	2011a).	On	that	occasion,	the	principle	
was	used	 to	argue	 that	 the	better	off	 should	be	out	of	 the	 ration	book	system.	At	
other	 times,	 its	mention	was	 a	 recognition	 that	majority’s	wages	were	meagre	 (R.	
Castro	 2007c),	 which	 could	 be	 alleviated	 with	 payment	 by	 results	 (Castro	 2009c,	
2014b).	
Although	Raúl’s	(self)	criticism	in	these	policy	fields	makes	sense,	his	suggestion	that	
the	 rise	of	new	 rich	 has	 complied	with	 socialist	principles	 is	dubious.	 Setting	aside	
the	known	case	of	people	receiving	remittances	from	relatives	 in	the	US	(an	unfair	
	
161	
though	 arguably	 unavoidable	 source	 of	 hard	 currency),	 the	 case	 of	 those	 abusing	
their	political	connections	is	yet	to	be	explored	–	in	other	words,	corruption.	
For	 example,	 the	 restaurant	 “La	Divina	 Pastora”,	 next	 to	 the	well-known	Havana’s	
tourist	 attraction	Morro	 Castle,	 originally	 a	 FAR	 company,	was	 closed	 and	 its	 staff	
fired	 only	 to	 be	 later	 re-opened	 as	 a	 “co-operative”	 owned	 by	 its	 so-called	
administrator	(Celaya	2013,	np,	Frank	and	Valdés	2014,	np).	The	new	owner	appears	
to	be	a	friend	of	Gen.	Guillermo	García	Frías	(Padrón	2015,	np).	Of	course,	the	extent	
of	 spontaneous	 privatisation	 of	 state	 assets	 disguised	 as	 co-op	 conversion	 is	 a	
perturbing	 matter	 for	 future	 consideration.	 In	 this	 sense,	 a	 Cuban	 academic	 has	
already	alerted	that	 the	new	co-ops’	 legislation	 issued	 in	November	2012	 (Consejo	
de	 Estado	 2012b,	 Consejo	 de	 Ministros	 2012)	 has	 suppressed	 the	 democratic	
potential	of	the	members’	General	Assembly	because	its	President	is	legally	treated	
as	 if	 s/he	was	 “a	 supreme	 figure”	 –	 perhaps	 “an	 extrapolation	 of	 the	 leadership’s	
schemes	of	the	state	sector”	(Mesa	Tejeda	2014,	238).	
In	 July	 2013,	 the	 seven-month-old	 prosperous-and-sustainable-socialism	 notion	
gained	 more	 ground	 when	 it	 was	 fully	 articulated	 within	 the	 whole	 ideological	
framework	advanced	by	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro	up	to	that	point.	The	journey	
away	from	CPE	orthodoxy	had	finally	turned	into	a	travel	towards	market	socialism:	
[T]he	 implementation	of	the	Lineamientos…	approved	by	the	Sixth	Congress…	[is]	 the	main	
task	of	all	of	us,	because	on	its	success	hinges	the	preservation	and	development	of	socialism	
in	 Cuba.	 A	 prosperous	 and	 sustainable	 socialism	 that	 ratifies	 the	 social	 property	 of	 the	
fundamental	means	of	production	and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 acknowledges	 the	 role	of	other,	
non-state,	forms	of	management;	 it	reaffirms	planning	as	an	indispensable	tool	 in	directing	
the	economy,	without	denying	the	existence	of	the	market.	(R.	Castro	2013c)	
The	market	had	been	pardoned,	but	not	yet	capitalism.	The	rise	of	self-employment	
was	not	the	return	of	the	bourgeoisie	–	i.e.	a	class	of	large	proprietors	of	means	of	
production,	as	opposed	to	small	businesses.	In	this	sense,	it	is	revealing	that	the	PCC	
did	not	create	a	specific	body	to	co-opt	the	self-employed	–	let	us	imagine	a	branch	
of	small	businesses	within	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	or	at	least	a	union	of	the	self-
employed	 within	 the	 CTC.	 Instead,	 the	 CTC	 scattered	 the	 newly	 affiliated	 self-
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employed	in	existing	trade	unions	as	if	to	underplay	their	specificity	in	a	message	of	
the	kind	“you	are	not	a	little	‘businessman’	so	do	not	dream	of	becoming	bourgeois;	
you	are	just	a	distinct	type	of	‘worker’,	so	join	your	peers	in	their	Union.”		
However,	it	is	clear	that	times	had	changed.	Private	economic	activity	never	had	this	
size	 during	 the	 Revolution,	 the	 quality	 of	 which	 is	 clearer	 if	 self-employment	 is	
disaggregated	into	the	three	different	actors	actually	involved	in	it:	1)	self-employed	
workers	 per	 se,	 2)	 owners	 of	 small	 businesses,	 3)	 private	 workers.	 The	 last	 two	
categories	 imply	an	 interesting	 relation:	 it	 legally	 refers	 to	a	 self-employed	worker	
hiring	an/other	self-employed	worker/s.	After	debates	among	Cuban	labour	lawyers,	
which	converged	in	the	need	of	legally	recognise	private	workers	(e.g.	Ferriol	Molina	
2013),	the	new	Cuban	Labour	Code	discussed	in	the	20th	CTC	Congress	included	the	
rights	of	“hired	workers”,	whom	can	also	be	employed	by	co-ops	(ANPP	2014a).	
Raúl	had	explained	on	December	2013	why	the	prosperous	and	sustainable	socialism	
would	be	“fairer”	in	spite	of	being	“less	egalitarian”:	the	new	model	will	“definitely	
report	 more	 benefits	 to	 all	 Cubans”	 (R.	 Castro	 2013a).	 Then	 during	 the	 20th	 CTC	
Congress,	Raúl	reassured	that	this	socialism	would	still	be	based	“on	the	property	of	
all	people	of	the	fundamental	means	of	production”;	therefore,	“the	state	enterprise	
is	and	will	be	the	main	form	in	the	national	economy”	(R.	Castro	2014b).	
Figure	4	attempts	to	summarise	the	ideological	vicissitudes	of	Cuba	in	Raúl	Castro’s	
time	 in	office.	 In	hindsight,	 the	2006-2008	period	was	a	preparation	stage	of	what	
would	 come	 next.	 Once	 Raúl	 was	 firmly	 in	 power,	 he	 championed	 the	 need	 to	
‘update’	 the	 economy	with	 increasing	 confidence	 from	 2009	 until	 2011,	when	 his	
revolt	reached	its	climax	at	the	Sixth	Party	Congress.	After	this	turning	point,	market	
socialism	started	to	emerge	and	be	acted	upon;	e.g.	the	relation	of	the	PCC	with	the	
economy	was	 redefined	 in	 the	 Conference.	 After	 this,	 when	 the	 dust	 settled,	 the	
project	 adopted	 a	 self-confident	 goal:	 prosperity	 was	 essential	 for	 socialist	
sustainability.	 In	 toto,	 the	market	 is	 no	 longer	 the	 enemy,	 but	 a	 junior	 partner	 of	
central	planning.	
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As	part	of	this,	the	autonomy	of	the	state	enterprises	advanced	gradually.	 In	2011,	
the	 Lineamientos	 had	 already	 advised	 “the	 separation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	
entrepreneurial	 functions”	 (PCC	 2011b,	 guideline	 6),	 which	meant	 the	 increase	 of	
decision-making	 power	 of	 the	 managers	 and	 more	 financial	 autonomy	 of	 the	
companies	 (PCC	 2011b,	 guidelines	 8,	 11,	 121).	 As	 part	 of	 this,	 the	 2012	 Party	
Conference	would	 ratify	 the	 retreat	of	 the	PCC	 from	the	economy,	as	discussed	 in	
the	previous	section.	Then,	a	step	further	was	given	when	new	legislation	was	issued	
in	April	2014,	which	stipulated	that	the	expenditures	of	the	state	enterprises	will	be	
financed	“based	on	the	contributions	of	their	enterprises	and	will	be	charged	to	their	
costs”	(Consejo	de	Ministros	2014,	art.	57).	For	example,	the	 investment	funds	will	
come	 from	 internally	 generated	 profits	 (MFP	 2014,	 art.	 26-7,	 35-6).	 Overall,	 the	
threat	 of	 bankruptcy	 looming	 state	 companies	 became	 real,	 while	 the	 decision-
making	power	of	the	managers	increased.	
Then	 the	 latest	 structural	 reform	 introduced	 by	 Raúl	 Castro	 in	 2014	 was	 a	 new	
Foreign	Investment	Law	(ANPP	2014b),	whose	most	noteworthy	innovation	was	the	
official	 reinsertion	 of	 FDI	 in	 Cuba’s	 development	 strategy	 within	 a	 less	 restrictive	
framework	 (Feinberg	 2014a).	 In	 order	 to	 attract	 potential	 investors,	 the	 annual	
International	 Havana	 Fair	 held	 in	 November	 2014	 focused	 in	 the	 “Portfolio	 of	
2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
	'prosperous	socialism'	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 3	 4	
	'upgrade	of	the	model'	 0	 1	 7	 13	 5	 3	 7	
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Figure	4.	Keywords	of	cautious	market	reform	in	Cuba,	2008-2014	
Sources:	 Own	 elaboration	 based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 all	 Raúl	 Castro's	speeches	 in	 Cuba	 (N=42)	 with	 NVivo	 software.	 It	 was	 counted	 the	number	of	total	appeareances	by	year	of	two	notions:	'actualización	del	modelo	económico	cubano'	and	'socialismo	próspero	y	sostenible'.	
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Opportunities	for	Foreign	Investment”	(MINCEX	2014),	as	opposed	to	the	traditional	
focus	on	trade	promotion.	That	Portfolio	was	a	168-page	document,	translated	into	
eight	 foreign	 languages,	 which	 summarised	 the	 economic	 situation	 of	 Cuba	 and	
specified	the	projects	in	different	sectors	of	the	economy	open	to	foreign	partners.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 keeps	 restrictions	 on	 FDI	 –	 i.e.	 the	 state	 has	 ruled	 out	
privatisations	and	will	give	preference	for	capital	from	diverse	countries.	
Feinberg	has	persuasively	assessed	the	politics	behind	the	Portfolio:	
With	 its	 contradictory	 combinations	 of	 frank	 analysis	 and	 attractive	 offerings	 and	 its	
demanding	 requirements	 and	 multiple	 barriers	 –	 [the	 Portfolio]	 opens	 an	 unusually	
transparent	window	 into	 the	on-going	struggles	within	 the	Cuban	elites:	among	 those	 that	
wish	 to	power	ahead	and	 integrate	 their	economy	 into	global	 capital	 and	 trading	markets,	
those	 that	 adhere	 to	 the	 revolution’s	 founding	 statist	 nationalism	 and	 those	 that	 seek	 a	
middle	road	of	carefully	controlled	change.	(Feinberg	2014b,	np)	
Whether	 these	 tensions	 are	 apparent	 or	 real	 is,	 of	 course,	 open	 to	 speculation.	
However,	 Feinberg’s	 interpretation	 equally	 captures	 the	 sum	 of	 political	 forces	 in	
Cuba,	which	has	 resulted	 in	 a	middle	 solution:	 neither	orthodox	CPE	nor	 capitalist	
shock	 therapy,	 but	 market	 socialism	 –	 an	 attempted	 compromise	 between	
orthodoxy	and	change,	between	the	plan	and	the	market.	Such	ideological	tensions	
are	at	the	heart	of	Cuban	market	socialism.	Whether	this	equilibrium	is	stable	in	the	
long	term,	is	something	to	ponder	in	future	research.	
Summary	
The	Sixth	Party	Congress	of	April	 2011	was	 the	 turning	point	of	Raúl’s	 presidency.	
When	 it	 ended,	 the	 ideological	 relaxation	 of	 CPE	 orthodoxy	 had	 turned	 into	 the	
regime’s	official	policy	–	a	socialist	market	model	had	been	sketched	in	a	Party	text:	
the	Lineamientos.	As	for	the	leadership,	the	new	Politburo	marked	the	culmination	
of	the	overhaul	led	by	Raúl	at	the	top.	In	the	next	period,	the	new	type	of	leadership	
would	be	ratified	while	the	new	type	of	ideology	would	start	to	crystallize.	
Together,	in	this	and	the	previous	chapter,	I	have	covered	the	process	of	change	in	
the	 two	 key	 variables	 of	 this	 study:	 the	 leadership	and	 the	 ideology	of	 the	 Cuban	
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regime.	In	total,	I	identified	two	political	transformations	in	the	period	2006-2014:	a)	
from	 charismatic	 to	 collegial	 leadership,	 and	 b)	 from	 CPE	 to	 market-socialist	
ideology.	 As	 I	 have	 detailed,	 this	 time-span	 covers	 Raúl’s	 temporary	 presidency	 in	
2006-8,	his	first	official	term	in	2008-13,	and	part	of	his	last	term	(2013-18).	
The	Cuban	polity	was	still	anti-capitalist,	although	 the	space	 for	market	actors	and	
mechanisms	 had	 been	 included;	 also,	 it	 was	 still	 a	 post-totalitarian	 single-party	
system,	although	the	FAR-PCC	coalition	had	replaced	the	role	of	Fidel’s	charisma.	If	
the	 leadership	and	 ideology	had	changed,	what	type	of	regime	had	thus	emerged?	
How	 such	 a	 political	 outcome	 looks	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 communist	
survivors?	These	are	the	question	addressed	in	the	next	chapter.	
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7.	Political	characterisation	
In	the	preceding	chapters,	I	discussed	how	the	leadership	and	ideology	of	the	Cuban	
regime	have	changed	in	2006-2014,	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	
As	I	have	been	at	pains	to	demonstrate,	such	changes	can	be	defined	as	follows:	
⎯ from	charismatic	to	collegial	leadership;	and	
⎯ from	CPE	orthodoxy	to	market-socialist	ideology.	
Now	in	this	chapter	I	will	discuss	the	relationship	between	both	variations	and	their	
combined	 effect	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 Cuban	 regime	 within	 the	 same	
timeframe.	A	key	claim	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	rise	of	market-socialist	ideology	is	at	
a	substantial	extent	an	effect	of	the	decline	of	charismatic	authority.	
I	will	explain	this	relation	by	re-assessing	Raúl	Castro’s	revolt	and	victory	through	the	
lenses	of	 regime-type	development.	As	a	 result	of	 this	analysis,	 I	will	propose	 that	
Cuba	has	shifted	from	a	charismatic	early	post-totalitarian	regime	to	a	mature	post-
totalitarian	one.	From	the	comparative	perspective	of	the	communist	survivors,	this	
characterisation	 means	 that	 the	 Cuban	 case	 has	 moved	 closer	 to	 the	 regimes	 of	
China	and	Vietnam	and	further	away	from	that	of	North	Korea.	
The	first	part	of	 this	chapter	deals	with	a	diachronic	examination	of	 the	process	of	
political	change	experienced	by	the	Cuban	regime	in	2006-2014.	Then	in	the	second	
part	I	will	further	develop	the	regime-type	characterisation	advanced	in	this	chapter	
by	 looking	 at	 one	 collateral	 symptom:	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	 incipient	 political	
liberalisation.	 I	 aim	 to	 explain	 it	 as	 an	 effect	 of	 the	 regime’s	 re-equilibration	 of	
legitimacy	I	will	have	proposed.	
7.1	Regime-type	development	
Here	I	have	divided	the	timing	of	the	process	of	leadership’s	and	ideological	change	
in	three	stages:	1)	preparation	(2006-2009),	2)	metamorphosis	 (2010-2011),	and	3)	
consolidation	(2012-2014).	As	can	be	inferred	from	the	language	I	am	using	to	tackle	
timing,	 it	 presupposes	 the	 passage	 from	 equilibrium	 “A”	 to	 “B”	 via	 a	 period	 of	
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struggle	and	rapid	change	(2006	to	2014	via	the	2011	Sixth	Congress).	However,	the	
speed	and	extent	of	leadership	and	ideological	change	differed	from	each	other;	i.e.	
the	qualitative	turn	occurred	first	in	the	leadership	than	in	the	ruling	ideology.	
Figure	 5	 contains	 a	 schematic	 representation	 of	 the	 process	 in	 selected	 years.	 In	
2006,	the	starting	point,	Fidel’s	charismatic	leadership	was	still	in	power	or	(when	he	
fell	 ill)	 it	was	 expected	 that	 he	would	 soon	 return	 to	office.	Also,	 the	 last	 cycle	 of	
idealist	economic	policy	was	still	there,	as	well	as	the	Battle	of	Ideas.	
Figure	5.	Leadership	and	Ideology	in	Cuba,	2006-2014	
	
By	 2009,	 a	 different	 picture	 started	 to	 emerge.	 Raúl	 Castro,	 already	 the	 new	
President	 of	 Cuba,	 discarded	 a	 charismatic	 succession.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	
discontinued	 the	 title	 of	 Commander-in-Chief	 when	 taking	 over;	 on	 the	 other,	 he	
dismantled	 Fidel’s	 personal	 staff,	 the	 Grupo	 de	 Apoyo.	 Also,	 after	 suggesting	 the	
need	of	“structural	and	conceptual	changes”	in	the	economy,	Raúl	had	organised	by	
then	two	public	discussions	on	the	subject,	which	encouraged	him	to	conclude	that	
the	 Cuban	 economic	model	 needed	 an	 “update”.	 Collegiality	 and	 cautious	market	
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reform	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 planted,	 but	 the	 charismatic	 leadership	 had	 just	 been	
uprooted	and	orthodox	CPE	was	moving	towards	the	same	direction.	
2011	was	the	year	of	Raúl’s	key	political	offensive.	The	Sixth	Party	Congress	was	the	
turning	point	of	his	presidency,	where	not	only	did	he	introduce	term	limits	(which	
turned	the	head	of	state	into	a	primus	inter	pares),	but	also	got	the	approval	of	the	
Lineamientos	 (which	 amounted	 to	 the	 ideological	 sketch	 of	 market	 socialism).	
Collegiality	had	been	set	up	and	orthodox	CPE	had	become	an	outdated	ideology.	
Raúl	Castro	entrenched	the	pragmatic	cycle	of	economic	policy	unleashed	during	his	
presidency	 in	 various	 ways.	 One	 of	 them	 was	 the	 promotion	 of	 like-minded	 FAR	
policy	 makers	 to	 the	 top,	 notably	 Marino	 Murillo:	 the	 point	 man	 for	 economic	
reform.	 Raúl’s	 designation	 of	 a	minister	 in	 charge	 of	 updating	 socialism	 stands	 in	
contrast	 to	 Fidel’s	 appointment	 of	 a	minister	 to	 lead	 the	 Battle	 of	 Ideas	 –	 hence	
further	 confirming	 that	 the	 rise	 of	 Murillo-like	 technocrats	 was	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 new	
ideological	environment	when	compared	to	the	last	idealist	cycle	of	economic	policy	
that,	according	to	Mesa-Lago	(2012),	Cuba	experienced	from	2003	until	2006.	
By	2014,	the	new	type	of	leadership	had	been	ratified	and	the	new	type	of	ideology	
had	 gained	 ruling	 status.	 Raúl	 had	 already	 confirmed	 that	 he	would	 step	 down	 in	
2018,	 and	his	potential	 successor,	Miguel	Díaz-Canel,	was	 for	 the	 first	 time	a	non-
histórico.	As	for	the	Lineamientos,	they	had	been	translated	into	structural	reforms,	
including	the	expansion	of	non-state	actors	for	the	sake	of	a	‘prosperous’	socialism.	
However,	what	is	the	relationship	between	the	two	changes	analysed	here?	
A	claim	of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	process	of	 ideological	change	was	an	effect	of	 the	
process	 of	 succession	 in	 the	 leadership	 because	 the	 dissipation	 of	 charismatic	
legitimacy	 could	 propel	 economic	 performance	 as	 a	 compensatory	 source.	 This	
causal	link	was	theorised	in	chapter	3;	now	I	will	discuss	some	substantiating	data.	
Re-equilibration	of	legitimacy:	
All	Raúl´s	speeches	in	Cuba	are	both	transmitted	on	national	TV	and	reproduced	next	
day	in	Granma	and/or	Juventud	Rebelde.	Such	speeches	do	not	only	 intend	to	help	
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Cubans	make	sense	of	political	developments	in	the	country,	they	are	also	the	public	
face	 of	 the	 regime’s	 political	 moves.	 As	 “the	 mode	 of	 exercising	 authority”	 is	
conditioned	by	 “the	 kind	of	 legitimacy	which	 is	 claimed”	 (Weber	1978a,	 213),	 it	 is	
not	 an	 insignificant	political	 development	when	 such	 claims	 vary	 in	 any	 regime.	 In	
the	case	of	Cuba	under	Raúl	Castro,	there	has	occurred	a	variation	in	the	legitimation	
strategy	of	the	regime	–	a	process	indicated,	albeit	indirectly,	by	Figure	6.	I	took	all	
Raúl	Castro’s	 speeches	delivered	 in	Cuba	 since	2008	and	coded	 them	according	 to	
key	 concepts	 that	 stand	 for	 one	 or	 another	 legitimation	 strategy	 –	 “Fidel”	 for	
charismatic,	 and	 “economía”	 (economy,	 in	 English)	 for	 performance-based.	 Then	 I	
disaggregated	this	data	by	year	and	compared	their	relative	incidence.		
	
When	the	ratio	shown	in	Figure	6	is	below	1,	it	means	that	in	that	single	year,	‘Fidel’	
was	 mentioned	 more	 times	 than	 the	 ‘economy’	 considering	 all	 Raúl’s	 speeches.	
Using	 this	 index,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 before	 the	 Sixth	 Party	 Congress	 (2011),	
charismatic	claims	prevailed	over	economic-based	ones,	while	the	opposite	was	true	
afterwards	–	indeed,	in	2008	“Fidel”	was	mentioned	45	times	and	the	“economy”	17	
times,	while	in	2015	the	numbers	changed	to	4	and	11,	respectively.	The	exception	
to	 this	 trend	 was	 2013,	 when	 Raúl’s	 presidency	 was	 renewed	 for	 five	 more	 (and	
final)	years	and	the	60th	anniversary	of	 the	attack	to	the	Moncada	barracks	on	the	
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Figure	6.	Claims	to	legitimacy:	charismatic-to-economical	ratio,	2008-2015	
Sources:	 Own	 elaboration	 based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 all	 Raúl	 Castro's	speeches	 in	 Cuba	 (N=45)	 with	 NVivo	 software.	 It	 was	 compared	 the	quantity	of	total	appeareances	by	year	of	two	terms:	'Fidel'	and	'economía'.		
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26th	of	July	was	commemorated.	 In	this	 latter	event,	which	marks	the	beginning	of	
the	 Cuban	 revolution,	 Raúl	 praised	 in	 his	 speech	 the	 legacy	 of	 his	 brother	 Fidel,	
mentioning	him	on	twelve	occasions	(from	a	total	of	twenty-three	that	year).	
Chapters	 5	 and	 6,	 indeed,	 already	 show	 how	 Raúl	 Castro	 first	 reformed	 the	
leadership	before	embarking	on	the	economic	reform.	What	is	also	revealing	is	that	
this	 shift	 in	political	 concerns	was	accompanied	by	a	decline	 in	public	discourse	of	
the	persona	of	Fidel	Castro	as	a	token	of	the	legitimacy	of	state	policies.	Thus,	if	Raúl	
asked	the	National	Assembly	permission	to	consult	everything	with	Fidel	when	the	
former	was	elected	 for	his	presidential	period,	 in	his	 re-election	 five	years	 later	he	
reminded	the	National	Assembly	that	the	constitution	stipulated	that	state	authority	
emanated	from	the	‘people’	(R.	Castro	2008c,	2013b).	If	in	2008	Raúl	felt	the	need	to	
rely	 on	 Fidel’s	 charismatic	 authority	 to	 legitimise	 his	 rule,	 in	 2013	 he	 sought	 the	
same	effect	through	different	means,	namely	the	emphasis	on	the	legality	of	his	rule.	
In	 fact,	 in	the	former	speech	Raúl	mentioned	Fidel	seventeen	times,	 far	more	than	
the	 five	 times	he	was	mentioned	 in	 the	 latter	 speech.	By	2013,	performance	–	 i.e.	
the	‘updating’	of	the	economic	model	–	was	already	the	kernel	of	Raúl’s	legitimacy.	
To	be	sure,	I	do	not	claim	that	Figure	6	is	the	key	evidence	of	this	thesis,	let	alone	a	
conclusive	 test.	 Saldaña	 has	 argued	 that	 in	 qualitative	 research	 one	 “can	 never	
conclusively	‘prove’	something;	we	can,	at	best,	convincingly	suggest”	(2011,	135).	In	
this	 sense,	 this	 graphic	 illustration	 only	 aims	 to	 persuade	 the	 reader	 that	 leader’s	
speeches	bear	discursive	footprints	left	by	the	change	in	the	political	salience	of	the	
succession	question	vis-à-vis	the	economic	reform	across	time.		Therefore,	although	
such	 a	 political	 process	 can	 only	 be	 obliquely	 gazed	 through	 Figure	 6,	 the	 pattern	
displayed	within	 it	may	 help	 to	 supplement	 and	 clarify	 the	 argument	 advanced	 in	
this	thesis	–	 i.e.	that	the	 leaders	of	the	Cuban	regime	have	changed	the	manner	 in	
which	 they	explain	 to	 the	population	why	 they	 think	 they	deserve	 to	be	 in	power,	
initially	stressing	the	endorsement	of	the	regime’s	founder,	then	claiming	that	they	
will	 provide	 economic	 results.	 Such	 a	 change	 is	 what	 I	 have	 defined,	 in	 analytic	
terms,	as	a	shift	from	charismatic	to	performance-based	legitimacy.	
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Although	 the	 intensification	 of	 the	 political	 concerns	 on	 the	 economy	 –	 when	
compared	 to	 concerns	on	 the	 succession	question	–	points	 to	a	 re-equilibration	of	
the	 centre	 of	 gravity	 of	 the	 regime’s	 legitimacy,	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 not	 without	
limitations.	There	 is	an	obvious	deficiency:	 the	analysis	 that	 leads	 to	Figure	6	 Is	an	
analysis	of	the	speeches	of	only	one	person,	even	 if	 that	person	 is	the	head	of	the	
Cuban	party-state.	However,	it	is	still	relevant	to	appreciate	changes	in	how	a	post-
totalitarian	leader	chooses	to	talk	about	his	political	decisions	to	both	the	elite	and	
the	lay	public.	But	perhaps	the	main	limitation	is	that	this	approach	does	not	tell	us	
anything	 about	 how	Cubans	 have	perceived	Raúl’s	 efforts	 to	 overhaul	 the	 regime.	
Although	the	 legitimacy	 lenses	are	focused	on	the	regime’s	posture	rather	than	on	
the	subjects’	reaction	to	it,	it	would	still	be	revealing	to	know	whether	the	regime’s	
leaders	have	succeeded	in	convincing	ordinary	Cubans	about	their	right	to	rule.	
In	 sum,	 the	pattern	discussed	 in	 this	 section	about	 the	 content	of	Raúl’s	 speeches	
can	at	best	 suggest,	 rather	 than	 ‘prove’,	 that	 the	decline	of	 charismatic	 legitimacy	
was	 compensated	 through	 the	 rise	 of	 market	 socialism.	 In	 consequence,	 it	 is	 still	
necessary	to	explain	the	political	process/es	that	can	account	for	that	outcome.	
Post-totalitarian	normalisation	and	maturation:	
From	a	 regime-type	perspective,	 Cuba	 in	 2006-2014	may	be	 said	 to	have	 changed	
from	a	charismatic	early	post-totalitarian	regime	to	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	one.	
However,	this	total	change	can	be	analytically	divided	into	two	distinct	processes:		
1. from	a	‘charismatic’	to	a	‘typical’	early	post-totalitarian	regime;	and,	
2. from	the	latter	equilibrium	to	a	maturing	early	post-totalitarian	regime.	
Although	 both	 processes	 were	 empirically	 intertwined	 and	 coetaneous	 to	 some	
extent,	each	represents	a	different	link	in	a	causal	chain.	
This	first	process	is	mostly	related	to	the	change	in	the	type	of	leadership.	
As	 already	 discussed,	 Raúl	 Castro’s	 answer	 to	 the	 succession	 problem	 after	 Fidel	
relinquished	 the	presidency	was	 the	 introduction	of	 collegiality,	as	 the	approval	of	
term-limits	 along	with	 the	dismantling	of	 the	Grupo	de	Apoyo	 caucus	attest.	 Thus,	
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the	 typically	 totalitarian	 (charismatic)	 leadership	 was	 superseded	 and	 a	 typically	
post-totalitarian	(collegial)	one	was	put	in	its	stead.	In	other	words,	the	charismatic	
early	 post-totalitarian	 regime	 lost	 its	 messianic	 (i.e.	 totalitarian)	 remainder	 and	
moved	 towards	 an	 early	 post-totalitarian	 equilibrium	 proper.	 This	 political	
accommodation	may	be	well	understood	as	one	of	post-totalitarian	normalisation	of	
the	Cuban	regime	–	i.e.	the	end	of	its	hybridity.	
As	 Fidel’s	 charisma	had	been	 an	old	 source	of	 legitimacy,	 its	 dissipation	 created	 a	
political	 deficit	 for	 the	 Cuban	 regime.	 As	 early	 as	 2009,	Hoffmann	had	 sensed	 the	
predicament	of	legitimacy’s	restitution	that	sooner	or	later	would	be	confronted:	
In	 the	 short	 run,	 the	 successor	 government	 can	 claim	 legitimacy	 based	 on	 the	 formal	
succession;	 in	 the	medium	term,	however,	 it	will	have	to	seek	new	sources	of	support	and	
legitimacy	 of	 its	 own.	 Economic	 performance	will	 be	 crucial,	 and	Raúl’s	 calls	 for	 economic	
reforms	–	however	 limited	 their	 implementation	has	been	so	 far	–	 seem	to	signal	 that	 the	
new	leadership	is	very	much	aware	of	this.	(Hoffmann	2009,	243)	
This	 argument	 can	 be	 taken	 a	 bit	 further.	 As	 the	 next	 generation	 of	 leaders	 –	
expected	to	 take	over	 in	2018	–	will	not	have	the	same	 legitimacy	of	 the	 founding	
fathers	 of	 communist	 Cuba,	 let	 alone	 Fidel	 Castro,	 the	upcoming	biological	 end	of	
the	other	revolutionary	veterans	in	power	increased	the	difficulty	to	the	problem	of	
revamping	the	legitimacy	of	the	regime.	Hence	Raúl	Castro’s	challenge	has	not	only	
been	to	make	his	presidency	stand	on	solid	ground,	but	also	 to	do	so	 in	a	manner	
such	that	the	new	equilibrium	of	the	political	system	endures	after	he	leaves.	
In	other	words,	the	revolutionary	veterans	–	still	the	‘inner	circle’	of	the	leadership	–	
have	showed	a	strong	interest	in	the	survival	of	the	system	they	devoted	their	life	to.	
This	 biographical	 feature	 of	 the	 elite	 is	 perhaps	 what	 ultimately	 explains	 the	
rejection	of	capitalist	restoration	within	Raúl’s	economic	reform.	Of	course,	it	is	yet	
to	be	seen	how	long	this	political	limit	will	survive	the	“históricos”	if	it	does.	
The	second	process	(maturation)	is	related	to	the	change	in	the	type	of	ideology.	
The	new	post-totalitarian	 equilibrium	 then	 rapidly	 evolved	 from	 the	early	 towards	
the	 late	 stage,	 in	 which	 the	 regime	 was	 now	 fully	 confronted	 with	 its	 economic	
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failures.	Raúl	responded	this	problem	with	another	switch:	he	gave	up	the	freezing	
path	 he	 inherited	 from	 Fidel	 (his	 last	 ‘idealist’	 cycle)	 and	 adopted	 a	 maturing	
direction.	 Raúl	 explicitly	 admitted	 that	 the	 economic	 focus	 of	 the	 Sixth	 Party	
Congress	expressed	the	bet	of	the	‘inner	circle’	for	the	survival	of	communism:	
The	Sixth	Party	Congress	should	be,	as	a	 fact	of	 life,	 the	 last	 to	be	attended	by	most	of	us	
who	belong	to	the	Revolution’s	historical	generation.		The	time	we	have	left	is	short,	the	task	
that	lies	ahead	of	us	is	gigantic,	and	[…]	I	think	we	have	the	obligation	of	taking	advantage	of	
the	power	of	our	moral	authority	among	 the	people	 to	 trace	out	 the	 route	 to	be	 followed	
and	 resolve	 some	 other	 important	 problems.	 […]	 [W]e	 strongly	 believe	 that	 we	 have	 the	
elemental	duty	to	rectify	the	mistakes	that	we	have	made	all	along	these	five	decades	during	
which	we	have	been	building	socialism	in	Cuba.	(R.	Castro	2010e)	
This	quote	also	reveals	the	extent	to	which	the	generational	succession	was	linked	to	
the	 problem	 of	 political	 survival.	 Thus,	 the	 “moral	 authority”	 of	 the	 revolutionary	
veterans	 was	 being	 used	 to	 make	 Cuba	 stand	 on	 more	 solid	 ground	 after	 Fidel’s	
charisma	 was	 lost.	 It	 was	 perceived	 as	 necessary	 “to	 trace	 out	 the	 route	 to	 be	
followed”,	 which	 the	 Congress	 did	 by	 approving	 the	 economic	 Lineamientos	 that	
turned	the	initial	relaxation	of	CPE	orthodoxy	into	nascent	market	socialism.	
Later,	when	 the	2012	Party	Conference	ended	–	with	 the	new	 types	of	 leadership	
and	ideology	now	clearly	flourishing	–	Raúl	assessed	the	new	political	situation:	“the	
route	has	been	traced”	(R.	Castro	2012b).	Indeed,	it	had.	
Here	 the	 perspective	 of	 legitimacy	 helps	 to	 understand	why	 the	 economic	 reform	
was	 necessary	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 It	 was	 necessary	 “to	 reach	 some	 sort	 of	 social	
contract	with	the	population	in	order	to	induce	it	to	‘pragmatically	accept’	that	given	
certain	external	and	 internal	constraints,	the	regime	is	performing	reasonably	well”	
(Saxonberg	2013,	 18).	 In	other	words,	 the	 turn	 to	a	performance-based	 legitimacy	
had	been	completed.	Thus,	as	a	 result	of	 the	Sixth	Party	Congress,	Cuba	definitely	
adopted	a	maturing	path,	as	opposed	to	a	freezing	one	of	CPE	entrenchment.	
However,	the	manner	in	which	Cuba’s	maturing	path	has	been	pursued	differs	from	
Saxonberg’s	scheme	for	there	was	no	abandonment	of	socialist	ideology,	let	alone	a	
restoration	 of	 capitalism	 (e.g.	 proper	 large-scale	 privatisations	 of	 means	 of	
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production).	 Conversely,	 Cuba	 underwent	 an	 ideological	 renewal	 (an	 ‘update’	 in	
Raúl’s	words)	in	order	to	reconcile	the	socialist	claims	of	the	regime	with	economic	
performance	(via	the	market),	now	turned	into	a	key	source	of	legitimacy.	
7.2	Liberalisation	as	a	collateral	symptom	
Here	 it	 is	 relevant	 the	 distinction	made	 by	 Linz	 and	 Stepan	 between	 liberalisation	
and	democratisation	 in	 non-democratic	 environments.	 Liberalisation	 “may	 entail	 a	
mix	of	policy	and	social	changes”,	such	as	(among	others)	“the	introduction	of	legal	
safeguards	 for	 individuals”	 –	 as	 some	 of	 the	 policies	 that	will	 be	 reviewed	 in	 this	
section	 –,	 while	 democratisation	 “entails	 liberalisation	 but	 is	 a	 wider	 and	 more	
specifically	 political	 concept.	 Democratisation	 requires	 open	 contestation	 over	 the	
right	 to	 win	 control	 of	 the	 government”.	 Thus,	 “it	 is	 obvious	 that	 there	 can	 be	
liberalisation	without	democratisation”	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996,	3).	
Cuba	 under	 Raúl	 Castro	 has	 also	 seen	 a	 degree	 of	 socio-political	 liberalisation	 –	
defined	 loosely	 as	 the	 relaxation	 of	 previous	 government	 restrictions.	 Concerning	
this	 subject,	 Farber	 (2015,	 np)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 Cuba	 has	 experienced	 “a	
significant	 degree	 of	 social	 liberalization	 (for	 example,	 in	 terms	 of	 religion	 and	
emigration).”	On	 a	 similar	 vein,	 Dilla	 (2014,	 np)	 has	 noted	 that,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	
past,	 the	 contemporary	Cuban	 regime	“does	not	demand	 the	 souls	of	 its	 subjects,	
but	 only	 their	 obedience”.	 From	 a	 regime-type	 perspective	 both	 developments	 fit	
the	definition	of	a	post-totalitarian	rule	reached	“by	choice”,	namely	a	maturing	path	
where	 pluralism	 relatively	 expands	 and	 mobilisation	 only	 aims	 “to	 achieve	 a	
minimum	 degree	 of	 conformity	 and	 compliance”	 while	 “the	 leading	 role	 of	 the	
official	party	is	still	sacrosanct”	(Linz	and	Stepan	1996,	42,	44-5,	293-4).	
The	 symptoms	 I	 will	 scrutinise	 are	 those	 belonging	 to	 the	 process	 of	 eliminating	
“irrational	prohibitions”	for	Cubans,	which	is	how	Raúl	Castro	has	referred	to	them.	
Such	 political	 changes	 are	 four:	 1)	 the	 freedom	 to	 buy	 hard-currency	 goods	 and	
services	previously	entitled	 to	 foreigners	only;	2)	 the	authorisation	 to	buy	and	 sell	
houses	and	cars;	3)	religious	tolerance;	and,	4)	flexible	migratory	rules.	
1.	DVD’s,	hotels,	mobiles	
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It	is	almost	obvious	to	infer	that	when	the	first	public	consultation	took	place	in	late	
2007,	a	 common	complaint	of	Cubans	was	 the	 issue	of	prohibitions.	 In	 the	speech	
that	Raúl	Castro	devoted	to	the	consultation,	he	precisely	addressed	this:	
We	agree	with	those	who	have	alerted	about	the	excess	of	prohibitions	and	legal	measures	
that	make	more	damage	than	good.	We	could	say	that	most	of	them	were	just	and	correct	in	
their	 time,	 but	 not	 a	 few	 of	 them	 have	 been	 overcome	 by	 life	 and	 behind	 each	 incorrect	
prohibition,	there	are	a	good	number	of	illegalities.	(R.	Castro	2007b)	
In	this	enunciation	the	notion	is	explicit	that	some	prohibitions	(those	causing	“more	
damage	than	good”)	have	become	obsolete	–	they	“have	been	overcome	by	life”.	On	
that	 occasion,	 however,	 Raúl	 also	 tried	 to	 keep	 moderate	 expectations	 on	 the	
possible	 pace	 of	 change:	 “All	 of	 us	 would	 like	 to	 go	more	 quickly,	 but	 this	 is	 not	
always	 possible”	 (R.	 Castro	 2007b).	 By	 then,	 Fidel	 Castro	was	 still	 on	 a	 temporary	
leave	of	office;	and	Raúl,	temporarily	on	board.	At	least	that	was	the	official	script.	
A	 reasonable	 guess	 is	 that	 the	 full	 transfer	 of	 power	 to	 Raúl	 was	 already	 being	
prepared	behind	the	scenes	for	when	this	actually	happened	in	February	2008,	the	
new	 government	 seemed	 to	 have	 pushed	 a	 button	 that	 activated	 a	 reformist	
impetus	that	had	been	nurtured	with	care.	In	other	words,	looking	back	in	hindsight	
on	 the	 first	 public	 consultation,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 such	 a	 process	 both	 increased	 the	
political	leverage	of	the	case	for	reform	while	it	also	paved	the	way	for	it.	
The	 new	 President	 of	 Cuba	 quickly	 went	 back	 to	 “the	 excess	 of	 prohibitions	 and	
regulations”	in	his	inaugural	speech:	“in	the	next	weeks	we	will	start	to	eliminate	the	
easiest	ones”	(R.	Castro	2008c).	But	again,	he	warned	this	would	be	a	slow	process:	
“The	 suppression	of	 other	 regulations	will	 take	more	 time”	 (ibid.).	 Cubans	did	 not	
have	to	wait	too	much	to	see	what	the	first	concrete	measures	were.	
In	early	March	2008,	the	regime	lifted	the	ban	on	DVD	and	computer	sales.	Then	at	
the	end	of	the	month	Cubans	were	authorised	to	book	rooms	in	hotels,	buy	mobile	
phone	services,	and	also	rent	cars	(Frank	2013,	114-5).	
2.	Cars	and	houses	
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On	the	eve	of	the	Sixth	Party	Congress,	during	the	third	public	consultation	–	the	one	
that	 debated	 the	 Lineamientos	 –	 the	 issue	 of	 prohibitions	 would	 re-emerge.	 Raúl	
Castro	actually	acknowledged	that	“many	of	the	statements	made	then	[in	the	first	
public	 consultation]	 are	 being	 repeated	 now	 during	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	
Lineamientos”	(R.	Castro	2010d).	In	particular,	he	would	tackle	the	issue	of	cars	and	
houses	in	his	December	2010	speech	–	i.e.	in	the	middle	of	the	pre-Congress	debate:	
One	can	arrive	at	a	life-tested	conclusion:	irrational	prohibitions	lead	to	violations	and	that	in	
turn	leads	to	corruption	and	impunity.		That	is	why	I	believe	that	people	are	right	[…]	in	their	
concerns	 over	 the	mind-boggling	 procedures	 associated	 with	 housing	 and	 the	 buying	 and	
selling	 of	 cars	 among	 individuals,	 just	 to	 mention	 two	 examples	 that	 are	 currently	 under	
study	 for	 an	 orderly	 solution.	 […]	 So	 if	 I	 have	 a	 little	 car,	 a	 jalopy	 or	 whatever,	 an	
“almendrón”,	as	it	is	commonly	called	here,	and	that	car	is	mine,	I	have	the	right	to	sell	it	to	
whomever	I	want.	(R.	Castro	2010d)	
These	“irrational	prohibitions”,	as	Raúl	 called	 them,	would	be	 lifted	after	 the	Sixth	
Party	Congress.	The	Lineamientos	approved	by	the	2011	Congress	 included	the	call	
to	authorise	 the	buy	and	sell	of	cars	and	houses	 (PCC	2011b,	guidelines	286,	297).	
Then	 in	 September	 the	 new	 car	 legislation	 was	 approved	 (Consejo	 de	 Ministros	
2011a),	and	the	houses’	would	come	in	November	(Consejo	de	Estado	2011).	
3.	Religion	
A	 new	 relationship	 between	 the	 Cuban	 state	 and	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 started	 to	
emerge	 in	2010.	 In	March	 that	year	opposition	member	Orlando	Zapata	died	on	a	
hunger	 strike	 in	 jail,	 which	 sparked	 international	 condemnation	 and	 a	 renewed	
attention	to	the	public	protests	of	the	Ladies	in	White	–	a	group	led	by	most	of	the	
wives	and	female	relatives	of	75	dissidents	jailed	in	the	“Black	Spring”	of	2003.	
However,	 the	crisis	 this	had	created	 to	 the	government	of	Raúl	Castro	came	 to	an	
end	 in	 July	 2010.	 In	 a	 deal	 brokered	by	 the	Catholic	 Church,	 52	 political	 prisoners	
were	released	by	the	Cuban	state	–	they	had	been	offered	asylum	in	Spain,	and	all	
but	13	accepted.	By	April	2011,	a	total	of	115	former	prisoners	had	arrived	in	Spain	
(Frank	2013,	204).	
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Later,	 in	 the	 opening	 speech	 of	 the	 Sixth	 Party	 Congress,	 Raúl	 would	 address	
religious	tolerance.	It	was	necessary,	according	to	him,	“to	continue	eradicating	any	
prejudice	that	prevents	bringing	all	Cubans	together,	like	brothers	and	sisters,	[…]	be	
them	[God]	believers	or	not”	(R.	Castro	2011a).	As	Raúl	then	made	reference	to	the	
“lengthy	 talks	with	 Cardinal	 Jaime	Ortega”	which	 concluded	 in	 the	 prisoners’	 deal	
with	 the	 Spanish	 government,	 it	 was	 obvious	 that	 this	 friendly	 gesture	 towards	
Catholicism	was	in	gratitude	for	the	prisoners’	deal	of	the	previous	year.	
In	August	2011,	in	what	seemed	an	opportunity	to	further	the	goodwill	towards	the	
Catholic	Church,	Raúl	made	public	the	rehabilitation	of	a	Catholic	militant	of	the	PCC.	
On	that	occasion,	he	denounced	the	“injustice”,	which	according	to	him	was	based	
on	“obsolete	concepts	[…]	still	rooted	in	the	mentality	of	leaders	at	all	levels”	(Castro	
2011c).	 However,	 the	 climax	 of	 the	 new	 relation	 was	 March	 2012,	 when	 Pope	
Benedict	XVI	visited	Cuba	and	offered	public	masses	in	Havana	and	Santiago.		
The	 Catholic	 Church	 was	 granted	 several	 concessions	 in	 2011-2012,	 including	 the	
opening	of	 the	cultural	 centre	Félix	Varela	–	one	of	 the	 few	spots	of	 critical	public	
debate	 –	 and	 the	 authorisation	 to	publish	magazines	 and	 a	 national	 procession	of	
the	 Lady	 of	 Charity.	 These	 were	 “discretional	 rights	 concessions	 –	 that	 in	 any	
democratic	society	would	exist	as	normal	and	well-defined	rights”,	as	Farber	(2012,	
124)	has	put	 it.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	Church	now	enjoys	a	new	position	 that	has	
enabled	it	to	spread	its	usual	ideas	against	abortion	or	homosexuality	(Farber	2012,	
131-32).	
Setting	aside	the	interests	that	the	Cuban	state	and	the	Catholic	Church	may	have	in	
harbouring	a	good	relationship,	the	by-product	of	religious	tolerance	is	real.	
4.	Migration	
The	 changes	 in	 migratory	 policy	 had	 been	 mentioned	 by	 Raúl	 Castro	 to	 Cardinal	
Ortega	in	2010	during	their	private	talks	that	ended	up	in	the	prisoners’	deal	(Frank	
2013,	 204).	 But	 he	would	 only	 address	 this	 subject	 in	 public	 after	 the	 Sixth	 Party	
Congress.	In	this	sense,	one	may	speculate	that	this	issue	had	also	been	raised	in	the	
pre-Congress	 debate,	 as	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 otherwise	 –	 any	 foreigner	 that	
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travelled	 to	 Cuba	 and	 spoke	 to	 local	 people	 before	 the	 new	migratory	 legislation	
came	into	effect	in	2013	almost	as	a	rule	heard	complaints	about	it.	
Raúl	Castro	finally	addressed	the	migratory	prohibitions	in	August	2011:	
As	part	of	the	measures	being	considered	in	the	reduction	of	prohibitions	and	rules	issued	in	
other	moments	 of	 the	 revolutionary	 process	 in	 legitimate	 defence	 […]	 that	 later	 endured	
unnecessarily,	 I	 take	 this	 opportunity	 to	 inform	 the	 deputies	 and	 the	 citizens	 that	we	 are	
working	towards	the	updating	of	migratory	policy.	(R.	Castro	2011c)	
The	new	 legislation	was	approved	 in	October	2012	 (Consejo	de	Estado	2012a)	and	
came	into	effect	in	January	2013.	Nevertheless,	although	the	new	rules	reduced	and	
made	 less	expensive	 the	bureaucratic	hurdles	 to	 leave	and	visit	Cuba,	 “the	 reform	
leaves	 standing	 –	 does	 not	 even	 touch	 it	 –	 the	 authoritarian	 principle	 that	 Cuban	
society	does	not	have	an	inalienable	right	to	free	passage”	(Dilla	2012,	80).	Cubans	
living	abroad	still	need	permission	to	visit	Cuba,	while	those	living	on	the	Island	can	
still	be	denied	foreign	travel.	This	migratory	arrangement	is	enforced	by	the	state	to	
encourage	an	acceptable	political	behaviour	of	its	subjects	(Dilla	2012,	75-77).	
However,	from	a	less	pessimistic	view,	one	must	accept	that	despite	the	fact	that	the	
new	migratory	policy	does	not	restore	the	unconditional	right	of	free	passage	it	has	
indeed	become	more	flexible.	
What	can	account	for	the	relative	liberalisation?	
It	 is	this	not	surprising	that	the	four	 liberalising	symptoms	I	have	summarised	here	
were	 introduced	 only	 after	 Raúl	 became	 the	 definitive	 new	 President	 in	 February	
2008.	 Furthermore,	 three	 of	 them	 fully	 emerged	 after	 the	 Sixth	 Party	 Congress,	
when	the	post-totalitarian	normalisation	was	turning	into	a	maturing	path.	By	then,	
the	 increase	 of	 economic-based	 legitimacy	 allowed	 the	 regime	 to	 get	 by	 without	
“irrational	prohibitions”.	In	any	case,	the	single-party	rule	is	still	sacrosanct.	
Here	 the	 perspective	 of	 legitimacy’s	 re-equilibration	 helps	 to	 explain	 the	 relative	
liberalisation.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 new	 role	 of	 economic	 performance	 in	 Cuban	 politics,	
certain	past	restrictions	now	appear	obsolete	by	virtue	of	their	 lack	of	contribution	
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to	 the	 new	 claims	 to	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 regime.	 In	 conclusion,	 setting	 aside	 the	
relaxation	of	rules	for	non-state	actors,	there	are	additional	political	symptoms	that	
confirm	the	maturing	path	of	the	Cuban	regime	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	
Summary	
In	this	chapter	I	demonstrated	that	the	change	experienced	by	the	Cuban	regime	in	
the	 period	 2006-2014	 can	 be	 adequately	 understood	 as	 a	 transition	 from	 a	
charismatic	 post-totalitarian	 character	 to	 a	 maturing	 post-totalitarian	 one.	 This	
meant	that	the	charismatic	legitimacy	of	Fidel	Castro	had	been	compensated	with	a	
turn	 to	 a	performance-based	 legitimacy	–	 as	 explained	by	Raul	Castro	himself	 and	
verified	 in	 the	 qualitative	 content	 of	 his	 speeches	 during	 his	 presidency.	 Such	 a	
political	 process	 explains	 why	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 charismatic	 leadership	 was	
accompanied	by	the	adoption	of	a	market-socialist	ideology.	
The	rise	of	a	performance-based	 legitimacy	 in	Cuba	has	also	been	accompanied	by	
correlated	phenomena	consistent	with	the	diagnosis	of	the	regime	as	undergoing	a	
maturing	 post-totalitarian	 transition.	 Such	 is	 the	 case	 of	 the	 relative	 liberalisation	
that	Cuba	has	also	lived	during	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro.	Although	he	has	ruled	
out	any	change	on	the	status	of	the	single-party	rule,	the	space	of	some	individual	
freedoms	has	increased	–	an	unambiguous	symptom	of	post-totalitarian	maturation.	
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8.	Conclusions	
The	question	of	this	thesis	was	how	and	why	has	the	Cuban	regime	changed	during	
the	 presidency	 of	 Raúl	 Castro?	 In	 chapter	 1	 I	 thus	 elaborated	 this	 question	 and	
explained	 how	 I	 collected	 relevant	 data.	 Then,	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 Marxist	
conceptual	ground	floor,	in	chapter	2,	I	defined	the	polity	that	emerged	in	Cuba	after	
the	 1959	 revolution	 as	 a	 non-capitalist	 totalitarianism.	 Then	 in	 chapter	 3,	 drawing	
from	 the	 literature	 of	 communist	 survival,	 I	 theorised	 the	 causal	 mechanism	 that	
could	have	provoked	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	path	in	Cuba	after	2006.	Chapter	4	
offered	 a	 concise	 historical	 background	 of	 the	 decades	 of	 communist	 rule	 under	
Fidel	Castro.	Then	chapters	5	and	6,	 for	 their	part,	offered	a	diachronic	analysis	of	
the	 presidency	 of	 Raúl	 Castro	 for	 the	 period	 2006-2014.	 Finally,	 in	 chapter	 7,	 I	
explained	why	the	evidence	of	the	chapters	5	and	6	confirmed	a	maturing	path.	
I	would	 like	to	conclude	this	 thesis	by	outlining	first	 the	main	argument	developed	
throughout	 this	 work,	 and	 how/why	 they	 are	 a	 contribution	 to	 knowledge;	 and	
second	by	sketching	some	 ideas	on	the	 implications	of	 the	changes	 in	Cuba	during	
the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro	for	radical	politics	and	the	US	connection.	
8.1	Arguments	and	contribution	
As	far	as	I	know,	this	thesis	is	the	most	exhaustive	study	to	date	on	the	Cuban	regime	
under	 Raúl	 Castro.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 I	 am	 the	 only	 one	 who	 has	 analysed	
contemporary	Cuba,	though.	To	be	sure,	scholars	in	many	fields	have	addressed	this	
important	topic.	Within	economic	analysis,	scholars	such	as	Mesa	Lago	(2012),	Pérez	
Villanueva	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 and	 Henken	 and	 Ritter	 (2014)	 have	 all	 explored	 the	
economic	changes	shaping	Cuba.	Within	political	analysis,	meanwhile,	scholars	such	
as	 Hoffmann	 (2009),	 Mujal-León	 (2011),	 and	 Kapcia	 (2014)	 have	 focused	 on	 the	
specific	vicissitudes	within	the	elite	that	have	shaped	the	new	leadership.	
However,	 none	 of	 these	 works	 has	 addressed	 the	 interconnection	 between	 the	
economic	 and	 political	 changes.	 Despite	 much	 excellent	 work	 on	 themes	 such	 as	
assessing	the	economic	reform	and	the	succession	question,	scholars	examining	the	
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transformations	 of	 the	 Cuban	 polity	 have	 not	 yet	 fully	 explained	 the	 intimate	 link	
between	the	above-mentioned	spheres,	which	is	what	I	aimed	to	do	in	this	thesis.	
The	main	 contribution	of	 this	 thesis	 is	 thus	 analytical,	 i.e.	 how	 to	explain	or	make	
sense	of	the	presidency	of	Raúl	Castro	and	what	this	means	for	Cuban	communism.	
In	 short,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 current	 market	 socialism	 is	 a	 product	 of	 charismatic	
decline	because	the	former	emerged	to	fix	the	legitimacy	crisis	opened	by	the	latter.	
In	addition	 to	 this	 insight,	 the	characterisation	of	 the	Cuban	case	offered	here	has	
some	conceptual	implications	for	the	literatures	I	mixed	in	the	analytical	framework	
of	 this	 thesis:	 ‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxism	 and	 Political	 Science	 –	 I	 added	 the	 ‘post-
totalitarian’	 regime-type	 into	 the	 former	 literature,	 and	 the	 ‘market-socialist’	
approach	 into	the	 latter.	On	the	one	hand,	how	shall	Marxists	 face	the	actuality	of	
post-totalitarian	 rule	 in	 Cuba?	 On	 the	 other,	 what	 does	 market	 socialism	 tell	 us	
about	 the	 theory	 of	 communist	 survival?	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 restate	 my	 main	
argument	before	discussing	its	contribution	to	transitology	and	the	Marxist	tradition.		
1.	Cuban	communism	
The	 central	 argument	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 in	 the	 period	 2006-2014,	 Cuba	
experienced	 a	 regime	 change.	 In	 other	 words,	 in	 the	 Cuban	 non-transition	 from	
communist	 rule,	 the	 form	 of	 government	 has	 exhibited	 an	 important	 variation.	
When	measured	against	the	post-totalitarian	regime	type,	Cuba	can	be	said	to	have	
changed	 from	 a	 charismatic	 post-totalitarianism	 to	 a	 maturing	 one.	 The	 basic	
argument	behind	this	conceptualisation	can	be	summarised	in	two	processes.	
The	 first	process	 started	when	Fidel	Castro	 stepped	down	 in	 July	2006.	 From	 then	
on,	 the	political	 legitimacy	provided	by	his	 charismatic	 leadership	 suffered	a	blow.	
Using	Weber´s	terms,	the	“succession	problem”	fully	emerged.	This,	of	course,	does	
not	 mean	 that	 Cuba	 since	 the	 1959	 revolution	 relied	 solely	 on	 Fidel´s	 persona.	
However,	 the	 sudden	 absence	 of	 an	 old	 source	 of	 legitimacy	 created	 the	 need	 to	
rebalance	the	claims	to	legitimacy	of	a	regime	interested	in	its	self-preservation.	
The	second	process	thus	refers	to	the	response	to	the	problems	created	by	the	first	
process.	Raúl	Castro´s	solution	to	the	“succession	problem”	–	again,	using	Weber´s	
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terms	–	was	 to	 replace	 the	 charismatic	 claims	 to	 legitimacy	by	 legal-rational	ones.	
However,	in	a	regime	where	socialist	ideology	had	been	seriously	undermined	by	the	
failures	of	 the	CPE	model,	 stressing	 the	 legality	of	 the	succession	was	not	enough.	
Hence	Raúl	took	a	step	further	and	promised	to	improve	the	standards	of	living.	
The	emergence	of	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	regime	in	Cuba	was	thus	the	result	of	
a	turn	to	performance-based	legitimacy	in	substitution	of	charismatic	claims.	Hence	
the	regime	sought	a	new	“pragmatic	acceptance”	from	its	subjects,	a	situation	that	
Saxonberg	defined	as	part	of	the	“late”	post-totalitarian	stage	in	the	following	terms:	
The	 communist	 regimes	 lose	 their	 grand-future	 oriented	 beliefs	 and	 instead	 promise	
improves	 living	standards.	Consequently	they	try	to	reach	some	sort	of	social	contract	with	
the	population	in	order	to	induce	it	to	“pragmatically	accept”	that	given	certain	external	and	
internal	constraints,	the	regime	is	performing	reasonably	well.	(Saxonberg	2013,	18)	
Using	Saxonberg’s	terms,	if	a	regime	acts	upon	this	performance-based	promise,	it	is	
maturing,	 but	 if	 it	 sticks	 to	 the	 (failed)	 CPE	 model,	 is	 said	 to	 be	 freezing.	 In	 this	
perspective,	Cuba	under	Raúl	Castro	matured	–	in	response	to	the	loss	of	charisma.	
To	 prove	 all	 the	 above-mentioned	 process,	 I	 first	 had	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
leadership	was	no	longer	charismatic	and	that	the	ideology	of	the	regime	had	been	
revised	 according	 to	 the	 new	 economic	 objectives.	 As	 I	 discussed	 throughout	
chapters	5	and	6	of	 this	 thesis,	 it	can	be	said	 that	collegiality	 replaced	charisma	 in	
the	leadership	and	that	market	socialism	replaced	CPE	at	the	level	of	ideology.	
Collegiality	 is	a	 form	of	collective	arrangement,	 in	which	all	of	the	members	of	the	
collegial	 body	 are	 equals.	 The	new	 leadership	 is	 collegial	 insofar	 as	 there	 are	now	
term	limits	in	top	posts,	and	the	title	of	Commander-in-Chief	–	the	Fidel’s	long-held	
title	 –	 has	 been	 discontinued.	 Collegiality	 is	 anti-charismatic	 because	 it	 tries	 “to	
prevent	the	rise	of	monocratic	power”	(Weber	1978a,	277).	However,	this	does	not	
exclude	the	possibility	that	a	collegial	body	possess	a	primus	inter	pares,	a	member	
who	is	the	first	among	equals,	as	Raúl	currently	is.	Another	proof	of	the	new	type	of	
leadership	in	Cuba	is	the	fact	that	 it	 is	expected	that	the	top	posts	 in	the	Politburo	
and	the	Council	of	State	currently	hold	by	the	revolutionary	veterans	–	the	Castro’s	
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‘inner	 circle’	 –	 are	 filled	 by	 leaders	 of	 the	main	 legal-rational	 pillars	 of	 the	 Cuban	
regime:	the	Communist	Party	of	Cuba	and	the	Revolutionary	Armed	Forces.	
Market	 socialism	 is	 “an	 attempt	 to	 reconcile	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	 market	 as	 a	
system	of	exchange	with	social	ownership	of	the	means	of	production”	(in	Calhoun	
2002,	294).	The	current	economic	doctrine	of	the	Cuban	regime	was	approved	in	the	
Sixth	 Party	 Congress	 of	 2011.	 The	 first	 bullet	 point	 approved	 by	 that	 meeting	
specified	 that	 “planning	will	 take	 the	market	 into	account,	 influencing	upon	 it	 and	
considering	 its	 characteristics”	 (PCC	 2011b,	 guideline	 1).	 It	 is	 true	 that	 ‘market	
socialism’	is	not	the	official	term	used	in	Cuba,	but	neither	is	‘collegiality’.	To	define	
the	regime’s	ideology	as	I	do,	simply	means	that	Cuba	is	still	non-capitalist,	but	the	
market	 subjects	are	no	 longer	stigmatised	as	 they	were	before	2006.	Raúl’s	call	 to	
‘update’	 the	economic	model	 in	order	to	achieve	a	 ‘prosperous’	socialism	can	thus	
be	read	as	a	market-socialist	victory	over	the	old	and	impoverishing	CPE	doctrine.	
I	 also	demonstrated	 that	 the	 change	 in	 the	 type	of	 leadership	and	 ideology	of	 the	
Cuban	regime	was	caused	by	the	re-equilibration	 in	 its	claims	to	 legitimacy.	Ergo,	 I	
also	demonstrate	that	such	a	re-equilibration	had	indeed	taken	place.	Here	I	think	is	
enough	 to	 remind	 the	 reader	 that	 this	 discussion	 is	 detailed	 in	 chapter	 7.	 The	
substantiation	 of	 these	 processes	 brought	me	 back	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	
according	to	which	Cuba	had	experienced	a	regime	change	in	the	period	2006-2014.	
2.	Post-totalitarian	literature	
Linz	 (2001)	 had	 explained	 that	 in	 his	 work	 with	 Stepan	 (1996),	 they	 limited	 “to	
distinguishing	 post-totalitarian	 regimes	 from	 both	 authoritarian	 regimes	 and	 the	
previous	totalitarian	regime.	We	did	not	enter	into	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	change	
from	totalitarianism	to	post-totalitarianism,	although	we	did	point	to	different	paths	
and	 degrees	 of	 change”	 (Linz	 2000,	 6).	 Saxonberg	 (2013),	 for	 his	 part,	 added	 a	
detailed	framework	to	explain	such	a	change	and	the	rationale	behind	the	different	
post-totalitarian	 paths.	 To	 be	 fair,	 his	 analysis	 of	 survival	 of	 communist	 rule	
supposed	a	breakthrough	in	my	doctoral	studies	–	I	read	his	book	almost	right	away	
after	being	published	and	decided	to	turn	my	thesis	into	a	contribution	to	a	path	he	
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had	opened.	In	doing	so,	however,	I	reapplied	his	theory	to	the	Cuban	case	in	order	
to	rectify	a	characterization	that	I	sensed	was	contradicted	by	reality.	
Thus,	I	have	discarded	and	sought	to	replace	Saxonberg’s	explanation	of	Cuban	post-
totalitarian	evolution.	For	him,	Cuba	since	the	 late	1980s	has	been	a	freezing	post-
totalitarian	regime	that	in	the	1990s	mixed	sultanic	elements	–	i.e.	Fidel	Castro	had	
become	 a	 dynastic	 leader	 like	 Kim	 Il	 Sung	 in	 North	 Korea.	 For	 Saxonberg,	 this	
definition	was	valid	as	far	as	2013.	This	thesis,	however,	refutes	this	characterization	
and	offers	the	alternative	above-mentioned	account	of	contemporary	Cuba.	
Besides,	 my	 characterization	 of	 Cuba	 under	 Raúl	 Castro	 poses	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	
theory	of	communist	survival,	according	 to	which	 the	communist	 regimes	can	only	
stick	 to	 CPE	 or	 surrender	 to	 capitalism	 (Saxonberg	 2013,	 28,	 272).	 In	 this	 sense,	
Cuba’s	 maturing	 path	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 introduces	 the	 market	 but	 sticks	 to	 non-
capitalist	 property	 relations	 is	 a	 conceptual	 contribution.	 However,	 to	 be	 more	
precise,	 the	 maturing	 alternative	 embodied	 in	 the	 market-socialist	 approach	 is	
registered	 but	 not	 theorised	 by	 Saxonberg.	 It	 is	 implied	 in	 his	 work	 in	 the	
characterisation	 of	 1970s	 Yugoslavia	 as	 a	 maturing	 post-totalitarian	 regime	
(Saxonberg	 2013,	 113)	 –	 precisely	 the	 case	 that	was	 the	 paradigm	 of	 real	market	
socialism	at	the	time.	For	Montias	(1970,	121),	only	two	market-socialist	cases	had	
existed:	the	Yugoslavian,	and	the	New	Economic	Policy	in	the	Soviet	Union	after	the	
civil	war	with	Lenin	still	in	charge.	(Just	to	avoid	confusion,	I	would	not	define	Lenin’s	
Soviet	Union	as	maturing	post-totalitarian	for	this	regime	was	not	totalitarian	yet.)	In	
this	 sense,	 I	 think	 that	 the	 idea	 that	market	mechanisms	 can	 operate	within	 non-
capitalist	 settings	 and	 actually	 work	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 socialist	 planning	 and	
property	relations	deserves	to	be	underscored	within	the	literature	dealing	with	the	
analysis	of	communist	systems	(survivors	or	not).	
3.	Non-Soviet-like	literature	
In	 this	 latter	 regard,	 I	 also	 think	 that	 the	 Cuban	 rediscovery	 of	 market-socialist	
solutions	has	 implications	 for	 the	 ‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxist	 tradition.	One	points	 to	
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the	need	to	reassess	the	role	of	the	market	in	socialist	thought.	The	other	points	to	
the	relevance	of	‘non-Soviet-like’	Marxist	critique	in	a	context	like	the	Cuban	one.	
The	 fact	 that	 Soviet-style	 CPE	 was	 the	 communist	 economic	 policy	 par	 excellence	
through	the	20th	century	has	created	the	notion	that	socialists	cannot	offer	anything	
but	CPE.	However,	Marx’s	 call	 for	 the	socialisation	of	 the	means	of	production	did	
not	have	to	be	only	understood,	 let	alone	materialised	as	a	monopoly	of	the	state,	
not	to	mention	one	led	by	a	single	party.	Even	Lenin,	as	early	as	1918,	proposed	that	
co-operatives	needed	to	play	a	key	role	in	the	new	Soviet	state	–	even	more	later	in	
the	middle	of	 the	market-friendly	New	Economic	Policy	 (e.g.	 Lenin	1918,	 1923).	 In	
short,	 the	 ‘market’	 is	not	a	notion	at	odds	with	communist	 ideas.	Furthermore,	 for	
Trotsky	it	is	the	‘market’	(along	with	‘democracy’)	that	Stalin’s	CPE	gravely	lacked:	
[T]hree	systems	must	be	subjected	to	a	brief	analysis:	(1)	special	state	departments,	that	is,	
the	hierarchical	system	of	plan	commissions,	in	the	centre	and	locally;	(2)	trade,	as	a	system	
of	 market	 regulation;	 (3)	 Soviet	 democracy,	 as	 a	 system	 for	 the	 living	 regulation	 by	 the	
masses	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 economy.	 If	 a	 universal	mind	 existed,	 [...]	 such	 a	mind,	 of	
course,	could	a	priori	draw	up	a	faultless	and	exhaustive	economic	plan,	beginning	with	the	
number	of	acres	of	wheat	down	to	the	last	button	for	a	vest.	The	bureaucracy	often	imagines	
that	just	such	a	mind	is	at	its	disposal;	that	is	why	it	so	easily	frees	itself	from	the	control	of	
the	market	and	of	Soviet	democracy.	(Trotsky	1932,	np)	
In	other	words,	Cuba’s	non-capitalist	rediscovery	of	the	market	shall	not	deserve	the	
political	opposition	of	radicals.	Otherwise,	radicals	end	up	lamenting	the	revision	of	
CPE	orthodoxy,	which	time	and	again	failed	in	different	countries.	Far	from	this,	the	
opposition	must	be	located	in	the	field	of	democracy	and	the	single-party.	
Trotsky	had	 long	argued	that	 if	a	workers’	 revolt	did	not	succeed	 in	democratically	
renewing	 the	 really	 existing	 socialism,	 then	 a	 capitalist	 restoration	 led	 by	 the	
bureaucracy	would	follow.	This	tension	remained	unsolved	in	the	transitions	to	post-
totalitarian	rule	because	a	key	claim	to	 legitimacy	of	these	elites	was	based	on	the	
idea	that	they	embodied	the	utopia	after	capitalism.	This	situation	is	what	Saxonberg	
(2013,	 17)	 has	 explained	 by	 the	 role	 of	 “ideological	 legitimacy”	 in	 the	 early	 post-
totalitarian	stage.	From	a	Marxist	view,	Žižek	has	explained	the	paradox	of	Stalinist	
regimes	 defending	 some	 socialist	 ideas	 by	 reference	 to	 “the	 radical	 ambiguity	 of	
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Stalinist	ideology	which,	even	at	its	most	'totalitarian',	still	exudes	an	emancipatory	
potential”	because	these	regimes	anyway	“provided	the	spectators	with	new	ethical	
standards	by	which	reality	was	to	be	measured”	(Žižek	2002,	131-32).	
In	 this	 sense,	 Saxonberg	 is	 right	 in	his	 claim	 that	once	 the	 ideological	 legitimacy	 is	
lost,	the	capitalist	restoration	is	 just	a	matter	of	time,	either	due	to	the	collapse	of	
communist	rule	or	to	prevent	the	collapse	itself.	In	any	of	these	cases,	the	elite	was	
unwilling	to	defend	a	status	quo	they	no	longer	believed	in.	And	this	brings	us	back	
to	Trotsky’s	basic	argument:	 in	 the	absence	of	a	workers’	 revolt	 that	democratises	
communist	rule,	capitalist	restoration	by	top	bureaucrats	is	an	actual	danger.	
8.2	Practical	implications	and	potential	scenarios	
In	this	final	section	I	will	outline	how	the	findings	of	this	thesis	may	1)	inform	radical	
political	practice,	and	2)	relate	to	the	new	US-Cuba	relations.	
1.	The	challenge	of	socialist	democrats	
To	define	Cuba	as	a	maturing	post-totalitarian	regime	has	two	major	implications	for	
the	‘non-Soviet-like’	perspective	outlined	in	the	introduction	and	chapter	2.	On	the	
one	hand,	such	a	definition	implies	to	acknowledge	that	market	socialism	is	an	anti-
capitalist	progress	compared	to	the	previous	CPE	orthodoxy;	on	the	other,	it	means	
that	 in	 the	 absence	of	 democracy,	market	 socialism	 can	degenerate	 into	 capitalist	
restoration	–	the	dilemma	described	by	Trotsky.	If	the	second	scenario	prevails,	the	
line	that	still	separates	Cuba	from	China	and	Vietnam	will	thus	be	erased.	
In	this	sense,	Raúl	Castro’s	reforms	have	increased	the	scope	of	market	mechanisms	
without	democratic	controls.	As	discussed	in	chapter	6,	the	Cuban	researcher	Mesa	
Tejeda	 (2014)	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 co-ops	 legislation	 undermines	 the	
democratic	potential	of	this	form	of	property.	At	the	same	time,	the	rise	of	decision-
making	 power	 of	 the	 managers	 in	 the	 context	 of	 financial	 autonomy	 of	 state	
companies	 is	not	countered	by	workplace	democratic	arrangements.	 In	the	case	of	
co-ops	legislation	at	least	the	notion	of	‘democracy’	is	mentioned	once	(Consejo	de	
Estado	2012b,	art.	4),	whereas	that	notion	is	never	mentioned	in	the	new	company	
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legislation…	which	otherwise	provides	a	 list	of	 the	106	“faculties”	of	 the	managing	
directors	(Consejo	de	Ministros	2014,	art.	65).	
Here	the	contrast	between	a	socialist	democratic	approach	and	a	liberal	democratic	
one	deserved	to	be	mentioned.	The	latter	celebrates	Raúl’s	reform	but	not	because	
it	proves	the	capacity	of	non-capitalist	economies	to	adopt	the	market,	but	because	
it	sees	it	as	a	transitory	stage	before	the	return	to	capitalist	normalcy.	
Thus,	 López-Levy	 (2011,	 15)	 sees	 Raúl’s	 reforms	 as	 “a	 step	 towards	 the	 goal	 of	
promoting	 a	 stable,	 peaceful	 and	 gradual	 transition	 to	 a	 more	 open	 political	 and	
economic	 system	 in	 a	 democratic	 Cuba.”	 However,	 what	 does	 a	 “more	 open”	
economic	system	means?	The	answer	is	in	López-Levy’s	advice	to	US	foreign	policy:	
The	optimal	antecedent	to	promoting	democratization	in	the	medium	term	is	by	supporting	
market-oriented	economic	reform	today.	A	peaceful	and	gradual	transition	to	democracy	in	
Cuba	 in	 the	mid-term	 depends	 as	much	 on	 economic	 reform	 as	 on	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	
independent	and	globally-connected	middle	class.	(López-Levy	2011,	16)	
As	if	following	the	advice,	indeed	the	US	government,	as	part	of	the	normalisation	of	
relations	with	Cuba	that	started	in	December	2014,	has	defined	as	one	of	its	policy	
goals	“to	empower	the	nascent	Cuban	private	sector”	(White	House	2015).	Thus,	in	
the	 liberal	democratic	 view,	democratisation	and	capitalist	 restoration	 in	Cuba	are	
like	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 same	 coin.	 In	 consequence,	 this	 approach	 is	 silent	 about	 the	
anti-democracy	 implied	 in	 the	 current	 reform,	 then	 even	 less	 interested	 in	 the	
substantial	dose	of	anti-democracy	required	to	install	a	capitalist	democracy.		
The	socialist	democratic	vision	may	start	by	restating	a	key	concept:	“From	Ancient	
Greece,	we	 have	 a	 name	 for	 the	 intrusion	 of	 the	 excluded	 into	 the	 socio-political	
space:	democracy”	(Žižek	2009b,	55).	While	the	liberal	democratic	approach	seeks	to	
engage	 the	 eventual	winners	 of	 the	 reform,	 the	 socialist	 democratic	 one	 seeks	 to	
avoid	 the	 formation	 of	 losers.	 The	 former	 seeks	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 bourgeoisie	
while	 the	 latter	wants	 to	avoid	 the	 formation	of	 the	proletariat.	 The	 task	 is	 to	act	
pre-emptively	 and	 oppose	 the	 top-down	politics	 in	 favour	 of	 bottom-up	practices.	
Although	the	case	for	a	non-capitalist	democratic	regime	has	not	been	elaborated	in	
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this	thesis	–	such	was	not	the	purpose	of	this	work	–	such	 is	the	perspective	that	 I	
think	can	better	articulate	the	opposition	to	the	prospect	of	capitalist	restoration.	
In	this	sense,	 it	 is	not	enough,	as	Piñeiro	Harnecker	 (2013,	2014)	does,	 to	 limit	the	
agenda	of	democratisation	to	the	workplace	level	(in	co-ops,	state	companies,	etc.).	
For	her,	the	task	is	to	expand	self-management	and	ultimately	make	it	the	main	form	
of	economic	administration,	thus	making	Cuba’s	market	socialism	less	authoritarian	
and	closer	to	the	Yugoslav	model.	However,	a	socialist	democratic	position	must	deal	
with	the	issue	of	the	party-state	in	Cuba,	otherwise	the	self-management	proposal	is	
incomplete	and	lacking	strategic	vision,	as	Farber	has	explained:	
An	unfortunate	byproduct	of	the	emphasis	on	local	self-management	has	been	a	relative	lack	
of	attention	to	the	elephant	in	the	room:	the	all-controlling,	all-encompassing,	undemocratic	
one-party	 state.	 Discussions	 of	 self-management	 have	 tended	 to	 ignore	 the	 necessity	 for	
planning	at	the	national	level	and	the	fact	that	the	CCP	will	inevitably	dominate	that	planning	
unless	 its	 political	 monopoly	 is	 abolished.	 The	 Yugoslavian	 experience	 of	 the	 last	 century	
shows	 that	 authentic	 self-management	 at	 the	 local	 level	 can	 only	 function	 when	 there	 is	
economic	 planning	 that	 is	 national	 in	 scope,	 but	 does	 not	 neglect	 democratic	 workplace	
participation.	 	Decisions	concerning	vital	questions	such	as	accumulation	and	consumption,	
wages,	taxes,	and	social	services	affect	the	whole	society	and	significantly	limit	what	can	be	
decided	 in	each	work	center	—	new	structures	are	needed	 to	 facilitate	exchange	between	
them.	(Farber	2014b,	np)	
The	struggle	for	political	liberties	and	independent	unions	is	thus	a	central	element.	
At	this	stage,	however,	Cuban	post-totalitarianism	blocks	all	independent	grassroots	
democracy,	which	entails	the	risk	of	making	the	current	market	socialism	just	a	mere	
transitory	stage	in	the	road	to	Party-led	capitalism,	as	in	China	and	Vietnam.	
2.	Final	note:	on	US-Cuba	relations:	
Although	 my	 research	 has	 since	 the	 outset	 been	 focused	 on	 internal	 political	
changes	in	Cuba,	it	has	been	inevitable	during	these	years	to	receive	questions	about	
the	 role	 of	 the	 US	 in	 shaping	 internal	 events.	 Of	 course	 I	 do	 not	 neglect	 the	
importance	 of	 US	 aggression	 both	 in	 the	 economic	 embargo/blockade	 dimension	
and	as	a	source	of	national/anti-imperialist	 legitimacy.	However,	 just	to	restate	the	
obvious,	while	 the	old	basic	contours	of	US-Cuba	 relations	had	not	changed	 in	 the	
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period	2006-2014,	the	Cuban	regime	had.	Thus,	it	could	not	be	attributed	any	causal	
effect	to	the	US	foreign	policy	in	shaping	internal	events	on	the	island.	This	is	not	to	
say	 that	 Raúl	 Castro’s	 government	 ignored	 the	 US	 in	 their	 calculations;	 it	 simply	
means	that	the	US	‘variable’	remained	constant	and	thus	lacked	explanatory	power.	
Hence,	the	changes	going	on	in	Cuba	could	be	better	explained	by	internal	factors.	
However,	US-Cuba	relations	started	to	normalise	on	last	December	2014.	And	after	
this,	me	and	the	few	others	PhD	colleagues	writing	a	thesis	on	contemporary	Cuba	
have	 now	 been	 asked	 how	 such	 an	 event	 proves	 or	 disproves	 our	work.	 The	 first	
thing	 to	 note	 is	 that	 this	 diplomatic	 turn	 says	more	 about	 a	 change	 in	US	 foreign	
policy	 towards	 Cuba	 than	 the	 other	 way	 around.	 Moreover,	 this	 diplomatic	
breakthrough	is	a	Cuban	victory	over	US	imperialism.	Farber	has	summarised	why:	
First,	because	it	acknowledges	that	the	imperial	power	of	the	US	was	not	able	to	coerce	the	
imposition	of	 its	socio-economic	and	political	system,	handing	a	victory	 for	 the	principle	of	
national	self-determination.	(Farber	2014a)	
While	 the	goal	of	Barack	Obama’s	government	 is	 still	 to	 stir	a	 transition	 to	 liberal-
democratic	rule,	 the	US	will	now	pursue	this	goal	 through	an	engagement	strategy	
rather	than	by	trying	to	isolate	the	Cuban	state	(Badella	2015).	In	the	past,	Cuba	had	
sabotaged	 the	 US	 detente	 attempts	 (Whitehead	 2007),	 which	 points	 to	 the	 main	
change	in	Cuba’s	attitude.	Raúl	Castro’s	government	is	aware	of	the	ultimate	goal	of	
US	policy	but	 is	willing	 to	 accept	 the	 challenge	 and	normalise	 relations.	 The	 latter	
point	was	made	explicit	at	the	opening	of	the	Cuban	embassy	in	Washington	last	July	
2015	by	Cuba’s	foreign	minister	Bruno	Rodríguez:	
To	insist	in	the	attainment	of	obsolete	and	unjust	goals,	only	hoping	for	a	mere	change	in	the	
methods	to	achieve	them	will	not	legitimize	them	or	favor	the	national	interest	of	the	United	
States	 or	 its	 citizens.	 However,	 should	 that	 be	 the	 case,	 we	 would	 be	 ready	 to	 face	 the	
challenge.(Rodríguez	2015)	
This	said,	how	the	new	US-Cuba	relations	look	under	thee	light	of	the	regime	change	
I	have	characterised	in	this	thesis?	This	question	brings	me	back	to	a	point	I	made	in	
the	introduction.	The	maturing	post-totalitarian	regime	was	born	in	Cuba	in	reaction	
to	the	succession	problem	sparked	by	the	stepping	down	of	the	charismatic	leader,	
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Fidel.	 Thus,	 performance-based	 legitimacy	 took	 over	 charisma.	 However,	 other	
elements	 of	 legitimacy	 remained	 constant:	 nationalism	 and	 the	 conquistas.	While	
Raúl	has	overhauled	the	conquistas,	the	central	elements	(free	education	and	health	
care)	 remain.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 nationalism,	 it	 has	 the	 double	 dimension	 of	 anti-
imperialism	 and	 claims	 of	 continuity	with	 the	 independence	 Cuban	movements	 of	
the	 19th	 century.	 As	US	 foreign	 policy	 for	 the	 first	 time	 deals	with	 Cuba	 in	 a	 non-
colonial	manner,	 the	 Cuban	 regime’s	 rationale	 for	 curtailing	 political	 liberties	 as	 a	
necessity	to	face	the	(real	or	perceived)	siege	of	an	imperial	power	is	weakened.	
As	 the	new	US-Cuba	 relation	undermines	 the	 claims	 to	 legitimacy	of	what	Cubans	
call	“the	internal	embargo”,	the	case	for	political	liberalisation	faces	more	favourable	
conditions.	 In	other	words,	activists	and	 independent	 journalist	alike	have	on	 their	
side	a	persuasive	question:	 if	 the	US	 is	no	 longer	positioned	as	the	 threat,	why	we	
still	face	harassment?	As	a	result,	the	political	weight	on	economic	performance	as	a	
central	element	of	legitimacy	has	increased,	thus	making	the	possibility	of	reversing	
the	 maturing	 path	 less	 likely.	 The	 regime	 can	 basically	 say:	 we	 guarantee	 the	
conquistas	and	the	feasibility	of	a	prosperous	socialism.	To	summarise,	the	economic	
reforms	are	likely	to	endure	as	well	as	the	prospects	for	socio-political	liberalisation.	
Liberalisation,	however,	does	not	lead	to	democratisation,	although	it	may	facilitate	
it.	As	this	prospect	has	to	do	with	the	future,	Raúl	Castro	has	located	the	legitimacy	
of	the	regime	not	in	the	past	–	the	1959	epopee	of	the	revolutionary	veterans	–	but	
in	the	promise	of	socialist	“prosperity	and	sustainability”.	The	gap	that	may	emerge	
between	promise	and	reality	will	most	probably	shape	the	controversies	within	what	
Geoffray	 (2015)	 calls	 the	 “emerging	 contentious	 space”	 in	 Cuba	 –	 an	 embryonic	
public	sphere	that	surfaced	in	the	post-Fidel	 liberalisation.	Certainly,	 it	 is	and	it	will	
be	in	the	interest	of	the	critical	socialist	pole	within	that	space	to	counter	the	voices	
for	capitalist	reform	with	the	case	for	the	democratic	market-socialist	alternative.	
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Appendix:	Chronology	of	Cuban	politics	(2006-2014)	
The	following	chronology	does	not	seek	to	be	comprehensive,	but	simply	indicative.	
Its	purpose	is	to	arbitrarily	list	some	key	events	focused	(mainly,	but	not	exclusively)	
on	two	processes:	1)	change	in	 leadership,	and	2)	economic	reform.	References	on	
each	event	have	been	given	in	the	body	of	the	thesis	where	appropriate.	
*	 *	 *	
August	 2006:	 Fidel	 Castro	 resigns	 as	 commander	 in	 chief	 of	 the	 armed	 forces,	
president	of	the	Council	of	State	and	Ministers,	and	first	secretary	of	the	Communist	
Party,	and	provisionally	transfers	these	positions	to	his	brother	Raúl	Castro.	
October	2006:	 Juventud	Rebelde	 reveals	 that	Raúl	has	set	up	an	academic	 team	to	
study	socialist	property	relations	as	part	of	the	search	of	a	new	economic	model.	
December	2006:	Raúl	 conducts	 a	 survey	among	Party	members	on	what	 the	most	
pressing	popular	concerns	were	–	economics	topped	the	results.	
January	2007:	Raúl	 asks	 the	Party	 cadre	on	economic	 commissions	 (municipal	 and	
provincial)	and	on	enterprises	to	debate	and	submit	proposals	to	improve	economic	
performance	without	leading	to	bigger	budgets.	
July	 2007:	 In	 his	 first	 major	 speech	 to	 Cubans,	 Raúl	 criticises	 how	 the	 country	 is	
economically	run	and	suggests	the	need	of	“structural	and	conceptual	changes”.	
September	2007:	Around	800,000	Communist	Party	members	and	a	similar	number	
of	Young	Communists	are	asked	to	discuss	Raúl’s	July	speech.	
October-December	2007:	1st	public	discussion	on	the	Cuban	economy	takes	place.	
February	2008:	Fidel	Castro	declines	to	the	potential	nomination	for	the	Presidency	
by	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 hence	 leading	 Raúl	 Castro	 to	 formally	 (no	 longer	
provisionally)	take	over	as	President	of	the	Council	of	State	and	Ministers.	
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March	2008:	Cubans	are	allowed	to	buy	computers	and	DVD	players,	rent	cars	and	
book	rooms	in	hotels.	Also,	they	are	offered	mobile	phone	services	for	the	first	time.	
July	 2008:	 In	 his	 26th	 July	 speech,	 Raúl	 lessens	 expectations	 by	 acknowledging	 the	
negative	impact	on	the	Cuban	economy	caused	by	the	global	economic	slowdown.	
August-September	2008:	Hurricanes	Gustav	and	Ike	cause	10	billion	USD	damages.	
October	2008:	Leasing	program	of	idle	land	to	private	farmers	and	co-ops	begins.	
January	2009:	Barack	Obama	takes	office	as	President	of	the	United	States,	 leading	
to	a	relative	improvement	of	US-Cuba	relations	that	will	last	almost	a	year.	
March	2009:	Raúl	reshapes	the	top	leadership,	dismissing	leading	officials	like	Carlos	
Lage	and	Felipe	Pérez	Roque,	along	with	ten	other	ministers	seen	as	Fidel-appointed	
successors.	FAR	officers	close	to	Raúl	and	rising	provincial	Party	cadre	take	over.	
April	2009:	The	 recently	 revamped	Council	of	Ministers	approves	an	austerity	plan	
that	takes	into	account	the	effects	of	the	2008	global	financial	crisis.	
June	2009:	The	Economy	and	Planning	Ministry	draws	a	plan	 to	 reform	 the	Cuban	
socialist	economy,	which	will	turn	out	to	be	a	predecessor	of	the	2010	Lineamientos.	
August	2009:	-	Raúl’s	speech	at	the	National	Assembly	opens	2nd	public	discussion	on	
the	economy.	He	also	announces	the	creation	of	a	Comptroller	General	office	to	face	
corruption,	and	implies	the	next	will	be	his	last	Party	Congress.	
September	2009:	Closure	of	workplace	lunchrooms	begins.	
October	2009:	Granma	calls	the	Cubans	“pigeons”	that	walk	with	the	“mouths	open”	
as	the	state	gives	them	“everything”.	
December	 2009:	 Detention	 of	 Alan	 Gross,	 a	 US	 agent	 who	 was	 illegally	 entering	
Internet	transmission	equipment	to	Cuba.	US-Cuba	relations	deteriorate.	
February	2010:	On	a	speech	to	top	officials,	Murillo	(Economy	Minister)	attacked	the	
“paternalistic”	policies	and	advocated	a	state’s	retreat	from	small	economic	activity.	
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March	 2010:	Opposition	member	Orlando	 Zapata	 dies	 on	 a	 hunger	 strike,	 causing	
international	condemnation	and	renewed	attention	to	the	Ladies	in	White.	
April	2010:	Cuban	barbershops	are	handed	over	by	the	state	to	the	barbers,	through	
leasing	arrangements	–	a	preview	of	the	major	state’s	retreat	to	come.	
July	 2010:	 52	 political	 prisoners	 are	 released	 by	 the	 Cuban	 government,	 in	 a	 deal	
brokered	 by	 the	 Catholic	 Church	 in	which	 all	 but	 13	 accepted	 asylum	 in	 Spain.	 By	
April	2011,	a	total	of	115	former	prisoners	will	have	arrived	to	Spain.	
July-August	2010:	Fidel	Castro	appears	in	public	again,	on	TV,	several	times,	speaking	
about	international	issues	–	an	oblique	endorsement	of	Raúl	internal	policies.	
September	 2010:	 CTC	 announces	 the	 government	 will	 lay	 off	 500,000	 employees	
over	 six	 months,	 and	 another	 500,000	 thereafter;	 also,	 the	 non-state	 sector	 is	
announced	to	be	expanded	in	order	to	absorb	the	workforce	made	available	by	the	
state.	
November	2010:	Raúl	announces	the	6th	PCC	Congress	in	an	event	attended	by	Hugo	
Chávez.	Raúl	warns	the	Congress	will	discuss	one	single	subject:	the	economy.	
December	2010:	The	document	 that	will	guide	the	Party	Congress,	 the	“Guidelines	
on	Economic	and	Social	Policy”,	is	discussed	by	the	grassroots	during	the	next	three	
months	–	hence	becoming	the	3rd	public	discussion	on	the	economy.	
January	2011:	A	long	expected	telecomm	fibre-optic	cable	arrives	from	Venezuela	–	
however,	it	will	start	working	until	2013.	
February	 2011:	 A	 meeting	 of	 an	 “expanded”	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 scraps	 the	 six-
month	deadline	of	500,000	layoffs	in	favour	of	an	open-ended	approach.	
March	 2011:	 Fidel	 resigns	 retrospectively	 as	 First	 Secretary	 of	 the	 Party,	 his	 last	
leadership	post.	
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April	2011:	The	6th	PCC	Congress	takes	place.	This	meeting	approves	the	final	version	
of	the	Guidelines	and	elects	new	Party	leadership.	In	the	closing	speech	of	the	event,	
Raúl	proposes	limits	in	top	posts	to	a	maximum	of	two	five-year	terms.	
October-November	 2011:	 Legalisation	 of	 car	 market,	 house	 market,	 and	 lifting	 of	
restrictions	on	internal	migration	from	the	provinces	to	the	capital.	
November	2011:	Abolition	of	Sugar	Ministry	in	favour	of	a	state-company,	as	part	of	
a	broader	move	away	from	CPE	and	towards	entities	independent	from	ministries.	
December	2011:	Farmers	are	authorised	to	directly	sell	their	produce	to	the	tourist	
sector.	 Besides,	 the	 non-state	 sector	 (both	 rural	 and	 urban)	 is	 offered	 banking	
services,	loans	included.	The	general	public	can	also	apply	for	loans	for	house	repair.	
December	2011:	Granma	announces	that	in	the	coming	year	over	2,000	workshops	
will	be	leased	to	workers,	which	will	then	become	self-employed.	The	model	is	based	
on	the	barbershops’.	In	2013,	other	1,000	similar	workshops	will	adopt	the	system.	
April	2012:	The	1st	PCC	Conference	discusses	the	adaptation	of	the	Party	to	the	rise	
of	the	non-state	sector,	and	approves	the	term	limits	on	top	leadership	positions.	
July	 2012:	 On	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 Murillo	 announces	 more	 land-
rights	to	farmers	and	foretells	state	companies	will	follow	the	sugar-sector	model.	
December	2012:	Urban	co-ops	are	approved,	and	UBPCs	(quasi	co-ops)	are	granted	
the	same	rights	as	private	(rural)	co-ops	and	small	farmers	except	land-ownership.	
January	2013:	Approval	of	Tax	Code	on	private	transactions,	non-state	social	security	
contributions,	and	on	state	and	non-state	sales.	
January	 2013:	 There	 are	 lifted	 major	 restrictions	 on	 international	 travel	 to/from	
Cuba	to	both	nationals	living	abroad	or	at	homeland.	
September	2013:	Launch	of	new	Port	of	Mariel,	a	joint	project	with	Brazilian	capital	
including	an	industrial	park,	intends	to	attract	major	FDI	and	international	sea	trade.	
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October	2013:	Granma	discloses	a	plan	to	achieve	currency	unification,	which	would	
bring	an	end	to	the	dual	currency	introduced	during	the	1990s	“special	period”.	
March	2014:	Approval	of	a	(friendlier	yet	restrictive)	new	Foreign	Investment	Law.	
March	2014:	Currency	unification	takes	another	step	with	a	roadmap	for	companies.	
April	 2014:	New	degree	of	 independence	of	 state	 companies	 is	 approved	and	 it	 is	
publicly	acknowledged	that	a	New	Company	Law	will	be	released	on	2015.	
June	 2014:	 A	 new	 Labour	 Code	 that	 covers	 the	 non-state	 sector	 for	 the	 first	 time	
comes	 into	 effect.	 A	 consultation	 that	 started	 in	workplaces	 in	 July	 2013	 led	 to	 a	
draft	on	December	that	year,	which	guided	the	20th	CTC	Congress	on	February	2014.	
June	 2014:	 On	 a	 speech	 to	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers,	 Murillo	 explains	 that	 retail	
services	will	be	non-state	managed	(either	co-op	or	self-employed)	“as	a	rule”.	
November	 2014:	 A	 document	 specifying	 the	 areas	 of	 the	 Cuban	 economy	 with	
“opportunities”	for	foreign	investors	is	officially	released	on	FIHAV	2014.	
December	 2014:	 Raúl	 Castro	 in	 Havana	 and	 Barack	 Obama	 in	 Washington	
simultaneously	 announce	 a	 prisoner	 swap	 (Alan	 Gross	 and	 an	 unknown	 spy	 in	
exchange	for	the	remaining	Cuban	Five)	and	a	“normalisation”	of	US-Cuba	relations	–	
both	sides	thank	the	intermediation	of	Pope	Francis	and	the	government	of	Canada.		
February	2015:	The	Seventh	Party	Congress	is	scheduled	for	April	2016.	It	is	expected	
that	the	revolutionary	veterans	step	down	from	the	Politburo,	paving	the	way	for	a	
new	generation	of	leaders,	hence	to	a	fully-fledged	post-Castro	Cuba.	
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